JUDGMENT 1. - Shri Mahavir Prasad has filed this revision against the learned City Magistrate, Bhilwara, dated 12-7-84 by which he has passed an order u/s 145(1) Cr. PC as also u/s 146 Cr. PC attaching the property in dispute. 2. On 30-6-84, Shri Banshi Lal, Supervisor, Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd., Bhilwara, filed a complaint u/s 145 Cr. PC before the learned City Magistrate, Bhilwara alleging that flat no. 6 in Mansingka Bhawan, belonging to Mansingka Industries Pvt. Ltd. Bombay, was in possession of the Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd , as tenants on the monthly rent of ks. 120/- and it was being used as a guest house of the Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd. for lodging their guests. It was further alleged that the present petitioner Shri Mahavir Prasad, who is the landlord of the property in dispute and an ex-partner of Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd. and is also the younger brother of Shri Vishwanoth, who is the present Managing Director of the Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd. wanted to come to Bhilwara for the purpose of the `mundan' ceremony of Ravi and Munna on 3-5-84 and, therefore, he asked the permission of Shri Vishwanath to stay in the said fiat. Shri Vishwanath agreed to this and permitted him to do so. Necessary arrangements for the stay of Shri Mahavir Prasad were made in the said flat and he came and stayed there along with some other people. However, as a matter of fact, he wanted to take illegal possession of the flat in question and had conspired in this respect without the knowledge of Shri Vishwanath and in furtherance of this intention, he placed his name plate on the flat and appointed armed guards there. He further started giving out that he had taken over the fiat on rent from Mansingka Industries and thus instead of being a guest, he became a trespasser. It has further been stated in the complaint that the petitioner Mahavir Prasad then filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif, Bhilwara, for permanent injunction restraining the Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd. and its Managing Director and the other Directors from interfering with this possession over the flat in question. However, that application for temporary injunction was dismissed by the learned Munsif holding that the petitioner had no right in the flat in question. However, that application for temporary injunction was dismissed by the learned Munsif holding that the petitioner had no right in the flat in question. The case of the complainant further was that the petitioner does not want to vacate the premises in dispute, over which he has no rightful possession and is not allowing the Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd. to use this flat as their guest house to which they are entitled and, therefore, there is a dispute about the possession of the flat and the armed guards of the petitioner threaten the Directors and employees of the Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd. with dire consequences if they interfered with their possession and, therefore, there is imminent danger of breach of peace. The application u/s 145 was supported by the affidavit of Shri Banshi Lal. The learned Magistrate sent the application to the police and the police after making necessary enquiry, reported that there was apprehension of breach of peace and that there was imminent danger. On this, the learned City Magistrate passed the aforesaid orders under sections 145 and 146 Cr. PC. Aggrieved of this, the petitioner Mahavir Prasad has come up in revision. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 4. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner no. 2 that this revision is not maintainable as the order of the learned City Magistrate is only an interim order and in this connection he has placed reliance upon Premlata v. Ram Lubbaya, 1978 CRI. LJ 1822 , Brij Lal v. Abdul Ahmed, 1980 CRI. LJ 89 , Indra Rao v. Bhagwali Devi, 1981 All. LNJ 687 , Sunder Bairagi v. State, 1984 CRI. L.J. 124 & Kartar Singh v. Pritam Kaur, 1984 CRI. LJ 248 . Apart from this, the learned counsel further urged, basing his contention on Brij Lal's case (supra) that the order in this case was an ex-parte order and the learned Magistrate himself could hear the present petitioner and if necessary, alter the order in question and, therefore, also it is only an interlocutory order. With all respect, I am unable to accept the view taken by the Hon'ble Judges of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in this respect. With all respect, I am unable to accept the view taken by the Hon'ble Judges of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in this respect. he order cannot be deemed to be interlocutory merely because the opposite party has an opportunity to raise objection against it before the court which passed it. This may, of course. be an ingredient of an interim order, interlocutory order but not the only criteria. In this connection, it may be pointed out that u/s 146 Cr. PC the attachment can be withdrawn by the Magistrate only when he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the subject of dispute. Thus this contingency is applicable only after an attachment has been made and at a later stage it is shown to the satisfaction of the Magistrate that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute but it does not mean that on that account alone the order passed under sub-section (1) of s. 146 is a mere interlocutory order. I need not discuss this aspect of the matter in detail cause be a Division Bench of this Court in 1979 Cr. LR (Supl.) 20, Sita Ram v. Ghasi Ram , has already taken a view that an order passed u/s 146 Cr. PC is not merely an interlocutory order and I sitting singally am bound by that decision and cannot rely upon the decision of the other High Court even if that be of a Full Bench and I do not feel called upon to differ from the view taken by Division Bench of this Court so as to refer the matter to a larger Bench. This view has further been followed in 1984 WLN 441 Johari & Ors. v. Kisori & Ors. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that when a regular suit had already been filed before the learned Munsif in which the question of title and possession both would be finally decided, the recourse to the proceedings u/ss 145 and 146 Cr. PC was uncalled for and in this connection, he has relied upon Moda Ram & Ors. v. Prithvi Raj, 1984 R.L.R. 588 and Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1985 CRI. LR (SC) 1 . PC was uncalled for and in this connection, he has relied upon Moda Ram & Ors. v. Prithvi Raj, 1984 R.L.R. 588 and Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1985 CRI. LR (SC) 1 . His second contention was that the mere apprehension of breach of peace is not enough to justify an attachment of the property u/s 146 unless one of the three conditions referred to in s. 146 is satisfied, and in the present case none of them is satisfied. In this connection, he placed reliance upon Ando & Ors. v. Bhura & Ors., 1981 Cr. LR (Raj.) 383 and Salla Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 1984 WLN (UC) 278 . 6. His third contention was that the petitioner according to tie complaint had occupied the premises on 3-5 84 and complaint has been filed on 30-6-84, it was sent to the police for enquiry and it was on 12-7-84 that the police submitted its report and in the meantime, there had been no untoward incident, which clearly goes to show that there was absolutely no emergency or imminent danger to the breach of peace and, therefore, also the attachment was uncalled for. Lastly it was also contented by the learned counsel that in any case, there was no justification for the learned Magistrate to pass an order u/s 146 ex-parte without notice to the present petitioners. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for non-petitioner no. 2 supported the order of the learned Magistrate and urged that there was material before the learned Magistrate to justify the orders u/s 145 and 146 Cr. P.C. and this Court sitting in revision cannot question the sufficiency of the material in this respect. He placed reliance upon R.H. Bhutani v. Mani J. Desai, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1444 , Ram Prasad & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others, 1983 RLR 751 , Madanlal v. The State of Rajasthan, 1983 R.L.W. 200 and Narsingh v. Dhanruj & Others, 1984 R.L.R. 98 . 8. I have given my careful consideration to the contentions raised before me by the learned counsel for both the sides. So far as the question of the sufficiency of the material before the learned Magistrate goes, I am in agreement with the learned counsel for non-petitioner no. 2 that Court can not go into the question of sufficiency of the material. So far as the question of the sufficiency of the material before the learned Magistrate goes, I am in agreement with the learned counsel for non-petitioner no. 2 that Court can not go into the question of sufficiency of the material. However, the basic question which requires consideration is whether in the circumstances of this case, recourse to the proceedings u/s 145 Cr. P.C. was at all justified. It is not in dispute that a suit had already been filed by the petitioner. Mahaveer Prasad in which the rights of the parties both in respect of title and possession of the property in dispute are to be adjudicated upon and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly observed in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. & Others, 1985 Cr. LR (SC) 1 that simultaneous proceeding both before the Civil court as well as the criminal court u/s 145 Cr.P.C. are not in the interest of the parties nor in the public interest. Their Lordships have observed as under: "There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that decree of the Civil Court is binding on the criminal court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceeding should not be permitted to continue and in the event of the decree of the Civil Court, the criminal should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach to civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation." 9. Apart from this, in the present ease, it further appears that the dispute is really not with regard to the actual possession of the-property in dispute inasmuch as admittedly the petitioner had been in possession of this property since 3-5-84 and the real dispute between the parties is whether the petitioner Mahavir Prasad is the tenant of the flat in dispute or it is the Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd., who is the tenant. Admittedly the owner of the property in dispute is M/s Mansingka Industries Ltd., Bombay. Admittedly the owner of the property in dispute is M/s Mansingka Industries Ltd., Bombay. It further appears that the petitioner Mahavir Prased is the younger brother of Shri Vishwanath, the Managing Director of the Rajasthan Vanaspati Products Ltd. and there is some dispute between the brothers in respect of the ownership or the tenancy of the building in dispute. Such a dispute can properly he decided only by a civil court and the recourse to proceeding u/s 145 Cr. PC in the circumstances of the case would clearly amount to circumventing the due process of the civil courts. As already stated above, the suit in respect of the property in dispute is already pending before the learned Munsif and the parties can get their right decided there. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above are clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. In these circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that the order of the learned City Magistrate, Bhilwara dated 12-7-84 cannot be maintained and deserves to be set aside. In this view of the matter, I need not go into the other contention of the petitioner. 11. The result, therefore, is that this revision is accepted and the order of the learned City Magistrate, Bhilwara, dated 12-7-84 is set aside.Revision accepted. *******