JUDGMENT V. P. Bhatnagar, J.—This criminal revision is directed against the judgment dated June 12, 1984 of the learned Sessions Judge, Solan and Sirmur Districts at Solan maintaining the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan against the petitioner Shiv Narain Bhasin under section 42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. 2, Briefly stated, the prosecution case, as noticed by the courts below, is that the saw-mill of the petitioner was raided by PW 4, S. I. Kidar Singh accompanied by PW 1 Sawaran Nath, Block Officer (Forest) and PW 2 Krishan Dutt. It was found by them that 85 pieces of chil (gath), 55 another pieces of chil (gol, and some fuel wool were lying for sate in the depot. The petitioner could not produce the certificate of registration of the depot and further he had not maintained any register in the form prescribed by the rules. The timber was also found not to have export hammer and sale hammer marks. 3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sdan acquitted the petitioner for the offence under section 420, I P. C, holding that none of the ingredients there under had been established by the prosecution but convicted him under section 42 of the Indian Forest Act and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for a period of three months and a fine of Rs 500 In default of the payment of the fine, the petitioner was ordered to suffer simple imprisonment for another period of 15 days. As stated above the appeal preferred against the judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge. Hence the present criminal revision. 4 It appears that there has been some confusion with respect to the true import of the prosecution case. The perusal of the FIR at Ex. PW 4/B as well as the challan put up in the trial Court under the provisions of section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that the raiding party found violation of law on two accounts It wanted to check the certificate of registration of the sale depot being run by the petitioner but this certificate could not be produced. The second infirmity noticed by the said raiding party was that the timber lying at the saw-mill did not bear the property mark. 5. The second infirmity noticed by the said raiding party was that the timber lying at the saw-mill did not bear the property mark. 5. A notice of accusation was served upon the petitioner by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Solan It reads : Take notice that on 10-7-82 at Bhojnagar you had kept timber namely 85 pieces chil (Gath), chil pieces goal size 55 nag and some balan for sale in the depot, though your depot was not registered for the sale of timber and also the timber was not marked with export hammer and sale hammer, thus you have committed an offence under section 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with section 420,I.P.C." Thus, the petitioner was accused on two counts. First, it was stated to him that his depot had not been registered for the sale of timber and secondly, the timber found there was not marked with export hammer and sale hammer. On these grounds, he was stated to have committed offences punishable under section 42 of the Indian Forest Act and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. 6. The manner in which the notice of accusation was framed clearly shows non-application of mind to the crux of the prosecution case. Whereas the prosecution has alleged that there was no property mark on the timber, the notice framed against the petitioner was to the effect that the timber was not marked with export hammer and sale hammer. The manner f] in which both the courts below have dealt with the case in their respective judgments also indicates that the difference between the various marks, adverted to above, has not been correctly appreciated. 7. The Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978 (in short, Transit Rules) have been made by the Governor, Himachal Pradesh under sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Rule thereof stipulates that no person shall transport or cause to be transported any forest produce that does not bear the imprint of the registered mark. It is this mark which is termed as property mark and Rule 10 provides that no pass for export or transport of forest produce shall be issued for any unmarked timber. Rule 20 thereof pertains to the penalty for breach of the Transit Rules. It is this mark which is termed as property mark and Rule 10 provides that no pass for export or transport of forest produce shall be issued for any unmarked timber. Rule 20 thereof pertains to the penalty for breach of the Transit Rules. Plainly, therefore, the requirement for having registered property mark and ensuring that timber bears this mark arises only when that timber is required to be exported or trans ported within the ambit of the Transit Rules. 8. The export hammer mark, as the very name suggests, should be connected with the export or transportation of th6 timber but, surprisingly enough, there is no mention of this term in the main body of the Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce Transit (Land Routes) Rules, 1978. The term does appear in Annexure "B" to Rule 12. Now, Rule 12 pertains to the issue of challans in Annexure "B" by the person in whose favour pass has been issued. The Transit Rules are totally silent as to when and under what circumstances the export hammer mark is to be put. On an interpretation of the Transit Rules, as in force at present, it is not possible to hold that the non-bearing of export hammer mark would constitute violation of any rule and, therefore, punishable there under. It may be noticed here that the prosecution case against the petitioner has no element of export or transportation of timber involved in it. Hence, strictly speaking, the property mark or the export hammer mark, as discussed above, were not required to be put on the timber lying at the saw-mill of the petitioner within the ambit of the Transit Rules. 9 The marking of the timber by the sale hammer is adverted to in the rules framed under the Himachal Pradesh Forest (Sale of Timber) Act, 1968. These rules are called the Himachal Pradesh Forest (Sale of Timber) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Sale of Timber Rules). The object of the aforesaid Act and the Rules is to regulate the sale of timber. It is not disputed that the petitioner was running a depot as defined in Rule 2 thereof and further that this depot was required to be compulsorily registered. Rule 0, however, provides that every person having a registered depot shall register his sale hammer mark in the office of the Forest Division in which the depot is situated. It is not disputed that the petitioner was running a depot as defined in Rule 2 thereof and further that this depot was required to be compulsorily registered. Rule 0, however, provides that every person having a registered depot shall register his sale hammer mark in the office of the Forest Division in which the depot is situated. No timber can be removed from any registered depot until it has been marked with registered sale hammer of the owner of the registered depot, as laid down in Rule 11. in other words, it is incumbent upon the owner of the registered depot to mark the timber with his registered sale hammer before it is removed from the depot. 10. As stated above, the notice of accusation stated that the accused had committed an offence under section 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with section 420, I.P.C. The essential ingredients of the offence under section 420, I.P.C., were neither contained in the F.I R. nor in the challan The learned trial Magistrate, therefore, rightly acquitted the petitioner straightaway for having committed no offence under this section. At the same time, section 42 of the Indian Forest Act is merely an enabling section empowering the State Government to prescribe by rules penalties of imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or both for the contravention of rules framed under section 41 of the Indian Forest Act. Therefore, it was necessary for the trial Magistrate to state the precise rules framed under section 41 of the Indian Forest Act for the violation of which the accused was required to be punished. To the above extent, the notice of accusation is manifestly defective. 11. The learned trial Magistrate convicted the petitioner under section 42 of the Indian Forest Act for not having maintained the register prescribed under Rule 9 of the Sale of Timber Rules framed under the Himachal Pradesh Forest (Sale of Timber) Act, 1968. It was further found that the timber did not bear any property or export hammer mark and this, according to the learned trial Magistrate, also constituted an offence under section 42 of the Indian Forest Act. These very findings were apparently maintained by the learned Sessions Judge in his impugned judgment. It was further found that the timber did not bear any property or export hammer mark and this, according to the learned trial Magistrate, also constituted an offence under section 42 of the Indian Forest Act. These very findings were apparently maintained by the learned Sessions Judge in his impugned judgment. Non-maintenance of the register under Rule 9 of the Sale of Timber Rules is an offence punishable under Rule 14 thereof and the provisions of sections 4l and 42 of the Indian Forest Act are totally in applicable. Transporting timber unmarked with property hammer mark is an offence under the Transit Rules, 1978 and punishable under Rule 20 thereof. The absence of export hammer mark on the timber under transit, however, constitutes no offence under the Transit Rules, 1978, 12. Keeping in view the provisions of law applicable to this case and discussed above, the case against the petitioner may now be examined. Non-production of the certificate of registration of the depot by the petitioner is the first ground contained in the notice of accusation. Ft has been held by the courts below that the petitioner had properly registered his depot. This finding has also not been challenged by Mr. M. R. Chaudhary, learned Assistant Advocate General. Thus, the only question which requires determination is whether the non-marking of the timber with the export hammer and the sale hammer, as stated in the notice, constituted any offence. 13. The timber was lying in the saw-mill and, indisputably, it is not the prosecution case that the petitioner was exporting or transporting such timber. Therefore, there was no occasion for this timber to be marked with the export hammer. Coming to the sale hammer mark, once again, the prosecution has not alleged that the petitioner had sold any timber or permitted it to be removed from the depot without marking it with the sale hammer and, therefore, vitiated the mandatory provisions of Rule 13 of the Sale of Timber Rules, 1969. In fact, it is not disputed that the timber was required to be converted into boxes for packing fruits and other produce. 14. Both the courts below have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not maintaining the register prescribed under Rule 9 of the Sale of Timber Rules. This is one of the main reason for convicting the petitioner. 14. Both the courts below have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not maintaining the register prescribed under Rule 9 of the Sale of Timber Rules. This is one of the main reason for convicting the petitioner. Obviously, a serious error has crept in because not only it was not the prosecution case that this register had not been maintained but this ground also did not form the subject-matter of the notice of accusation. Therefore, the petitioner has not convicted for having committed an offence for which he was not being tried. In my opinion, this fact, perse, is sufficient to vitiate the entire trial of this case. The learned Assistant Advocate General has urged that this lacuna can be removed even at this stage in the High Court during the hearing of the present criminal revision. I am afraid it is too late in the day to do so. Also, this would amount to travelling beyond the very prosecution case as made out in the F. I. R. as well as in the challan filed in the court under the provisions of section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. Another contention raised by the learned Assistant Advocate General may also be noticed here. He has drawn my attention to the provisions of Rule 9 of the Sale of Timber Rules under which, as stated above, a register has to be maintained by the owner of the registered depot. One of the information which is required to be given in that register is "property mark and/or khudan marks". It has been urged on the basis of this provision that every piece of timber lying in a registered depot must bear property mark and/or khudan mark. The exact connotation of property mark has already been dealt with by me above. A certain variety of timber which has reached a saw-mill after having been exported or transported would naturally bear property mark thereon. In case of that variety of timber, the property mark is required to be stated in the said register. However, it would be stretching the provisions too much to hold that each and every variety of timber must contain property mark. At least, such conclusion does not allow from the contents of Rule 9. ibid. And then, the absence of property mark is not the subject-matter of the notice of accusation. 16. However, it would be stretching the provisions too much to hold that each and every variety of timber must contain property mark. At least, such conclusion does not allow from the contents of Rule 9. ibid. And then, the absence of property mark is not the subject-matter of the notice of accusation. 16. No other point has been urged before me on behalf of the State. 17. In view of the above discussion, it is quite clear that the conviction of the petitioner is erroneous and cannot be sustained. I, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and acquit the petitioner. His bail bonds are discharged. In case he has paid any fine, it be refunded to him. The case property be returned to the petitioner. Order accordingly.