JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - The petitioner, a clerk in the office of the Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Pilibhit, feels aggrieved by an order suspending his services. He has, therefore, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. According to the petitioner, on or before June 26, 1971 he was employed as a clerk in the Municipal Board at Pilibhit. As a result of the coming into force of the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) his services stood transferred to the U.P. Board of Basic Education (hereinafter referred to as the Board). This transfer took place by virtue of the operation of Section 9 of the Act. The main submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that despite the provisions of the Act, the authority competent to pass the order of suspension is the Basic Shiksha Adhikari. The foundation of this argument is: The State Government in the exercise of rule making power under the Act created the Basic Shiksha Adhikari as the competent authority to appoint the clerks for and on behalf of the Board and, therefore, on the relevant date that Adhikari alone had the jurisdiction to suspend the service of the petitioner. Section 9, as it originally stood, may be extracted:-- "(1) On and from the appointed day every teacher, officer and other employees serving under a local body exclusively in connection with basic schools (including any supervisory or inspecting staff) immediately before the said day shall be transferred to and become a teacher, officer or other employee of the Board and shall hold office by the same tenure at the same remuneration and upon the same other terms and conditions of service as he would have held the same of the Board had not been constituted and shall continue to do so unless and until such tenure, remuneration and other terms and conditions are duly altered by the Board. Provided that any service rendered under a local body by any such teacher, officer or other employee before the appointed day shall be deemed to be service rendered under the Board. ............... Provided that any service rendered under a local body by any such teacher, officer or other employee before the appointed day shall be deemed to be service rendered under the Board. ............... (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to any teacher, officer or other employees, who by notice in writing in that behalf to the State Government within a period of two months from the appointed day intimates his option for not becoming an employee of the Board, and where any employee gives such notice his service under the local body shall stand determined with effect from the appointed day and he shall be entitled to compensation from the local body which shall be as follows: ......... 3. Section 19 empowered the State Government to make Rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and in particular for regulation of the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed as teachers to basic schools belonging to any local body. By the U.P. Education Laws (Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. 12 of 1978) sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act was omitted. In sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the word "duly altered by the Board" the words "altered by rules made by the State Government in that behalf" were substituted. Section 19 was substituted by the following: "19(1) The State Government may, by notifications, make rules for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers such rule may provide all or any of the following matters, namely:-- (a) the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the posts of officers, teachers and other employees under Section 6; (b) the tenure of service, remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of officers, teachers and other employees transferred to the Board under Section 9. 4. It is the petitioner's own case that his service as a clerk stood transferred to the Board under Section 2. The provisions of Section 9 read with the proviso as they originally stood clearly provided that the services of the petitioner stood transferred to the Board and he became its employee. It is not the case of the petitioner that he at any stage intimated to the Board under sub-section (2) of Section 9 that he did not wish to become an employee of the Board. It is not the case of the petitioner that he at any stage intimated to the Board under sub-section (2) of Section 9 that he did not wish to become an employee of the Board. In other words, he did not exercise the option given to him and he accepted the position that from the appointed day the Board became his employer and a relationship of master and servant or employer and employee came into existence between him and the Board. In Section 9 the Legislature made it clear that the petitioner became an employee of the Board on the same terms and conditions, including tenure and remuneration, which he enjoyed under his erstwhile employer, namely, Municipal Board, Pilibhit. The terms and conditions of the service of the petitioner were kept infact on the assumption that the Board had not come into existence. To put it differently, though the services of the petitioner stood transferred to the Board and it commenced exercising supervision, direction and control over him (petitioner), yet the terms and conditions of his services remained unaltered. However, the Legislature reserved in the Board the power to alter the tenure, remuneration and other terms and conditions. 5. Section 9 was confined to those employees who had already been recruited elsewhere and whose services stood transferred to the Board. This provision did not empower the Board to make fresh recruitment. This was so as by operation of law the categories of persons referred to in the said section stood duly recruited or appointed by the Board on the appointed day. The Board was recognised as the de jure authority to either appoint or recruit. 6. The expression "condition of service" as used in Section 9 in its context and setting did not embrace either recruitment or appointment, The Board was not empowered to bring about any change in the authority to appoint or recruit. That would have amounted to a modification of the legislative mandate. 7. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh 1970 (20) F.L.R. 81 the Court explained the said expression to mean all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it, in matters like pension etc. 8. 7. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh 1970 (20) F.L.R. 81 the Court explained the said expression to mean all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it, in matters like pension etc. 8. Section 6 of the Act empowered the Board to appoint such number of officers, teachers and other employees as it thought necessary. It also provided that the recruitment and terms and conditions of service of the persons appointed by the Board shall be regulated by Rules made by the State Government in that behalf. It will be immediately seen that while in Section 6 the Legislature had used the word "recruitment" along with "terms and conditions". In Section 9 the word "recruitment" is conspicuous by its absence. This clearly negatives the idea that the employees referred to in Section 9 are recruited by the Board. If the idea of recruitment of employees was foreign to Section 9, the question of the Board being authorised by the Legislature to change the appointing authority of the various employees referred to in that provision did not arise. 9. No change has been brought about in the legislative intendment as contained in Section 9 by the amendments by the Legislature in Section 19 by enforcing U.P. Act No. 25 of 1978. On the contrary, the amendment has clarified the position that the rules made by the State Government will govern or supplement the power of recruitment conferred in the Board under Section 6. 10. Section 16 of the U.P. General Clauses Act does not advance the case of the petitioner. It provides that where, by any Act, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears, the authority having power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss the person appointed by it in exercise of that power. The crucial words in this provision are, "unless a different intention appears". I have already dilated upon the distinction maintained by the Legislature in Sections 6 and 9 of the Act in the matter of recruitment. The crucial words in this provision are, "unless a different intention appears". I have already dilated upon the distinction maintained by the Legislature in Sections 6 and 9 of the Act in the matter of recruitment. In State of Assam v. Kripanath Sharma and others A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 459 an argument based on Section 18 of the Assam General Clauses Act, which is analogous to Section 16 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, is answered in the following manner:-- "But there is another difficulty in the present case which stands in the way of the Assistant Secretary having the power to dismiss teachers who had been taken over under Section 34 of the Act and thus had been appointed before the Act came into force. Section 18 of the 1915-Act says that the authority having power to make an appointment shall have the power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by it in exercise of that power. Therefore, the authority which appoints can only dismiss such persons as have been appointed by it. It cannot dismiss persons appointed by any other authority, for such persons have not been appointed by it in the exercise of its power as appointing authority. In the present case, as we have already pointed out, the office of the Assistant Secretary of the State Board was created for the first time by the Act. Therefore, all those persons who had been appointed before the Act came into force could not possibly be appointed by the Assistant Secretary, for there was no such authority in the earlier enactment repealed by the Act. In the earlier Act the appointing authority was the School Board, for there was no Assistant Secretary of the State Advisory Board thereunder. Therefore, a person appointed before the Act came into force by the School Board cannot be said to have been appointed by the Assistant Secretary of the State Board or its predecessor the State Advisory Board, for there was no such authority in the earlier enactment. In the circumstances, we are of opinion that the Assistant Secretary could not dismiss teachers appointed before the Act came into force, for there was no such authority existing before that. 11. This petition is devoid of any merit. It is, accordingly, dismissed summarily.