JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india filed in August 1983 is for quashing the order dated 13-2-1981 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Indore, the respondent No. 4, in the departmental Enquiry held against the petitioner and two others whereby he has been dismissed from service. ( 2. ) IT is not in dispute that at the relevant time the petitioner was holding the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector, Police at Mhow, District indore. The charges dated 25-12-1980 framed by the Superintendent of police were in respect of the activities dated 15-12-1980 of the petitioner and others directed against him in respect of the penalty of censure imposed by him on two police personnel and the action taken in two other matter public complaints. The Departmental enquiry was conducted by the respondent No. 5, the Deputy Superintendent of Police working under the respondent No. 4. ( 3. ) THE petitioner had submitted an application dated 1-1-1981 to the respondent No. 4 stating that the former has no hope of getting justice from him and his subordinates and on the facts of the case it was against the principles of natural justice that he should himself initiate the Departmental enquiry. ( 4. ) AT the conclusion of the Departmental Enquiry the petitioner was dismissed by the respondent No. 4 by the impugned order. ( 5. ) THE petitioner appealed to the Deputy Inspector General of Police indore but was unsuccessful. He also approached the Inspector-General of Police, respondent No. 2 who treating his representation as revision and ultimately dismissed it on 4-12-1981. ( 6. ) IN the petition it is contended that the charges were not accompanied by list of documents and list of witnesses, despite the demand, the same were not supplied to him, initiation of the Departmental Enquiry by the Superintendent of Police was against the principles of natural justice and the petitioner was also deprived of a reasonable opportunity of being heard. ( 7. ) THE Departmental Enquiry was challenged also on the ground that it is violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and Rules 9, 10, 14 and 18 of the M. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short the Control and Appeal Rules)and also of the Regulations Nos. ( 7. ) THE Departmental Enquiry was challenged also on the ground that it is violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and Rules 9, 10, 14 and 18 of the M. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short the Control and Appeal Rules)and also of the Regulations Nos. 214, 215 and 222 of the Police Regulations framed under the Police Act, 1961. ( 8. ) IT was lastly contended that the Superintendent of Police, Indore not being the appointing authority had no authority to impose on the petitioner the penalty of dismissal. Delay in filing the petition was explained mainly on the ground of poverty. ( 9. ) IN their return the respondents denied the submissions made by the petitioner in his petition. Denying the applicability of the Control and appeal Rules it was contended that the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay. ( 10. ) AS to the position of a Government servant Article 310 of the constitution provides as under : "except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the union or of an all India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State. " As pointed out in the decision in Hukumsinghs case, 1979 M P L J 625=1979 J L J 632. the principle of doctrine of pleasure contained in this Article is subject to the guarantee given by Article 311 ibid. Except to the extent of guarantee contained in article 311 and the provisions of the Rules made under Article 309, the common law right of the Government to terminate the services of its servant continues. The result is that whenever a Government servant claims that the termination of his services is void and he is entitled to continue in service, he must show the breach of any of these provisions in order to substantiate his claim that the termination of his services is void and ineffective. In the decision in Manager, Govt. The result is that whenever a Government servant claims that the termination of his services is void and he is entitled to continue in service, he must show the breach of any of these provisions in order to substantiate his claim that the termination of his services is void and ineffective. In the decision in Manager, Govt. Branch Press v. D. B. Beliappa, A I R 1979 S C 429. it has been pointed out that the rule of master and servant in its original obsolete form, to bring it in tune with vastly changing socio-economic conditions and mores of the day, has been eroded by judicial decisions and legislation particularly in is application to persons in public employment to whom the constitutional protection of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 is available. ( 11. ) THE relevant portion of Article 311 may usefully be produced. It runs thus:- "311. (1) No person who is member of a civil service of the Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. " (Emphasis supplied ). As to the connotation of the term appointing authority the decision in dinkarraos case, 1976 MP L J 848. is pertinent. Interpreting Article 311 (1) of the Constitution the Supreme Court in the decision in Slate of M. P. v. Shardul Singh, 1971 MPLJ 363. has held that the guarantee provided under the aforesaid provision does not include within itself a further guarantee that the Departmental Enquiry should also be initiated or conducted by the authority named therein. As held in G. N. Ghoshs case, AIR 1963 SC 812 . prohibition against demonstration is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. ( 12. ) IT must be remembered that Departmental Enquiry is not a matter of empty formality. It is a serious proceeding intended to give the servant concerned a chance to meet the charge and to prove his innocence. prohibition against demonstration is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. ( 12. ) IT must be remembered that Departmental Enquiry is not a matter of empty formality. It is a serious proceeding intended to give the servant concerned a chance to meet the charge and to prove his innocence. It has to be conducted according to relevant statutory rules regulating it and the principles of natural justice. Impartiality and fairness amongst other matters are the essential elements of natural justice. In this connection the following observations in the F. B. decision in Bal Krishna Tiwari v. Registrar, A. P. S. University, 1978 M PL J 172=1978 J L J 182. may usefully be reproduced : "rules of natural justice are not codified. Principles of natural justice are not statutory. They are fundamental rights of judicial procedure which have been evolved to ensure fair adjudication wherever rights of an individual are affected. Their aim is to prevent miscarriage of justice. Where there is violation of principle of natural justice proceedings can be quashed by certiorari. Acts of public authorise, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative, can be challenged when the rules of natural justice have been contravened. However, the rules of natural justice are not capable of definition. They vary according to the constitution of the statutory body and the statute under which they function. But they depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case and the frame-work of the law applicable to it. " ( 13. ) IN the decision in Bhagwat Parshad v. I. G. of Police AIR 1970 P and H 81. which pertains to a writ petition by a police constable, it has been pointed out that there are well settled limitations in exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In addition to other Supreme Court decisions, the one in State of Orrisa v. Bidyabhushan, A I R 1963 Sc 777. has also been referred to in the above cited decision the Supreme Court has observed to the following effect. "the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. "the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable : nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. The condition necessary for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is, that the order of the inferior tribunal suffers from an error which is apparent on the face of the record, or in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the tribunal has acted illegally or arbitrarily. The evidence has been considered and the conclusion drawn from its appraisal cannot be re-opened. No error of fact will be corrected by this Court when exercising its supervisory jurisdiction. It is not permissible to advance the argument, that the evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 14. ) COMING to the merits of the matter, the contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that the impugned order of dismissal is by the superintendent of Police and the appointing authority for the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector from which the petitioner has been dismissed is the deputy Inspector General of Police and thus there has been violation of the constitutional guarantee under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution and the impugned order is clearly vitiated. In addition, it has also been contended that Rules 14 and 18 of the Control and Appeal Rules have also been infringed. It may be pointed out that Rule 14 prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalties including that of dismissal and Rule 18 (1) providing for common proceedings is in these terms : "where two or more Government servants are concerned in any case, the Governor or any other authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on all such Government servants may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 15. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 15. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents replying to the contention regarding the infraction of the Control and Appeal Rules contends that a perusal of sections 1 to 4 of Chapter I of Part If of the Police Regulations which according to the prefactory note at page 11 consist of rules and executive orders by the Government and the executive orders and rules of the inspector-General of Police shows that the following four classes of police personnel are involved in the administration": (i) Gazetted staff-Indian police Service; (ii) Gazetted staff-State; (iii) Subordinate staff-Officers and (iv) Subordinate staff-rank and file and in this context it has to be held that the expression state Police Service occurring in Regulation 21 3 of the police Regulations refers only to the gazetted staff-State and not to the subordinate staff. In support of this submission he also invited my attention to section 7 of the Police Act which deals with punishments only for subordinate staff and to regulations 228 to 232 regarding D. E. Regulation 213 runs thus: "the rules contained in the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and those in the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, will regulate the punishment of and appeals from officers belonging to the Indian Police Service and the State Police Service respectively". The respondents learned counsel in support of his aforesaid submission also invited my attention to Rule 3 (d) of the Control and Appeal Rules and urged that in view of the Police Act and the Police Regulations Governing the question of punishments to subordinate staff of the police department, the applicability of the Control and Appeal Rules is clearly excluded. Reliance for the submission was placed on the decision in Mewa Ram Charans case, AIR 1954 All 587. It is apposite to reproduce Rule 3 (1) (d) referred to above: "3 (1 ). These rules shall apply to every Government servant but shall not apply to- (d) any person for whom special provision is made, in respect of matters covered by these rules, by or under any law for the time being in force or by or under any agreement entered into by or with the previous approval of the Governor before or after the commencement of these rules, in regard to matters covered by such special provisions. " ( 16. " ( 16. ) ON a careful consideration of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and a perusal of the relevant provisions, I am of the view that it cannot be held that the Control and Appeal Rules are wholly excluded in Departmental Enquiries against subordinate staff of the police department. The correct principle is as stated by Krishnan, J. in premchandra v. State, 1970 MPLJ 430. Therein it was observed as under :- "civil Service Regulations, as in force in the State are applicable to all civil Departments including the Police. Within that Department, there are the Police Regulations which naturally prevail wherever there is conflict between them and the Civil Service Regulations; but in a field like temporary employment, for which there is no special Police regulation, the Civil Service Regulations as in force in this State, apply. A probationary Sub-Inspector can be removed without a proceeding under Article 311, unless he has been confirmed during the interval. Of course, if a probationary officer is to be sent away with a black-mark, then proceedings would be necessary. " ( 17. ) NOW as the S P S authority to pass the impugned order. A perusal of the Schedule referred in Rule 8 of the Control and Appeal Rules shows that for Assistant Sub-Inspector the appointing authority is the deputy Inspector General of Police. Even according to Regulation 221 the punishment of dismissal enumerated in Regulation 214 (vi) is not within the competence of the Superintendent of Police. That power is with the Deputy Inspector General as provided in Regulation 222. Under regulation 229 (b) the Superintendent of Police in the event of punishment of dismissal has only to forward the case to him. ( 18. ) FROM the foregoing discussion it is clear that the impugned order of dismissal not being by the appointing authority being in contravention of the guarantee under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution has to be struck down resting as it does on illegal and improper foundation. ( 19. ) THE petitioners next contention that principles of natural justice also stand violated in his case it may be stated is also not without force. ( 19. ) THE petitioners next contention that principles of natural justice also stand violated in his case it may be stated is also not without force. It is clear from the record that the agitation giving rise to the Departmental enquiry against the petitioner and others was directed against the action taken by Shri Ashok Patel, the Superintendent of Police Indore and without compliance with Rule 18 of the Control and Appeal Rules, he not only himself initiated the Departmental Enquiry but also passed the impugned order which as already held is violative of the constitutional guarantee under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. It is rightly observed that the role of the accused or the witness and of the Judge cannot be played by one and the same person and it is futile to expect when those roles are combined that the Judge can hold the scales of justice even. In this connection the following observations in the decision in Arjun Chaubeys case AIR 1984 S C 1356. are pertinent: "evidently, respondent No. 3 assessed the weight of his own accusations against the appellant and passed a judgment which is one of the easiest to pass, namely, that he himself, was a truthful person and the appellant a liar. In doing this, respondent No. 3 violated a fundamental principle of natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the appellant related to his conduct qua respondent No. 3. Therefore, it was not open to the latter to sit in judgment over the explanation offered by the appellant and decide that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge in his own case and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Any one who has a personal stake in an enquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the inquiry. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 20. ) THIS brings us to the question of delay in filing the petition. Whether in a given case delay should be condoned or not depends on its facts and circumstances. As pointed out in the decision in Indersingh H. v. State of M, P. 1981 JLJ 109. it is not that writ under Article 226 if filed within a period of limitation provided for a suit for similar relief cannot be rejected on the grounds of undue delay. As pointed out in the decision in Indersingh H. v. State of M, P. 1981 JLJ 109. it is not that writ under Article 226 if filed within a period of limitation provided for a suit for similar relief cannot be rejected on the grounds of undue delay. As pointed out in the decision in Sudamadevi v. Commissioner and others, 1983 J L J Note 40. in every case it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as the period of limitation. There may be cases where even short delay may befatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner. In the decision in Arjun Chaubeys case (supra) holding that illegality from which the order of dismissal suffered was of a grave and fundamental character, it was observed that the alleged habitual mis-behaviour on the part of the appellant could not cure or condone it. ( 21. ) IN the instant case the impugned order is not only in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice but is also violative of the constitutional guarantee under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. In has an indelible stamp of infirmity; ( 22. ) IN the circumstances of the case I am of the view that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be crippled on technical considerations allowing flagrantly unjust orders to stand and defeating thereby the purpose for which that jurisdiction is conferred. ( 23. ) IT has been stated at the Bar that Writ Petition Nos. 376/82 and 377/82 by Sub-Inspector Mahendra Pratapsingh and some others in connection with the agitation against the very action taken by the Superintendent of Police, Indore have been allowed by this Court on 17-5-1984. ( 24. ) ON a cumulative consideration of the facts and circumstances detailed above, I am of the view that condoning the delay the petition deserves to be allowed. ( 25. ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 13-2-1981 passed by the respondent No. 4 dismissing the petitioner from employment is set aside. The respondents are directed to let the petitioner continue in his employment uninterrupted granting him all the intervening benefits. ( 25. ) IN the result the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 13-2-1981 passed by the respondent No. 4 dismissing the petitioner from employment is set aside. The respondents are directed to let the petitioner continue in his employment uninterrupted granting him all the intervening benefits. Parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. The amount of security deposit be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.