JUDGMENT : S.S. Sandhawalia, C. J. - Whether a document can be presented for registration by a person other than the executant under section 32 of the Registration Act is the significant question has necessitating this reference to the Division Bench. 2. The case set up by respondent no. 2 Ram Mishra, was that the petitioner Parasnath Singh, being in urgent need of money, has executed an agreement to sell 81 decimals of land for a consideration of Rs. 15000/- On the 1st of July, 1977. Thereunder he received Rs. 1250/- as an advance and had firmly promised to execute the deed of sale after obtaining permission from the Consolidation authority. Subsequently after securing permission from the Chakbandi officer for selling his land five sale deeds scribed by Matiur Rahman was duly executed on the 28th of August, 1977 at Lalganj. The contents of these sale deeds were read over and well understood by the petitioner and thereafter he bad appended his signature and thumb impression on each of the documents after which the witnesses attested the same. As it was very late in the day, the documents were not presented before the Sub-Registrar, Lalganj for admission of execution and on the request of the petitioner the balance of the consideration money of Rs. 13750/- was paid to him on the condition that on the following day he would admit the execution of the documents and get them duly registered. The said documents were delivered over to respondents no. 2 but thereafter in spite of the promises made the petitioner did not turn up in the registry office at Lalgunj for admission of execution of the sale deeds. 3. Respondent no., 2 thereafter presented the five sale deeds in the court of the District sub-Ragistrar, Vaishali, Hajipur, for securing the appearance of the petitioner and to initiate proceeding under section 36 of the Indian Registration Act, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act.) Accordingly summonses were issued and served on the petitioner but he faied to appear on the date fixed and hence the cases were converted under section 44 of the Act. The petitioner thereafter appeared and contested all the five cases. In his written statement he took up the plea that he neither executed the sale deeds is question nor received any consideration money. The petitioner thereafter appeared and contested all the five cases. In his written statement he took up the plea that he neither executed the sale deeds is question nor received any consideration money. It was alleged that respondent no.2 had prevailed on him to come to the house of Matiur Rahmen, the said house and subsequently under threats and duress obtained his thumb impression and signature on a number of blank stamped papers, etc. These were later converted into the agreement to sell and the sale deeds. 4. In support of his case, respondent no. 2, apart from stepping into the witness box himself examined five more witnesses, On the other hand, the petitioner examined himself and two more witnesses is support of his case. On a close appraisal of the evidence, the District sub-Regisatrar arrived at a firm conclusion that the petitioner has put his signatures and affixed his thumb impressions with full awareness of the contents of the documents. Holding that the requirements of section 74 of the Act were satisfied, he ORDER :d the registration of all the five documents under section 75 thereof. 5. Aggrieved by the ORDER :aforesaid, the present writ petition has been preferred for quashing the same. The case, originally came up for hearing before my learned Brother, S. Ali Ahmad, J. sitting singly. Noticing that the moot-question that arose was whether a prospective transferee under a sale deed is competent to present the document for registration under section 32 of the Act, he referred the same to a Division Bench for an authoritative decision. 6. As before the learned single Judge so before us, the core of the submission of Mr. Mishra, the learned counsel for the petitioners was rested on the opening part of clause (a) of section 32 of the Act. Canvassing for a strained construction it was submitted that this clause visualises the presentation of a document only by the person executing the same or other person claiming under such executants. The somewhat vehement contention was that the right of presentation and registration is granted by the statute only to the executant and persons deriving their claim from him and to no one else. 7. Inevitably the controversy herein revolves around the language of section 32 and it is, therefore, apt to first read the same- "32. Persons to present documents/or registration.-Except in the case mentioned in Secs. 7. Inevitably the controversy herein revolves around the language of section 32 and it is, therefore, apt to first read the same- "32. Persons to present documents/or registration.-Except in the case mentioned in Secs. 31, 32 and 33 every document to be registered under this Act, whether such registration be compulsory or optional, shall be presented at the proper registration-office— (a) by some person executing or claiming under the same or, in the case of a copy of a decree or ORDER :, claiming under the decree or ORDER :, or (b) by the representative or assign of such person, or (c) by the agent of such person representative or assign, duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned." 8. A closer analysis of the aforesaid provision makes it manifest that the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner is devoid of merit by a variety of reasons. The broad scheme of section 32 would leave no manner of doubt that paramount thing therein is the document to be registered. The opening part of the section preceding clauses (a), (b) and (c) places the document to be registered to the forefront and the references in the clauses which follow, therefore, cannot be divorced from the dominant opening part of the section. Consequently, when the relevant part of clause (a) is read analytically, it clearly means two distinct persons firstly, the person executing the said document and, secondly, the person claiming under the said document. The right of presentation is conferred on both these categories, and it is done so in identical terms. 9. The view aforesaid is further buttressed when reference is made to the latter part of clause (a) of section 32. This again talks of a person seeking registration of a copy of decree or ORDER :. In express term this category means a person claiming under the decree or the ORDER :. Therefore, viewed as a whole clause (a) centres around documents and persons claiming under the same. 10. A somewhat strict and technically grammatic meaning also lends support to the stand that in clause (a) the relevant part means claiming under the document and not under any person. The composite phrase employed is "by some person executing or claiming under the same". 10. A somewhat strict and technically grammatic meaning also lends support to the stand that in clause (a) the relevant part means claiming under the document and not under any person. The composite phrase employed is "by some person executing or claiming under the same". If it was intended that the claim must be under the parson then correct word to be employed would be "him" and not "the same". When one derives a title or a right from a person then the correct phraseology to indicate the situation would be that it is derived from him and not from the same. 11. In the light of the above, three distinct categories which clause (a) envisages for the presentation of every document to be registered under the Act are- (i) some person executing the document; (ii) some person claiming under the document; and, (iii) some person claiming under the decree or ORDER :. 12. A larger perspective or section 32 is again indicative of the fact that right of presentation is vested in the aforesaid three categories. The succeeding clauses (b) and (c) then prescribe the subsidiary persons who may also make the presentation on behalf of the primal ones. Clause (b) authorises the representative or assign of such persons to do so. To further facilitate the presentation, clause (c) prescribes that an agent of such person or representative or assign may do so, provided that he is duly authorised by a power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in the manner prescribed in the succeeding section 33. Thus viewed, clauses (1), (b), and (c) prescribe the broad hierarchy of person who can present a document for registration. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner had then attempted tenuously to rely on section 26 as well. However, a close look at that provision would indicate that far from aiding him, this would, indeed boomerang, on his stand. This section, in terms, refers to any person claiming under any document which is capable of being presented and registered. Further it visualises the issue of summons against persons including the executant to appear in the registration office, either in person or by duly authorised agent. It is thus. plain that where the executant does not choose to be present, his attendance can be compelled under this section. Further it visualises the issue of summons against persons including the executant to appear in the registration office, either in person or by duly authorised agent. It is thus. plain that where the executant does not choose to be present, his attendance can be compelled under this section. Obviously, this would be necessary when the document is presented and sought to be registered by a person other than the executant who wishes to compel his attendance. Mr. Mishra attempted to whittle down this provision by contending that this would provide for a case where the executant has himself presented at document originally but later absents himself. Undoutedly, section 36 would cover such a situation; but equally it is pervasive enough to apply in a situation where the person presenting the document is other than the executant and wishes to compel the latter's attendance. 14. It would appear that there is a paucity of direct precedent on the point. But the following observations of their Lordships in Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat and others. (AIR 1954 Supreme Court 316) lend patent credence to the view that a document maybe presented for registration by a person other than its executant :- "Where, therefore, a document is presented for registration by a person other than a party to it or his legal representative or assign or by a person who is not an agent authorised in the manner prescribed is S.33, such presentation is wholly inoperative, and the registration of such a document is void". 15. More pertinent and direct are the observations of the Full Bench in Venkati Rama Reddi and others vs. Pillati Rama Reddi and others (AIR 1917 Madras 27), Seshagiri Aiyar, J.; unequivocally observed thererin :- "It is now well settled that in the case of sales, mortgages, leases and exchanges, if a document has been executed and the executant refuses to register, it is open to the person in whose favour the document is executed to compel its registration and the document will then become valid." and again— "If the legal representative of the deceased donor can present for registration the document executed by the deceased man, I fail to see why the person in whose favour the document is executed should not under the Registration Act similarly present it for registration." 16. To conclude on this aspect, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative. It is held that a document can be presented for registration by a person other than its executant under section 32 of the Registration Act. 17. Repelled upon the aforesaid primal contention, Mishra, the learned Counsel for the petitioner bad attempted' a flanking movement by raising two tenuous and subsidiary submissions as well. Relying again on section 32, which provides for the presentation of the document at the proper registration office, he contended that the same was at Lalgunj but the document was presented and registered at Hajipur and the proceedings are, therefore, vitiated. This submission has only to be noticed and rejected. It would appear that the objection with regard to the proper registration office was wholly abandoned before the District Sub-Registrar, Vaishali. In the comprehensive and detailed impugned ORDER :(Annexure 5) there is not a hint or mention of any objection being raised or pressed on the point of the registration office being not the proper one. What is, perhaps, more significant is the fact that in the writ petition itself no such point with regard to any infirmity of the ground of the registration office being not the appropriate one has even been mentioned. In this context we are unable to permit the raising of any such argument and adjudicate upon the same without the necessary factual basis. 18. Lastly, as an argument of despair, it was sought to be contended that permission from the Consolidation authorities was not taken for the sale, and, therefore, the proceedings were in violation of section 6 of the Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act and, thus, vitiated. This stand is again wholly untenable. The impugned ORDER :(Annexure 5) expressly notices that the plaint itself averred that permission had been obtained from the Chakbandi officer for the selling of the land after the agreement to sell has been executed. It was thereafter that the sale deeds were duty executed. In paragraph 22 of the written statement (annexure 2) filed by the petitioner himself he had averred that the opposite party (respondent no. 2) had committed further forgeries and fraud in obtaining permission from the Chakbandi officer. It was thereafter that the sale deeds were duty executed. In paragraph 22 of the written statement (annexure 2) filed by the petitioner himself he had averred that the opposite party (respondent no. 2) had committed further forgeries and fraud in obtaining permission from the Chakbandi officer. This would plaintly indicate that it was the petitioner's own case that a permission from the Consolidation authority had been secured; but it was sought to be assailed as having been obtained by fraud, etc. Apparently, because this objection has no legs to stand on, the same was not raised or pressed before the District Sub-Registrar who has not made even a hint or mention about it in the impugned ORDER :. We are thus unable to find any substance in his submission which must also be rejected. 19. For the reasons aforesaid this writ petition is without merit and is hereby dismissed with costs. S. Ali Ahmad, J. – I agree.