Saikia, J:- The petitioner of this application for anticipat­ory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, shortly 'the Code', is a Commerce Graduate from Gauhati University and has been temporarily looking after the day to day ma­nagement of the Hotel Nandan owned by M/S Shyam Udyog (P) Limited. On 2.5.85 at 11.55 P. M. one Dwijen Phookan lodged a First Information Report (Annexure-1 to the application) at the Pan Bazar Police Station, Gauhati stating with reference to the information lodged there at same morning regarding the mi­ssing of his daughter Smt. Smita phukan that she had been recovered from the Hole) Nandan, G. S. Road at about 6. 30 P. M from the unlawful custody of one Shri Abhijeet Choudhury, who was a receptionist of the said hotel and Shri Himanshu Sharma, who was known to be a Director of the said Hotel. It was farther stated that the girl had been Kidnapped and enticed away from the lawful custody of her parents by Shri Abhijeet choudhury in collusion with Shri Himanshu Sharma and other pe­rsons who kept her concealed in the said hotel Nandan. The girl was stated to be a minor of about 14 years and a student of Class VIII. The aforesaid F. I. R. was forwarded to the Paltan Bazar Police Station where under Hotel Nandan fell vide G. D. Entry No. 54 of 2.5.84. The Paltan Bazar Police Stat­ion vide G. D. Entry No. 87 of 25 85 forwarded the F. I. R. to the chandmari Police Station as the complainants house fell within its jurisdiction. The Chandmari Police Station thereupon registered its case No. 84/85 under Section 366A I. P. C. It is stated in this application that the said Shri Abhijit Chowdhury who was the receptionist was "forcibly taken away" from the premises of the Hotel Nandan at about 5.30 P. M. on 2.5.85 and was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati on 3,5.85 and the Forwarding Report (Annexure II to the ap­plication) of the Officer-in-charge, Chandmari Police Station st­ated that at about 6.30 P. M. the victim girl was recovered from the unlawful custody of the accused person by the complainant. 2. 2. The petitioner states that he happened to be present in the hotel on 2.5.85 in connection with the day to day mana­gement of the hotel and since the date of occurrence the police has been making discreet enquiries about him and his brother in connection with the said case and therefore he has reasons to believe that ha may be arrested in connection with the above case. He further states that he hails from a very reputed family of Gauhati. His grand father is an Advocate and his father is a reputed Chartered Accountant and his family mem­bers own both movable and immovable properties at Gauhati and other places. He also states that there is absolutely no chance of his tampering evidence or hampering the investi­gation and he shall make himself available as and when required by the police and be shall not in any manner make inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted or co­nnected with the case and he undertakes to abide by any condi­tion direction or order from the Court. 3. Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned Advocate General, Nagaland for the petitioner submits : The petitioner's apprehen­sion of arrest in connection with the case is reasonable. He hails from a respectable family. His grand father being an Ad­vocate, his father being a reputed Chartered Accountant and his brother the Managing Director of M/s Shyam Udyog (P) Limi­ted, there is no likelihood of his evading the process of the criminal court or not attending the trial or in any way tampe­ring with the evidence or witnesses of the case. If he is kept in custody for some days before granting bail he will immediately suffer in prestige and business good will. His name does not app­ear in the FIR and Shri Abbijeet Chowdhury whose name appears has already been granted bail by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati on 7.5.85. till 18-5-85 The petitioner has come before this Court with the prayer for anticipatory bail which may be granted. The petitioner has not been arrested so far because of the inte­rim order passed by this Court on 10.5.85. 4. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, the learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, submits: this is not a case with any exceptio­nal feature so as to justify anticipatory bail. The petitioner has not been arrested so far because of the inte­rim order passed by this Court on 10.5.85. 4. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, the learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, submits: this is not a case with any exceptio­nal feature so as to justify anticipatory bail. The interim order dated 10.5.1985 which stated that the petitioner should not be arres­ted by the police authority is not in accordance with law and requires immediate modification. Considering the nature of the case and the social alarm caused by it a girl of 14 years having been allegedly kidnapped and kept concealed in the Hotel Nandan anticipatory bail may not be granted to the petitioner. This Division Bench should formulate some guidelines so that such blan­ket orders not to arrest the accused are not passed so as to stifle the investigating agency. 5. Mr. Bhattacharjee very fairly states that he appeared for the petitioner on 10.5.85 when the aforesaid interim order was passed and it was his duty to point out to the Court that the order was not in accordance with law but his attention was not attracted to the last part of the order and he has no objec­tion if that part of the order is now modified so as to conform to the provisions of Section 438 of the Code. 6. We have perused the provisions of Section 439 A of the Code as inserted by the Code of Criminal procedure Assam Amendment Act, 1983, While Sections 364,365,367 and 368 I.P.C. are mentioned in that Section, Sections 366 and 366 A I.P.C do not find mention in the Section. Offences under both Sec­tions 366 and 366 A are Don bailable. The constraints laid down in Section 439 A of the Code are, therefore, not applicable to this case. 7. The first question is whether anticipatory bail may be granted in this type of cases. It is not denied that the alle­ged kidnapping of a minor girl of 14 years, a student of Class VIII and keeping her concealed in a hotel would cause alarm in the society. However, a person is guilty of an offence only after being found to be so by a competent criminal court. It is not denied that the alle­ged kidnapping of a minor girl of 14 years, a student of Class VIII and keeping her concealed in a hotel would cause alarm in the society. However, a person is guilty of an offence only after being found to be so by a competent criminal court. Since the processing of a case by the police and the subsequent trial in the court may take some time it is desirable that, wherever it is expedient to do so, the accused person may be released on bail since his guilt is yet to be established. Sec­tion 438 of the Code providing for ''anticipatory bail” is a new provision which enables the superior courts to direct the release of a person on bail prior to his arrest. In its 41st report the Law Commission in recommending this provision observed : "Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the power of a Court to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that there is no such power under the existing provisions of the Code. The necessity for gran­ting anticipatory bail arises mainly because sometimes influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false cases for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting them detained in jail for some days. In recent time with the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail". Section 438 deals with direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest. Under sub-section (1) thereof "When any.person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direc­tion under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail''. Subsection (2) deals with the directions and con­ditions which may be made. Subsection (2) deals with the directions and con­ditions which may be made. Under sub-section (3) "if such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepa­red either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub-section (1)". 8. The question whether or not to grant anticipatory bail involves, as was observed in Gurbakash Singh Sibbia vs. The St­ate of Punjab, 1980 CRT. L. J. 1125 : AIR 1980 SC 1632 : (1980) 2 SCO 565, ''a question of great public importance bearing, at once on personal liberty and the investigational powers of the police'', and "the society has a vital stake in both these inte­rests, though their relative importance at any given time depe­nds upon the complexion and restrains of political conditions" The question is how best to balance these interests while acting under Section 438 of the Code ? The arrest of a person immedi­ately affects his freedom of movement and an order of bail gi­ves back to the accused that freedom. Besides, the arrest by it­self may have some effect on the dignity of a person. Section 46 Cr. P.C. provides how arrest is made. Under sub-section (1) thereof, "In making an arrest the police officer or other persons making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word of action.'' The touching or confining may thus be avoided by submission to the custody by word or action. It is a natural impulse of man to avoid arbitrary arrest. Guarantee against it has been insisted by mankind. In Magna Ill embodied: "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or diseased or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him, save by the lawful jud­gment of his peers or the law of the land. To no one will we sell, dimly or delay right or justice." 9. To no one will we sell, dimly or delay right or justice." 9. The universal declaration of human rights adopted in the General Assembly Resolution 217 (in) on December 10, 1948 included the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and deten­tion and the right to be presumed innocent until court finds gui­lty. Art. 21 of the Constitution of India provides for protection of life and personal liberty and under it no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to pro­cedure established by law. However, in the interest of the society and public prosecution law provides for arrest of a person un­der prescribed circumstances. Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides when police may arrest a person without wa­rrant. This section confers very wide powers on the police in order that they may act swiftly for the prevention or detention of cognizable offences without the formality and delay of having to go to a magistrate for order of arrest. Section 42 of the Code provides for arrest of a person on refusal to give name and resi­dence. Section 43 provides for arrest by private person and pro­cedure on such arrest. Section 44 provides for arrest by Magis­trate. Section 46 provides for arrest and section 48 provides for pursuit of offenders into other jurisdictions. Section 49 lays down that the person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint then is necessary to prevent his escape. Under section 50 a person arrested should be informed of grounds of arrest and of tight to bail. Section 57 provides that no police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of a ma­gistrate under section 167, exceed twenty four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magi­strate's Court. Article 22 of the Constitution of India also provides for protection against and detention in certain cases. Under sub-arti­cle (1) no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest or shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Under sub-arti­cle (1) no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest or shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Under sub-article(2) every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the Magistrate and no such person shall b£ detained in custody beyond the said period without the au­thority of a magistrate. The foundation of the right to arrest a person is as being concerned with commission of an offence. As was held in H. N. Rishbud vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 , discovery and arrest of the suspected offender is one of the stages in investigation of an offence. This was reiterated in the State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Mubarak Ali, AIR 1959 SC 707 and in Jagadish Miner vs. The Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 221 . It is settled law that under the Code investigation con­sists generally of the following stages : (1) proceeding to the spot; (2) ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case; (3) discovery and arrest of the suspected offender; (4) collection of evidence relating to the commission of the off­ence, which may consists of (a) examination of various persons including the accused, and reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, and (b) search of the places and seizure of things is necessary for the investigation and to be produced in the trial; (5) formation of the opinion as to whe­ther on the materials collected there is a case to place the ac­cused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the nece­ssary steps for the same by filing a charge-sheet under Section 173. Thus discovery and arrest of the suspected offender is a part of the investigation. Besides, even for taking other steps in course of investigation the arrest of the suspected offender may be helpful. Any order not to arrest the suspected offender may, to that extent, affect investigation and the right of the investigating agency. Thus discovery and arrest of the suspected offender is a part of the investigation. Besides, even for taking other steps in course of investigation the arrest of the suspected offender may be helpful. Any order not to arrest the suspected offender may, to that extent, affect investigation and the right of the investigating agency. It is at the point of discovery and arrest of the suspected offender that the police discretion is to be exe­rcised. Excise of police discretion inter acts with the members of the public. Facing the problem of law enforcement and social control the police should act in conformity with broader aim of social purpose. It is for the police to decide whether to pursue strictly a law enforcement attitude or at the same time be conscious of social values and thereby obtain social support. 10. Investigation is done under the provisions of Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In England the Royal on Criminal Procedure (1981) said : "The ultimate purpose of arrest is to bring before a Court for trial a person who commits a criminal offence or is reasonably suspected of so doing. But because arr­est deprives the citizen of his liberty, its use is to be re­stricted generally to offences that carry the penalty of imprisonment-that is to say of course arrest able offences and to persons against whom summons procedure will not be effective. The period of detention upon arrest may be used for ce­rtain purposes, and the power of arrest is also related to them. It may be used to prevent the suspect from destroying evidence or interfering with witnesses or warning accomplices who have not yet been arrested. Where there is good reason to suspect a repetition of the offence specially, but not exclusively offences of violence it may be used to stop such an occurrence Finally, the criterion of having reasonable grounds for suspicion sufficient to ju­stify a charge; hearsay evidence for example, may be sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion, but it is not sufficient for a person to be charged, since it will not be admissible in evidence at trial. Accordingly the period of detention may be used to dispel or confirm that reaso­nable suspicion by questioning the suspect or seeking fur­ther material evidence with his assistance. Accordingly the period of detention may be used to dispel or confirm that reaso­nable suspicion by questioning the suspect or seeking fur­ther material evidence with his assistance. This has not always been the law or practice but now seems to be well established as one of the primary purposes of dete­ntion upon arrest". The Royal Commission further observed : "Although this is common practice and, if properly conducted, entirely permissible practice, once the person has been arrested, it is not by itself a legitimate cause of arrest or the purpose of the exercise of the power of arrest otherwise available. There must be present in the mind of the person who effects the arrest, if it is to be reasonably effected, a fear that the process of interroga­tion will be initiated by the presence of one or other of the following circumstances. The destruction of evidence, interference with other potential witnesses, the warning of an accomplice, a repetition of the offence or the escape of the suspect. The other is that if there are other steps which the arresting constable could take for the furthe­rance of the investigation, then the constable should take those other steps, first unless it is demonstrated to be necessary or at least desirable that the other steps should not be taken first''. It was observed in State of West Bengal and ors. vs. Swapan Kumar Guha, 1982 Cri. L. J. 819- AIR 1982 SC 949 , that if the Court interferes with the proper investigation in a case where an offence has been disclosed, the offence will go unpunished to the serious detriment of the welfare of the society and the cause of the justice suffers. It is on the basis of this princi­ple that the Court normally does not interfere with the inves­tigation of a case where an offence has been disclosed. But it cannot be said that an investigation must necessarily be permi­tted to continue and will not be prevented by the Court at the stage of investigation. A condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the F. I. R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizanble offence has been committed. An FIR winch does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provision are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or cons­titute the starting point of a lawful investigation. An FIR winch does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provision are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation or cons­titute the starting point of a lawful investigation. An investi­gation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by toe FIR. is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report (F.I.R.) which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. 11. The distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail, has been pointed cut by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurbaksh Singh (Supra). Whereas an order of bail is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police an anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of a nest and is therefore effec­tive at the very moment of arrest. Police custody is an inevi­table concomitant of arrest for non-bailable offences. An order of anticipatory bail constitutes, so to say, an insurance against police custody following upon arrest for offence or offences in respect of which the order is issued. It is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favour it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. 12. Several questions arise while deciding whether or not to grant anticipatory bail in a particular case. The first ques­tion is what are the types of cases in which anticipatory bail should be gaited; Secondly what is the stage of the case at which or until which anticipatory bail may be granted; thirdly, what should be duration of the anticipatory bail order; fourthly, what are the directions or conditions to be imposed; fifthly, whether notice should be given to the respondents; and lastly, whether interim order need be passed. The answer to these questions to be found in Gurbaksh Singh (Supra) where Chandrachud, C. J. discussed all these aspects. The Court should bear in mind the law enunciated therein. The answer to these questions to be found in Gurbaksh Singh (Supra) where Chandrachud, C. J. discussed all these aspects. The Court should bear in mind the law enunciated therein. The Law Commi­ssion, in paragraph 31 of its 48th Report agreed that it is in very exceptional cases that such power of anticipatory bail should be exercised and that the provision should not be put to abuse at the instance of unscrupulous petitioners; and that the final order should be made only after notice to the Public Prosecutor. The initial order should only be an interim one. However, their Lordships observed : ".... But the crimes, the criminals an even the com­plainants can occasionally possess extraordinary features. When the even flow of life becomes turbid, the police can be called upon to inquire into charges arising out of political antagonism. The powerful processes of crimi­nal law can then be perverted for achieving extraneous ends. Attendant upon such investigations, when the police are not free agents within their sphere of duty, is a great amount of inconvenience, harassment and humilia­tion. That can even take the form of the parading of a respectable person in handcuffs, apparently on way to a court of justice. The foul deed is done when an adver­sary is exposed to social ridicule and obloquy, no matter when and whether a conviction is secured or is at ail possible. It is in order to meet such situations, though not limited to these contingencies, that the power to grant anticipatory bail was introduced into the Code of 1973". Section 438 is designed to ensure a valuable right like the right to personal freedom. It is to be noted that the ordinary provi­sion for bail under Section 437 and 439 Cr. P.C. have not been made otiose by the provision of Section 438. However, as their Lordships observed : "An over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions." The directions and conditions should be in conformity with those objective and not to hamper investigation at all. Relying on the observations made in Bakhand Jain, AJR 1977 SC 315/(7977) 2 SCR 5, their Lordships agreed that the power conferred by Section 438 is of an extraordinary character and that it is not ordinarily resorted to like the power conferred by Sections 437 and 439. Their Lordships also agreed that the power to grant anticipatory bail should be exercised with due care and circumspection. The guidelines are found in para 51 of the decision which reads : "In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusa­tion appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, considering the antece­dents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of those pro­positions is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides; and equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations, too numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must weigh with the court while granting or rejecting antici­patory bail. The nature and seriousness of the propo­sed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to type making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a rea­sonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and "the larger interests of the public or the State" are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail.'' However, their Lordships clearly stated that no braid and fast males can be laid down in discretionary matters like the grant or refusal of bar, whether anticipatory or otherwise. No such rules can be laid down for the simple reason that a circumstance which, in a given case, turns out to be conclusive, may have no more than ordinary signification in another case. No such rules can be laid down for the simple reason that a circumstance which, in a given case, turns out to be conclusive, may have no more than ordinary signification in another case. Their Lordships preferred to leave the High Court and the court of Sessions to exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr. P.C. by a wise and careful use of their discretion which, by their long train­ing and experience, they are ideally suited to do. Their Lord­ships observed that the ends of justice would be better served by trusting these courts to act objectively and in consonance with principles governing the grant of bail which are recognised over the years, than by divesting them of their discretion which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general application. Their Lordships held that the Court may, if there are reasons for doing so; limit the operation of the order to a short period until after the filing of an F. I. R. in respect of the matter covered by the order. The applicant may in such cases be directed to obtain an order of bail under Section 437 and 439 of the Code within a reasonably short period after the filing of the FIR as aforesaid. But this need not be foll­owed as an invariable rule. The normal rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time. Thus there is nothing to show that an order of antici­patory bail is to continue till the end of the trial. A blanket order of anticipatory bail should not generally be passed. An-order which serves as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity, is a 'blanket order'. A blanket order is bound to cause serious interference with the rights and duty of the police in the matter or investigation be­cause, regardless of what kind of offence is alleged to have been committed by the applicant and when, an order of bail which comprehends allegedly unlawful activity of any description what-so ever will prevent the police from arresting the applicant even if he commits, say, a murder in presence of the public. Such an order can then become a character of lawlessness and a weapons to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be predicated when the order was passed. Such an order can then become a character of lawlessness and a weapons to stifle prompt investigation into offences which could not possibly be predicated when the order was passed. The co­urt which grants anticipatory bail must take care to specify the offence or offences in respect of which alone the order will he effective. 13. Applying the above guidelines to the fact and circuits a aces of the instant case we find that the petitioner name is not mentioned in the FIR; he has cot denied his presence at the hotel; accused Abhijeet Choudhury has already been gr­anted bail by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati; he hails from a respectable family; has deep roots in the society; is not likely to abscond or evade the process of the court or in any way hamper investigation of the case or tamper with the evidence. He undertakes to abide by any condition imposed by this Court. There has been reasonable apprehension of his being arrested in connection with the case, as the police has been making discreet enquiries about him. We accordingly vacate our interim order dated 10.5.85 and finally order and direct that if the peti­tioner is hereafter arrested without warrant by an Officer in Ch­arge of a Police Station in connection with Chandmari Police Station Case No. 84/85, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail of Rs. 5000/- (Five thousand) to the satisfaction of the police officer arresting him; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence decides that a warrant should be issued in the first instance against the peti­tioner, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the directions given in this order. We further direct that in the event of the petitioner being so arrested and enlarged on bail, he shall immediately thereafter make himself available for interro­gation by any police officer and subsequently also as and when requ­ired by the police. He shall not directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any Police officer. He shall not leave Assam without permission from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati. He shall not directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any Police officer. He shall not leave Assam without permission from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gauhati. This order shall continue till the trial starts where ­after the petitioner shall obtain a bail order from the trial court. 14. In the result, this application is allowed.