JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - The principal relief claimed in this petition is that the Regional Transport Authority, Agra, (hereinafter referred to as the Transport Authority) may be directed to grant to each of the three petitioners either permanent or temporary stage carriage permits on the Mainpuri- Devalpur via Tarapur route (hereinafter referred to as the route). 2. The Transport Authority fixed the strength of the route at three stage carriages and at present there are three existing vacancies. Applications were invited by the Transport Authority for the grant of permanent stage carriages on the route. The applications were received and were duly published as required by the provisions of S. 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The said applications for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits are still pending. The petitioners aver that they were granted temporary stage carriage permits on the route from time to time and now the transport authority is refraining from doing so. 3. The petitioners instituted a joint suit No. 469 of 1984 in the court of Munsif at Mainpuri and in that suit they persuaded the Munsif to pass an order of injunction to the effect that no one else except the petitioners should be granted any permit on the route. It appears that in view of the said order passed by the Munsif, the Transport Authority could not grant permanent permits. The Secretary of the Transport Authority has put up a note that in view of the order passed by the Munsif, the matter regarding grant of temporary permits should be placed before the Regional Transport Authority in its meeting. 4. The provisions of the Act contemplate the grant of permanent stage carriage permits. If the number of the applications for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits exceed the number of permits to be granted, the Transport Authority is enjoined to adopt the process of pick and choose after comparing the merits inter se of the various candidates for permits. The best applicant of the lot has to be chosen keeping in view the provisions of S. 47 of the Act. The terms of the aforesaid provisions constitute the touchstone on which the merits of the competing applicants for permits have to be tested. The best applicant of the lot has to be chosen keeping in view the provisions of S. 47 of the Act. The terms of the aforesaid provisions constitute the touchstone on which the merits of the competing applicants for permits have to be tested. It is the requirement of the provisions of the Act that all pending applications for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits on a particular route should be disposed of together. 5. Section 62 of the Act confers power upon a Transport Authority to grant temporary stage carriage permits. A temporary stage carriage permit granted under the said provisions is effective for a limited period, not in any case to exceed four months. The provisions of the Act do not countenance the renewal of the temporary stage carriage permits. After expiry of the life of an existing temporary permit, a fresh temporary stage carriage permit may be granted, if the conditions enumerated in S. 62 exist. Even while granting a temporary stage carriage permit the Transport Authority is under an obligation to consider on merits all the pending applications for the grant of a temporary permit and select the best applicant in the context of the provisions contained in S. 47. In the first proviso to S. 62 of the Act the legislature has imposed an absolute ban on the grant of a temporary permit in respect of any route or area during the pendency of the applications for the grant of a new permit with respect to that route or area. The precise words used are : "..........shall be in no case can be granted." However, the embargo has been relaxed in sub-section (2) of S. 62 wherein it is provided that a temporary permit may be granted on a particular route in a situation where the Transport Authority concerned has been restrained by 'any competent Court or Authority from granting permanent permits. This limited power of the grant of a temporary permit has been further circumscribed by the conditions that the life of temporary permits so granted shall not exceed the period for which the Transport Authority has been restrained from granting a temporary permit and the number of the transport vehicle in respect of which a temporary permit has been granted shall not exceed the number of vehicles in respect of which the grant of a temporary permit has been restrained. 6. 6. The Munsif while considering an application for grant of an interim injunction at the instance of the petitioners was required to administer the provisions of the Act. He has to keep in view the fact that the sheet- anchor or foundation of the enactment was the interest of the travelling public and the various provisions of the Act rotated around it. The Munsif had neither any jurisdiction to issue any order of interim injunction directing the Transport Authority to grant either permanent or temporary stage carriage permits to the petitioners alone or grant temporary stage carriage permits during the pendency of the applications for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits. Therefore, the Munsif exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the order of interim injunction under reference. 7. The principle quiatimet normally operates when relief is given by issue of an infunction. The assistance is given by the Court to the party seeking its aid because the party apprehends some probable injury to his right or interest in the immediate future. The right or interest which is sought to be protected must be a legal one. In order to obtain a relief of an injunction in a pending suit the suitor has to establish an actual or threatened infringement or invasion of some local right. That right must be recognised by and capable of being enforced under the law. A party having no legal right whatever cannot be granted an injunction in the form of a relief. 8. The Code of Civil Procedure and the Specific Relief Act 1963, deal with the subject matter of an injunction. The provisions contained in the former deal with the grant of temporary injunctions and the provisions contained in the latter govern the grant of perpetual injunction. By and large the principles which govern the grant of perpetual injunctions operate in the matter of grant of a temporary injunction. Indeed, no temporary injunction can be granted in a case in which a permanent injunction is not available. Section 37 of the Specific Relief Act empowers a court to grant temporary and perpetual injunctions. Sub-sec. (1) of that provision provides that the grant of a temporary injunction is regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 37 thereof circumscribes the power of a court to grant of a perpetual injunction. Section 37 of the Specific Relief Act empowers a court to grant temporary and perpetual injunctions. Sub-sec. (1) of that provision provides that the grant of a temporary injunction is regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 37 thereof circumscribes the power of a court to grant of a perpetual injunction. It provides that a decree of a perpetual injunction can be passed against a defendant prohibiting him (the defendant) from asserting a right or committing an act, which would be contrary to the right of the plaintiffs. In the case before the Munsif, the plaintiffs, the petitioners before this court, had a limited legal right of getting their applications for permanent or temporary stage carriage permits considered on merits and in accordance with law in competition with the other applicants. They had no legal right whatever to get their applications considered in isolation of the other pending applications. They had also no right to secure temporary permits for the route during the pendency of the applications for the grant of permanent permits for the same. On the contrary, as indicated above, the provisions of the Act pointedly prohibit the grant of a temporary permit during the pendency of applications for the grant of permanent permits. The Munsif by his order of interim injunction, infact, directed the Transport Authority to act in violation of the law, thereby conferring upon the petitioners rights which the law not only did not recognise but expressly negatived. S. 38 of the Specific Relief Act prescribes the different situations in which a perpetual injunction may be granted. According to it, a court acquires jurisdiction to grant a perpetual injunction to a plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour (plaintiff). To put it differently, no plaintiff can seek a relief of perpetual injunction unless he establishes an existing obligation in his favour. The term "obligation" is defined in S. 2(a) of the Specific Relief Act: "includes other duty enforceable by law." It is apparent that all duties are not included in the term. Only such duties as are enforceable by law are embraced in it. It is now well known that duty and right are co-related. The plaintiff must, therefore, in the first place show that there is a legal right and that right is either being actually injured or is likely to be injured. Only such duties as are enforceable by law are embraced in it. It is now well known that duty and right are co-related. The plaintiff must, therefore, in the first place show that there is a legal right and that right is either being actually injured or is likely to be injured. We have already held that the plaintiffs had no legal right for the protection of which the Munsif issued the order of interim injunction. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Munsif passed the order of interim injunction in utter disregard of the provisions contained in Ss. 37 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act. 9. The order of the Munsif has not been impugned in this writ petition. On the contrary, the petition is founded on that order. In substance, the petitioners seek the enforcement of the interim order of injunction. There can be no dispute that the power of superintendence conferred upon this court by Article 227 of the Constitution can be exercised by us if the machinery contained in the said provision is set into motion by an aggrieved party by means of an appropriate application. However, the condition precedent for the exercise of power under the said Article is not the making of a proper application by an aggrieved party. The exercise of suo motu powers is implicit or inherent in the power of superintendence conferred upon this court. Once it is established that the courts and Tribunals, which are subject to our superintendence, have exceeded their bounds, the arms of this court can be extended to set matter right. We are tempted to extract a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 274 and 275 of 1958, decided on 13-8-1961, S. Barrow v. State of U.P. : "............ whenever it come to, or is brought to, the notice of the High Court that orders passed by the subordinate courts or Tribunals are illegal and deserve to be set aside it can exercise its power of superintendence in that behalf in whatever manner that said illegal orders come to its notice. That in our opinion is implied in the conferment of the relevant power; and so we have no hesitation in holding that the power under Article 227 can be exercised suo motu." 10. The Munsif, Mainpuri is not a party before us. That in our opinion is implied in the conferment of the relevant power; and so we have no hesitation in holding that the power under Article 227 can be exercised suo motu." 10. The Munsif, Mainpuri is not a party before us. Can we quash an order of interim injunction passed by the Munsif in his absence in the exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution? We need not dilate upon this question as the same stands answered by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammad Enamual Haque v. Muhammad J. Hussain in Civil Appeal No. 985 of 1963 decided on 8-5-1964, (1964 SC (Notes) 181) : "There is neither practice, nor binding authority to support the contention raised by the counsel for the respondent that in a proceeding for an order under Article 227 of the Constitution it is necessary to implead the court or Tribunal against the order for which the proceeding is initiated by the High Court. By entertaining a petition under Article 227, the High Court does not seek to exercise jurisdiction to issue any prerogative writ. Jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under Article 227 is of superintendence - a jurisdiction somewhat analogous to the revisional jurisdiction which the High Courts for a long time past have been invested under diverse statutes. To a proceeding invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution the Tribunal was not a necessary party, and in an appeal against the order passed in personam against the appellant in that proceeding the Tribunal is not a necessary party." 11. We have already indicated that the Munsif not only stepped beyond his bounds but also committed a patent illegality. We are, therefore, satisfied that this is a fit case for exercising the power vested in us under Article 227 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we quash the order of interim injunction passed in Suit No. 469 of 1984. 12. It is now an admitted position that the applications for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits on the route are pending. The order of the Munsif has been quashed by us. Now, there is no order of any competent court or authority prohibiting the grant of permanent stage carriage permits by the Transport Authority. 12. It is now an admitted position that the applications for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits on the route are pending. The order of the Munsif has been quashed by us. Now, there is no order of any competent court or authority prohibiting the grant of permanent stage carriage permits by the Transport Authority. In such a situation, the Transport Authority has, in view of the provisions contained in the first proviso to section 62 of the Act, no jurisdiction to grant any temporary permits during the pendency of the applications for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits. 13. The petitioners have averred that the applications for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits are ripe for hearing. If that be so, the stage is now set for the Transport Authority to proceed forthwith to consider and dispose of all the applications pending before it for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits on merits and in accordance with law. The Transport Authority shall now dispose of all the pending applications, including those of the petitioners, for the grant of permanent stage carriage permits on the route within a period of two months from the date of the production of the certified copy of the order of this Court by all or any of the petitioners before it. 14. With these observations the writ petition is dismissed summarily. 15. A copy of this order may be supplied to the learned counsel for the petitioners on payment of usual charges, if possible, within 48 hours.