N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by a plaintiff of a suit under sec. 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act and presently the opponent before the Board of Nominees. The suit is filed for a declaration that he is a duly elected Director of the respondent No. 1 Co-operative Society as per the elections held in August 1984 and he cannot be restrained from acting as such. The Society on the other hand was contending that he was removed from his office by the Registrar under sec. 76 B (1) of the Act. And he was disqualified on the day of the election namely August 1984 the Registrars Order being dated 27/01/1984 his election itself was had and therefore he could not bank on his alleged elect of August 1984 The Nominee of the Registrar refused to grant the interim injunction and his order came to be confirmed by the Co-operative Tribunal in the revision application filed against that order and that has given rise to the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) I am not oblivious of this Courts limited jurisdiction while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India nor oblivious of the dis- cretionary character of this High Courts writ jurisdiction. However when it appears that on gross misconception of facts and law the authorities refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by law if the decisions impugned before this High Court can be said to be without jurisdiction they are liable to be in- terfered with. ( 3 ) IN order to understand the controversy a few facts are require d to be noted carefully. The petitioner at the relevant time of the order i. e. 1981 1982 1983 and 1984 was holding the posts of an elected Director on the Board of Direc- tors of this respondent No. 1 Co-operative Society. As the order of the Tribunal itself shows vide paragraph 3 his post was to fall vacant on his retirement in Aug. 1984. As per bye-laws 1 members of the Board of Directors were to retire on rotation and the petitioner was one of term. As the order of the Tribunal itself shows vide paragraph 3 his post was to fall vacant on his retirement in Aug. 1984. As per bye-laws 1 members of the Board of Directors were to retire on rotation and the petitioner was one of term. So his term as a Director was limited to the period upto August 1984 Had he not been removed he also would have ceased to be a Director. Now the Registrar in exercise of his power under sec. 76-B (1) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act removed him from the office of the Director. He could not have been removed beyond the period of his tenure the. beyond August 1984 But the Registrar perhaps oblivious of the limitations of his power purported to pass an order removing him for one year Being aggrieved by the said decision the petitioner had filed a revision appli- cation before the State level Additional Register. The Additional Registrar was competent to reject the revision applications but he had no jurisdiction to fur- ther say that the petitioner was disqualified also by necessary presumption. But he purported to say that to take this concurrent amuse of the Co-operative Tri- bunal as unwarranted and without authority of law and therefor non-est. The petitioner came to be namely elected in August 1984 As stated above he also laboured under the impression that he had no right to work as a Director and so he waited till March 1985 when he approached the respondent No. 1 Society to permit him to function as a Director. He having been so restrained filed a suit before the Board of Nominee and applied for an interim injunction. The injunction having not been granted by the Nominee as well as by the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal as per their respective orders at annexures-H and J. the present petition has come to be filed. ( 4 ) EVEN a bare look at the text of section 76-B (1) (2) makes it clear that under that section 76-B the Registrar has got two-fold powers. Under sub-sec. (1) he has got power to remove a Director. But that power is obviously limited their be remainder of the terms of his. This is very clear from the later part of Sub-sec. Under sub-sec. (1) he has got power to remove a Director. But that power is obviously limited their be remainder of the terms of his. This is very clear from the later part of Sub-sec. (1) After removal of an officer the Registrar has to direct the Society to appoint a person or a qualified member in the vacancy caused by such a removal and the new incumbent small hold the office so long only as the Office in whose place he is elected or appointed would have held if the vacancy had not occurred. This means and must mean that removal cannot be beyond the period of this office. The petitioners office was to come to an end in August 1984 Therefore his removal though stated to be for one year was operative only till August 1984 Under sub-section (2) it was open to the Registrar to further direct that the petitioner who was removed under sub-section (1) would stand disqualified to hold the post or contest the election for any office of the society for a period not exceeding four years from the date of lithe order of dis- qualification. Disqualification therefore does not per se follow removal. It is to be specifically and separately ondered. The power to disqualify is discretion- any as the auxiliary verb may clearly indicates. The Registrar unfortunately did not know this fine distinction of law. He simply jumbled up both the sub- sections in his order annexure-A. The operative part of the order is only for re- moral for one year which for all practical purposes was removal only upto August 1954 The Co-operative Tribunal in the revision against that order went further to say that because am that removal he stood disqualified for one year. If the removal was only upto August 1984 how can there be consequential or as a matter of course disqualification operative beyond August 1984 This is a clear example how the offices and Judicial Tribunals clothed with judicial powers are manned by people not knowing law and such mistakes are being committed by them. If the removal was only upto August 1984 how can there be consequential or as a matter of course disqualification operative beyond August 1984 This is a clear example how the offices and Judicial Tribunals clothed with judicial powers are manned by people not knowing law and such mistakes are being committed by them. ( 5 ) IF the petitioner whose removal came to an end or ceased to be opera- tive in August 1984 sought re-election and came to be elected he had a right to act as such in and from August 1984 These clear legal concepts unfortu- vlately are lost sight of both by the Board of Nominees and the Co-operative Tribunal and their refusal to grant interim injunction flows from their know- ledge about their jurisdiction. In other words their orders suffer from jurisdic- tional error and therefore they are set aside. ( 6 ) MR. Patel for the respondent No. 1 Bank however has contended be- fore me that the order annexure-B of the Additional Registrar had become final. I have already dealt with it. It is the exuberance on the part of the Additional Registrar to have unwittingly twisted the law by going beyond his jurisdiction in a revision application filed by this private party. ( 7 ) MR. Patels second argument was that this injunction granted would ultimately result into allowing the suit. If that is the natural and inevitable out- come it cannot be helped. ( 8 ) MR. Patels last valiant argument was that in the matter of discretion this High Court should not interfere. It is truism to state that discretion must be judicial discretion. Where it is open to the authority to grant or not to grant an injunction in the given set of circumstances and facts and if the authority exercises the jurisdiction one way or the other this court cannot interfere with it. But where there is gross misconception of jurisdictional power and the refu- sal emanates from that gross misconception. the orders are to be branded as pas sed without authority of law and/or in disregard of jurisdictional powers. ( 9 ) THE result it that the petition is allowed. But where there is gross misconception of jurisdictional power and the refu- sal emanates from that gross misconception. the orders are to be branded as pas sed without authority of law and/or in disregard of jurisdictional powers. ( 9 ) THE result it that the petition is allowed. the respondent-Bank is res- trained by an injunction issued by this Court form interfering with this petito- ner acting as a Director of the respondent No. 1-Bank in his capacity as a Director elected in the elections held in August 1984 Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs to be paid by the respondent No. 1-Bank ( 10 ) THE request to maintain statics quo is resided because in my view there is no other alternative outcome of this litigation possible. Petition allowed. .