JUDGMENT N.P. Singh, J : - An Order of transfer of the petitioner from the post of Block Development Officer, Mairwa (Siwan) to the post of Block Development officer, Ekma (Saran) has been challenged in this writ application on the ground that the petitioner bas been transferred not on account of administrative exigencies but at the instance of a Member of Legislative Assembly (hereinafter called M.L.A.) to accommodate respondent no. 4, who, on transfer of the petitioner is to join the post in question. 2. According to the petitioner, he was transferred from the district of Munger to the post of Block Development Officer. Mairwa by a Government notification dated 9.6.1984. The petitioner joined the said post on 17.5.84. The petitioner had hardly completed two months when an order dated 17.7.1984 of the State Government was issued transferring respondent no 4 to the post which the petitioner was holding without issuing any order of transfer in respect of the petitioner. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 24.8.1984 was issued transferring the petitioner from Mairwa to Ekma. In support of the assertion that the transfer of the petitioner has been engineered by the local M.L.A., the petitioner has stated in detail as to how at the instance of said M.L.A., the previous Block Development Officer Shri Zoha was transferred. When Mr. Zoha relinquished the office at Mairwa in the month of December, 1983 the M.L.A. addressed a letter dated 5.1.1984 to the then Chief Minister, Bihar saying that Sri Zoha had been transferred from Mairwa at his instance) and against that post Sri Chandramauli Mishra (respondent no. 4) be posted. A copy of that letter has been annexed to the writ application. The petitioner has stated on affidavit that in view of the aforesaid letter and pursuit by the local M.L.A. respondent no. 4 was transferred from Ekma Block to Mairwa Block which necessitated the transfer of the petitioner from Mairwa Block only three months after his joining the said post. In this connection, the petitioner has annexed a letter dated 30.8.1984 addressed by the District Magistrate, Siwan to the State Government laying that the petitioner had hardly continued for about 4 months and has been transferred although there was no complaint against him. He requested the State Government to stay the order of transfer. 3. In this connection, the petitioner has annexed a letter dated 30.8.1984 addressed by the District Magistrate, Siwan to the State Government laying that the petitioner had hardly continued for about 4 months and has been transferred although there was no complaint against him. He requested the State Government to stay the order of transfer. 3. This Court while directing the learned Advocate General, who appeared on behalf of the State, to seek instructions, passed an order for maintenance of status quo. In the meantime respondent no. 4 has appeared, As the writ application relates to an order of transfer the parties were heard in detail at the stage of admission and with consent of all it is being disposed of at this stage. 4. Normally, this Court does not interfere with an order of transfer, because the State Government has ample power to transfer officer from one place to another for administrative reasons. The State Government has fixed ordinarily a period of three years of posting of an officer. It has also prescribed a procedure for transfer of officers on the recommendation of the Establishment Committee concerned. But, even without observing those conditions if a transfer has been made taking into account any administrative exi-genecy, the transfer order shall not become ipso facto null and void. In the Case of Man Singh vs. State of Bihar and others, this Court has examined the aforesaid aspect in detail. But the question is as to whether an officer can challenge an order of transfer on the ground that it has been made for extraneous consideration at the instance of a person who is no where in the administrative hierarchy? 5. The Supreme Court in one of its earliest judgment's while considering the power of the Court Vis-a-vis exercise of an executive power, in the case of Sardar Pratap Singh vs. State of Punjab observed as follows: "Pausing here, we might summarise the position by stating that the Court is not an appellate forum where the correctness of an order of Government could be canvassed and, indeed it bas no jurisdiction to substitute its own view as to the necessity or desirability of initiating disciplinary proceedings, for the entireity of the power, jurisdiction and discretion in that regard is vested by law in the Government. The only question which could be considered by the court is whether the authority vested with the power has paid attention to or taken into account circumstances, events or matters wholly extraneous to the purpose for which the power was vested or whether the proceedings have been intiated mala-fide for stisfying a private or personal grudge of the authority against the officer." It was further observed:- “......The Constitution enshrines and guarantees the rule of law and Art. 226 is designed to ensure that each and every authority in the State including the Government acts bona fide and within the limits of its power and we consider that when a court is satisfied that there is an abuse of misuse of power and its Jurisdiction invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to afford justice to the individual....” It is well known that in view of several judgments of the Supreme Court in the last ten years, for purpose of scrutiny by Court, the distinction between an administrative and quasi judicial order has been virtually obliterated, All administrative orders which do not conform to the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are justiciable in court of law. 6. The Calcutta High court in the cases of Dr. (Smt) Pushpika Chatterjee vs. State of West Bengal and N.N. Singh and other vs. General Manager, Chittaranjan Locomoitive Works and others has pointed that if the order of transfer is not for public interest or for administrative purposes and it is found that it has been for collateral purpose such an order can be held to be mala fide. It was further pointed out that once such order are held to be mala fide court can interfere even though no civil or civil consequences follow from such orders. In the case of Lachminarayan Das vs. Shiveshwar Kar it was observed as follows :- "The question about the transfer of an official is primarily for the authorities concerned. A variety of factors may weigh with the authorities while considering the question of transfer viz. the suitability of the official for the post, his aptitude, past conduct, reputation, the period for which he had been on that post and a number of other grounds which may be clubbed together under the head 'exigencies of services'. A variety of factors may weigh with the authorities while considering the question of transfer viz. the suitability of the official for the post, his aptitude, past conduct, reputation, the period for which he had been on that post and a number of other grounds which may be clubbed together under the head 'exigencies of services'. It is not for this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to go into the matter and adjudicate about the advisability or, propriety of the transfer. The Court can only interfere if the transfer is violative of any legal provision or is otherwise mala fide." A learned judge of this Court also in the case of Ramakant Choudhary vs. The State of Bihar and other after having considered the matter in detail observed as follow :- "If I were to allow the order passed by the administration to stand, what would it ultimately mean? It would mean that a member of the Legislative Officer dictates to an Administrative officer the course he bas to adopt in discharge of his duties,. It would mean that such an order though passed for extraneous reasons as a result of undue influence, is allowed to stand As stated earlier, the basic principle of good administration is that even administrative action must be just and fair. If the order is allowed to stand it would amount to allowing an unjust, unfair and an ultra vires order to continue to have effect. It is true that the Administrator was the sole judge of the exigencies of public service and connected matters for the purpose of making an order of transfer. It is however, equally true that be was bound to take into consideration on relevant matters and decide for himself the basic principle of our democracy is the rule of law. A duty has been cass upon this Court in this behalf. This Court cannot, therefore, result to set aside an order such as the present one.” I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. 7. In the case of Shyam Sunder Sen Vs. The State of Bihar and others, Untwalia J., (as he then was) pointed out, “In the set up of the democratic Government run under our Constitution powers of the three limbs of the state, namely, legislative, executive and judiciary, are in separate compartments. 7. In the case of Shyam Sunder Sen Vs. The State of Bihar and others, Untwalia J., (as he then was) pointed out, “In the set up of the democratic Government run under our Constitution powers of the three limbs of the state, namely, legislative, executive and judiciary, are in separate compartments. Undoubtedly, the power of the judicial limb is different and distinct from the power of the executive and legislative limbs of the State. Since, however, our democracy is being run on the parliamentary system of Government, the Ministers for their executive actions are jointly responsible to the legislature. That way the members of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council come to have their way in the matter of administration. A question does arise as to whether it is legitimate and proper for the member of the legislature to Interfere with the day-to-day administration of the Government as the two members purported to inter-middle by their letter dated the 14th of October, 1971." It was held that decision of State Government on basis of such recommendation of the members of Legislature was mala fide. 8. The democratic system of which all of us are party conceives that an executives officer should not be under political pressure, so that he can perform his duty in an objective and fearless manner. But, of late, several cases have been coming to this court where an officer can produce material to show that be has not been transferred from a particular place in normal course of business of the State but really be has been ousted for an ulterior purpose. This is bound to cause demoralisation and a situation of helplessness in many cases. As such, in my view, if on materials this court is satisfied that the transfer of the officer concerned has been engineered, then such order has to be tested on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 9. It is true that in respect of an order of transfer of an officer, perhaps, no civil or evil consequence is involved because transfer is an integral part of public employment. But, will the court uphold even an order of transfer where it appears that the authority concerned bas surrendered its discretion and judgment in respect of administrative exigency to a source which is not supposed to decide that question? But, will the court uphold even an order of transfer where it appears that the authority concerned bas surrendered its discretion and judgment in respect of administrative exigency to a source which is not supposed to decide that question? Can it reject an application in which an order of transfer has been challenged although the Court is satisfied that it is not in normal course of event, but amounts to ouster of an officer from a particular place at the instance of a particular individual? While hearing writ applications, we have come across cases where M.L.As of the locality have been writing to the Ministers or Chief Minister concerned in respect of the transfer of officers from their locality. In one case we found that on such request an officer was not only transferred, but a copy of the order of transfer was formally communicated to the M.L.A /M.L.C. concerned. It has been rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents that M.L.A./M.L.C. being the representative of the people hits certainly a right to bring to the notice of the Government any Act, of omission or commission of a public servant. But, whether such right extends to get an automatic transfer of such an officer? The representative of people can certainly bring to the notice of the authorities concerned the inaction or improper action of an officer in his locality but then the State Government has to apply its independent mind whether it will in the, interest of administration of the State that such an officer should be transferred irrespective of the period for which he has stayed at such a place. In my opinion, whenever any complaint is made against an officer by a representative of the people, it should be examined by the State Government and an independent decision should be taken so that in many cases public servants do not become victim of local machination. 10. From the admitted facts of the present Case it is apparent that the M.L.A. of the area even before the petitioner had joined the post in question, addressed a letter to the Chief Minister requesting him to transfer Respondent No. 4 from Ekma and post him as Block Development Officer, Mairwa. 10. From the admitted facts of the present Case it is apparent that the M.L.A. of the area even before the petitioner had joined the post in question, addressed a letter to the Chief Minister requesting him to transfer Respondent No. 4 from Ekma and post him as Block Development Officer, Mairwa. I can appreciate that a representation of the people can complain about an officer who has been posted in hi, locality, but can he even suggest the names of the officers who should be posted in his locality? In my view, the answer is in negative. In the instant case, admittedly the State has yielded to that request and the petitioner is affected by that. Learned counsel for the State could not place any material although the case was adjourned on different dates, to show even in a prima facie manner that the petitioner has not been transferred, to accomodate respondent no.4, at the instance of the M.L.A. aforesaid. On behalf of respondent no. 4 also nothing could be pointed out to controvert the assertions made on behalf of the petitioner. 11. In such situation, I am left with no option but to allow this writ application and quash the impugned order of transfer dated 24.8.1984 and to direct the State to apply its independent mind on the question of transfer of the petitioner. It will be open to the State to issue a fresh order of transfer in accordance with law. There will be no order as to cost. I agree Application allowed.