JUDGMENT A.P. Misra, J. - The present petition is directed against the order dated 21st April, 1980 passed by the revisional Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act (Annexure-A to the writ petition). 2. The case of the petitioners is that they are owners and landlord of house No. 28 (old), corresponding to No. 43 (New), Karanpur Allengani, Allahabad wherein respondent Nos. 2 to 7 were tenants on a rent of Rs. 15/- per month. The said respondents fell in arrears of rent since March 1, 1960 to 31.8.1969 amounting to Rs. 1710/-, a notice of demand dated 12.9.1969 was sent but the said respondents did not pay the rent within the stipulated period of thirty days and did not hand over vacant possession, therefore, the present suit was filed for ejectment and recovery of damages for use and occupation. The suit was contested by respondent Nos. 2 to 7 mainly on the ground that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In an earlier suit (suit No. 708 of 1950) a compromise was arrived at. It is not in dispute that the said compromise became decree of the Court. It was further alleged that in term of the compromise since no payment of rent was made as stipulated therein, an application was made in the execution, before the executing Court and in pursuance to the same a symbolic possession was obtained on 22.4.1953. It was then urged that actually the answering respondents continued. It is on these facts inference was sought to be drawn that possession of the respondent became adverse to the petitioner. In any case, it was urged that the petitioners did got them evicted within the period of limitation, therefore, by virtue of passage of time the said respondents matured their title. In view of this petitioner could not be said to be the landlord of the disputed premises. 3. Admittedly, the said suit was filed by the petitioners' predecessor and by compromise in any case relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted between the parties. Thus, if there was any claim of adverse possession, it came to an end on the date of the decree. 3. Admittedly, the said suit was filed by the petitioners' predecessor and by compromise in any case relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted between the parties. Thus, if there was any claim of adverse possession, it came to an end on the date of the decree. Petitioner further has taken an alternative case that a Sarkhat was executed by the respondent Sambhu Nath on 24th July, 1953 wherein he accepted himself to be the tenant of the aforesaid house. In fact respondent continued to pay rent till 1960 which had been recorded in the Bahi Khata. Thus, it was urged, by virtue of payment of rent subsequent to the symbolic possession that relationship of landlord and tenant continued. 4. The Judge Small Causes Court after considering both oral and documentary evidence recorded the finding that there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and respondent Nos. 2 to 7 and respondent Nos. 2 to 7 were in arrears of rent and as such were liable for ejectment. The notice served on the respondents was held to be valid and thus the suit of the petitioner was decreed for ejectment of respondent Nos. 2 to 7 and for recovery of Rs. 555/- and also for pendente lite and future damages for use and occupation. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the respondents 2 to 7 filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, before the District Judge, Allahabad. The District Judge allowed the revision filed by respondent Nos. 2 to 7. It came to the conclusion that since petitioner obtained actual possession in the execution of the decree in the aforesaid suit and as a matter of fact respondent Nos. 2 to 7 were not evicted within the stipulated period thereafter, their possession became adverse to the petitioner, and the right, if any, of the petitioner ceased by virtue of this adverse possession. The petitioners being aggrieved as against the said order, have filed the present writ petition challenging the same. 5. The first ground of attack by the petitioner is that the Judge Small Causes Court in exercise of power under Section 25 of the said Act could neither appraise nor reassess the evidence on the record to set aside finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. 5. The first ground of attack by the petitioner is that the Judge Small Causes Court in exercise of power under Section 25 of the said Act could neither appraise nor reassess the evidence on the record to set aside finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. In the present case it was urged that the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court was that the petitioner is the landlord of the disputed premises in question of which respondent Nos. 2 to 7 were the tenants and this finding could not have been set aside by reappraisal of the evidence on record. For this proposition he placed reliance in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi, AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1447 . In this case it was held that the power exercisable by the revisional Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is not as wide as that of the appellate Court under Section 96, C.P.C. It could not be doubted that the power exercisable under Section 25 of the said Act is not for the reappraisal of the evidence. However, revisional Court exercised the power validly or not will depend on the facts of each case. If it could be shown that the power was exercised in a case where the trial Court arrived at a finding on the basis of inadmissible evidence or by misinterpreting a document or is perverse or it took consideration irrelevant material on the record, then it would be valid exercise of power. To this proposition even Sri. G.P. Bhargawa appearing for the respondents does not dispute. His submission is that on the facts of the present case, exercise of power was validly done as the trial Courts finding was perverse and could not have been sustained in the eyes of law. It is in this light each of the finding is to be examined. Petitioner's case is that when the trial Court accepted that the rent was received after 1953 from the respondent by the landlord on the basis of the entry made in the petitioner's Bahi Khata paper No. 123 Ka to 123 Ka/11, the revisional Court exceeded in its jurisdiction in setting aside this finding of fact. Petitioner's case is that when the trial Court accepted that the rent was received after 1953 from the respondent by the landlord on the basis of the entry made in the petitioner's Bahi Khata paper No. 123 Ka to 123 Ka/11, the revisional Court exceeded in its jurisdiction in setting aside this finding of fact. On the other hand, it was urged by Sri Bhargava that by placing reliance on it the trial Court committed error of law inasmuch as this being petitioner's own document could not have been used against the respondents in view of Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act and is also not admissible in law. The original Bahi Khata was not produced in Court. It is not in dispute that original Bahi Khata was not produced by the petitioner. It was also urged as per statement of the petitioner himself (annexure-B to the counter affidavit), the counter foil of the receipt which was with the petitioner was not filed. In view of all these it was urged that the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court on this point could not be sustained in the eye of law. I find force in this contention of the respondent. It was incumbent on the petitioner either to have filed the original Bahi Khata or to have produced the counter foil before any reliance could be made on it. Thus, the revisional Court rightly set aside this finding of the trial Court and in exercise of this power it could not be said to be a case of reappraisal of evidence. 6. The next point urged by the counsel for the petitioner was that the trial Court accepted the execution of a Sarkhat by Shambhu Nath, respondent No. 4 to the extent of of the said tenancy right and the said finding having been arrived at by examining the hand writing of the executant and this being the finding of fact in any case could not have been interfered by the revisional Court. It was then urged that the execution of the said Sarkhat proves that the respondents are not tenants of the disputed premises and on this account alone the claim of respondents that they are in adverse possession is liable to be defeated. It was then urged that the execution of the said Sarkhat proves that the respondents are not tenants of the disputed premises and on this account alone the claim of respondents that they are in adverse possession is liable to be defeated. It was further urged that in any case in view of the execution of Sarkhat the revisional Court was not justified in dismissing the claim of the petitioner in toto. According to the petitioner at least to the extent of execution of Sarkhat the respondent No. 4 the revisional Court, to that extent should have sustained the finding of the trial Court. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the execution of this document was neither valid nor could be sustained in the law and no reliance could be placed on it. It is urged that this was executed by one of the members of one branch only and that member executed when his father was living and thus execution of Sarkhat by him could not defeat the claim of every other member and is thus not sustainable in the eye of law. For this purpose reliance was placed on the statement of the petitioner himself (Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit) showing admittedly on the date of the execution the executant's father was living. According to the respondents, even otherwise and by virtue of execution of the said document, the possession of other members of the family which is coextensive with the executant, could not be defeated. There is force in this contention. If there is right of other persons existing in law by virtue of their possession then it could not be extinguished by act of one of its members. Thus, if right of other respondents has matured by adverse possession and specially when possession of each is co-extensive with other, the mere execution of Sarkhat by one could not extinguish the claim of others. The execution of Sarkhat may have relevancy, in case petitioners have proved their relationship of landlord qua respondents, for this purpose of only splitting the tenancy but in no case, it would affect, the claim of the other respondents for the accommodation in question. The execution of Sarkhat may have relevancy, in case petitioners have proved their relationship of landlord qua respondents, for this purpose of only splitting the tenancy but in no case, it would affect, the claim of the other respondents for the accommodation in question. Thus, this finding recorded by the trial Court suffers from illegality as the said finding was arrived at by misconstruing the document and any misapplication of law and this inference by the revisional Court was justified. Now coming to the main contention raised on behalf of the petitioners, which is that the relationship of landlord and tenant in any case is admitted by respondents at least since the execution of the compromise deed which became decree in suit No. 708 of 1950 and thus burden is on respondents that subsequently such relationship came to an end. In the said suit it is true, the respondents have been claiming to be in adverse possession since long and the suit was filed by the predecessor of the petitioner. However, during the pendency of the said suit since a compromise was arrived at on 9th April, 1952 any prior claim, right if any ceased qua compromise. It is not in dispute in the present case that on the date of the execution of this compromise deed the relationship of the landlord and tenant was accepted by the parties. It was then urged that after the said decree, the respondents did not pay the amount referred to therein within the stipulated period. This led the petitioner to make an application for the execution of the decree in terms of the said compromise for eviction of respondents. Petitioner got only symbolic possession on 22nd April, 1953 in pursuance thereof. 7. Counsel for the respondent urged on these facts that the possession taken by the petitioner was only symbolic and, in fact, respondent Nos. 2 to 7 continued in possession even thereafter as they were never evicted from the disputed premises, their possession became adverse to the petitioner at least from that date. In other words, since the respondents were not evicted in terms of the compromise, their possession became adverse to the petitioner. 8. In order to appreciate this it is necessary to give certain facts. In other words, since the respondents were not evicted in terms of the compromise, their possession became adverse to the petitioner. 8. In order to appreciate this it is necessary to give certain facts. As aforesaid, the said suit was decreed on a compromise arrived at between the parties and as per compromise the defendants were to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 12.50 paise per month for a period of Ist October, 1948 to 31st March, 1952 after adjusting the house and water tax from Ist April, 1952 the rent of the disputed premises as agreed to Rs. 15 per month and the defendants were to continue to be in possession as tenants. It was further stipulated in the said compromise that if the decretal amount was not paid then the defendants would be liable to ejectment in execution of the decree. Parties have filed the said compromise that if the decretal amount was not paid then the defendants would be liable to ejectment in execution of the decree. Parties have filed the said compromise and also in the application moved in the said execution case. It is alleged that since the judgment-debtor did not pay the decretal amount within the stipulated period i.e., by 15th July, 1952 therefore, the possession of the disputed premises was liable to be delivered to the plaintiff. In pursuance of the same it is not disputed that through the Court amin the possession of the said accommodation was delivered to the plaintiff-petitioner. According to Dakhalnama it is stated that Sundar Ram and Ramphal the sons of the decree holder have obtained possession on 22nd April, 1953 after best of drum and proclamation through Court amin who had executed Dhakalnama. The trial Court on these facts held that the possession delivered to the plaintiff was actually symbolic and he never obtained actual possession. The revisional Court on the interpretation of Dakhalnama concluded that actual possession was delivered to the plaintiff. Admittedly this fact is contrary to the plea of either parties. Case of both the sides is that only symbolic possession was taken. Even before me same position is maintained by them. Thus, the finding recorded by the revisional Court is not sustainable. In fact, respondent's own case is that they continued in possession even after the alleged date on which possession was obtained by the plaintiff. Case of both the sides is that only symbolic possession was taken. Even before me same position is maintained by them. Thus, the finding recorded by the revisional Court is not sustainable. In fact, respondent's own case is that they continued in possession even after the alleged date on which possession was obtained by the plaintiff. In view of this such a possession could only be symbolic. However, the question still remains as to what would be the effect of symbolic possession taken by the plaintiff in pursuance to the application moved in the execution proceedings. 9. In the light of these facts as aforesaid it is necessary to examine whether revisional Court was justified to set aside the finding recorded by the trial Court. Trial Court came to the conclusion that since the petitioner obtained symbolic possession, respondents were never dispossessed. It was only if they were dispossessed by petitioner and later they would have been adverse. In the present case respondents were never dispossessed and, therefore, that decree was never satisfied. Thus, in view of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, such possession would continue to be that of a tenant. It was thus held that since even after 22nd April, 1953 the relationship of the landlord and tenant continued, the question of maturing title by the adverse possession does not arise. The revisional Court set aside the said finding on the basis of the interpretation of Dakhalnama by holding that actual possession was delivered to the plaintiff and thus it was held that the trial Court was not justified in holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed on the basis of the compromise decree, as it did not come into being as neither any rent was paid nor terms of compromise was complied with. 10. Sri G.P. Bhargawa, learned counsel for the respondents urged that in view of the decision made in Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao (deceased) and others, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 591, the compromise decree could not be treated as a decision of the Court and thus would not operate as res judicata under Section 11 CPC. For ready reference the relevant portion relied by him is quoted as under :- "A compromise decree is not a decision by the Court. For ready reference the relevant portion relied by him is quoted as under :- "A compromise decree is not a decision by the Court. It is the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. A compromise decree merely sets the seal of Court on the agreement of the parties. The Court does not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the Court was implicit in it only a decision by the Court can be res judicata, whether statutory under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure , or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests, such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter which was heard and finally decided and cannot operate as res judicata. Such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties. But such an estoppel must be specifically pleaded." On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners Sri Keshari Nath Tripathi referred to the amendment made in Section 11, CPC in the year 1976 by virtue of which explanation (8) was added. He referred this when very feeble argument was raised by the counsel for respondents, that if serious dispute of title is raised then proper course open was to get the title decided through regular suit. According to Mr. Tripathi, to which I agree, by virtue of this addition even if it is held that the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of serious dispute of title, yet parties would be bound by its decision. Thus, in a subsequent suit if such a question is raised, parties shall be precluded from raising such issue as the earlier decision would operate as res judicata. 11. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court does not lend any support to the respondents. Even according to this decision a compromise decree is really a decree and in future it creates estoppel by conduct between the parties. It is true it could not be said to be the decision of the Court. This decision has only relevancy where a question of res judicata is raised. In the present case principle of res judicata is neither raised here nor was ever raised before the trial Court or even before the revisional Court. It is true it could not be said to be the decision of the Court. This decision has only relevancy where a question of res judicata is raised. In the present case principle of res judicata is neither raised here nor was ever raised before the trial Court or even before the revisional Court. This decision also would not give any help to the petitioner to file fresh suit in view of explanation (8) of Section 11, CPC. 12. Sri Bhargawa then relied on the Full Bench decision of the case of Jang Bahadur Singh and another v. Hanwant Singh, AIR 1981 Allahabad 9. The relevant portion relied by him is quoted herein under :- "Whereupon an execution sale possession has been delivered in accordance with the proposition of the law, that is, in accordance with Section 318 or 319 of the old Code as the case may be, having regard to the nature of the property, or under Order 21, Rule 95 or Rule 96, the auction purchaser gets a fresh start for the computation of limitation. But where such possession has not been delivered, the mere fact of formal delivery of possession does not save limitation." In that case a suit for possession of a house was filed and the question to be determined was whether the suit is barred by limitation. The house in question was sold by auction in execution of the decree and sale was confirmed subsequently and the decree of possession was obtained thereafter. It is on these facts the question raised was as to the time from when the limitation would start running. It was held that if possession has been delivered to the parties in accordance with law which according to Old Act Sections 318 and 319 and according to New Act under Order 21, Rule 95 or Rule 96, the auction purchaser gets a fresh start for the computation of limitation but where such possession has not been delivered, the mere fact of formal delivery of possession does not save limitation. In that case also only formal possession was given. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the judgment-debtor was in actual possession and thus it was necessary for the auction purchaser to get the actual possession. 13. In that case also only formal possession was given. This case has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the judgment-debtor was in actual possession and thus it was necessary for the auction purchaser to get the actual possession. 13. It was in this light held that mere obtaining of formal possession would not exclude the running of limitation. In the present case only relevant question to be determined was whether by not containing actual possession the status of landlord and tenant would cease. On the other hand, counsel for the petitioner urged that since the decree was never satisfied as he was never delivered the actual possession, so the question of respondents' possession becoming adverse to the petitioner does not arise on that account. Counsel for the petitioner relied on the case of M.V.S. Manikaya Rao v. M. Narasimha and others, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 470. The relevant portion is quoted herein under :- "Having expressed our difficulties on the matter let us proceed on the assumption without deciding it, that Article 144 is applicable. Even so, it seems to us that the suit is not barred. It is not disputed that in order that the suit may be barred under the Article the defendant must have been in uninterrupted possession for twelve years before the date of the suit. Now, in the present case that was not so. By delivery of symbolic possession under the order of November 6, 1939 the adverse possession of the defendants was interrupted. Time has, therefore, to commence to run from that date and so considered, the suit having been brought within twelve years of the date, it was not barred under the Article. That would follow from the case of Sri Radha Kirshna Chandorji v. Ram Bahadur, AIR 1917 Supreme Court 1972), where it was held that delivery of formal possession also interrupted the continuity of adverse possession." In this very case AIR 1921 Allahabad 9 (supra) was also referred but it was stated that the facts in that case were different from the facts of the present case. In view of this case emphasis was made by the counsel for the petitioner that even by delivery of symbolic possession the adverse possession of the defendants, if any, from before was interrupted. In view of this case emphasis was made by the counsel for the petitioner that even by delivery of symbolic possession the adverse possession of the defendants, if any, from before was interrupted. There could be no doubt, In view of the aforesaid decision, any claim of adverse possession from before would come to an end at least from the date on which symbolic possession was given. In fact, in the present case admittedly even before it, the claim of adverse possession, if any, of the respondents came to an end when compromise decree was passed in the earlier suit. In the present case the present suit was filed in 1970 and symbolic possession was taken on 22.4.53, thus if respondents could prove their adverse possession even after this date, then they would mature as the suit was admittedly filed much after expiry of twelve years. 14. It is, therefore, necessary to examine, whether the status of the landlord and tenant which at least was admitted since the compromise came to an end either by non-execution of the decree, or by default of the parties to the compromise or by obtaining only symbolic possession. 15. In order to prove adverse possession, respondents relied on their stand of being in possession taken in the earlier suit, the fact they continued in possession even after the compromise and even after the delivery of possession in execution proceedings and the fact no rent was paid to the petitioner. It was further urged that since as per terms of the compromise decree they were defaulters and if in pursuance of the execution proceedings they were not evicted from the disputed premises, their possession would be deemed adverse to the petitioners. Alternatively, it was urged that in any case even if it be accepted, the decree was not fully satisfied by not evicting the respondent Nos. 2 and 7, the same could not be done now as execution of the said decree would be barred by limitation. Mr. Bhargawa urged, in the present case, Old Limitation Act would apply and thus under Article 22 (old) maximum period for the execution of the decree be three years. Alternatively, it was urged, even if new Limitation Act is applied which came into force from Ist January, 1974, the limitation provided therein is 12 years. Mr. Bhargawa urged, in the present case, Old Limitation Act would apply and thus under Article 22 (old) maximum period for the execution of the decree be three years. Alternatively, it was urged, even if new Limitation Act is applied which came into force from Ist January, 1974, the limitation provided therein is 12 years. According to him if respondents did not pay the rent as stipulated in the compromise decree by 15th July, 1952 then at the most decree should have been got satisfied within a period of three years and in any case even under the New Act it should have been got satisfied within a period of 12 years from 1952. In the present case petitioner by obtaining symbolic possession did not get the satisfaction of decree then the same would not be executed now. 16. It is necessary first to consider the compromise itself. The compromise is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. By reading it, it could not be doubted nor it has been disputed that under it petitioners and respondents 2 to 7 agree to be the landlord and tenant and it was stipulated henceforth the rent was payable by respondents 2 to 7 the petitioner in terms mentioned therein. In case the said amount was not paid by 15th July, 1952, it gives right in favour of the petitioner to evict the respondents from the said premises in execution of the decree. This makes it abundantly clear that from this date, at least, the relationship of landlord and tenant was accepted by both the parties to the said suit. Stipulation in this document of getting eviction by the petitioner is a right granted in his favour and is a right like a right of landlord given in a statute in case of default. In case of tenant's default only a right is created in favour of landlord. But in case, either on account of laches or by waiver, the landlord does not exercise that right under the statute, it would not amount to chaser of the relationship of the landlord and tenant. It may be the right to receive the rent for which default is committed, might be barred by period of limitation but the relationship of landlord and tenant continued thereafter. It may be the right to receive the rent for which default is committed, might be barred by period of limitation but the relationship of landlord and tenant continued thereafter. Thus, in view of compromise decree also, even if petitioner did not get evicted the respondents it could not be said that on this ground the relationship of landlord and tenant ceased. Thus, mere possession also never would constitute it to be adverse. A tenant's possession however long it may be, could never be adverse. In order to constitute that the party is in adverse possession, it is necessary to prove by some overt act showing hostility as against the claimant or by denouncing his title openly. In the present case the revisional Court merely on the basis of possession held that possession to the adverse to the petitioners. Thus, the finding given by the revisional Court cannot be sustained as it misapplied the law of adverse possession. 17. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, regarding the decree becoming time barred, would not apply in case where relationship of landlord and tenant exists by virtue of the said compromise. Limitation would apply in case when money decree or instalment amount if not paid when it became due. It is on this account as period of rent due may became time barred but it would in no case change their status as landlord and tenant. 18. In view of the aforesaid facts the finding recorded by the revisional Court on the point that no relationship of landlord and tenant exists, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The order dated 21st April, 1980 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) passed by the revisional Court is set aside. However, since the revisional Court did not decide whether any default was committed or not by the respondents in the payment of rent, the case is remanded back to it for deciding afresh in the light of the observations made above. 19. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the case is remanded to the revisional Court of District Judge, Allahabad for deciding afresh in accordance with the observations made above. Costs on parties.