ORDER : These four applications are at the instance of four employees of the Westing House Saxby Farmer Limited, which has been impleaded as respondent no.1 in all the applications. The nature of the subject matter of dispute also in all the four applications is the same and as such common questions of law and facts are involved in all the applications. 2. The subject matter of challenge in each case is a chargesheet-cum-order of interim suspension dated 20.11.1984. The said applications being moved on 4th December, 1984, interim order was issued and all these applications were directed to be heard analogously. 3. Notices of the applications having been served on the employer Company and its officers, who were impleaded as respondents, the extension of the interim order had been contested on their behalf. Although the interim order was clarified, inter alia, by permitting the respondents to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding and restraining them only from passing the final orders. Mr. Choudhury, appearing on behalf of the respondents, did not avail of the benefits of the said clarification but made a prayer for disposal of the writ applications on merit. Mr. Moitra, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, appreciating that the points raised regarding the legality and validity of the chargesheets by the petitioners could not be properly considered and decided upon without factual materials being brought on record, expressed his inclination to make submissions relating to the validity and propriety of the interim suspension of the petitioners imposed through such chargesheets and both Mr. Chowdhury and Mr. Moitra invited me to dispose of the writ applications deciding the merits of such submissions relating to interim suspension and reserving their respective rights with regard to the remaining portions of the chargesheets or consequential proceedings for future occasion as and when the same would arise. Accordingly, all the applications for writ with the consent of the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties, were heard as contested applications. It may be noted, at this stage, that, apart from the employer-company and its officers, there were two state respondents, who have appeared through Mr. Kandari. Advocate. 4. Before dealing with the different contentions raised on behalf of the contesting parties concerning the validity and propriety of the orders of suspension passed against the petitioners, it is necessary to notice the short relevant facts for appreciating the merits of such contentions. 5. Kandari. Advocate. 4. Before dealing with the different contentions raised on behalf of the contesting parties concerning the validity and propriety of the orders of suspension passed against the petitioners, it is necessary to notice the short relevant facts for appreciating the merits of such contentions. 5. It is an admitted fact that the Company has its own certified standing orders, governing the service conditions of hourly paid employees. Such Standing Orders do not contain any provision for interim administrative suspension but provide for penal suspension in case of minor offences. The other admitted fact is that none of the petitioners is an hourly paid employee but all of them receives monthly salaries. 6. Mr. Moitra, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has contended that since there is no rule providing for interim administrative suspension of a monthly paid employee, the impugned order of suspension can be taken to have been passed in exercise of the inherent right of an employer but result of excercising such a right can at most prevent the employee concerned from performing their duties as such there being no suspension of the contract of employment, it cannot prevent him from claiming his emoluments even without work. Relying upon this distinction in the nature of powers of suspension of an employer, Mr. Moitra has asserted that during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, which his clients like to contest, respondent no. 1, can at best, forbid his clients in exercise of the implied right of an employer, to discharge their duties as such employees but the emoluments due to them (petitioners) must be paid and cannot be substituted by payment of subsistance allowances. 7. Mr. Choudhury, on the other band, on behalf of the respondents employers, has pleaded that in the present ease there is no question of absence of any power of the employer to suspend a contract of employment as the provisions of the model standing orders, as given in Appendix 'A' to the Bengal Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1946, will apply on the strength of S. 12A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Sub clause (a) of Clause 28(5) of the said Appendix empowers the employer to pass an order of suspension, inter alia, in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding or during pendency of a disciplinary proceeding and sub-clause (b) of the said clause 28(5) lays down the procedure and fixes the rate for payment of subsistance allowance during the period of suspension. Section 10A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, however, entitles the suspended employee to payment of subsistence allowance on the basis of any law in vogue in any state if the provisions thereof are more beneficial to the employee concerned. Mr. Choudhury, in view of the aforesaid legal posit ion, has sought to rely on the provisions of S. 2(f) and 3 of the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969. Mr. Choudhury has submitted that the petitioners, accordingly, cannot claim any amount except what is permissible in terms of the said provisions of law. 8. In my view, the submissions of Mr. Choudhury have considerable force. It is a settled position in law, that the power to suspend an employee servant without any- pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service but must arise either from an express term in the contract itself or statutory provision governing such contract The master can, in such circumstances, namely absence of express contract statutorily provided have, at best, a right to forbid the employee to perform his duties but cannot on the ground of such non-performance withhold due wages or salaries of the employee concerned. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the relevant statute or the rule framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. This difference between suspending the contract of service of employee and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting distinguishes the nature of powers of the employer in presence and absence of a contractual term or statutes or rules embodying provision for suspension. Another important distrinction in relationship between the employer and suspended employee arises from the distinction in the nature of power of suspension. Another important distrinction in relationship between the employer and suspended employee arises from the distinction in the nature of power of suspension. In the second class of cases, the employee obeys the order of the employer forbidding him to perform the work because the contract is subsisting Reference may be made to the cases of T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem reported in AIR 1961 SC 276 , R. P. Kapoor v. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 787 , B.R. Patel v. State of Maharastra AIR 1968 SC 800 , V.P. Gindroniya v. State of M.P. & Anr. reported in AIR 1970 SC 1494 and Vice Chancellor, Jammu University and Anr v. D.K. Rampal reported in AIR 1977 SC 1146 . In the present case since the admitted position is that the certified standing orders of the Company are applicable only to hourly paid employees and no monthly paid employees such as the petitioners, the provisions of model standing orders as referred to hereinabove would apply. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in the case of Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited v. Ninth Industrial Tribunal and Others reported in 1977 (1) LIC 607. Accordingly the ad interim order of suspension passed by the respondents has the effect of suspending the contract of service with the result that the petitioners cannot claim anything beyond the subsistence allowance in terms of clause 28(5)(b) of the Appendix to the Bengal Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1946 or the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969, whichever is boneficial to the employees concerned. It may be noted at this stage that regarding the merit of the order of suspension, no other point has been urged before me. 9. In the premises, I am not inclined to interfere with the orders of suspension, assailed in the writ applications, and dismiss the same without any order as to costs. I make it clear, however, that I have not entered into the questions of the validity or otherwise of the remaining portion of the charge-sheet and the same are kept open. 10. I make it clear, however, that I have not entered into the questions of the validity or otherwise of the remaining portion of the charge-sheet and the same are kept open. 10. Since I have already hold that the employees, the writ petitioners, are not entitled to claim any amount other than subsistence allowance, the amounts paid to them in terms of my order passed in the present writ applications should be adjusted after completion of the disciplinary proceeding from the amount which may be found due and payable to the writ petitioners. All interim orders subsisting during the pendency of the writ applications are vacated. Applications dismissed.