JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.: - This is a writ petition arising out of the proceedings under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (for short, The Tenancy Act). 2. The respondent filed an application under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act against the petitioners on the ground that they were in illegal and unauthorised occupation of survey number 37/3 admeasuring 4 acres of village Hingna Tamaswadi, Tahsil and District Akola. The petitioners resisted the application on the ground that they were statutory owners of the suit field under the Tenancy Act and also on the ground that they were in lawful possession of the same pursuant to the order in the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure passed on 8-2-1960. 3. It was found by the Sub-Divisional Officer that in the proceedings for transfer of ownership of the suit field, it was finally held on 30-1-1968 that the petitioners were not the tenants of the suit field. He further found that the petitioners were not the statutory owners of the suit field and that their possession was illegal and unauthorised. He, therefore, directed eviction of the petitioners from the suit field. 4. The petitioners filed a revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short, the M.R.T.) against the aforesaid order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Before the learned M.R.T. , it was also contended on behalf of the petitioners that the application under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act was barred by limitation. The learned M.R.T. held that no limitation was applicable section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act. The learned M.R.T. confirmed the findings on merits rendered by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer. The revision application of the petitioners was accordingly dismissed by the learned M.R.T. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petition in this Court. 5. The learned M.R.T. held that no limitation was applicable section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act. The learned M.R.T. confirmed the findings on merits rendered by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer. The revision application of the petitioners was accordingly dismissed by the learned M.R.T. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petition in this Court. 5. The first question which is strenously urged before me on behalf of the petitioners is that the Collector while exercising powers under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act is a 'Court' within the meaning of the said expression under the Limitation Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as Limitation Act) and therefore, in the absence of any period of limitation being prescribed for making an application under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act, the period of limitation prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the said application under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act. The principal question, therefore, to be considered is whether the Collector while exercising powers under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act is a 'Court' within the meaning of the said expression under the Limitation Act. It is not in dispute that no period of limitation is prescribed under the Tenancy Act for making an application under section 120(c) of the said Act. 6. The above contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in fact is no more res integra as it stands concluded by the direct decision of this Court in the case of (Kalidas alias Madhaorao Pande v. Wamanrao Narayanrao Pande)1, 1979 Mh.L.J. 887 in which it is held that the collector while exercising the powers under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act is not a 'Court' within the meaning of the said expression under the Limitation Act and, therefore, the period of limitation prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, would not be applicable to the application made under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act. The correctness of the view taken in the aforesaid judgment is, however, canvassed before me. The correctness of the view taken in the aforesaid judgment is, however, canvassed before me. It is urged that in view of the later judgment of this Court in the case of (Ranchhoddas Atmaram Bairagi and another v. Gupta Brass Stores and others)2, 1983 Mh.L.J. 933 rendered under the provisions of C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, 'The Rent Control Order'), in which it is held that authorities under the Rent Control order are 'Courts' within the meaning of the said expression under the Limitation Act, it should be either held that the Collector exercising powers under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act is a 'Court' within the meaning of the said expression under the Limitation Act or in view of the conflict of the views between the aforesaid two judgements of this Court, the question should be referred for a decision by a larger Bench. 7. It is, however, pointed out on behalf of the respondent that in the first place the decision rendered in the case of Kalidas v. Waman (cited supra) is a direct decision upon the provisions of section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act which is, therefore, binding upon me and further that the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the case of Ranchhoddas v. Gupta Brass Stores (cited supra) that an authority under the Rent Control Order is a 'Court' within the meaning of the said expression under the Limitation Act are obiter as they were not necessary for the decision of the said case. The submission, therefore, is that the said observations cannot in any way undermine the authority of the previous decision of this Court under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act referred to above or make out a case for reference to a larger Bench. 8. I am, however, relieved of the task of deciding the above controversy relating to the alleged divergence of the views in the two decisions cited supra, in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1852 of 1979, decided on 10-7-1985 (Sakuru v. Tanaji)3, rendered by V. Balakrishna Eradi and Sabyasachi Mukharji, JJ. 8. I am, however, relieved of the task of deciding the above controversy relating to the alleged divergence of the views in the two decisions cited supra, in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1852 of 1979, decided on 10-7-1985 (Sakuru v. Tanaji)3, rendered by V. Balakrishna Eradi and Sabyasachi Mukharji, JJ. In the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme court the question raised was whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act were applicable to an appeal which lay to the Collector under section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short A.P. Tenancy Act). The Supreme Court observed in para 3 of the aforesaid judgment that by its previous decisions in (Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli)4, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1335; (Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corpn. of India)5, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 209 and (Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad)6, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 177, it was well-settled that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to the proceedings in 'Court' and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi judicial Tribunals or executive authorities notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the Collector before whom the appeal lay under the A.P. Tenancy Act not being a Court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, according to me, fully supports the view taken by this Court in the case Kalidas v. Waman (cited supra) which therefore, does not need any reconsideration. Since the said decision is a direct decision under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act, it is binding upon me. 9. In this view of the matter although it is not necessary to consider this question any further, I may briefly deal with the same since both the parties have at length tried to substantiate their rival submissions by citing numerous decisions before me. 9. In this view of the matter although it is not necessary to consider this question any further, I may briefly deal with the same since both the parties have at length tried to substantiate their rival submissions by citing numerous decisions before me. Relying upon several decisions and in particular the decision of this Court in the case of Ranchhoddas Atamaram Bairagi and another v. Gupta Brass Stores and others (cited supra) it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that as legally understood a Court means an authority or a Tribunal which has a power to pronounce definitive judgments which are authoritative, final and are binding upon the parties appearing before it. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners the second and most important characteristic of a 'Court' is that it must directly be conferred with the judicial power of the sovereign State by the Statute. It is, therefore, contended that since the Collector who derives his judicial power under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act directly from the statute and since has power to pronounce definitive judgments binding upon the parties under section 120(c) of the said Act, it is a 'Court' within the meaning of the said expression under the Limitation Act. There cannot be any dispute upon the characteristics of a 'Court' which any authority or a Tribunal must answer before it can be said to be a 'Court' as understood in law. 10. The real question however, to be considered in my view is whether such a wider concept of the 'Court' is contemplated under the provisions of the Limitation Act, of the various judgments of the Supreme Court would show that a 'Court' contemplated under the provisions of the Limitation Act is an ordinary Civil or Criminal Court as is generally understood. I may for instance refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Nityanand M. Joshi and another v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India and others)7, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 209 in which it is held that the Limitation Act is applicable to the ordinary Courts. I may for instance refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Nityanand M. Joshi and another v. The Life Insurance Corporation of India and others)7, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 209 in which it is held that the Limitation Act is applicable to the ordinary Courts. Even in the judgment in the case of (The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhaliumma)8, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 282 on which heavy reliance is placed on behalf of the petitioners to support their contention that Article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the applications under any Act and not necessarily to the applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has taken the view that the Limitation Act would apply to any petition, applications filed under the Act before a 'Civil Court' (see para 22 of the report). It may be seen that although the application in the said case was under the Telegraph Act, it lay before the District Judge who as found in the said case was an ordinary Court of civil jurisdiction. 11. It may also observe that in the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sakuru v. Tanaji (cited supra) the view taken by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of (K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateshwara Rao)9, A.I.R. 1978 A.P. 166 is affirmed. The view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said case is that the Limitation Act applies to any proceedings before the Civil or Criminal Courts and not to the proceedings before the Collector, who is not a Civil or a Criminal Court. It is, therefore, clear that for the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act is not enough that an authority or a Tribunal should be a 'Court' as is legally understood, but it must be an ordinary Civil or Criminal Court of the Land as the said expression is normally understood. The authorities under the Rent Control Order or under the Tenancy Act are not Civil or Criminal Courts as they are generally understood. Hence the provisions of the Limitation Act are not directly attracted to the proceedings under the said enactments. The authorities under the Rent Control Order or under the Tenancy Act are not Civil or Criminal Courts as they are generally understood. Hence the provisions of the Limitation Act are not directly attracted to the proceedings under the said enactments. In this view of the matter the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that Article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act deserves to be rejected. 12. Turning to the next point raised in this petition, it may be seen that according to the petitioners they have claimed title to the suit field by adverse possession at any rate from 1961 onwards and therefore, according to them, such a complicated question of law and fact was not within the summary jurisdiction of the trial Court under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act. Relying upon the decision of this Court it is urged that the learned Sub-Divisional Officer should not have decided this matter. It is, however, pointed out on behalf of the respondent that no such plea was raised by the petitioners in their written statement. It is also shown that no such plea was even urged before the Courts below. A perusal of the written statement and the orders of the Courts below would show that the plea of adverse possession was not raised by the petitioners. 13. It would appear from the written statement and the orders of the courts below that the plea raised by the petitioners in the instant case was that they were statutory owners of the suit field under the Tenancy Act and therefore their position was legal. Another question raised was that since they were in possession by virtue of the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Officer passed in the proceedings under section 145 of the code of Criminal Procedure, their possession was legal. The first submission was repelled by the Courts below on the ground that it was held in the proceedings for transfer of ownership to the petitioners that the petitioners were not the tenants of the suit field and they would not, therefore, be statutory owners of the same. 14. The first submission was repelled by the Courts below on the ground that it was held in the proceedings for transfer of ownership to the petitioners that the petitioners were not the tenants of the suit field and they would not, therefore, be statutory owners of the same. 14. As regards the second plea raised by the petitioners it was held by the learned M.R.T. that the possession of the petitioners pursuant to the order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was until they were in due course of law dispossessed by the orders of the appropriate authorities. The above view taken by the learned M.R.T. is correct. The petitioners cannot claim any lawful title on the basis of the order of the Criminal court under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The power is conferred upon the collector under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act to evict a person who is in illegal and unauthorised possession of the suit field. Thus in the facts and circumstances narrated above, since no question of adverse possession was raised and since the petitioners were clearly trespassers as they were adjudicated as not tenants and therefore having no rights of statutory ownership of the suit field, there was no complicated question of law and fact involved in the instant case. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in this regard is, therefore, rejected. 15. The last point urged on behalf of the petitioners before me is that there was an alternative remedy which was barred by time and therefore, it was not open to the respondent to move an application under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act. In support of the above contention the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of (Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra DuynMussorie Electric Tram Way Co. Ltd.)10, A.I.R. P.C. 63 and (Jadeja Kiratsinhji Anandsinhji v. Patel Kana Vela)11, A.I.R. 1964 Guj. 122. In my view the above contention does not survive for consideration, because, there is no material on record to show that the civil suit in respect of the claim is barred by time. As already pointed out there is no plea of adverse possession raised on behalf of the petitioners in their written statement and there is no point of time given when their alleged adverse possession commenced. As already pointed out there is no plea of adverse possession raised on behalf of the petitioners in their written statement and there is no point of time given when their alleged adverse possession commenced. It cannot, therefore, be said that the civil suit for possession based upon the title of the respondent would be barred by time. 16. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----