JUDGMENT K. Sukumaran, J. 1. "Upper Surianalle" is a tea estate in the High Ranges with its boundless contiguity of greenery and silhouette of azure hills. Blood was spilled there when a head conductor was murdered, way back on 16th October 1966. The investigative machinery of the State was set in motion. Forty persons were apprehended and remanded to judicial custody. C.A. Thomas and Sankaralingom, two workmen of the Estate, were among them. The judicial custody continued till 20th January 1967. Charges were framed against twenty-nine of them, 2. Absence without leave beyond 10 days is a mis?onduct provided under Standing Order 22 of the Standing Orders of the Estate. The management had granted the two accused workmen all available leave to their credit. Even thereafter absence was continuing. On 12th December 1966, after about two months of such continuous absence, the management initiated disciplinary proceedings for the misconduct of unauthorised absence. The charge-sheet was served on 12th December 1966. The enquiry was fixed on 23rd December 1966. The enquiry was adjourned to 3rd January 1967 pursuant to the request made in that behalf. The charge-sheeted workmen did not appear at the enquiry. The enquiry was proceeded with in their absence. The workmen were found guilty. The punishment could not, however, be imposed straightaway in view of a pendency of a dispute, I.D. No. 13 of 1965 before the Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey. Approval of the dismissal was sought for from the Tribunal by filing a petition, M. P. No. 15 of 1967. Approval was, in due course, granted. The workmen were dismissed on 23rd January 1967. 3. The two criminal cases A case and a counter case S.C. Nos. 14 and 19 of 1967 were tried by the Sessions' Judge. All except seven among the accused were acquitted. Thomas and Sankaralingom were among the seven who were thus convicted, they being accused 9 and 10 in the case. The conviction and sentence were challenged by them in an appeal Crl. Appeal No. 259 of 1967 before this Court. The conviction under Section 323, Indian Penal code was confirmed and they were sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months. They were released from the jail in December 1968. 4. The conviction and sentence were challenged by them in an appeal Crl. Appeal No. 259 of 1967 before this Court. The conviction under Section 323, Indian Penal code was confirmed and they were sentenced to simple imprisonment for three months. They were released from the jail in December 1968. 4. With the termination of the criminal case before the Sessions' Court, and the acquittal of the majority among the accused, the question of those acquitted workmen continuing in the employment of the estate came up for active consideration. The matter was settled by an agreement reached with the Union on 7th October 1969. Twenty-two among the workmen were agreed to be rein stated, but without backwages. The case of the remaining seven were to be referred to for adjudication. The reference was made to the Labour Court, Quilon on 6th April 1970. During the pendency of the dispute, there was a further agreement between the management and the union. Four more workers were reinstated, again without backwages. That left the dispute one concerning three workmen. 5. On 30th August 1975, the Labour Court gave its award. It upheld the dismissal of the workmen. the Union challenged the correctness of the award before this Court in a writ petition, O.P. No. 673 of 1976. Chandrasekhara Menon, J. by judgment dated 27th October 1977 allowed the writ petition. A further consideration of the matters as referred to therein was directed by the judgment. The management then took up the matter in appeal, W. A. No. 51 of 1978. The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal. It, however, observed that the Labour Court could have a denovo enquiry, if it so felt. 6. After the matter was back before the Labour Court, the management gave evidence by examining the Superintendent and producing Exts. E-3 to E-7. On the side of the Union three witnesses were examined. 7. In the meanwhile, one among the three workmen involved in the industrial dispute died. The dispute thereafter, concerned and was carried on, by the remaining two workmen, Thomas and Sankaralingom referred to above. 8. The Labour Court passed its award on 20th January 1981. E-3 to E-7. On the side of the Union three witnesses were examined. 7. In the meanwhile, one among the three workmen involved in the industrial dispute died. The dispute thereafter, concerned and was carried on, by the remaining two workmen, Thomas and Sankaralingom referred to above. 8. The Labour Court passed its award on 20th January 1981. It took the view that the misconduct was proved; and noted that the case was one before the Introduction of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, with the consequence that there was ordinarily no interference with the punishment awarded by the management. The dismissal of the workmen was upheld. 9. This award too was challenged before this Court by writ Petition O.P. No. 2158 of 1981. By judgment dated 7th June 1984, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the award. The matter was remanded to the Labour Court with certain peremptory directions and findings. According to the learned Judge: "The court must consider whether or not the workmen were justified in contending that the punishment imposed by the Management was vitiated by reason of victimisation. The punishment would amount to victimisation if the court were to find that it was discriminatory or grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proved or so monstrous that no reasonable employer would have imposed in the circumstances of the case, and the like" The learned Judge further held that even in the event of the Labour Court concluding that the charge against the workmen had been proved and the punishment was not vitiated by victimisation, the award of the Labour Court would be effective only as from 20th January 1981, the date of publication of the award impugned in that writ petition. 10. The management has appealed from the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 11. The appeal memorandum is somewhat prolix and a substantial portion of it is devoted apparently to project the anguish of the appellant about the manner in which, according to it, the contentions of the parties had been dealt with by the learned Single Judge. The correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge could be considered de hors those complaints. Sri K. A. Nayar appearing on behalf of the appellant forcefully and exhaustively presented before us all relevant aspects. The correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge could be considered de hors those complaints. Sri K. A. Nayar appearing on behalf of the appellant forcefully and exhaustively presented before us all relevant aspects. We shall proceed to formulate the points arising for decision and express our views thereon. 12. As noted earlier, the learned Judge took the view that the approach of the Labour Court to the question of punishment was not in consonance with established principles of law. According to the learned Judge, the enquiry of the management was not merely a defective one but totally honest, resulting in the punishment being effective only from the date of the second award of the Labour Court. In other words, the workmen will be entitled to the entirety of the backwages from 1966 to 1981, even if the misconducts proved and the punishment found to be justified. Whether these conclusions reached by the Single Judge are in tune with the well settled principles of law, are the questions arising for our consideration in this appeal. 13. The Judgment of the learned Single Judge, records and in forceful language, submissions about the punishment being totally unjustified and operating as an act of victimisation. Even a case of discrimination is projected as an important aspect which had arisen for consideration. It would appear that on behalf of the Union, the plea of victimisation and discrimination had been advanced, and in superlative terms. The punishment is referred to as one "imposed by the Management in blatant and conscious disregard of the rules of natural justice" and "shockingly and unconscionably severe". The judgment stated that the hurried enquiry "spoke eloquently of unfair labour practice and victimisation on the part of the Management". The enquiry of the Management held on 3rd January 1967 was characterised as "blatant and deliberate violation of the rules of natural justice." The Labour Court was charged with a failure to consider "an important point of the act of victimisation''. 14. We must straightway clear the ground by pointing out that no plea of victimisation or discrimination had been made in the original petition challenging the award. 15. We have repeatedly scanned grounds A to E to find out whether a plea of victimisation or discrimination had been urged. Such pleas have not been even shadowed anywhere in the original petition. We must straightway clear the ground by pointing out that no plea of victimisation or discrimination had been made in the original petition challenging the award. 15. We have repeatedly scanned grounds A to E to find out whether a plea of victimisation or discrimination had been urged. Such pleas have not been even shadowed anywhere in the original petition. This plain factual situation could not be got over even by counsel for the respondent-union who spared no efforts to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We have therefore to proceed on the basis that no plea of victimisation or discrimination had been taken up in the original petition. It was therefore impermissible and incorrect for the learned Single Judge to traverse areas uncovered by the pleadings, and enter findings adverse to a party who had no effective opportunity to meet a case on which the learned Judge ultimately chose to enter such adverse findings. 16. It is also necessary to refer to what had transpired before the Labour Court after the matter had been directed to be considered afresh by the judgments of this Court. The Labour Court had referred to the judgment in the earlier writ petition, whereunder the earlier award of the Labour Court had been quashed on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice and "hence defective". The Labour Court emphasised that the Union had not disputed the following: 1. The two workmen had been continuously absent for more than ten days and that such absence was due to their detention in custody as accused in a criminal case. 2. The workmen had, been eventually convicted in a criminal case in connection with which they had been arrested. 3. Under the Standing Orders continuous absence from duty for more than 10 days without leave is a misconduct. 4. The workmen had not been granted leave, for the period of absence though they had been granted eligible leave earlier. 17. The Labour Court has thereafter referred to the contention Presumably the only contention that had been urged before it. It was about the inability of the workmen to report for duty while they had been kept in custody. 4. The workmen had not been granted leave, for the period of absence though they had been granted eligible leave earlier. 17. The Labour Court has thereafter referred to the contention Presumably the only contention that had been urged before it. It was about the inability of the workmen to report for duty while they had been kept in custody. This contention was considered by the Labour Court, and in our opinion cogently and correctly, in the following words: "No doubt it is true that they were not physically capable of presenting themselves for duty as they were in detention. But if the workmen themselves were responsible for their detention, there is no justification to hold that their detention and consequent absence from duty were for reasons beyond their control. If these workmen had been ultimately found to have been wrongly arrested for no fault of theirs it may be justifiably urged on their behalf that their absence from duty for more than 10 consecutive days does not merit any punitive action against them by the management. But that is not the position here. Their arrest and detention by the authorities have been justified by their consequent (sic) conviction by the court which has been confirmed in appeal. In other words this is a case where the workmen by their own acts landed themselves in a situation which compelled their absence from duty for more than 10 days. They cannot therefore escape the consequences of a situation of their own making and therefore I am of the view that the charge against them has been substantiated." (emphasis supplied) 18. The Labour Court further found that there was no scope for interference with the quantum of punishment is the reference of the dispute related to a pre-section 11 A period. A complaint based on victimisation and discrimination has not been urged before the Labour Court. No such complaint was indicated in the Original Petition. Such contentions were therefore totally outside the pleadings in the case and should not be entertained, much less accepted. 19. That apart, we are also of the view that the finding of the learned Judge on victimisation and discrimination is even otherwise, unsustainable. 20. The Union cannot with grace contend that any discrimination was practiced in relation to the two workmen involved in. this case. A greuesome murder had admittedly taken place in the estate. 19. That apart, we are also of the view that the finding of the learned Judge on victimisation and discrimination is even otherwise, unsustainable. 20. The Union cannot with grace contend that any discrimination was practiced in relation to the two workmen involved in. this case. A greuesome murder had admittedly taken place in the estate. The police investigated the crime. There was no suggestion that the management had any connection let alone any role in the unfortunate incident. Nor was even there any allegation that the arrest and remand to judicial custody of the workmen initially numbering about forty, had been in any way, influenced by or at the instance of, the management. Those who got involved in a criminal case and were consequently unable to attend to their duty, have ordinarily to suffer the consequences. At any rate they cannot fasten any liability on the management, if, in the course of the investigation of the crime, the police officials had apprehended them, and the court had remanded them to custody, (which implies that the court at that stage did not deem it fit to enlarge them on bail), even if, ultimately, the case had ended in an acquittal. The Labour Court was more than fair in observing that in the event of there having been an acquittal a different Superintendent, approach was possible in relation to the punishment meted out to them for their earlier unauthorised absence, when such absence was a compulsion out of then existing situation. The management fairly realised this position. That fairness is reflected in the two agreements entered into with the union, when all those who had been acquitted had been reinstated but without backwages. If a differentiation was made between those who were acquitted in a criminal case and those convicted, a charge of discrimination is inconceivable. A mistake happened in the case of one person, who had been convicted by the court but had been reinstated by the management under the agreement. This was due to a misrepresentation by the union itself that that person had been acquitted. The union would be totally unjustified in pointing the accusing finger to the management, when the management was an innocent victim of a false or fraudulent representation of the union itself. The plea of discrimination as against the management is totally unjustified in the circumstances. 21. The union would be totally unjustified in pointing the accusing finger to the management, when the management was an innocent victim of a false or fraudulent representation of the union itself. The plea of discrimination as against the management is totally unjustified in the circumstances. 21. It is now settled that when a misconduct is proved, a victimisation is ordinarily ruled out. The proved misconduct is the very antithesis of victimisation as observed by the Supreme Court. (See Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 98). It is unnecessary to refer to all the decisions laying down the above proposition of law; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. v. Ram Naresh Kumar 1961 (1) LLJ 511, Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Prasad 1969 (2) LLJ 799 and Lalla Ram v. D.C.M. Chemical Works Limited 1978 (1) LLJ 507 , are some of them. As noted earlier, the misconduct charged against the workmen consisted of absence without leave for more than 10 days. Regarding the factum of such absence without leave, and the duration of the absence exceeeding 10 days, there is no doubt or dispute at all. The misconduct is therefore proved to the hilt. Under the standing orders, the misconduct is one in which a punishment of dismissal is permissible. Thus, the case is one in which the misconduct is clinchingly proved and the punishment is within the permissible limit. The situation is one in which section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act was not applicable. (See Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Management. 1973 (1) L.L.J. 278 at 294). The plea of victimisation is also devoid of factual foundation, in such a factual background. 22. It is not as though incarceration of the workmen in jail and their consequent disability to attend to duty had not occured earlier in industrial establishments. Way back, the Supreme Court had to consider such situations in the cases, Burn and Co. Ltd. v. Their Employees 1957 (1) LLJ 226 , and Indian Iron and Steel Co. v. Their Workmen 1958 (1) LLJ 260 = A.I.R 1958 S.C. 130 The principles were succinctly stated in the following words: "It is true that the arrested men were not in a position to come to their work, because they had been arrested by the police. v. Their Workmen 1958 (1) LLJ 260 = A.I.R 1958 S.C. 130 The principles were succinctly stated in the following words: "It is true that the arrested men were not in a position to come to their work, because they had been arrested by the police. This may be unfortunate for them; but it would be unjust to hold that in such circumstances the Company must always give leave when an application for leave is made. If a large number of workmen are arrested by the authorities in charge of law and order by reason of their questionable activities in connection with a labour dispute, as in this case, the work of the Company will be paralysed if the Company is forced to give leave to all of them for a more or less indefinite period. Such a principle will not be just; nor will it restore harmony between labour and capital or ensure normal flow of production. It is immaterial whether the charges on which the workmen are arrested by the police are ultimately proved or not in a Court of law. The Company must carry on its work and may find it impossible to do so if a large number of workmen are absent. Whether in such circumstances leave should be granted or not must be left to the discretion of the employer. It may be readily accepted that if the workmen are arrested at the instance of the company for the purpose of victimization and in order to get rid of them on the ostensible pretext of continued Superintendent, absence, the position will be different. It will then be a colourable or malafide exercise of power under the relevant standing order; .."(emphasis supplied) 23. It will thus be seen that the Supreme Court gave considerable emphasis on the necessity to avert a situation where the work of the establishment is not 'paralysed' and the establishment is enabled "to carry on its work". (The report of the Donovan Commission and the white paper in place of strike, indicate the thinking on allied problems in the United Kingdom). Whatever be the economic system or the social set up, neither the citizen nor the State can ignore the importance of work. Even the 'craft ethic' of earlier times stressed that aspect. (The report of the Donovan Commission and the white paper in place of strike, indicate the thinking on allied problems in the United Kingdom). Whatever be the economic system or the social set up, neither the citizen nor the State can ignore the importance of work. Even the 'craft ethic' of earlier times stressed that aspect. "The craft ethic implies that a worker should be free to control the time and pace of work, and should feel that he has some commitment to his work" ( See Industrial Relations, 2nd Edn. By Michael P. Jackson). Employment cannot therefore be treated as a part of a pastime or an escapist hobby. The Nation can ill afford a wanton neglect of work. If an emp?oyees gets involved in a criminal case by his own volun?ary acts it is not the establishment that has to suffer. Philips, J. observed and with force; "Quite apart from guilt, involvement in the alleged criminal offence often involves a serious breach of duty or discipline". (See the extract made by Woolf J. in R. v, BBC, (1933) 1 All E.R. 241 at 255). Of course the situation "may be entirely different, if a false case had foisted against the workmen. As noted earlier, the workmen in the present case do not have any such plea. The guilt of the workmen is one which had been established by the Session's Court and confirmed by the High Court. In the above circum?tances, the view taken by the Labour Court that the work?en in question ''by their own acts landed themselves in a situation which compelled their absence.."and that "they cannot therefore escape the consequences of a situa?ion of their own making", is perfectly legal and correct. There was no justification, either on principle or on prece?ents, to interfere with such a well reasoned finding of the Labour Court. The learned Judge, with respect, misapplied the legal principles and proceeded on non-existent assum ptions, when he interfered with the award of the Labour Court. We are therefore constrained to intervene in appeal and set aside that finding. 24. The next question concerns the nature of the domestic enquiry. Is it a totally nonest one or only a defec?ive one for the reason that it was held in violation of the principles of natural justice. Certain facts relevant on this aspect may, even at the risk of repetition, be recapitulated. 24. The next question concerns the nature of the domestic enquiry. Is it a totally nonest one or only a defec?ive one for the reason that it was held in violation of the principles of natural justice. Certain facts relevant on this aspect may, even at the risk of repetition, be recapitulated. The charges framed against the workmen were served on them in jail. The enquiry had been fixed on 23rd Decem?er 1966. The union then sought adjournment pointing out the inability of the workmen who were then in custody to attend the enquiry. An adjournment was granted though not for a period beyond 20th January 1967 as desired by the Union. There was sufficient time for the workmen to seek urgent orders from the criminal court pointing out the situation they were in and praying for release on bail. If they did not take any step in that direction, or, having taken such steps failed to persuade a Court of Law to release them on bail, they have necessarily to suffer the conseque?ces. The enquiry was fixed on 3rd January 1967. The workmen did not attend the same. The enquiry was pro?eeded with ex parte. The Labour Court took the view that their inability to attend the enquiry was not for reasons beyond their control. It stated: "A person committing a crime under the influence of drink and thereby incapable of knowing the nature and implication of his action is nevertheless liable unless it is shown that the intoxicating liquor was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. It may therefore be said by way of analogy that a person confined in jail for his own actions cannot be deemed to be there for reasons beyond his control. The management as seen from the records acted fairly in postponing the enquiry to a later date on the request of the union; but they could not be expected to adjourn the enquiry sine die till the delinquent workmen were out from the jail". It was this view that was challenged before this Court in O.P. No. 673 of 1976. This court took the view that the enquiry was vitiated. Chandrasekhara Menon, J. after referring to the circumstances, observed: "In such circumstances it was only proper and correct that the management had adjourned the enquiry after 20th of January". It was this view that was challenged before this Court in O.P. No. 673 of 1976. This court took the view that the enquiry was vitiated. Chandrasekhara Menon, J. after referring to the circumstances, observed: "In such circumstances it was only proper and correct that the management had adjourned the enquiry after 20th of January". It was also stated that "in such cases it is necessary that there should be a proper enquiry in confirmity with the principles of natural justice", (emphasis supplied). In the writ appeal also the Division Bench only stated: "In the circumstances, the learned Judge's conclusion, that the domestic enquiry was not fair and proper was correct and calls for no interference". The Supreme Court has dealt with and discussed the nature of the vitiating element in an enquiry of that type. On such case is Kalyani v. Air France 1963 (1) LLJ 679 . The enquiry was found to be one violative of the principles of natural justice. The misconduct was ultimately established before the Tribunal. The Supreme Court definitely held that the dismissal will relate back to the date of the original order. The following passage at page 684 clearly expresses the principle: "In the present case an inquiry has been held which is said to be defective in one respect and dismissal has been ordered. The respon?ent had however to justify the order of dismissal before the Labour Court in view of the defect in the inquiry. It has succeeded in doing so and therefore the approval of the Labour Court will relate back to the date on which the respondent passed the order of dismissal. The contention of the appellant therefore that dismissal in this case should take effect from the date from which the labour court's award came into operation must fail." 25. Thus when an enquiry is found to be violative of the principles of natural justice, it is termed as a defective one for that ground. In other words, such an enquiry is not treated as 'nonest'. This principle was again reiterated in D.C. Roy v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1760. In that case too, the enquiry was found to be vitiated by a violation of the principles of natural justice. Yet, the Supreme Court said that it was only a defect in the enquiry. This principle was again reiterated in D.C. Roy v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1760. In that case too, the enquiry was found to be vitiated by a violation of the principles of natural justice. Yet, the Supreme Court said that it was only a defect in the enquiry. It was emphasised: "The enquiry in the instant case does not suffer from defects so serious or fundamental as to make it nonest." We see no difference whatever in the factual situation as it obtains in the present case. The domestic enquiry herein was, no doubt, held to be violative of the principles of natural justice. It was, however, in the language of the Supreme Court, only a defective enquiry and not nonest. If that be the situation, the principles of the two decisions would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. When ultimately the misconduct is found, established, as the Labour Court has held it has been (and we have upheld that finding earlier), the dismissal order would relate back to the date of the original order of dismissal. There is no escape from that conclusion on the facts disclosed, findings recorded in the earlier writ proceedings, and on a proper application of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. 26. The learned Judge appears to have been swayed much by the obiter observations of a possible hypothetical case arising on a future occasion. Those observations were intended only to ensure that the workmen did not suffer when "under the facade of a domestic enquiry the employer passes an order gravely detrimental to the employees' interest like an order of dismissal". It is only in that context that the Supreme Court further observed that "an enquiry blatantly and consciously violating the principles of natural justice may well be equated with the total absence of an enquiry.." It may, however, be noted that even after the above observations, the Supreme Court was careful to point out: "But we will not pursue the point beyond this as the facts before us do not warrant a closer consideration thereof". 27. Coming to the solid facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the management had only a facade of the enquiry. It had done all that could ordinarily be done by a management proposing a domestic enquiry. 27. Coming to the solid facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the management had only a facade of the enquiry. It had done all that could ordinarily be done by a management proposing a domestic enquiry. The dis?bility of the workmen to attend the enquiry was not in any way attributable to the management. In the then prevai?ing situation, if the management did not accede to the request for what it felt to be an unduly long adjournment, it could not be stated that there was a blatant and conscious violation of the principles of natural justice, even if the refusal of adjournment is found to be improper or unjusti?ied. It is one thing to say that a particular manner in which an application for adjournment was treated by the management was incorrect or improper. It is an entirely different thing to say that error in the decision on an application for adjournment was indicative of a total lack of bona fide on the part of the management. The workmen had been apprehended way back in October, 1966. They continued to be in custody even after three months of their arrest. The management had granted them all the eligible leave. Even thereafter the continued absence transgressed the permissible limit. The management took care to ensure that the charges had been duly served on the workmen. The enquiry originally fixed was adjourned by a further period of about 10 days. It is impossible in these circumstances to hold that what the management attempted was only 'a facade of enquiry' and that it 'blatantly and consciously violated the principles of natural justice in conducting the enquiry'. We are clear in our mind that in the above circumstances the real ratio in the Kalyani's case and D.C. Roy's case (supra) applied to the facts of the present case and that the obiter observations did not have any application whatever. ' 28. In coming to the conclusion he reached the learned Judge had followed the decision in Govindan Unnithan v. Industrial Tribunal 1981 K.L.T 342. We have indicated the true scope and effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kalyani's case and D.C.Roy's case, supra, and hold that Govindan Unnithan v. Industrial Tribunal, supra cannot have application to situations such as the one disclosed in the present. 29. We have indicated the true scope and effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kalyani's case and D.C.Roy's case, supra, and hold that Govindan Unnithan v. Industrial Tribunal, supra cannot have application to situations such as the one disclosed in the present. 29. In this view of the matter, we must reverse the finding of the learned Judge regarding the entitlement of the workmen to arrears of wages till 20th January 1977, even if the guilt is established. We vacate that finding and hold that the workmen were correctly found by the Labour Court to be guilty of misconduct and that the order related back to the original date of dismissal, namely 23rd January 1967. 30. Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in V. P. Gupta v. M/s Delton Cable India (P) Ltd.1984 (2) S.L.R. 5. That case arose in a reference made after the introduction of section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workers was visited with dismissal on what the Supreme Court referred to as a 'flimsy charge' of abusing of a fellow worker. The facts of that case do not bear any similarity to the present case. 31. Yet another attempt was made to submit that the workers, in addition to their disability arising out of the detention in jail, had also been hospitalised. The period during which Thomas and Sankaralingom had been hospitalised came to an end respectively on 9th November 1966 and 11th November 1966. The hospitalisation for such an earlier period, cannot have any effect or impact on the result of the enquiry or the proof relating to the misconduct. The management, by their communication dated 12th December 1966, had granted leave up to the period for which they had eligibility. That too ended on 23rd October 1966 and 28th October 1966 respectively. The argument based on the hospitalisation of the two workmen cannot therefore have any force or effect in the circumstances. 32. The management, by their communication dated 12th December 1966, had granted leave up to the period for which they had eligibility. That too ended on 23rd October 1966 and 28th October 1966 respectively. The argument based on the hospitalisation of the two workmen cannot therefore have any force or effect in the circumstances. 32. Counsel for the management particularly emphasised the fact that the effect of the judgment of the learned Single Judge would be to compel the management to pay sums amounting to lakhs of rupees to two of its workmen found guilty, of a criminal offence by the highest court of the land, even when about thirty of the workmen against whom criminal proceedings had been initiated but had been acquitted, could get only a reinstatement without back-wages. We see force in those submissions. This Court cannot coerce a management to proffer a purse to the workmen who would take the law into their hands, and be convicted by a court of law for criminal offences. Encouraging the criminal elements, we may observe with utmost judicial restraint, is highly unjust and plainly illegal. Time was when those working in the plantations had untold agonies and immeasurable miseries. Even the law as passed by the legislature, enabled exploitation of the workmen, driving them to sub-human conditions. Such was the situation when Workmen's Breach of Contract Act, Madras Act XIII of 1859 was in force in the former Madras State. The gruesome effect of the implementation of that law gets reflected in some of the earlier decisions rendered by the Madras High Court. One such case from the former Malabar area is Kunhi Moidin v. Chamu Nair I.L.R 41 Madras 182. Even after the advent of the Constitution, things had not improved very much initially. The continuing misery is discernible from novel depicting the life in the plantations, and written by none other than Dr. P. H. Daniel, one of the pioneer organisers of the trade union movement in the plantations of South India. Considerable improvements have been registered in the life and living conditions of the labour and the staff since then. The march of time brought in its wake developments with positive content and progress measures. A sophistication is discernible in the management at least in organised sectors of the plantation industry. Considerable improvements have been registered in the life and living conditions of the labour and the staff since then. The march of time brought in its wake developments with positive content and progress measures. A sophistication is discernible in the management at least in organised sectors of the plantation industry. Such management could not be held to ransom as it were, when, in respect of a misconduct on the part of a workman, it is seen to have earnestly endeavoured to adhere to the principles of fair play and justice and the procedures enjoined under law. The judgment of the learned Single Judge would mete out manifest injustice to the appellant. The judgment has therefore, to be set aside. We do so. 33. In the result, we allow the appeal, dismiss the Original Petition and uphold the award of the Labour Court. Having regard to the circumstances, the parties will bear their respective costs in all the proceedings before this Court.