B. K. BEHERA. J. ( 1 ) UPON hearing the learned Additional Standing Counsel and the learned counsel for the respondent, who had figured as the accused person in the trial court being charged under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code with having committed rape on Srada Panigrahi (P. W. 6) in his bi-cycle shop on April 25, 1980 at about 8 p. m. after dragging her from a place nearby where a cinema show was going on, I find, for the reasons to follow, that no interference is called for, as, on a careful examination of the evidence of the eleven witnesses examined for the prosecution and the four witnesses examined for the defence, the learned trial judge has found that the charge had not been established and the findings recorded by the trial court cannot be said to be unreasonable or perverse calling for interference by this Court in an appeal against acquittal. ( 2 ) AS has been submitted at the Bar, the medical evidence did not support the case of the prosecution, as deposed to by P. W. 6 in the court, that she had been raped against her will and without her consent, as no injury had been found on her person or on the person of the respondent. The seizures of some clothes of P. W. 6 would not also further the case of the prosecution as no semen was detected in any of the articles. The Paijama (M. O. IV) said in have been seized from and belonging to the respondent did contain some semen, but it was found insufficient for serological test. This could not, therefore, be taken to be a circumstance against the respondent. ( 3 ) ABSENCE of injuries on the person of the aggressor or the aggressed is not a sure indication as to whether rape had or had not been committed as in a case of helpless resignation, injuries might not have been caused on the aggressor or the aggressed owing to want of resistance. In the instant case, however, as would be found from the evidence of P. W. 6, it was not for the first time on April 26, 1980 that the respondent had sexual intercourse with her. On her own showing, the respondent had sexual intercourse with her for about six times prior to the date of occurrence. In the instant case, however, as would be found from the evidence of P. W. 6, it was not for the first time on April 26, 1980 that the respondent had sexual intercourse with her. On her own showing, the respondent had sexual intercourse with her for about six times prior to the date of occurrence. Her case that the respondent had made a false promise that he would marry her and that he had taken an oath in that regard before a Goddess had not found assurance from any other evidence and there was nothing to show that she had even informed this fact to her parent or anyone else. ( 4 ) ALTHOUGH she had testified in the court that she had been forcibly dragged and subjected to sexual intercourse without her consent during the night of occurrence, it is important to keep in mind that in her statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure recorded in the course of investigation, she had not slated a word about it An English rendering of the statement recorded in the Oriya language would read: Purnachandra Sadangi had kept me for one year and two months. During that time, I used to go to the house or my father at Boriguma and used to go to B. Singhpur. On the last Friday (25. 4. 80), I had gone to the house of Purnachandra Sadangi at B. Singhpur. At about 9 p. m. during the night, the boys caught us. I fled away to our house at B. Singhpur. My mother assaulted me and said Go where you had gone. I again fled away to the house of Purnachandra Sadangi. Then at his instance, I went to the house of Surya Behera and stayed there. I have come here as the Police has brought me. I have association (Milam is a) with Purnachandra Sadangi. Purnachandra Sadangi is the respondent in this appeal. It would thus be seen that, the story presented by her in the court had not been spoken to when her statement was recorded by a Magistrate in the course of investigation. ( 5 ) AS has been submitted by the learned counsel for both the sides, the prosecution has not established by clear evidence that P. W. 6 was below sixteen years at the time of the occurrence. ( 5 ) AS has been submitted by the learned counsel for both the sides, the prosecution has not established by clear evidence that P. W. 6 was below sixteen years at the time of the occurrence. Under the law, therefore, P. W. 6 could give consent for sexual intercourse with a person. ( 6 ) A reading of the evidence of P. W. 6 would indicate that it the respondent did have sexual intercourse with her during the night of occurrence, it was with her consent. She had stated in her cross-examination: I know the accused since my childhood. I know the caste of the accused. We are Brahmin by caste I was a student when the first incident tack place. After about four to five months thereafter I left my school. After the first incident and before the time of occurrence I had sexual intercourse with the accused for about six times. All the incidents took place in the shop room. The accused has his house in Brahmin Sahi. The shop room of the accused is at a distance of one furlong from his house. I cannot say the exact dates or months when the six intercourses took place. Some of the intercourses were made during day time and some during night time Sometimes the accused had dragged me and some times he requested me to have sexual intercourse with me. For the first four times the accused dragged me and for the last two times I went with him on his request. For all the six times, I was not consenting to the intercourse out of my own will. After the oath ceremony performed in the temple, I had firm belief in me that the accused would marry me and accept me as his wife and I would accept him as my husband. So I went to his shop room with him for the purpose of co-habitation. All the six times none has been the occurrence. I did not disclose this fact to anybody. When I was coming to the shop of the accused, he was dragging me from the road, during night time. During the day time-incidents I followed the accused on, his request Stating as to what happened during the night of occurrence, P. W. 6 had stated in her cross- examination thus: irst the accused stood near me and winked eyes. When I was coming to the shop of the accused, he was dragging me from the road, during night time. During the day time-incidents I followed the accused on, his request Stating as to what happened during the night of occurrence, P. W. 6 had stated in her cross- examination thus: irst the accused stood near me and winked eyes. The accused was standing at a distance of six feet. I saw the accused to his face, but did not tell anything. Thereafter the accused came near me and dragged me by holding my hands. I did not object the accused there. . . We stayed there for about one and a half hours. I did not touch the body of the accused. Then also the accused committed sexual intercourse with me by the same manner as mentioned above. I did not feel any pain or struggle by the time of incident in question. There was no inconvenience to me. I enjoyed the intercourse. I wore my underwear. The accused wore his dresses. The discharge was inside my vagina. I have not washed my vagina or cleaned it otherwise after co-habitation. The accused wore his dresses before me. I have not seen the accused washing or cleaning his penis. The accused went outside after the incident locking the door from outside, without telling me anything. As the accused told me that there were people outside the shop room, I stayed there sometime more. According to the direction of the accused I came out by opening the back door only ( 7 ) THE aforesaid statements would give an indication, that what had been stated by P. W. 6 in the court against the respondent with regard to the charge was untrue. ( 8 ) AS would appear from the evidence, P. W. 6 had not informed about what had happened to anyone and not even to her mother. In the first information report lodged by no other person than the father of P. W. 6, at about 6. 30 p. m. on April 76, 1980, not a word had been stated about the commission of rape on P. W. 6 by the respondent. ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I find that the trial court had rightly concluded that the charge had not been brought home to the respondent. 30 p. m. on April 76, 1980, not a word had been stated about the commission of rape on P. W. 6 by the respondent. ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I find that the trial court had rightly concluded that the charge had not been brought home to the respondent. If, as deposed to by P. W. 6, the respondent had sexual intercourse with her during the night of April 26, 1980, the facts, evidence and circumstances discussed above would give an indication that it had been done with the consent of P. W. 6 and not without her consent and against her will, as claimed by the latter. The order of acquittal cannot be interfered with. ( 10 ) THE appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. .