JUDGMENT - COUTO G.F., J.: - The petitioner, a candidate for admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Goa Medical College for the session 1985-86, seeks in this petition a writ of mandamus or in the nature of mandamus commanding the first three respondents to forthwith admit him to the said course and further a declaration that condition that the candidate should have passed the XIIth standard (HSSCE/equivalent) from schools/colleges in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and that the exemption from passing the XIIth standard or its equivalent from such school/college is available only to the children of the officers of the Central Government posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, if the transfer of the concerned officer takes place during the mid-academic year when the children were studying in schools/colleges outside the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, are arbitrary and unconstitutional. 2. The relevant facts may be stated. The petitioner is the son of a Central Government servant, namely an Assistant Engineer, Microwave. His father was transferred on 13-7-1984 from Karad to Panaji and this transfer took place during the mid-academic year when the petitioner was studying in the XIIth standard in a college outside the Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. The petitioner answered his Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination conducted by the Maharashtra State Board for Secondary and Higher Secondary Education, Pune Divisional Board, in March 1985, having appeared for the said examination from the Science College, Karad (District) Satara. According to the petitioner, the said examination is deemed by the University of Bombay, in its scope and standard, to be equivalent to the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination and the subjects studied by the petitioner include physics, chemistry and biology, including a practical test in each of these subjects, and also English. The medium of instruction of the petitioner at the level of the said Examination has been English. The petitioner applied for admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Goa Medical College (Session 1985-86) in the general category within the prescribed time, attaching to the said application some documents. The medium of instruction of the petitioner at the level of the said Examination has been English. The petitioner applied for admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Goa Medical College (Session 1985-86) in the general category within the prescribed time, attaching to the said application some documents. However, along with his application, he filed also a letter dated 7-6-1985, wherein he has stated that he has appeared for the XIIth Science Examination in March 1985 from the H.S.S.C. Board, Pune at Karad Centre and the result of the said examination has not been yet declared at the time of the filing of the application and was going to be declared on 12th June, 1985. He, therefore, submitted that he was not able to produce, as required in the Prospectus, the passing Higher Secondary School Certificate as well as the mark list. The last date prescribed in the Prospectus of the Goa Medical College for filing the application was 10th June, 1985, and the petitioner has produced the passing certificate of the H.S.S.C.E. only somewhere on 17th June, 1985. On 30th June, 1985, the first respondent, Dean of the Goa Medical College, published on the notice board a list of candidates selected for admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Goa Medical College (Session 1985-86) under the category general. The name of the petitioner was not included in the said list and as such, it is clear that he has been refused admission to the said course. 3. The petitioner states that the list contains 39 candidates beginning with one Kum. Naique Varsha B. and ending with Kum. Shenvi Malaya Bindev. The said Kum. Naique Varsha B. had obtained 91.66 per cent marks whereas Kum. Shenvi Malaya Bindev obtained 79.33 per cent marks. The petitioner has obtained 90 per cent marks in Science subjects, namely, in Physics, Chemistry and Biology. Naique Varsha B. and ending with Kum. Shenvi Malaya Bindev. The said Kum. Naique Varsha B. had obtained 91.66 per cent marks whereas Kum. Shenvi Malaya Bindev obtained 79.33 per cent marks. The petitioner has obtained 90 per cent marks in Science subjects, namely, in Physics, Chemistry and Biology. Therefore, he made inquiries as to why he had not been selected and he was informed by the first respondent that admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Goa Medical College, Panaji (Session 1985-1986) has been refused to the petitioner because, although the condition of five years, residence in the Union Territory did not apply to the petitioner since he is the son of a Central Government servant who has been transferred to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, the condition of having passed the XIIth standard or its equivalent from any school/college in the Union Territory applies to him, inspite of the fact that the petitioner's father has been transferred to this Union Territory during the mid-academic year when the petitioner was studying in the XII standard in a college outside this Territory. This was so because the petitioner's father, it was represented, is not posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu. It is further the case of the petitioner that by letters dated 26th June, 1985 and 1st July, 1985, he pointed out to the Lt. Governor of Goa, Daman and Diu, the injustice of the rule refusing admissions to the M.B.B.S. course at the Goa Medical College, Panaji, to sons of the Central Government servants posted in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, but not under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu while granting them to sons of the Central Governments servants posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu. According to the petitioner, the said rule contained in sub-clause 6 of clause 1 of Part II of the Goa Medical College Prospectus in arbitrary, unconstitutional, ultra vires, null and void and hence, the present writ petition seeking a declaration to that effect and a direction to respondents 1 to 3 to admit him forthwith to the M.B.B.S. course (Session 1985-86). 4. The respondents filed their returns. 4. The respondents filed their returns. In his affidavit-in reply, the first respondent stated that it is not correct to say that the petitioner has applied to the M.B.B.S. course of the Goa Medical College, category general, within the prescribed time and had further attached to the said application the documents as required in Clause 4 of Part II of the Prospectus. In fact, the petitioner applied for admission to the said course in general category within the prescribed time on 7-6-1985 but he has not complied with the requirement of Clause 3 which requires that the application for admission be accompanied by certified true copies of the testimonials and certificates as provided in Clause 4 of Part II of the Prospectus. He specifically failed to produce the certificate and the mark list showing that he has passed the Higher Secondary School Examination. He further, along with his application filed a letter addressed to the first respondent dated 7-6-1985 wherein he has stated that he has appeared for XIIth Science examination in March 1985, from the H.S.S.C. Board, Pune at Karad Centre, and that the results had not been declared and were going to be declared only on 12-6-1985. Therefore, he submitted that he was not able to produce H.S.S.C. mark list, H.S.S.C. certificate and medium of instruction. He also stated that he would produce such certificates within a week after the results were declared, and later on, he actually produced the said certificates. Therefore, the first respondent contends in his return that the petition is liable to be dismissed on the said ground alone without going into the merits of the submissions made by the petitioner. Similarly, respondents 2 and 3 filed their affidavit-in-reply and submitted that the application of the petitioner for admission to the M.B.B.S. course, though received in the office of the Dean on 7-6-1985, did not comply with all the requirements as stipulated in the Prospectus. In fact, the petitioner has not attached to the application the certificates as required in sub-clauses (2) and (3) of Clause 4 of Part II of the Prospectus and, on the contrary, has stated in his letter dated 7-6-1985 that the results of the XIIth standard examination to which he has appeared were due to be declared on 12th June, 1985. Therefore, it is the case of the second and third respondents that on the date for submitting the applications, that is 10th June, 1985, the petitioner was not eligible to be considered for admission to the M.B.B.S. course, 1985-86 Session. It is further alleged that not all the averments made in the petition are correct and, in any case, the exemption for passing the XIIth standard examination or equivalent is intended only to candidates, the services of whose fathers are placed at the disposal of the administration of Goa, Daman and Diu for being appointed to the posts in the administration of this Territory and whose services are paid from Budget funds voted by the Legislative Assembly of Goa, Daman and Diu. It is denied that the classification made does not disclose any intelligible differentia having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved and declared by the college Prospectus. 5. Before entering into the merits of the petitioner's case, particularly into the merit of his contentions that the conditions embodied in sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus are or are not unconstitutional, it is necessary to deal with the questions raised by respondents 1 to 3 in their returns, particularly that the petitioner was not eligible to be selected to any of the seats in the Goa Medical College M.B.B.S. course since he had not yet passed the XIIth standard examination upto 10th June, 1985, that is the last date under the Prospectus for the applications to be filed. In this respect, Mr. V.B. Nadkarni, the learned Government Advocate, invited our attention to Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus and submitted that in the said clause, conditions of eligibility for admission to M.B.B.S. course are laid down. In this respect, Mr. V.B. Nadkarni, the learned Government Advocate, invited our attention to Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus and submitted that in the said clause, conditions of eligibility for admission to M.B.B.S. course are laid down. It is specifically provided therein that an applicant to the M.B.B.S. course in the Goa Medical College should, inter alia, have passed, at least in the second division, either the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination of Goa Board or the examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, which is deemed to be equivalent to Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination by the University of Bombay, with physics, chemistry and biology, including a practical tests in each of them and English as subjects for the last two years of study, or an examination which, in scope and standard, is deemed by the University of Bombay to be equivalent to the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination and the subjects studied at the passing level include physics, chemistry and biology, including practical test in each of them and english as subjects for the last two years of study, or an examination which in scope and standard, is deemed by the University of Bombay to be equivalent to the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination and the subjects studied at the passing level include physics, chemistry and biology including practical test in each of these subjects and English. Then Clause 3 of Part II of the Prospectus deals with applications for admission to the M.B.B.S. course at the Goa Medical College and specifically provides that the application should reach the office of the Dean of the Goa Medical College on or before the 10th June, 1985, and should be accompanied by certified true copies of the testimonials and certificates required under Clause 4 of Part II of the prospectus. The said Clause 4 provides that some certified copies of testimonials and certificates are to be attached with the application for admission and among such certificates, under sub-clause 2, it is stated that a certificate of passing and the statement of marks obtained at the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination is necessary. The said Clause 4 provides that some certified copies of testimonials and certificates are to be attached with the application for admission and among such certificates, under sub-clause 2, it is stated that a certificate of passing and the statement of marks obtained at the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination is necessary. Similarly, sub-clause 3 provides that a certificate of having passed the XIIth standard examination issued by the Principal of the school/college from which he/she has passed the said examination is required and further that certificate should specify the medium of Instruction at standard XII. Thus according to the learned Counsel, it becomes clear from a combined reading of Clauses 1, 3 and 4 that a candidate for admission to the M.B.B.S. course at the Goa Medical College should have passed the XIIth standard or the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination on or before 10th June, 1985, to be eligible for such admission. Now, the petitioner admittedly has not completed his H.S.S.C.E. on or before the 10th June, 1985 and as such, he was not at all eligible. Consequently, he could not have any grievance for not getting admission in the Goa Medical College, 1985-1986 Session. The learned Counsel further contended that only if he had completed the said XIIth standard on or before the 10th June, 1985, he could have been considered and the first respondent could have allowed him to produce the certificate at a later stage in exercise of the powers vested in him under the note to Clause 4 of Part II of the Prospectus. In support of these submissions, Mr. Nadkarni placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Charles K. Skaria v. C. Mathew)1, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1230. 6. Mr. S.K. Kakodkar, however, joined issue with Mr. Nadkarni and submitted that the reason given by the first respondent for refusing admission to the petitioner was that his father, though a Central Government employee and though transferred in the mid-academic year, was not working under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu. This being so, according to Mr. Kakodkar, it is not open to the respondents to fill in the gap and to introduce a different reason to justify their action. This being so, according to Mr. Kakodkar, it is not open to the respondents to fill in the gap and to introduce a different reason to justify their action. This much indeed the respondents are not entitled to as held by the Supreme Court in (Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas)2, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16 and (Mohindar Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner)3, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851. He further contended that sub-clause 3 of Clause 3 of Part II of the Prospectus does not require that the candidate who makes the application should hold all the qualifications upto the 10th June, 1985. It requires only that the application should reach the office of the Dean on or before the 10th June, 1985, and not after the said date. In addition, the learned Counsel invited our attention to Clause 2 of Part I of the Prospectus which deals with the aims and objects of the medical education. In the said Clause 2, it is stated that it is the aim of the Goa Medical College to produce basic doctors to provide primary health care to the people of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, as well as train post graduates in various specialities. It further provides that in order to recruit the best talent for the above purpose, the applicants desirous of admission will be selected on the basis of the Prospectus which is drawn with the intention of providing opportunity for medical education to the student community of this Territory and keeping in view the principles of natural integration. Now, according to the learned Counsel, the petitioner has secured 90 per cent marks in Science subjects namely, Physics, chemistry and biology, in the XII standard examination and therefore, if he is denied admission because of a fortuitous fact that results were announced only on 12-6-1985, the aims avowed in Clause 2 of Part 1 of the Prospectus will be violated. In addition, what is to be considered is whether or not the candidate or applicant has got the prescribed educational qualifications at the time the selection is made. The learned Counsel further contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in Charles Skaria's case is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, is not an authority for the proposition advanced by the learned Government Advocate. The learned Counsel further contended that the decision of the Supreme Court in Charles Skaria's case is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, is not an authority for the proposition advanced by the learned Government Advocate. He contended that the said decision of the Supreme Court has been made in the context of giving additional marks to some candidates for the purposes of selection and not for the purposes of eligibility. 7. The Goa Medical College Prospectus for the Session 1985-1986 contains two parts. Part I deals with the aims and objects of medical education, courses of study, examination, fees, scholarships/prizes, hostel accommodation, cancellation of admission, transfers, etc. Part II deals with eligibility for admission to M.B.B.S. courses, application form, application for admission to the M.B.B.S. course, certified copies of testimonials and certificates to be attached to the application, allocation of seats, guidelines for selection and seats that are allotted to the Government of India and notification of selected applicants. It is the Part II of the Prospectus that is relevant for the purpose of appreciating the contentions of the respondents. Clause 1 of Part II deals with the eligibility for admission to the M.B.B.S. course and lays down the requirements which an applicant to the M.B.B.S. course in the Goa Medical College has to satisfy in order to be eligible for admission to the said course. Sub-clause 1 provides that such an applicant should have passed, at least in the second division either the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination of Goa Board or the examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, which is deemed to be equivalent to Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination by the University of Bombay, or an Examination which, in scope and standard, is deemed by the University of Bombay to be equivalent to the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination, with physics, chemistry and biology, including practical tests in each of them and English as subjects for the last two years study. Then, Clause 3 deals with applications for admission to the M.B.B.S. course and lays down that such applications should be addressed the Dean and submitted either personally to the office of the Dean or sent by registered post, reach the said office on or before 10th June, 1985, be accompanied by certified true copies of the testimonials and certificates required under Clause 4 of Part II and be separate for each category. Clause 4 provides that certified copies of testimonials and certificates are to be attached to the application and specifies what are such testimonials and certificates required. Sub-section (2) provides that one of the certificates to be attached to the application is the certificate of passing and the statement of marks obtained at the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination or its equivalent, and sub-clause (3), a certificate of having passed the XIIth standard examination issued by the Principal of the school/college from which the applicant has passed the said examination and that such certificate should specify the medium of instruction at standard XII. The aforesaid three clauses are to be read together because they deal not only with the eligibility of the candidate, but also with the manner in which the application is to be made and the last date upto which such application can be made. Under Clause 1, one of the sine qua non for the eligibility for admission to the M.B.B.S. course is that the candidate should have passed at least in the second division, either the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination of Goa Board or the examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, or an examination which, in scope and standard, is deemed by the University of Bombay to be equivalent to the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination with Physics, Chemistry and Biology, including practical tests in each of them and English as subjects for the last two years of study. It is thus clear that, as per the Prospectus, a candidate who does not hold the aforesaid qualification cannot be considered since he is not eligible. It is thus clear that, as per the Prospectus, a candidate who does not hold the aforesaid qualification cannot be considered since he is not eligible. Now, Clause 3 of Part II, as we have already said, provides that the application for admission should be addressed to the Dean of the Goa Medical College and should reach his office on or before the 10th June, 1985, postal delay as a reason for delayed receipt of the application being not a sufficient reason and, therefore, not accepted. It further provides that the application should be accompanied by certified true copies of the testimonials and certificates required under Clause 4 of Part II. Sub-section (2) of the said Clause 4 requires that the certificate of passing and the statement of marks obtained at the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination or its equivalent and sub-clause (3) requires also a certificate of having passed XIIth standard examination issued by the Principal of the school/college for which the candidate has passed the said examination be attached to the application. In other words, an application for admission to the M.B.B.S. course can be said to be complete only when it is accompanied by certified true copies of the testimonials and certificates as required by Clause 4 of Part II, particularly the certificate of having passed and the statement of marks obtained at the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination or its equivalent, and since the application has to reach the office of the first respondent on or before the 10th June, 1985, it necessarily follows that a candidate should be already holding the prescribed educational qualification on or before the 10th June, 1985. We say so because the date 10-6-1985 is a deadline which only exceptionally can be extended by the Dean by publishing a notice to the effect in local newspapers, after obtaining the approval of the Government. That the said date 10-6-1985 is a peremptory deadline cannot be disputed, and we so held in (Vaishya Virendralal Bava v. Union of India others)4, Writ Petition No. 137 of 1985, dt. 5-8-1985. It is true that in the note to Clause 4, it is laid down that certificates received after the due date and time will not be considered and that this condition may be relaxed, on exceptional grounds, by the Dean. 5-8-1985. It is true that in the note to Clause 4, it is laid down that certificates received after the due date and time will not be considered and that this condition may be relaxed, on exceptional grounds, by the Dean. It was argued that in view of this note, the fact that the petitioner has produced the certificate of passing the XIIth standard examination on a date after 10-6-1985 is of no consequence and can be actually relaxed. In our view, there is no merit in this submission, for what the note permits is that the certificates can be produced after the prescribed date if the condition to that effect is relaxed on exceptional grounds by the Dean. The note does not empower the Dean to relax the essential requirement for eligibility that the applicant/candidate should hold a particular educational qualification on or before the said last date for the application, that is 10th June, 1985. In this connection, the observations made by the Supreme Court in Charles Skaria's case are most relevant. It is true that in Charles Skaria's case the question before the Supreme Court was not in respect of the eligibility of the candidates but was in respect of the selection for the post graduate seat in ophthalmology. However, while dealing with the case, the Supreme Court made some observations which apply in all fours to the case before us. It was, inter alia, observed that :- “If acquisition of qualification for eligibility or weightage were to be looked into subsequent to the lst date, we should think that only an open and official or authentic declaration of result by the University, or perhaps an official intimation of declaration of results alone can serve the purpose.” The Supreme Court further observed that:- “There is nothing unreasonable nor arbitrary in adding 10 marks for holders of a diploma. But to earn this extra 10 marks, the diploma must be obtained at least on or before the last date for application, not later. Proof of having obtained a diploma is different from the factum of having got it. Has the candidate in fact, secured a diploma before the final date of application for admission to the degree course? That is the primary question. It is prudent to produce evidence of the diploma along with the application, but this is secondary. Proof of having obtained a diploma is different from the factum of having got it. Has the candidate in fact, secured a diploma before the final date of application for admission to the degree course? That is the primary question. It is prudent to produce evidence of the diploma along with the application, but this is secondary. Relaxation of the date on the first is illegal, not so on the second.” Continuing, the Supreme Court further observed that what is essential is the possession of the diploma before the given date. Then, in para 26, the Supreme Court observed as under:- “Even so, there is a snag. Who are the diploma-holders eligible for 10 extra marks? Only those who, at least by the final date for making applications for admissions possess the diploma. Acquisition of a diploma later may qualify him later, not this year. Otherwise, the dateline makes no sense. So, the short question is when can a candidate claim to have got a diploma? When he has done all that he has to do and the result of its is officially made known by the concerned authority. An examinee for a degree or diploma must complete his examination-written, oral or practical - before he can tell the selection committee or the Court that he has done his part. Even this is not enough. If all goes well after that, he cannot be credited with the title to the degree if the results are announced only after the last date for applications but before selection. The second condition precedent must also be fulfilled, viz. the official communication of the result before the selection and its being brought to the ken of the committee in an authentic manner. May be, the examination is cancelled or the marks of the candidates are withheld. He acquires the degree or diploma only when the results are officially made known. Until then his qualification is inchoate. But once these events happen his qualification can be taken into account in evaluation of equal opportunity provided the selection committee has the result before it at the time of - not after - the selection is over. He acquires the degree or diploma only when the results are officially made known. Until then his qualification is inchoate. But once these events happen his qualification can be taken into account in evaluation of equal opportunity provided the selection committee has the result before it at the time of - not after - the selection is over. To sum up, the applicant for post-graduate degree course earns the right to the added advantage of diploma only if (a) he has completed the diploma examination on or before the last date for the application (b) the result of the examination is also published before that date, and (c) the candidate's success in the diploma course is brought to the knowledge of the selection committee before completion of selection in an authentic or acceptable manner.” It is clear from the above observations of the Supreme Court that what is relevant is whether a candidate is or is not holding the prescribed qualification on or before the last date for making the application. If he actually holds such qualification, the question of proof may be relaxed, but the qualification itself cannot be relaxed. In the case before us, admittedly, the petitioner was not holding the qualification of having passed the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination on the 10th June, 1985, since it is his own case that the results were declared only on 12th June, 1985, that is two days after the dateline for filing the application had expired. Thus it is clear that on 10th June, 1985, the petitioner was not at all eligible for admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Goa Medical College, Session 1985-86. 8. Thus it is clear that on 10th June, 1985, the petitioner was not at all eligible for admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Goa Medical College, Session 1985-86. 8. It is true that the petitioner has stated in para 6 of the petition that the first respondent had informed him orally that he has been refused admission to the M.B.B.S. course on the ground that, although the condition of five years residence in the Union Territory did not apply to him being a child of the Central Government servant who has been transferred to this Union Territory, the condition of having passed the standard XII or its equivalent from any school/college in the Union Territory applied to the petitioner, in spite of the fact that the petitioner's father had been transferred to this Union Territory during the mid-academic year, when the petitioner was studying in the XIIth standard in a college outside this Union Territory, only because the petitioner's father is not posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu. This averment made in para 6 of the petition has not been denied in the return of the first respondent, for in 7 thereof, the first respondent admitted that what is stated in para 6 of the petition is substantially correct. But does this circumstance constitute a bar for the respondents refusing admission on the ground of non-eligibility? Mr. Kakodkar, relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas and Mohindar Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner (supra), answered this question in the affirmative. In our view, however, the aforesaid authorities of the Supreme Court do not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. In both such cases, orders had been made in writing in exercise of statutory authority and a particular ground has been to pass the said orders. Later on, when the validity of the said orders had been challenged, it was attempted to fill in the gap and make the orders valid on completely different grounds. In both such cases, orders had been made in writing in exercise of statutory authority and a particular ground has been to pass the said orders. Later on, when the validity of the said orders had been challenged, it was attempted to fill in the gap and make the orders valid on completely different grounds. It was on this background that the Supreme Court has held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise, and that otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. In the case before us, the situation is entirely different, for right from the beginning, the petitioner was not eligible and could not by any stretch of imagination, be made eligible. Thus, even if the first respondent stated that he was not being admitted only because the services of his father were not placed under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, the vice in the petitioner's case is such that, in no manner, he could have got the admission. 9. Mr. Kakodkar, as we have already said next contended that the qualifications were to be held at the time of selection and not at the time of filing of the application. He submitted that the fate of a candidate could not be decided on the basis of a fortuitous circumstance, namely, of the announcement of the results by the Board. What matters, according to Mr. Kakodkar, is whether at the time of the selection, the candidate is actually holding the required and prescribed qualification. As against this, the learned Government Advocate submitted that the date of looking into the applications of the various candidates and selecting them for admission to the M.B.B.S. course is also fortuitous and, therefore, the candidate who applies for this course cannot also benefit from such fortuitous date. In any event, he contended that the date fixed in the prospectus as the last date for submitting the application is not at all fortuitous. We fully agree with the learned Government Advocate. In any event, he contended that the date fixed in the prospectus as the last date for submitting the application is not at all fortuitous. We fully agree with the learned Government Advocate. In fact, what matters is not the date of which the selection was made, but the date on which the applications were to be made. Therefore, the primary question is whether, at the time of filing of application, the applicant was fulfilling all the requirements under the Prospectus to make him eligible. If on the last date he was not eligible, the fact that he got the necessary requirement at a later stage is of no consequence and he cannot avail of this circumstance to make himself eligible for admission to the concerned course. Obtaining the necessary qualification at a later stage has not indeed a retrospective effect as to make the candidate eligible. On this ground alone, therefore, the petition fails. 10. Be that as it may, also otherwise the petition has no merit. In fact, the contention of the petitioner that sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus is arbitrary and unconstitutional inasmuch as it requires that a child of a Central Government servant who has been transferred to the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu has passed the XIIth standard or its equivalent from any school/college in this Territory and inasmuch as a sub-classification is made distinguishing between the Central Government employees posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and those who are not so posted is not correct, as we will presently show. 11. Mr. Kakodkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has first contended in this connection that the proviso to sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of Part II to the effect that the condition of five years residence in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu shall not apply to the children of the Central/Union Territory Government servants who have been transferred to this Union Territory if the candidate has passed the XIIth standard or its equivalent from any of the schools/colleges in the same Union Territory is irrational and unreasonable and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel, elaborating the said submission, invited our attention to sub-clause (3) of Clause 1 of Part II and submitted that under the said clause an examination which, in scope and standard, is deemed by the University of Bombay to be equivalent to the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination has also been made sufficient qualification for the purposes of making an applicant eligible for admission to the M.B.B.S. course in Goa Medical College. If this is so, the argument proceeded, there is no reason whatsoever to require a candidate to pass the XII standard or its equivalent from any school/college in this Union Territory. The dispensing with the condition that the candidate must have passed the XIIth standard or its equivalent from any of the schools/colleges in this Union Territory and the object purportedly to be achieved by holding medical courses in the said college. The learned Counsel further submitted that the classification on the basis of the school from which a student has passed is arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In this respect, he placed reliance on the decisions of a Division Bench of this Court in (Syed Kabiruddin v. Dean, Govt. Medical College, Nagpur)5, A.I.R. 1985 Bom. 199, and of the Supreme Court in (State of Maharashtra v. Raj Kumar)6, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1301 and also in the case of (M. Abdulaziz v. Goa Medical College)7, A.I.R. 1974 Goa, Daman Diu 26. 12. Sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus lays down that an applicant to the M.B.B.S. course in the Goa Medical College should have resided in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu for a minimum period of five years preceding the year of the application and have passed the XIth and XIIth standard (HSSCE/equivalent) from school/college in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, provided that for the seats reserved under category II and category III, the applicants should have resided in districts of Daman and Diu, respectively, for a minimum period of five years. It further provides that the condition of give years residence in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu shall not apply to the children of the Central or Union Territory Government servants who have been transferred to this Union Territory if the candidate has passed the XII standard or its equivalent from any of the schools/colleges in the Union Territory. Then, it provides also that the condition of the applicant having passed the XIIth standard or its equivalent from any school/colleges in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu shall not apply to the children of the officers of the Central Government and All India Services who are posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu if the transfer of the concerned officer takes place during the mid-academic year when the child/children were studying in the standard XII or its equivalent in schools/colleges outside this territory. It is thus apparent and clear that a new class consisting of the students who have resided in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu for a period of five years, preceding the year of the application and have passed the XIth and XIIth standard from schools/colleges in this Union Territory, was carved out from the larger class of student community. This classification is permissible and there is nothing wrong in it. It is not arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational. It is based on an intelligible intellligentsia and there is a nexus between the said classification and the objects for the medical education given in the Goa Medical College. In fact, the said classification is obviously made for the purpose of providing a fair opportunity for medical education to the student community in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and for the avowed aims and objects to produce basic doctors to provide primary health care to the people of this Union Territory as well as train post-graduates in various specialities. This classification is thus absolutely valid and does not, in any manner, violate the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. This classification is thus absolutely valid and does not, in any manner, violate the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. In any case, we may also point out that such kind of classification has been expressly approved by the Supreme Court in (Pradeep Jain v. Union of India)8, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1420, for the Supreme Court observed while dealing with the question of validity of wholesale reservation made by some of the State Governments on the basis of domicile or residence requirement within the State or on the basis of institutional preference for students who have passed the qualifying examination held by the University or the State, that such wholesale reservation was unconstitutional and void as offending the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. However, while so holding, the Supreme Court also further observed that the very mandate of the equality clause viewed in the perspective of social justice would justify to some extent of reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on institutional preference for students passing the qualifying examination held by the University or the State. The Supreme Court, after having so observed, added in para 19- “We are glad to find that the policy of the Government of India in the matter of reservation based on residence requirement and institutional preference accords with the view taken by us in that behalf. We may point out that even if at some stage it is decided to regulate admissions to the M.B.B.S. course on the basis of All India Entrance Examination, some provision would have to be made for allocation of seats amongst the elected candidates on the basis of residence or institutional affiliation so as to take into account the aforementioned factor.” (emphasis supplied) 13. The view expressed by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Jains case was reiterated in (Dinesh Kumar v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad)9, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1059. Thus, in the light and on the strength of the above observations of the Supreme Court, there is no doubt whatsoever that the classification made in sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus is entirely valid. Thus, in the light and on the strength of the above observations of the Supreme Court, there is no doubt whatsoever that the classification made in sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus is entirely valid. It is no doubt true that the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in Pradeep Jain's case what was considered was the institutional preference, a circumstance that does not occur in the case before us, in view of sub-clause (3) of the said Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus. We are afraid that this contention of the learned Counsel is not well founded, since preference is given to the students who have passed the XIth and XIIth Standard from any of the schools/colleges in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu affiliated to Goa Board of the Higher Secondary School Certificate Examination or similar Board of the Gujarat State, in so far as the districts of Daman and Diu are concerned. It is also no doubt true that it would appear that a different note was struck in Syed Kabiruddin v. Dean Govt. Medical College, Nagpur, State of Maharashtra v. Raj Kumar and in M. Abdulaziz v. Goa Medical College (supra), for in the said cases, the reservation on the basis of institutional preference was found to be bad. We may, however, mention, as otherwise was rightly pointed out by Mr. Kakodkar, that a judgment is an authority, primarily, for the case decided by it and, therefore, it is necessary to see in what context it was held in the said authorities that reservation on the basis of institutional preference is bad, and further, whether the law in that respect was generally laid down therein. On going through the aforesaid three authorities we find that no law was generally laid down on the said point and we are further satisfied that those observations were made bearing in mind the special facts and circumstances of those cases. We may, in particular, advert to Raj Kumar's case (supra) and especially to the following observations- “The Rule of weightage as applied in this case is manifestly unreasonable and wholly arbitrary and cannot be sustained. The High Court has fully elaborated these points and has aptly observed thus. “.... We may, in particular, advert to Raj Kumar's case (supra) and especially to the following observations- “The Rule of weightage as applied in this case is manifestly unreasonable and wholly arbitrary and cannot be sustained. The High Court has fully elaborated these points and has aptly observed thus. “.... On the contrary, it places a rural candidate in an advantageous position by a sheer accident of his passing the S.S.C. Examination from rural area.” “.... Here we are faced with a problem that a candidate by sheer chance of his appearing and passing the examination from rural area gets an advantage over all others by arbitrary addition of ten per cent of marks which, as we have indicated above, has no reasonable nexus or connection with the object of getting the best candidates suitably adapted to rural life.” It is thus clear from the above observations in Rajkumar's case that the Supreme Court found that the reservation on the basis of institutional preference was bad in the aforesaid context of the case which is not occurring before us. The said situation was similar to the one that was before the Court in Syed Kabiruddin's case and, therefore, the same considerations had moved the Division Bench of this Court to hold that the said reservations on the basis of institutional preference was bad. In M. Abdulaziz's case, the Court found that in the particular facts before it, reservation on the basis of institutional preference was not justified. No special pronouncement of law in general on the said point was made and, in the circumstances, the said cases are not an authority for the proposition that any reservation on the basis of institutional preference is void. Thus, in our view, the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Pradeep Jain and Dinesh Kumar is holding the day on the said point, and accordingly, we are of the view that the classification reserving seats on the basis of institutional preference is entirely valid and is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We, therefore, find no substance in the submission to the contrary made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. We, therefore, find no substance in the submission to the contrary made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 14. We may now turn to the next contention of the learned Counsel, according to which the third proviso to sub-clause (6) of the said Clause 1 is bad inasmuch as the condition of five years residence in the Union Territory shall not apply to the children of the Central/Union Territory Government servants who have been transferred to this Union Territory if the candidate has passed the XIIth standard or its equivalent from any of the School/colleges in the Union Territory. In our view, this sub-classification suffers no vice and, on the contrary, is not arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational. The said classification is clearly necessitated by the needs of the very administration of this Union Territory where Central Government employees are posted. There is an intelligible differentia beyond such classification which, in our view, is entirely fair and just. In the circumstances, therefore, we find no substance in the said submission of Mr. Kakodkar. 15. We finally turn to the last contention of Mr. Kakodkar according to which the last proviso to sub-clause (6) of the aforesaid Clause 1 is bad inasmuch as a discrimination is created between the officers of the Central Government on the ground that some are posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and the others are not so posted. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that, first of all, the said proviso of the said Clause 6 is based on a misconception of law and under a wrong impression that there exists as entity known as Government of Goa, Daman and Diu. He submitted that, in law, there is no such entity, for the Union Territories are administered by the President and, as such, they are actually administered by the Central Government. The so-called Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, the learned Counsel further contended, is nothing but one limb of Central Government. He placed reliance in support of this submission on the decisions of the Supreme Court in (Devji Vallabhbhai v. Administrator, Goa, Daman and Diu)10, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1029 and in (Goa Sampling Employees' Association v. G.S. Co. of India Pvt. Ltd.)11, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 357. He placed reliance in support of this submission on the decisions of the Supreme Court in (Devji Vallabhbhai v. Administrator, Goa, Daman and Diu)10, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1029 and in (Goa Sampling Employees' Association v. G.S. Co. of India Pvt. Ltd.)11, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 357. He contended that since in law there is no entity known as Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, it necessarily follows that the distinction made between the Central Government employees posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and those who are not posted under such Government is illusory arbitrary and unjustified. In any event, he further submitted, even if there is such an entity in law, then the classification made is discriminatory and arbitrary, for there is no reason whatsoever to distinguish between the two categories. The learned Government Advocate, however, joined issue with Mr. Kakodkar and submitted that though the Union Territories are administered by the President the fact remains that there is distinctly an entity which is different from the Central Government which holds the administration of a Union Territory. He invited our attention to the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, and submitted that under the said Act, there is a Legislative Assembly for the Union Territory, Ministers and other functionaries who are paid from Budget fund voted by the Legislative Assembly or charged, as the case may be. This shows that though the Territory is actually administered by the President, nevertheless, for the purposes of administration, a special entity which is different from the Central Government was created, known as 'Administration of Union Territory'. This otherwise becomes clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Goa sampling Employees' Association's case, he contended. In the said case according to the learned Counsel, the Supreme Court has observed that the Constitution itself makes a clear distinction between State and its Government called the State Government and Union Territory and the Administration of the Union Territory. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the Supreme Court itself made it clear that there is one entity known as 'Administration of Union Territory', and the observations that were made to the effect that the appropriate Government in that particular case was the Central Government were only for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act. 16. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the Supreme Court itself made it clear that there is one entity known as 'Administration of Union Territory', and the observations that were made to the effect that the appropriate Government in that particular case was the Central Government were only for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act. 16. As observed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Goa Sampling Employees' Association's case, Article 239(1) provides that save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law, every Union Territory shall be administered by the President acting to such extent as he things fit, through an Administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify. Article 239-A confers power on the Parliament by law to create local legislature or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union Territories, including Goa, Daman and Diu. The Supreme Court then observed that the law by which the local legislature and/or Council of Ministers are created will also specify their Constitution, powers and functions in each case, and that by sub-article (2) it was ensured that such law when enacted shall not be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368. Then, the Court observed that Article 240 confers power on the President to make regulations for the peace, progress and good Government of the Union Territories specified therein, and Article 246(4) provides that Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. It was further observed that the expression 'Central Government' has been defined in section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, as meaning the President, and shall include, in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the Administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution. The expression 'State Government' is defined in section 3(6) inasmuch as it respects to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, as meaning in a State, the governor, and in a Union Territory, the Central Government and the expression 'Union Territory' is defined in section 3(62-A) as meaning Union territory specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include any other territory comprised within the territory of India but not specified in that Schedule. And after making a reference to the relevant provisions of the Union Territories Act, the Court observed as follows: “14. Would it be constitutionally correct to describe Administration of a Union Territory as State Government? Article I provides that India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.' Sub-Article (2) provides that 'the States and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the First Schedule'. Sub-Article (3) introduced a dichotomy between the State as understood in the Constitution and the Union Territory when it provides that 'the territory of India shall comprise (a) the territories of the State; and (b) the Union Territories specified in the First Schedule'. The provisions of Part VI of the Constitution do not apply to the Union territories. Part VI of the Constitution which deals with States clearly indicates that the Union Territory is not a State. Therefore, the Union Territory constitutionally speaking is something other than State. As far as the States are concerned, there has to be a Governor for each State though it would be permissible to appoint the same person as Governor of two or more States. Part VIII provides for administration of Union territories. Article 239 conferred power on the President for the administration of Union territories unless otherwise provided by an act of Parliament. Therefore, apart from the definitions of the expressions 'Central Government', 'State Government' and 'Union Territory' as enacted in the General Clause Act, 1897, the Constitution itself makes a distinction between State and its Government called the State Government and Union Territory and the Administration of the Union Territory. Unless otherwise clearly enacted, the expression “State will not comprehend Union Territory' and the 'State Government would not comprehend Administration of Union Territory. Unless otherwise clearly enacted, the expression “State will not comprehend Union Territory' and the 'State Government would not comprehend Administration of Union Territory. Now if we recall the definitions of three expressions 'Central Government' {Section 3(8)), 'State Government (section 3(60)) and 'Union Territory' {section 3(62A)} in the General Clauses Act, it would unmistakably show that the framers of the Constitution as also the Parliament in enacting these definitions have clearly retained the distinction between State Government and Administration of Union Territory as provided by the Constitution. It is especially made clear in the definition of expression 'Central Government', that in relation to the Administration of a Union Territory the Administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution, would be comprehended in the expression 'Central Government'. When this inclusionary part is put in juxtaposition with exclusionary part in the definition of the expression 'State Government' which provides that as respect anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, it shall mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union Territory, the Central Government, the difference conceptually speaking between the expressions 'State Government' and the 'Administration of a Union Territory' clearly emerges. Therefore, there is no room for doubt that the expression 'Administration of a Union territory', Administrator howsoever having been described, would not be comprehended in the expression 'State Government' and used in any enactment. These definitions have been modified to bring them to their present forms by Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order, 1956. Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that in all General Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of the Act unless thee is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the words defined therein will have the meaning assigned therein. Indisputably the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a Central Act enacted after the commencement of the General Clauses Act and the relevant definitions having been recast to meet the constitutional and statutory requirements, the expressions 'Central Government'. 'State Government' and 'Union Territory' must receive the meaning assigned to each in the General Clauses Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context in which it is used. No such repugnancy was brought to our notice. 'State Government' and 'Union Territory' must receive the meaning assigned to each in the General Clauses Act unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context in which it is used. No such repugnancy was brought to our notice. Therefore, these expressions must receive the meaning assigned to them.” It becomes thus clear from the above observations of the Supreme Court that though conceptually speaking there should be no such thing as a State Government in an Union Territory, since Union Territories are administered by the President and the expression 'Central Government' means the President under section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, nonetheless, a special entity known as Government of the Union Territory was created or its administration. This entity cannot be said to be exactly a limb, a department, or a Ministry of the Central Government, but it definitely is something different, which was created for the purposes of the proper administration of the Union Territory. It would appear that this creation was necessitated by the needs of the administrative decentralisation and though it is a sort of an extension of the Central Government, nonetheless, it is an autonomous body comprised within the Central Government, and not merely a department of the Central Government. As a result of this distinction, though Union Territories are being administered by the President, nevertheless, some officers of the Central Government are being posted under the special and autonomous administration established in such territories, whereas others are posted directly under departments of the Central Government. This being the position, it cannot be said that the classification made in sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of the Prospectus distinguishing between the Central Government employees under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and those who are not so posted is arbitrary, unreasonable and irrational. Therefore such classification cannot be held to be bad. This being the position, it cannot be said that the classification made in sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of the Prospectus distinguishing between the Central Government employees under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and those who are not so posted is arbitrary, unreasonable and irrational. Therefore such classification cannot be held to be bad. But though the said provision of sub-clause (6) is not vitiated on that count, the whole proviso to the effect that the condition of the applicant having passed the XIIth standard or its equivalent from any school/college in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu shall not apply to the children of the officers of the Central Government and All India Services who are posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu if the transfer of the concerned officer takes place during the mid-academic year when the child/children were studying in the XIIth standard or its equivalent in schools/colleges outside this territory is, in our view, bad, for it is arbitrary and unreasonable and in addition, has no nexus whatsoever with the object that is sought to be achieved by the Goa Medical College. The said proviso, far from being reasonable and rational, is, on the contrary, entirely arbitrary and unfair, for it unjustifiably discriminates against the student community of this Union Territory by giving double opportunity to the children of such officers of the Central Government who were studying in XIIth standard or its equivalent outside the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. They will indeed, by virtue of the said proviso, be eligible to apply for admission to Medical Colleges in the State where they were studying the XIIth standard and, at the same time, they will be eligible for admission to the Goa Medical College of this Territory. This not only has no nexus at all with the objects to be achieved, namely, to provide an opportunity for the medical education to the student community of this Union Territory and primary health care to the people of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, but to some extent defeats the very object of providing an opportunity for medical education to the student community of this Union Territory. Therefore, in our view, the aid proviso, being bad as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, is liable to be struck down. 17. Therefore, in our view, the aid proviso, being bad as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, is liable to be struck down. 17. In the result, this petition fails and is consequently dismissed. The aforesaid proviso in sub-clause (6) of Clause 1 of Part II of the Prospectus of the Goa Medical College, session 1985-86, to the effect that the condition of the applicant having passed the XIIth standard or its equivalent from any school/college in the Union Territory shall not apply to the children of the officers of the Central Government and All India Services who are posted under the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, if the transfer of the concerned officer takes place during the mid-academic year when the child/children were studying in the XIIth standard or its equivalent in schools/colleges outside this Territory is struck down. Rule accordingly. There will be no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case. Petition dismissed. -----