JUDGMENT K.S. Paripoornan, J. 1. The petitioner is a Deputy Materials Manager (Acting) in the employ of the 1st respondent - The Fertilisers and Chemicals, Travancore Limited. The Deputy Manager (Materials), Deputy Manager (Development) etc., are in the scale of pay of Rs. 1550-2260. In this Original Petition he prays that the respondent may be directed by the issue of a writ of mandamus to make the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Deputy Manager (Materials) permanent from 1977 or from 1st May 1980, when the respondent filled up one post of Deputy Manager (Materials) by promoting Sri S. Parasuraman, or in the alternative from 1st June 1981 on which date the petitioner completed 15 years Managerial Experience under the amended rules. There is also a prayer to quash Ext. P-4 (Ext. P-5), dated 1st September 1981 promoting the 2nd respondent to the post of Deputy Manager (Materials) (scale Rs. 1550-2260) and Ext. P-6, dated 1st September 1981 promoting the 3rd respondent also to the said post (scale Rs. 1550-2260). Respondents 2 and 3 are persons who were promoted as early as 1st September 1981. 2. The short facts necessary to understand the scope of the controversy raised in the O. P. are as follows: The petitioner was an Advocate practising at Cannanore since 1st September, 1955. He entered the service of the 1st respondent company as Executive Assistant to Project Administrator of Cochin Division on 1st June 1966. He was promoted as Manager (Public Relations and Administration) in April, 1971. He was transferred to the Stores Department as Superintendent (Materials) in 1974. He was appointed as an Officer on Special Duty in 1978. In 1979 he was posted as Manager training. From 1971 the post was upgraded in the scale of Rs. 1350 to Rs. 1950. During the time he was in the Stores Department, he was sent for higher training twice. Since 1971 he is continuing in the same grade, Rs. 1350 to Rs. 1950. The next grade is Rs. 1550 to Rs. 2260, either as Deputy Manager Development/Deputy Materials Manager etc. Ignoring the valid claims of the petitioner, and in contravention of the guidelines for promotions, the first respondent promoted respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to the post in 1981. At that time, it was understood that no writ petition was maintainable against Government-company. The next grade is Rs. 1550 to Rs. 2260, either as Deputy Manager Development/Deputy Materials Manager etc. Ignoring the valid claims of the petitioner, and in contravention of the guidelines for promotions, the first respondent promoted respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to the post in 1981. At that time, it was understood that no writ petition was maintainable against Government-company. It was only, after Ajay Hasia's case AIR 1981 SC 487 , it became clear that a writ petition has been held to be maintainable against a company owned by Government. So, the necessary steps were taken by the petitioner to vindicate his rights after sometime. Exts. P-1 and P-3 are the guidelines regarding promotions. Promotions were denied to the petitioner in 1977, 1980 and 1981. The petitioner was not promoted in 1977 though there were vacancies of two posts as Deputy Materials Manager in Cochin Division. It was presumably based on the confidential reports for the year 1976. As per clause 5(1) of Ext. P-1, the Promotion Committee shall carefully scrutinise the confidential reports and other documents relating to the service and performance of the employees. Normally candidates not having clear reports for the previous three years (3 years) may not be recommended for promotion. So, the confidential records, for the years 1975, 1976 and 1977 could be considered. Out of these, the confidential records of the petitioner contained adverse remarks for 1976 and they were made by one K, p! K. Nair, General Manager, who was inimically disposed towards the petitioner. The confidential reports about the petitioner for the preceding year 1975 as also for the subsequent year 1977 were exemplary. Without communication of such adverse remarks that crept in for 1976, petitioner's promotion in 1977 was denied. The denial of promotion in 1977 without communicating the adverse remarks in the confidential reports (1976) is unauthorised. The entries in confidential reports were made in 1976 by Sri K. P. K. Nair, who was prejudiced against the petitioner. Again, in 1980 one post of Deputy Materials Manager was filled up by promoting one S. Parasuraman, who was admittedly junior to the petitioner. The petitioner's name was not even considered in 1980. There is no justification for adopting such a course, either Sri S. Parasuraman was promoted on 6th May, 1980. Again, in 1980 one post of Deputy Materials Manager was filled up by promoting one S. Parasuraman, who was admittedly junior to the petitioner. The petitioner's name was not even considered in 1980. There is no justification for adopting such a course, either Sri S. Parasuraman was promoted on 6th May, 1980. Sri S. Parasuraman was not promoted in 1977 in view of the fact that his confidential reports contained adverse remarks for the year 1977. The respondent company made promotions in violation of guidelines for making promotions. One Mr. Mathew was promoted on 1st September 1981. Sri Parasuraman was promoted in violation of promotion policy contained in Exts. P-1 to P-3. Sri J, P. Alexander was promoted in February, 1978 against clause 5(i) of Ext. P-1. Sri N. C. George, Personal Manager of the Cochin Division had not the required educational qualification and he did not have 18 years of managerial experience when he was promoted. Sri K. A. Krishnan had no necessary experience in the plant, as required under Ext. P-1, and he was promoted as Deputy Chief Superintendent. Sri A. Thomas was promoted, though he did not have the 15 years' experience as required under Ext. P-1. One R. G. Pillai was promoted in 1971 though he did not have the 13 years' managerial experience as required under Ext. P-1. He was promoted as Assistant Manager. The procedure followed by the first respondent company is illegal. Then again, in 1981, respondents 2 and 3 juniors to the petitioner, were promoted to the post of Deputy Manager (Materials) and the petitioner, was not considered at all. So, on three occasions, justice has been denied to the petitioner. To put it in brief, in 1977, due to adverse entries in the confidential records (uncommunicated), the petitioner was considered but not selected; but on the other two occasions, in 1980 (when Sri S. Parasuraman was promoted) and in 1981, the petitioner was not considered at all for the promotion. It was in these circumstances, the petitioner filed this Original Petition seeking the above reliefs. 3. On behalf of the first respondent company, the following five aspects were high-lighted during the arguments stating that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief: (i) Till 1978, i.e. till the rules came into force (27th January 1978) the matter was governed by contract of employment. That did not provide for procedural formalities. 3. On behalf of the first respondent company, the following five aspects were high-lighted during the arguments stating that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief: (i) Till 1978, i.e. till the rules came into force (27th January 1978) the matter was governed by contract of employment. That did not provide for procedural formalities. The adverse entries in the confidential reports need not be communicated in the absence of any rules governing the subject matter. So, the denial of promotion in 1977, based on the adverse entries in the confidential reports for 1976 is justified. The petitioner cannot assail it. (ii) In 1977, though there were two vacancies, no person was promoted as Deputy Materials Manager. So, the grievance of the petitioner that he was not promoted to the post of Deputy Materials Manager in 1977 has no foundation. (iii) Since 27th January, 1978 when Ext. R-1 rules regarding promotions came into force, instead of 15 years' experience in the particular field, other qualifications were substituted in that place. It was so done by the Board from time to time. The petitioner was not qualified in 1980 to be considered for the promotion. (iv) The third respondent is a B.E. Civil Engineer. Special qualifications were laid down in Ext. R-1. (v) Even assuming that in 1977 the petitioner was not considered, the petitioner was considered in 1981 along with others. The selected candidates were found to be more suitable. Ranking was given and the petitioner was not given any rank. 4. The first respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit dated 12th August, 1982 and Ext. R-1 has been filed. Ext. R-1 is the recruitment rules in the managerial grades. The relevant rules are: "R.3. Merit, efficiency and performance of the individual officer will form the basis of determining his promotability. * * * R.5. Assessment of merit: (a) For determining suitability and relative merits of eligible employees for promotion to a higher post, a system of assessment by Promotion Committees will be followed and the members of the committees will follow the guidelines given herein. * * * (f) For posts in grade Rs. 2250-2750 and above, the committee will be constituted by Chairman and Managing Director. Merit will be the basic criterion for promotion. * * * (f) For posts in grade Rs. 2250-2750 and above, the committee will be constituted by Chairman and Managing Director. Merit will be the basic criterion for promotion. (g) The promotion committees shall consider eligibility as per specification laid down for the post, suitability of the eligible individuals for the post and the relative merits of the personnel assessed to be suitable. * * * (i) The committee shall carefully scrutinise the confidential reports and other documents relating to the service and performance of the employees. Normally candidates not having clear reports for the previous three years may not be recommended for promotion. The committee may also interview any candidate's if felt necessary. (j) While the committee's objective should be to arrive at unanimous recommendations, such unanimity shall not overlook basic requirements. Differences of opinion among the members of the committee, if any, shall be stated clearly in the report. (k) The committee shall rank the employees considered suitable by it in the order of merit." 5. We shall advert to the points raised by the first respondent in seriatim: Point No.1. - In the detailed counter affidavit filed by the first respondent, it was not specifically pleaded that till the rules (Ext. R-1) came into force on 27th January 1978, the matter is governed by contract of employment, nor was any material placed before this Court to show, what is the contract of employment in the instant case. That apart, even in the absence of any rule, it is settled law that if the petitioner's claim was ignored or overlooked in view of some adverse remarks contained in the candidate's confidential records, it should have been communicated. Any decision taken or step taken, without complying with the above minimal requirement of law which is consistent with natural justice or "fairness", is arbitrary and is illegal-null and void. See the decision of this court reported in Karunakaran v. Director, Bureau of Economics and Statistics 1966 KLT 372 , Manoharan Pillai v. State of Kerala ILR 1977 (2) Ker. 70 at 5710. So, the first point stressed by the 1st respondent's counsel fails. Point No. 2. - The point stressed by counsel for the first respondent was that in 1977 when there were two vacancies, they were not filled up. 70 at 5710. So, the first point stressed by the 1st respondent's counsel fails. Point No. 2. - The point stressed by counsel for the first respondent was that in 1977 when there were two vacancies, they were not filled up. Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the O.P. contain the necessary averments, as to why the failure to consider the petitioner's claim and withholding of promotion in 1977 is assailed. The answer to the same contained is in paragraphs 6 and 9 of the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent. It will be useful to quote paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Original Petition and paragraphs 6 and 9 of the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent. "Original Petition: Para No. 6. - In 1977, a large number of promotions were made in all divisions. There were vacancies of 2 posts as Deputy Materials Manager in the Cochin Division. The petitioner was then Superintendent, Stores. The petitioner should have been promoted to one of these vacancies. Clause 5(i) of the Policy (Ext. P-1) provides that the promotion committee will peruse the confidential reports and other documents relating to the service of the officers. It is provided that candidates who are not having clear reports for the previous three years may not be recommended for promotion. In 1977 when the promotion committee considered the names of persons for promotion, the relevant years during which the confidential reports were to be considered were 1975, 1976 and 1977. In 1975, Sri N. K. Padmanabhan the then Deputy General Manager, (there was no general manager at that time) had even recommended a double increment to the petitioner in the scale of pay. The assessment report about the petitioner's performance for the year 1975 was 'exemplary'. In 1977, the assessment was made by Sri Venkitakrishnan, the then General Manager. The petitioner understands, that the assessment for that year was also 'very good'. But it seems that for the year 1976, the then General Manager, Sri K.P.K. Nair had made some adverse remark. But, so far, the petitioner has not been communicated about the adverse remark. Presumably acting on this uncommunicated adverse remark, the petitioner was not promoted to the post of Deputy Materials Manager. The minimum education and experience required for promotion prescribed in Exts. P-1 to P-3 came to effect only subsequently with effect from 27th January 1978. But, so far, the petitioner has not been communicated about the adverse remark. Presumably acting on this uncommunicated adverse remark, the petitioner was not promoted to the post of Deputy Materials Manager. The minimum education and experience required for promotion prescribed in Exts. P-1 to P-3 came to effect only subsequently with effect from 27th January 1978. Along with that of the petitioner, the case of one Sri Parasuraman was also considered for promotion to the other post of Dy. Materials Manager. But there was some adverse remark against him for the year 1977. So he was also not appointed. But the adverse remark was communicated to him and his explanation was rejected. But he was promoted in 1980 as soon as the bar relating to the adverse remark was cleared after 3 years. The petitioner submits that so far, no adverse remark of any kind in the confidential records of the petitioner has been yet sent to him. This Hon'ble Court has held that the uncommunicated adverse remark could not be relied upon by the Departmental Promotion Committee. It is therefore submitted that denial of promotion to the petitioner in 1977, if it was based on any adverse remark, which was not communicated to him is illegal and without jurisdiction. If any adverse remark had been entered in the petitioner's confidential reports in 1976, then the petitioner submits that the same was made by Sri K. P. K. Nair who was prejudiced against him. * * * 8. The petitioner submits that justice was not done to the petitioner by the respondent management. In 1977, there was no reason for the Departmental Promotion Committee to 'pass over' the petitioner's claim. The petitioner was not communicated of any adverse remark in his confidential reports. The petitioner understands that in 1975 and 1977, the assessment of merit in the petitioner's case was excellent. If there was adverse remark against the petitioner in 1976, the petitioner could have explained it if it had been communicated to him. Sri K.P.K. Nair, the then General Manager was acting prejudicially against the petitioner. The petitioner may be permitted to state one instance to show that Sri K.P.K. Nair was prejudiced towards him. The petitioner is a rose expert. He has acted as a judge in various shows. For years he was a judge in the Kerala Rose Show and Horticultural Exhibition at Trivandrum. The petitioner may be permitted to state one instance to show that Sri K.P.K. Nair was prejudiced towards him. The petitioner is a rose expert. He has acted as a judge in various shows. For years he was a judge in the Kerala Rose Show and Horticultural Exhibition at Trivandrum. This show is conducted every year and it is one of the best shows in South India. Eminent rose exports were being invited to act as judges. In 1976 also the petitioner was invited to act as a judge as in the previous years. The previous and subsequent General Managers used to send petitioner to attend these flower shows on duty. But in 1976, Sri K.P.K. Nair did not even grant him leave to enable him to attend the show on his own. At that time he had more than two months leave to his credit. The F.A.C.T. is the first large scale Fertiliser undertaking in India and it is also the 1st to put in the Market a specific Rose Fertiliser (Rose Mix.) The respondent should have therefore proudly sent the petitioner to the flower show. But Sri K.P.K. Nair did not allow the petitioner to go on duty or on his own leave. During subsequent years, the succeeding Managers used to send the petitioner to the Flower Show on duty. The petitioner was a judge in the All India Rose Convention in 1979 held at Jaipur. A true copy of the letter sent by Secretary, the All India Rose Convention to the then Chairman and the Managing Director is produced herewith and may be marked for reference as Ext. P-4. The adverse remark if any made in 1976 was therefore entered in the confidential reports without any good faith. The uncommunicated adverse remark should have been ignored." "Counter affidavit by Respondent No. 1 Para No. 6 - It is true that in 1977 promotions were effected in the various divisions of the respondent. It is also correct that there were vacancies for two posts as Deputy Materials Manager in the Cochin Division. However, Shri Padmanabhan could not be promoted against these posts due to the adverse remarks in his confidential reports. It is also correct that there were vacancies for two posts as Deputy Materials Manager in the Cochin Division. However, Shri Padmanabhan could not be promoted against these posts due to the adverse remarks in his confidential reports. Para 9.- Further averments contained in the Original Petition regarding allegations against Sri K.P.K. Nair are totally incorrect and are hereby denied." It will be seen from the above, that the assertion made now during the arguments that though there were two vacancies, they were not filled up in 1977, militates against the specific plea of the first respondent contained in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit. There is no averment, that no person was promoted. It is idle for the first respondent to contend that though there were two vacancies in 1977, they were not filled up. The second point raised is without substance and against the specific case set up in the counter affidavit. 6. In this context, the promotion of Sri S. Parasuraman, in 1980, may also be considered. That will dispose of the third point now raised during arguments. In paragraphs 7 and 9 (b) of the O.P., the petitioner had dealt with the promotion of Sri Parasuraman, in detail. "7. In 1980, one post of the Deputy Materials Manager was filled up by promoting Sri S. Parasuraman. He was junior to the petitioner. He was not promoted in 1977, as his confidential reports contained some adverse remarks relating to the assessment of performance for the year 1977. Even, though the petitioner was considered by the promotion committee in 1977, in 1980, his name was not even considered. There was no justification for excluding the petitioner and at the same time considering Sri Parasuraman in 1980. Sri Parasuraman was promoted on 6th May 1980. * * * 9(b). For promotion to the post of the Deputy Materials Manager Sri S. Parasuraman had not the experience of 15 years in Management Grade as prescribed in Ext. P-1. Sri Parasuraman joined in F.A.C.T. only 1969. To make up 15 years of Managerial experience, his service in the P.W.D. was also considered. This is not warranted by the procedure prescribed in Ext. P-1 to P-3. P-1. Sri Parasuraman joined in F.A.C.T. only 1969. To make up 15 years of Managerial experience, his service in the P.W.D. was also considered. This is not warranted by the procedure prescribed in Ext. P-1 to P-3. If this can be taken, the petitioner's experience as an advocate for 10 years also should be counted as managerial experience especially when the rule itself stated that the decree in law is a desirable qualification for this post. Again the petitioner was invited to join the respondent company primarily taking into account his experience as lawyer. The records relating to his appointment will show this." As against the same, the averments in paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent which alone deal with this are relevant: "7. As stated above the minimum qualification and experience for various posts came into force with effect from 27th January 1978. As per Ext. R-1 promotion to the post of Deputy Materials Manager were to be effected from persons who are having 15 years' experience in management grade, and who are having Graduate Decree. As per the policy and procedure applicable all promotions to all posts in managerial grades are to be filled by selection. Promotions to higher grade will ordinarily be against sanctioned posts and will be done at the sole discretion of the company. The said promotions will also be subject to directions that may be issued from time to time by the Board. Merit, efficiency and performance of the individual officer will form the basis of determining his promotability. For assessment of merit and determining the suitability a Promotion Committee is constituted in respect of various posts. As per the rules the Promotion Committee should consider the eligibility as per the specifications laid down, suitability of the eligible individuals to the post and the relative merits of the personnel assessed to be suitable. Since Sri Padmanabhan did not possess 15 years experience in management grade, he was not eligible to be considered for the post when the post was taken up for consideration in April, 1980. 8. Further averment contained in paragraph 7 of the original petition that the petitioner was entitled for promotion in 1980 and his case should have been considered is also not correct. 8. Further averment contained in paragraph 7 of the original petition that the petitioner was entitled for promotion in 1980 and his case should have been considered is also not correct. As mentioned above, for the purpose of promoting a person to the cadre of Deputy Materials Manager 15 years experience in management grade is required. Admittedly the petitioner joined the service of the respondent only on 1st June 1966. Therefore, after the Rules came into effect 111 1978, the petitioner's case could not be considered till 1st June 1981, the date on which he completed 15 years experience in management grade. * * * 10. Further instances contained in paragraph 9 of the original petition are hereby denied. However, in any event, various facts mentioned during the past 10 years are not relevant for considering the promotion of a person, if he is really eligible for promotion as per the prevailing rules." It should be stated that the specific case set up by the petitioner regarding the promotion of his junior Sri S. Parasuraman has not been even denied in the counter affidavit; nor any cogent of valid reason stated as to why the petitioner was not meted out the same treatment, adverted to or answered. In the absence of specific denial of the averments contained in the O.P. it has to be taken for the purpose of this case, that the averments in the O.P. are true and correct. The third point raised by counsel for the first respondent is that after Ext. R-1 rules came into force from 21st January 1978 instead of 15 years experience, other qualifications were substituted. It was so done at various stages. The substitution was done by the board. There is no pleading on record filed in this case to substantiate the above fact. The present plea is that the petitioner was not promoted in 1980, since he was not qualified to be considered. The averments in paragraphs 7 and 9(b) of the O.P. which have been met in paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of the counter affidavit, extracted above, will substantiate that the contentions now raised by the first respondent on this score is absolutely without substance. 7. The 4th contention taken by the first respondent is that the third respondent is a B.E. Civil Engineer. In view of the special qualifications prescribed as laid down in Ext. 7. The 4th contention taken by the first respondent is that the third respondent is a B.E. Civil Engineer. In view of the special qualifications prescribed as laid down in Ext. R-1 he was promoted as per Ext. P-6 on 1st September 1981. It should be stated that there is no specific case set up on this score in the counter affidavit. 8. The 5th and the final point raised by the first respondent was that though the petitioner was not considered in 1977, he was considered in 1981 and the selected persons were found to be more suitable. Ranking was given and the petitioner was not given any rank. It is common ground that there is no record to show how the Departmental Promotion Committee found some of the candidates more suitable than others. The Departmental Promotion Committee should act 'objectively' in selecting the suitable or fit persons, to hold the post. On what objective tests the relative suitability to the posts were considered is not discernible from any record. Admittedly, no ranking was given in 1981. It is true that in paragraph.13 of the counter affidavit it is stated that the petitioner was also considered in 1981. But according to R.5(k) the ranking in the order of merit should have been done. It was not done. Any promotion made without following R.5(k) is unauthorised. So viewed, the promotions made in 1981 ignoring the petitioner cannot be considered to be valid in law. Promotions were considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee meeting evidenced by proceedings, dated 11th July 1981. In C.M.P. No. 28370 of 1983 the petitioner produced copy of the proceedings evidencing the proceedings of the D.P.C. dated 11th July 1981 to show that the petitioner was not considered at all. It also shows that no ranking was shown as envisaged by rule 5(k). In the absence of relevant records, how can it be said that the petitioner was considered at all? Much less, how can it be said that compared to the petitioner, other selected persons, were found to be more suitable? The positive requirement as per rule 5 (k) is the "ranking". If ranking had been made of all the candidates or eligible persons, it could be said that a comparative evaluation of the suitability or fitness or merit of all candidates was made. It is totally absent in this case. The positive requirement as per rule 5 (k) is the "ranking". If ranking had been made of all the candidates or eligible persons, it could be said that a comparative evaluation of the suitability or fitness or merit of all candidates was made. It is totally absent in this case. On what basis, others were found to be more suitable is not stated. In the absence of ranking, it is not possible to say that others were found to be more suitable. There is no proper consideration of the matter in the eye of law. On these unassailable materials, there is no escape from the conclusion, that the first respondent ignored the claims of the petitioner in not promoting him in 1977 based on uncommunicated adverse remarks in the confidential records. It is unauthorised. Again persons, who had not 15 years' experience like the petitioner, were promoted in 1980 as could be seen from paragraphs 7 and 9(b) of the O.P. The reply by the first respondents on this behalf contained in the counter affidavit adverted to in an earlier paragraph is vague and has failed to deal with the specific aspects or pleas, mentioned by the petitioner in his affidavit. In failing to consider the claim or case of the petitioner in 1980, the first respondent acted arbitrarily and not in accordance with law. Even in 1981, though it is stated that the petitioner was considered along with others, and the selected persons were found to be more suitable, it has not been shown that the first respondent acted according to law and that there is no reliable material to show that the petitioner was ever considered much less as per the guidelines and norms indicated in Ext. R-1. The Departmental Promotion Committee's proceedings dated 11th July 1981 on the basis of which promotions were made in 1981, does not show that the petitioner was considered at all. There was no ranking as enjoined by rule 5(k). Without specifying the ranking of the persons who were considered, it is idle to contend that though the petitioner was considered, the selected persons were found to be more suitable. The denial of promotion to the petitioner in 1981 is also equally unsustainable. 9. There was no ranking as enjoined by rule 5(k). Without specifying the ranking of the persons who were considered, it is idle to contend that though the petitioner was considered, the selected persons were found to be more suitable. The denial of promotion to the petitioner in 1981 is also equally unsustainable. 9. We hold, that the petitioner is entitled to a declaration, that the denial to consider the claims of the petitioner for promotion by the first respondent, in 1977 or in 1980 or in 1981, is totally illegal, arbitrary and unjustified. We grant a declaration accordingly. 10. Now that we have held that the action of the first respondent in refusing to consider the claims of the petitioner for promotion in 1977, 1980 and still later in 1981, is arbitrary, unjustified and illegal, what is the relief the petitioner is entitled to and this court can grant in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? Mr. K.A. Nayar of M/s Menon and Pai very fairly submitted that if on the facts we are convinced that justice has not been noted out to the petitioner, even without a further direction from this court the management will afford the necessary consequential relief to the petitioner. We appreciate this gesture on the part of the management and we record this concession made by counsel. Be that as it may, as a pure question of law, respondents' counsel argued that the jurisdiction exercised by this court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is neither appellate or revisional it is only a supervisory jurisdiction. This court is concerned only to see whether the action of the 1st respondent is justified in law and that if it is not so, this court can only annul or demolish the order in certiorari proceedings. Counsel contended that this court cannot go beyond and issue a consequential direction in the nature of mandamus directing that the petitioner should be given a particular post, much less at a particular point of time. In this connection, the decision reported in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 192 and some other decisions were cited before us. Broadly stated, ordinarily, the legal position appears to be so. But it should not be forgotten that Art.226 of the Constitution is couched in a very comprehensive manner. In this connection, the decision reported in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. AIR 1952 SC 192 and some other decisions were cited before us. Broadly stated, ordinarily, the legal position appears to be so. But it should not be forgotten that Art.226 of the Constitution is couched in a very comprehensive manner. As stated by the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer AIR 1966 SC 81 it confers wide powers on the High Court to meet justice wherever it is found. It has been also held that in addition to the powers exercised by the courts in England for issuing writs, the High Court can also issue directions, orders, etc. and can mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar requirements. The earlier decision of the Supreme Court in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa AIR 1954 SC 440 is also relevant. In this view of the matter the further question is what is the nature of the direction or order that can be made, in affording the consequential reliefs? Petitioner's counsel Mr. Sen brought to our notice the decision of this Court reported in K. S. Sofhi v. Fertilisers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. 1984 KLT 32 as confirmed in Kunju Muhammed v. State of Kerala 1984 KLT 403 (FB) and contended that the plaintiff is an "authority within the meaning of Article 12. It was also submitted that all the benefits conferred by Part XIV of the Constitution also may be available in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court in Kalra's case AIR 1984 SC 1361 at 1367 and 1368. This position is demurred by the 1st respondent. The position that emerges from a reading of the above decisions, is that the petitioner is entitled to enforce whatever rights he has under Part 111 of the Constitution and as held in Kalra's case AIR 1984 SC 1361 at 1367 and 1368, the distinction sought to be drawn in some cases between protection of rights under Part XIV and Part III of the Constitution has no significance. Even so, what is the specific direction that can be given in this case? Petitioner's counsel Mr. Even so, what is the specific direction that can be given in this case? Petitioner's counsel Mr. M. C. Sen referred to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kunju Muhammed v. State of Kerala 1984 KLT 403 FB paragraph 20, and the decision in Rajamma v. State of Kerala 1983 KLT 457 and contended that in the former case a direction was issued to issue appointment orders and in the latter case a direction was issued to advice for appointment. In this case, the court can issue a direction directing the respondent to treat the petitioner as duly promoted at the earliest point of time, i.e. 1977 considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. The unreported decisions rendered by a Bench wherein one of us was a party. (Narendran, J.) in O.P. No. 870 of 1976 and O.P. No. 6167 of 1982 (Chandrasekhara Menon, J) affirmed in Writ Appeal No. 186 of 1984, were also brought to our notice. In O.P. No. 6l67 of 1982 the matter involved was denial of promotion to a selection post. On this aspect, counsel also heavily pressed into service the modern approach made by the Supreme Court of India in State of Kerala v. Kumari T. P. Roshana" and laid stress on the following observations: “Nor is law unimaginative, especially in the writ jurisdiction where responsible justice is the goal. The court cannot adopt a rigid attitude of negativity and sit back after striking down the scheme of Government, leaving it to the helpless Government caught in a crisis to make do as best as it may, or throwing the situation open to agitational chaos to find a solution by demonstrations in the streets and worse. We are therefore, unable to stop with merely declaring that the scheme of admission accepted by Government is ultra, vires and granting the relief to the petitioner of admission to the medical college. The need for controlling its" repercussions calls for judicial response. After all, law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but an operational art in society. * * * Had we left the judgment of the High Court in the conventional form of merely quashing the formula of admission the remedy would have aggravated the malady-confusion, agitation, paralysis. The need for controlling its" repercussions calls for judicial response. After all, law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but an operational art in society. * * * Had we left the judgment of the High Court in the conventional form of merely quashing the formula of admission the remedy would have aggravated the malady-confusion, agitation, paralysis. The root of the grievance and the fruit of the writ are not individual but collective and while the 'adversary system' makes the judge a mere umpire, traditionally speaking, the community orientation of judicial function, so desirable in the Third World remadial jurisprudence, transforms the Court's power into affirmative structuring of redress so as to make it personally meaningful and socially relevent Frustration of invalidity is part of the judicial duty; fulfilment of legality is complementary. This principle of affirmative action is within our jurisdiction under Article 136 and Article 32 and we think the present case deserve its exercise." Later, in Charles K. Skaria v. Dr. C. Mathew 1980 (2) SCC 752 at 758 in paragraph 9 the Supreme Court again observed : "9. Whatever might be the passion for correct law and provocation, on account of governmental indifference, the court, in our view, must use its power to correct error and promote order and not strike down an illegal error without going forward to affirmative action which may minimise injury, generally. Indeed, the judicial process, in its creative impulse, must hesitate to scuttle, salvage wherever possible and destroy only when the situation is beyond retrieval a life-giving facet forgotten by the High Court when quashing the admissions for the year. This positive perspective justifies the final direction that we issue in the concluding para of this judgement, if we may anticipate the nature of the relief we have moulded." There is an exhaustive survey of the relevant decisions bearing on this subject in a recent book "writ jurisdiction under the Constitution" by B. L. Hansaria (1984, Edn.) at pages 62 to 64, 275 and 276. In view of the legal position as stated above, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, we would have been inclined to grant the consequential relief to the petitioner by giving a direction to the respondent to promote the petitioner as Deputy Manager, (Materials) from 1977 and reckoning his status and position on all aspects, as if he was promoted as Deputy Manager, (Materials) in 1977, when the vacancy arose and the petitioner was denied promotion based on uncommunicated confidential report. This is so, in view of lapse of time, and restoration of such position alone will meet the ends of justice in this case. We have only indicated the legal position and also our views in the matter. However, we are refraining from issuing a direction to the above effect in this case, since respondent's counsel Sri. K. A. Nayar submitted that even without the consequential direction from this court, they will give consequential reliefs necessarily following from our main decision, once we come to the conclusion that justice has not been meted out to the petitioner. We grant a period of one month to the 1st respondent to pass appropriate orders and take further steps in the light of this judgment. The Original Petition is allowed as stated above. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.