JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision under section 115 of the C. P. C. is directed against the order dated 10-1-1984 of the Second Civil Judge (Class-II), Morena in an eviction suit (No. 68-A/1981) filed by non-applicants 1 to 8 (on 25-6-1981) against non-applicants 9 and 10 (Ramkumar and Balraj, sons of late bilayatiram) disallowing the applicant-interveners application dated 5-1-1984 under Order 1, Rule 10 (2) of the C. P. C. for being impleaded as a co-defendant on the ground that his father late Shri Gyan Prakash was a joint-lessee of the suit accommodation. ( 2. ) THE in pugned order runs as follows : ( 3. ) THE plaint averments are that on 10-11-1951 Bilayatiram (father of N. As 9 and 10)took the suit accommodation from the plaintiffs father bhikharam on a monthly rental of Rs. 40/-, During his lifetime Bilayatiram ran, and after his death his sons (NAs 9 and 10) have been running a shop in the rented premises. The plaintiffs father-Bhikharam died on 17-1-1981. The non-applicants 9 and 10 defaulted in payment of rent from 10-1-1981. The plaintiff s demand-cum-quit notice dated 18-2-1981 on non-applicants 9 and 10 having failed, the plaintiffs filed the suit under section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. ( 4. ) THE defendants one objection was that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the interveners father Gyan Prakash Kapila who was a joint-lessee of the suit accommodation. ( 5. ) THE trial Court negatived the objection on 25-2-1982 and the defendants revision (No. 242 of 1982) was dismissed by this Court on 30-4-1982. ( 6. ) THE interveners case in seven paragraphs of his application is that he being the joint-lessee of the suit accommodation, he prayed for being impleaded as a co-defendant. He further stated that rent receipts are being made out in the name of his father Gyan Prakash. He averred that he came to know of the suit in October 1983. ( 7. ) THE plaintiffs written reply dated 5-1-1985 which was backed by plaintiff 2 Siladhars affidavit runs as follows : ( 8. ) THE aforementioned affidavit also refers to this Courts decision dated 30-4-1982 in C. R. No. 242 of 1982, referred to in paragraph 5 above. ( 9. ) I have heard the learned counsel of the intervener and the plaintiffs. ( 10. ) THE aforementioned affidavit also refers to this Courts decision dated 30-4-1982 in C. R. No. 242 of 1982, referred to in paragraph 5 above. ( 9. ) I have heard the learned counsel of the intervener and the plaintiffs. ( 10. ) THE interveners learned counsel states that the rent note filed by the plaintiffs also supports his averment that his father Gyan Prakash and the defendants father Bilayatiram were the joint lessees of the suit accommodation. ( 11. ) IT is urged that he being the heir of a joint-lessee, he should have been impleaded as a co-defendant on his own application, and that the order dated 30-4-82 in C. R. No. 242-1982, to which he was not a party, cannot operate to preclude him from applying for, and from being impleaded as a co-defendant. ( 12. ) THE plaintiffs learned counsel supported the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge. ( 13. ) NOW, the effect of this Courts order dated 30-4-82 in C. R. No. 242/1982 on the interveners right to apply for being impleaded as co-defendant will be considered. ( 14. ) THIS Court had observed as follows: "in a suit for eviction a decree can be passed against a person who is put by the plaintiff to be a tenant, assuming the allegations made by the defendant / applicant to be corrct, then if the plaintiffs alleged that the person, who is occupying the suit shop, is their tenant, then alone a decree for eviction can be passed against him. But, presently, bilayatiram is alleged to be their tenant and the plaintiffs have filed the suit accordingly. Therefore, taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiffs are the dominus litis they have their choice to file their suit against whom they want eviction from the premises. " ( 15. ) THUS, this Court said in effect only this: That the plaintiffs being the dominus litis their is the choice of the defendants for their suit. ( 16. ) NOW, the rule of dominus litis by itself does not necessarily cover a case where an intervener seeks to be impleaded as a co-defendant to resist a suit based on a contract under which he claims to have the same rights in the suit property as the impleaded defendants are alleged (in the plaint) to have in it. ( 17. ( 17. ) WHAT is more, neither the trial Court in its order dated 25-2-1982 nor this Court in its order dated 30-4-1982 (In C. R. no. 242/82) considered the case from the angle whether Gyan Prakash Kapila was to use the expression used in order 1, rule 10 (2), Civil Procedure Code- "a person whose presence before the court was necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions in the suit". ( 18. ) IN Pannalal v. Jiwanlal, 1976 MPLJ 170 (FB) = 1976 JLJ 84 a Full Bench of this Court held that the aforementioned expression describes a person, known in legal parlance as a proper party to the suit. In the ruling the intervened application was considered from the point of view whether they were proper parties to the suit. ( 19. ) IT then follows that this Courts order dated 30-4-1982 does not have the effect of precluding the intervener from applying under Order 1, rule 10 (2), Civil Procedure Code. ( 20. ) THE plaintiffs learned counsel has relied on sunil v. Satyanarayan, 3985 MPRCJ 6. In that case the interveners had said that they were in possession of the suit accommodation in their own right. This Court, therefore, said in effect that even so, they could protect their rights or interest in the property (against any invasion under an eviction decree) by resorting to an appropriate action and, as such, the rule of dominus litis was clearly indicated to refuse them leave to intervene in the eviction suit. Hence, the trial Court agreed in thinking that this Courts order dated 30-4-1982 was an answer to Subhashchands application dated 5-1-1985. ( 21. ) THE trial Courts other reasons are as follows : (i) The application does not disclose in what capacity he is holding the suit shop at present. (ii) The application shows that he resides in Delhi. (iii) The applicant has not filed any affidavit about his being in possession (of the suit accommodation situate at Morena) (iv) The applicant has failed in his duty in not placing facts before the Court in good faith. (v) The affidavit (of plaintiff No. 2 Liladhar) appeared to be more substance as a piece of rebuttal to the averments in the application of Subhashchand. ( 22. (v) The affidavit (of plaintiff No. 2 Liladhar) appeared to be more substance as a piece of rebuttal to the averments in the application of Subhashchand. ( 22. ) NOW, the aforementioned reasons purport to show as if the trial Court were deciding that the applicant had no defence whatsoever to the suit on the merits because he had not come up with any averments and proof relating to his being in actual possession of the suit accommodation. The question arises whether the trial Court had the jurisdiction to pose such questions and answer them. In Sampatbai v. Madhavsingh, 1959 MPLJ 1162 = AIR 1960 MP 84 , Dixit, J. (as then he was) observed in a revision preferred by an unsuccessful intervener as follows : "again as pointed out in Dollfus Mieget Compagnie S. A. v. Bank of England, 1950-52 All ER 605 at p. 611, in determining whether or not an applicant has a proprietory right in the subject matter of an action sufficient to entitle him to be joined as a defendant - the true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents the applicants rights, but rather in what would be the result on the suject matter of the action if those rights could be established. " ( 23. ) IN Mukhtiyar Mohammad v. Pannalal C. R. No. 110 of 1984 (Gwalior Bench, 1984 M. P. L. J. 514) I relied on Sampatabais aforementioned dictum and held that the "civil Judge had no jurisdiction to analyse the constituents of the interveners right. I gave my reasons in paragraph 20 as follows : "again, the learned Civil Judge took it. upon himself to discuss and held - on facts and in law - that the inervener has absolutely no case on merits in answer to the case disclosed in the plaint. This adjudicatory exercise by the learned Judge was not justified because, the intervener did not seek a final adjudication on the merits of the claim - indeed he could not have done so in view of the limited scope of examination of the question [under Order 1, Rule 10 (2)] whether he was a proper party to the suit. This adjudicatory exercise by the learned Judge was not justified because, the intervener did not seek a final adjudication on the merits of the claim - indeed he could not have done so in view of the limited scope of examination of the question [under Order 1, Rule 10 (2)] whether he was a proper party to the suit. My reason is this, that a Court gets jurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon the defence of a person finally only after that person is, or has been impleaded as, a defendant, and that too after a proper trial, held in accordance with the relevant provision of law. The learned Civil Judge, therefore, assumed jurisdiction, when he had none, to hold that the intervener had no case on merits and the Judge had allowed himself to be influenced by his aforementioned finding into rejecting the interveners prayer. " ( 24. ) THE aforementioned observations fully cover the impugned order dated 10-1-1984 and uncover the error of the learned Civil Judge. ( 25. ) AGAIN, the learned Civil Judge did not even mention in the impugned order whether intervener Subhashchand was a proper party to the suit, let alone consider the point. ( 26. ) WHAT is more, he did not advert to the fact that there was no denial in the plaintiffs written reply dated 5-8-1984 and in plaintiff No. 2 Liladhars affidavit dated 5-8-1984 that intervener Subhaschands father Gyan Prakash and the defendants father Bilayatiram had jointly taken the suit accommodation on lease from the plaintiffs father Bhikharam and that rent receipts are being passed in the name of Gyan Prakash. ( 27. ) BESIDES, the learned Judge did not refer to the rent-note dated 10-11-1951 filed by the plaintiffs which begins as follows : The rent-note was signed by Gyan Prakash Kapila and Bilayatiram. ( 28. ) AGAIN, the learned Judge did not advert to the rent-receipts dated 11-4-1980 and 23-11-1980 (Exs. D. 1 and D. 2) issued by them in the name of Gyan Prakash Kapila. ( 29. ) TO cap it all, the learned Judge did not refer to the quit notice dated 18-2-1981 (Ex. P. 23)addressed to Bilayatiram Ramkumar Kapila and which purports to have been sent out to defendant Balraj and intervener Subhaschand as well. The opening part of the paragraph 2 of the notice runs as follows : ( 30. ( 29. ) TO cap it all, the learned Judge did not refer to the quit notice dated 18-2-1981 (Ex. P. 23)addressed to Bilayatiram Ramkumar Kapila and which purports to have been sent out to defendant Balraj and intervener Subhaschand as well. The opening part of the paragraph 2 of the notice runs as follows : ( 30. ) IT is, therefore, evident that the learned Judge committed material irregularity in completely ignoring the material referred in the last five paragraphs. ( 31. ) IN Pannalal v. Jiwanlal, 1978 JLJ 87, this Court held that where an intending purchaser sues for specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property, persons, claiming a title to the property adversely to the defendants, were not proper parties and were refused permission for beingjoined as parties to the suit. ( 32. ) HOWEVER, applicant Subhashchand Kapila is seeking intervention in an eviction suit based on a contract of tenancy, and it is on the basis of this contract of tenancy that he seeks to be impleaded as a co-defendant. Hence, the dicta in the aforementioned two rulings are not applicable to the applicant subhashchands application dated 5-1-1985 for intervention in the suit. ( 33. ) IN the result, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and applicant subhashchands application dated 5-1-1984 deserves to be allowed. ( 34. ) I, therefore, allow the revision petition and set aside the impugned order. The application dated 5-1-1984 of intervener Subhashchand is allowed, subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions : (i) By 24-4-1985 applicant Subhashchand shall pay to the plaintiffs or deposit in Court for payment to them a sum of Rs. 200/- as costs. (This condition is being imposed because the applicant, on his showing, made a delay of more than 2 months in applying for intervention and also because the intervention will have the effect of increasing the costs of the plaintiffs, who had closed their evidence on 5-8-1983) (ii) If costs are not paid or deposited by 24-4-1985, the application dated 5-1-1984 of Subhashchand shall stand dismissed on 25-4-1984. (iii) If costs are paid by 24-4-1985, the intervener shall be shown as defendant No. 3 in the cause title of the plaint and in the Civil Suits Register. ( 35. ) CONSIDERING all the circumstances into consideration, I make no orders as to costs of the revision proceeding. (iii) If costs are paid by 24-4-1985, the intervener shall be shown as defendant No. 3 in the cause title of the plaint and in the Civil Suits Register. ( 35. ) CONSIDERING all the circumstances into consideration, I make no orders as to costs of the revision proceeding. Counsels fee Rs. 50/ -. Revision allowed.