JUDGMENT S. Saghir Ahmad, J. 1. On 1921985, we had dismissed the petition by the following short order : For the reasons to be recorded later the petition being devoid of merit is dismissed summarily, We now proceed to give our reasons. 2. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The petitioner, who was a Junior Engineer in the U.P. Public 'Works Department, was convicted by the Special Judge, (II Additional District and Sessions Judge), Saharanpur on 23583 for offences under sections 120B, 467 and 471 IPC read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to three years' Rigorous Imprisonment. The petitioner has filed Criminal Appeal No. 1257 of 1983 in this court, at Allahabad, against the above conviction, which has been admitted and the petitioner has been released on bail. The petitioner has been dismissed from service by order dated 4285 (Annexure1) and it is this order which has been challenged in this writ petition on the grounds, inter alia, that before passing the order of dismissal the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of hearing as provided by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, particularly as the dismissal was not Abased on the ground of conviction alone but was founded on other grounds as well. 4. A Government servant holds office during the pleasure of the President or of the Governor of the State, as the case may be. Article 311 places certain restrictions on the exercise of that pleasure. Article 311(2). which is relevant for the purpose of the present case, may be quoted below : 311 (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. which is relevant for the purpose of the present case, may be quoted below : 311 (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed : Provided further that this clause shall not apply (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge ; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry ; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. 5. The provisions quoted above indicate that a person cannot he dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except, after an enquiry in which he is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. But this is not applicable where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that (i) the words led to his conviction on a criminal charge mean convicted finally and since in the instant case the appeal was pending in this court against the order of conviction passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, the petitioner could not have been dismissed without the enquiry envisaged by Article 311(2). Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that (i) the words led to his conviction on a criminal charge mean convicted finally and since in the instant case the appeal was pending in this court against the order of conviction passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, the petitioner could not have been dismissed without the enquiry envisaged by Article 311(2). (ii) As laid down by this court in Radhey Govind Swamp v. Union of India (1984 Lucknow Civil Decisions 93) the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to explain his conduct, (iii) The order of dismissal was not based merely on the ground of conviction but was founded on other grounds as well and for this reason also the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity of hearing prior to his dismissal from service and (iv) In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan ( AIR 1983 SC 803 ) the petitioner should not have been dismissed from service during the pendency of the appeal so that he could have been paid his salary or at least the subsistence allowance to enable him to pursue his appeal against the order of conviction. 7. Let us proceed to consider the questions on merits. 8. A Single Judge of this court in R.S. Das v. Divisional Superintendent, Allahabad (AIR 1960 Alld. 538) has held that the words has led to his conviction mean that the proceedings have ultimately resulted in conviction. If a person is acquitted in appeal, then he cannot be said to have been convicted finally and his case will not be covered by Proviso (a) to Article 311 (2). 9. The decision of the Single Judge was upheld by the Division Bench in Special Appeal in Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway v. Ram Saran Das (AIR 1961 Alld 336). These decisions have since been followed in Union of India v. R. Akbar Sheriff ( AIR 1961 Mad 486 ), Tarini Kumar v. Chief Commercial Superintendent and another ( AIR 1965 Cal 75 ) and Dhaniji Ram Sharma v. Union of India and another (AIR 1965 Punj 153). The Punjab High Court in Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Divisional Superintendent (AIR 1959 Punj 401) has taken a similar view. 10. The Punjab High Court in Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Divisional Superintendent (AIR 1959 Punj 401) has taken a similar view. 10. This question was also considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Kunwar Bahadur v. Union of India (1967 ALJ 486 : AIR 1969 Alld. 414). In that case the employee (Kr. Bahadur was convicted by the Special Judge (Anticorruption) on 17556. On 21556 his services were terminated without giving him any opportunity to show cause. An appeal which was filed by Kr. Bahadur against the order of conviction was allowed by this Court on 941957. Kr. Bahadur then instituted a suit in the court of Civil Judge, Allahabad for a declaration that the order of removal from service was bad and that he was entitled to the arrears of salary. The suit was dismissed and the first appeal, which Kr. Bahadur thereafter filed, was referred to the Full Bench for deciding the question whether the provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution would apply to the facts of the case. It was contended before the Full Bench that the Government is not under any obligation to wait for the decision of the appeal and that it can proceed to dismiss a Government servant immediately on his conviction by the trial court or else there would be inordinate delay in finalising the departmental proceedings. The Full Bench observed as under Now, it is always open to Government to pass an order of dismissal or removal from service immediately after a criminal court records conviction. In that case the administration runs the risk of the conviction being later set aside in appeal or revision. It is for the administration to decide whether in a particular case it should pass an order of dismissal or removal immediately after conviction by the trial court, or wait for the result of a possible appeal or revision. Such considerations of expediency can have little bearing on the interpretation of Article 311 of the Constitution. 11. The Full Bench also held that if the conviction is set aside by the appellate court, the employee immediately becomes entitled to the protection of Article 311(2) and, at that stage, the Government cannot insist that because at the time of the passing of the order of dismissal, there was already a conviction validly recorded, the order of dismissal would stand. 12. 12. The point, therefore, that a person is liable to be dismissed or removed from service on being convicted by the trial court without waiting for the decision of the appeal or revision filed against the order of conviction, should be taken to have been concluded by the aforesaid decisions, particularly the Full Bench decision in Kunwar Bahadur's case (supra) in which, as pointed out above, it has been laid down that it is open to the Government to pass an order of dismissal or removal from service immediately after the trial court records conviction. (See also Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab and another, 1980(3) SLR 173 in which the Full Bench decision of this court in Kr. Bahadur's case (supra) has been followed). 13. Let us come to the second ground. 14. In Radhey Govind Swamp v. Union of India (1984 Lucknow Civil Decisions 93) a Bench of this Court, of which one of us (S. Saghir Ahmad, J.) was a member, had made an observation to the following effect : It is to be noted that in the instant case a notice was issued to the petitioner before action was taken on the basis of conviction. Thus, the requirements of Challappan's case reported in 1975(2) SLR 587 (SC) were undisputedly fulfilled. 15. It is on the basis of the above observation that the learned counsel has contended that before removing the petitioner from service, a show cause notice should have been issued. 16. It will be noticed that an enquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) is not to be held where a person is dismissed or removed etc. on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. What is important is that the basis of the dismissal etc. should be the conduct which has led to conviction and not mere conviction. The conduct spoken of in clause (a) of the Proviso refers to the conduct as a Government servant. In order, therefore3 that a person may be dismissed or removed from service without holding an enquiry as contemplated by Article 311(2), his conduct as a Government servant, which has led to his conviction, should be the basis of removal. The conduct spoken of in clause (a) of the Proviso refers to the conduct as a Government servant. In order, therefore3 that a person may be dismissed or removed from service without holding an enquiry as contemplated by Article 311(2), his conduct as a Government servant, which has led to his conviction, should be the basis of removal. If the dismissal order is based on the ground of mere conviction, it may not be possible to dispense with the enquiry, as it would not be covered by the Exception contained in Clause (a) of the Proviso. 17. Article 311 (2), as also its Proviso, has since been amended and the requirement of opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment has been deleted. Challappan's case which is also reported in AIR 1975 SC 2216 , was decided before the amendment. Even in that case it was laid down by the Supreme Court as under : An analysis of the provisions of Article 311 (2) extracted above would clearly show that this constitutional guarantee contemplates three stages of departmental inquiry before an order of dismissal, removal or reduction can be passed, namely (i) that on receipt of a complaint against a delinquent employee, charges should be framed against him and a departmental inquiry should be held against him in his presence ; (ii) that after the report of the departmental inquiry is received, the appointing authority must come to a tentative conclusion regarding the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee and (iii) that before actually imposing the penalty a final notice to the delinquent employee should be given to show cause why the penalty proposed against him be not imposed on him. Proviso (a) to Article 311(2), however, completely dispenses with all the three stages of departmental inquiry when an employee is convicted on a criminal charge. The reason for the proviso is that in a criminal trial the employee has already had a full and complete opportunity to contest the allegations against him and to make out his defence.In these circumstances, therefore, if after conviction by the court a fresh departmental inquiry is not dispensedwith, it will lead to unnecessary waste of time and expense and a fruitless duplication of the same proceedings all over again. It was for this reason that the founders of the constitution thought that where once a delinquent employee has been convicted of a criminal offence that should be treated as a sufficient proof of his misconduct and the disciplinary authority may be given the discretion to impose the penalties referred to in Article 311(2), namely, dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. 18. The question whether any further opportunity was required to be given to the respondent was considered by the Supreme Court in Para 21 of the report at Page 2224 in the light of Rule 14 of the Railway servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 which, inter alia, provides that the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit. 19. It was on the basis of this provision that the Supreme Court held that even after conviction by a criminal court, the employee concerned is entitled to hearing as the provisions contained in Rule 14, referred to above, Import a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking a final action in the matter, the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case objectively considered. 20. The question whether it was required of the disciplinary authority to hear the accused and consider the matter even where no provision like Rule 14 existed, was left open by the Supreme Court. 21. In Challappan's case, therefore, opportunity of hearing, even after conviction, was required to be given because of Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 and not on the ground that it was required by Article 311 (2). Challappan's case has since been followed in many cases but we may refer to only two of them to further clarify the point. In T. Jayant v. Union of India and others (1980(2) SLR 507) and Sardara Singh v. The Administrator of Union Territory, Chandigarh (1980(3) SLR 702), the orders of dismissal following conviction were set aside on the ground that an opportunity of hearing was not given as was contemplated by Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 which, incidentally, is couched in language similar to Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. 22. 22. The observation of this court in Radhey Govind Swarup's case (supra) cannot, therefore, be pressed m aid in this case as Radhey Govind Swarup was a Head Rakshak in the Railway Protection Force and the purport of the observation was that even if an opportunity was required to be given, it had been given inasmuch as a notice was first issued before dismissing him (R. G. Swarup) from service. 23. It is thus clear that : (i) if a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, he need not be provided an opportunity of hearing vide Proviso (a) to Article 311(2) (See also Narayan Prasad Rewany v. State of Orissa and another AIR. 1957 Orissa 51 ; Durga Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1957 Punj 97 ; In re : B. Nagabhushanam AIR 1966 AP 72 ; Sunil Kumar Ghosh v. State of West Bengal and others AIR 1970 Cal 384 ; A.B. Culvert and another v. The General Manager S. E. Rly. and another AIR 1970 Cal 501 ; Om Prakash v. The Director, Postal Services and others AIR 1973 Punj 1 and Santosh Kumar Mahapatra v. State of Orissa and others 1975 Lab 1C 1464). (ii) But if there is a service rule, which contemplates a further opportunity to be given to the employee concerned even after his conviction, then that opportunity should be given to him or else the order of dismissal would be bad vide Challappan's case (supra); R. Radha Krishnan Nair v. State of Kerala (1978(2) SLR 661), T. Jay ant v. Union of India (supra) and Sardara Singh v. The Administrator of Union Territory (supra). 24. We have not, in the instant case, been referred to any service rule which requires an opportunity of hearing to be given to the petitioner before passing the order of dismissal on the basis of conviction recorded by the criminal court. The petitioner, therefore, in our opinion, was rightly dismissed from service and the order impugned in this writ petition cannot be struck down on the ground that the petitioner should have been first afforded an opportunity of hearing. 25. The impugned order of dismissal is contained in Annexure1. The petitioner, therefore, in our opinion, was rightly dismissed from service and the order impugned in this writ petition cannot be struck down on the ground that the petitioner should have been first afforded an opportunity of hearing. 25. The impugned order of dismissal is contained in Annexure1. The order recites that the petitioner, who was Junior Engineer (Civil), had participated in the strike of Junior Engineers on 10174 while he was posted at Roorkee and during the period of strike, he got an appointment, on his own application, as Junior Engineer in Rural Engineering Service without disclosing that he was already in service and was on strike. He worked in that department till 28374. He resumed his charge in the PWD, on the strike being called off, on 8474. During this period he committed several irregularities which were inquired into by the vigilance and on a case being made out against him a crimina1 prosecution was launched which ultimately resulted in his conviction under Section 5(2), read with Section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and he was sentenced to three years' R. I. He was, therefore, dismissed from service. The basis of the order therefore, is his conduct as a government servant which has ultimately led to his conviction. This order cannot be struck down on the ground that because other circumstances have also been taken into consideration the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of hearing as, in our opinion, the basis of removal from service is the petitioner's conduct which, as observed earlier, had led to his conviction. 26. Learned counsel, in the end, invited our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Bhan ( AIR 1983 SC 803 ) and contended that the petitioner, who has a right to live, should continue to be provided subsistence allowance so long as the appeal filed by him against the order of conviction is not finally disposed of. This decision was considered by this court in Radhey Govind Swarup's case (supra) and was explained as under Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made certain observations in State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, AIR 1983 SC 803 , which suggest that it is necessary in order to enable the convict appellant to prosecute his criminal appeal against conviction that the petitioner should be allowed to continue in service. We find, however, that no such question was involved in that case. In that case the person who had been convicted was not dismissed from service, but was allowed by the appointing authority itself to continue in service. He was merely placed under suspension. While under suspension, he was paid a token subsistence allowance. It was the rule providing for a merely token subsistence allowance that was struck down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the ground that the grant of token subsistence allowance was meaningless and that if the appellant could not get even a proper subsistence allowance he would not be in a position to prosecute his appeal. Nothing was, however, considered about a case where the convict is dismissed from service in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of the Proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. If a Government servant is allowed to remain in service, it is but proper that he should receive either his salary or a reasonable subsistence allowance. But the principle cannot be extended to the case of a person who is no longer in service. 27. We reiterate the view expressed above. In the above Supreme Court case the contract of service had not come to an end and the petitioner even after his conviction was allowed to continue as a suspended employee with the reduction of normal subsistence allowance to a nominal sum of Rs. 1/ p. m. under the Second Proviso to Rule 151 (i) (ii) (b) of Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959. This provision was struck down by the Supreme Court as violative of Articles 14, 16, 21 as also 311 (2) of the Constitution. 28. In the instant case the contract of service came to an end on the dismissal of the petitioner from service. This provision was struck down by the Supreme Court as violative of Articles 14, 16, 21 as also 311 (2) of the Constitution. 28. In the instant case the contract of service came to an end on the dismissal of the petitioner from service. There is, therefore, no occasion to direct payment of subsistence allowance to him even after dismissal particularly when there is no service rule made in Uttar Pradesh for that purpose. We can only hope that the Government in identical cases would not immediately proceed to dismiss a person from service on his being convicted by the criminal court and if that person has filed an appeal or revision, then the Government would wait for the appellate or the revisional judgment so that if the conviction is set aside, the dismissal may not take place at all. Bat in the instant case, reinstatement can be ordered only on the petitioner's acquittal by the appellate court. 28. No other point was pressed. 29. In the result we find no merit in the petition which is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. (Petition dismissed)