JUDGMENT : S. S. Sandhawalla, C. J. - Whether a composite suit pertaining to lands, which partly fall within the definition in section 2(9) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation; Act, 1956 and partly lie beyond its ambit, would abate at all; and if so, either wholly or partially under section 4(c) of the said Act, is the somewhat intricate, question necessitating this reference to the Division Bench. 2. Since the primary and, indeed, the sole issue herein is one of abatement, iris unnecessary to delve too deeply into the somewhat tangled facts. The plaintiff appellant, Bettiah Estate, had brought the title suit for eviction of the defendant from the lands measuring 23.16 acres (situated in village Narainpur police station Bagaha, district West Champaran) including the industrial establishment of a saw mill with all its appurtenances of a yard attached thereto as also out houses, store houses and residential quarters for the workmen, etc. It was the case that the said saw mill had been closed down by the State and was advertised for sale and was purchased by Messrs Hari Ram Bholi Ram; However, the said purchasers, instead of removing the saw mill machinery, applied to the Manager of the Bettiah Estate for permission to run the mill and timber business as a lessee, which proposal was submitted for sanction to the Commissioner, Tirhut Division, which was later accorded. However, the purchasers failed to execute and register a deed of lease as had been agreed to despite repeated demands and consequently Title Suit no. 98 of 1955 against the said purchasers for their ejectment came to be filed by the appellant. During the pendency of the said suit, the defendant Nand Kishore Prasad applied to the Manager of the Bettiah Estate for purchasing the saw mill from the former purchasers. The plaintiff appellant agreed to allow the defendant to run saw mill on the condition that he would later execute and register deed of lease on the same terms and conditions as in the unregistered deed of lease of Messrs Hari Ram Bholi Ram. On the basis of the agreement, a satisfaction petition was filed in the aforesaid Title Suit no. 98 of 1955. 3. On the basis of the agreement, a satisfaction petition was filed in the aforesaid Title Suit no. 98 of 1955. 3. The defendant, in pursuance of the above agreement, was allowed to occupy the disputed land and buildings but later on he also failed to execute and register a lease and the claim, therefore, was that his possession was that of a tenant at will or a mere licensee. It was further alleged that the defendant had committed various acts of negligence and default and was liable for damages. After serving notice the suit for eviction and for damages far use and occupation-both past and future-was instituted. 4. The defendant contested the suit by filing two written statements and controverting the allegations of the appellant. It defence, it was claimed that the defendant was in possession as a raiyat and had become a full-fledged occupancy raiyat without the execution of any registered lease and that he was not tenant at will or a licensee. It was further alleged that Murat Ahir and others had deen in occupation of about 9 acres of land and they had built their residential houses thereon. Further, there was a foot-ball ground on 3 acres of land and, the defendant continued to be in possession of the remaining area which he cultivates. 5. On the aforesaid pleading, as many as 9 issues were framed, and on holding most of them in favour of, the plaintiff appellant the trial court decreed the suit concluding that the defendant was a tenant at will of the disputed land and buildings and directed the ejectment of the defendant as also the payment of Rs. 2,371/40 paise as damages. On appeal, the learned District Judge noticed that the only point which had been pressed before him was whether the defendant appellant, who was a tenant at will or licensee, could be evicted by the plaintiff. On a consideration of the facts, and circumstances, the first appellate court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had no right left in them to maintain the suit after the vesting of the zamindari of Bettiah Raj in the State of Bihar and, therefore; they were not entitled to any relief. The appeal was consequently allowed and the JUDGMENT : and decree of the court below was set aside and the suit dismissed. 6. The appeal was consequently allowed and the JUDGMENT : and decree of the court below was set aside and the suit dismissed. 6. The present second appeal was filed in this court on the 27th of June, 1977. During its pendency, an application has been filed averring that the land in dispute situated in Bagaha Anchal had been notified under sections 1(3) and 3(1) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred to as the ‘Act’)-vide notification no. 204 dated the 14th of February, 1979 and notification no. S. O. 288 dated the 16th of February, 1979 which have been duly published In the Bihar Gazette. Consequently, it is claimed that the present appeal, which was pending at the material time, and all proceedings would stand abated under section 4(c) of the Act. This application and the appeal first came up for hearing before my learned Brother, S. Ali Ahmad, J., sitting singly. Before him the issue was raised that the suit and the appeal under section 4 (c) of the Act would abate only with regard to the lands which are under agricultural operation and not with regard to land under the industrial establishment of the saw mill and the appurtenances thereto. Noticing the significance of the question as also the issue of the identification of the land under agricultural operation or otherwise, the matter was referred to a Division Bench. 7. For arriving at a true and meaningful construction of section 4(c), one cannot and, indeed, should not be oblivious to the true purpose and object for its enactment. The Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act (hereinafter called the 'Act') came into force in 1956. This statute has undergone structural changes by a number of subsequent amendments, to which detailed reference is not necessary here. As the ex-hautive provisions of its forty sections would indicate, the Act was intended to be a self-contained Code for the purpose of consolidation of agricultural land within the State. This statute has undergone structural changes by a number of subsequent amendments, to which detailed reference is not necessary here. As the ex-hautive provisions of its forty sections would indicate, the Act was intended to be a self-contained Code for the purpose of consolidation of agricultural land within the State. The bar against the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts under section 37 of the Act is indicative of the fact that the Legislature clearly requires that with respect to any matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act, the same alone provides the forums for its determination, and further, all decisions or ORDER :s given or ORDER :s passed under the Act are immune from interference by a Civil Court. 8. Adverting particularly to section 4, it deserves recalling that the original enactment and its contents and even caption were entirely different from the present one, which was substituted by Act 27 of 1975. This provision, as its beading indicates, deals with the necessary legal and consequential effects which flow from a notification under section 3(1) of the Act. It is unnecessary for our purposes to advert to all the exhaustive provisions of section 4, and it would suffice to mention that by clause (c) thereof, it is plainly intended that with regard to all matters in regard to a proceeding, which can and ought to have been taken under this Act, any proceeding pending before any other Court or authority, whether of the first instance or of appellate, revisional or referential, would abate with the necessary consequence of the same being decided under the Act. Since the controversy inevitably has to be focussed on clause(c), it is apt to read the relevant part of section 4 which reads : "4 Effect of notification under section 3 (1) of the Act upon the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of section 3 in the official gazette the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operation, ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely- (a) ……….. (b) ………. (b) ………. (c) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act pending before any court or authority, whether of the first instance or of appeal reference or revision, shall on an ORDER :being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated........." It is obvious that the language of the provision aforesaid is couched in terms of the widest amplitude. It would, therefore, be capable of an equally wide ranging construction. Inserted as it was in 1975, it is plainly enough directed to the laudable object that the consolidation of land holdings, which in the rural economy can be the corner-stone of progress, should be expedited and the road blocks of contentious civil litigation with regard to areas under consolidation be removed. Herein there may well arise an undoubted conflict of private interest, on the one hand and public weal, on the other, and equally therewith, a clash betwixt the rule of primacy of the Civil Court, on the one hand, and the urgent social need of consolidation, on the other. Therefore, a synthesis between these rival extremes has to be arrived at with some degree of precision. The Courts of law are, attuned-and, in a way, rightly-to the rule of the primacy of civil law and the dictum plainly is that the civil jurisdiction is not to be ousted, except by clear and categoric, exclusive, either express or by necessary implication. Yet it must be noticed that section 4(c) has been added only a decade ago, plainly for the reason that the long and tortuous process of civil litigation cannot but be a serious hurdle in the social objective of expeditious consolidation of land holdings. It is, therefore, that section 4(c) lays down the some what radical rule that all suits, appeals, references or revisions in Courts, which pertain to land under consolidation and come within the ambit of the wide ranging clause, shall stand abated. Thus the consolidation authorities would hold undisputed way over the area duly notified under section 3 (1) of the Act. Thus the consolidation authorities would hold undisputed way over the area duly notified under section 3 (1) of the Act. Undoubtedly, the Courts have to be jealous of the civil rights of the citizens and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, but equally one cannot by a process of interpretation frustrate the basic object of the Legislature in enacting section 4(c) to give a relatively freer hand to the authorities under the Act. Therefore, if there is some conflict betwixt the primacy of the Civil Court and the urgent need of consolidation, the former must give way to the latter, because the special legislation for consolidation may, otherwise be defeated and frustrated from effectuating its purpose. Nevertheless, a true stand has to be taken which takes note of both the rival claims. 9. With the aforesaid background, it seems necessary to pose the problem with some pointed clarity because the issue herein undoubtedly does not seem to be entirely free from difficulty. It seems to be plain that if the property in dispute comes clearly within the definition of 'land' under section 2 (9) of the Act, the suit would abate wholly, if the other requisites of section 4 (c) stand satisfied. On the other hand, if the property in dispute does' not come within the ambit of section 2 (9) at all, then no question of any abatement would arise. The problem, therefore, arises only when the property is composite in nature, i.e., some part of the same is within the meaning of section 2(9), whilst the other is without it. With regard to such composite property, three legal consequences could possibly follow-(i) the suit would not abate at all; (ii) the suit would abate wholly; and (iii) the suit would abate partially with regard to the property, which is 'land' within the meaning of section 2(9) and would not abate with regard to the property which is not so. 10. Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, the learned Advocate-General, ably assisted the court on request as amicus curiae, by first taking the extreme stand that such a composite suit would abate wholly. He placed reliance on section 2(3), and in particular, on clause (iv) of the Explanation thereto. 10. Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, the learned Advocate-General, ably assisted the court on request as amicus curiae, by first taking the extreme stand that such a composite suit would abate wholly. He placed reliance on section 2(3), and in particular, on clause (iv) of the Explanation thereto. It was highlighted that the Director of Consolidation had been empowered to declare certain areas to be unsuitable for the purpose of consolidation and thus exclude them from the notification under section 3. The submission was that unless such an exclusion was made by the Director, the whole of the area notified by section 3 (1) would come ,within the ambit of consolidation, irrespective of the fact whether it Was agricultural land or otherwise within or without the definition of section 2 (9). Consequently, the whole of the notified area would come within the span of clause (c) or section 4, and thus suits or proceedings appertaining to be same would stand abated. Reliance was further placed on section 9 generally, and particularly to section 11(2)(c) and 11(4) (iii) for the submission that they have relevance not to the definition of 'land' under section 2(9), but the larger applicability of the notification under section 3 to the whole of the area. In sum, the contention was, that if the notification under section 3(1) subsists without any exclusion made therefrom by the Director under clause (iv) of the Explanation to section 2 (3), then every-thing under the sun in the revenue estate cannot, escape the ambit of consolidation. The learned Advocate General placed reliance on passing observations in Parmeshwari Devi and others vs. Sobha Devi and others ( 1984 PLJR 868 ) and, Ram Pratap Mahto and others vs. Dipial Mahto and others ( 1979 BBCJ 738 ). 11. The aforesaid argument was also espoused by one of the learned counsel for the parties in contending that the individual character of the property within the notified area of consolidation was irrelevant, and whether these were presently an industrial establishment or purely agricultural land was of no consequence whatsoever. Reliance was placed on para 6 of the report in Mirza Sulaiman Beg and others vs. Harihar Mabto and others ( 1985 PLJR 152 ) for contending that the Division Bench therein has construed the definition in section 2 (9) widely and had, indeed, freed it from the shackles of being agricultural in nature. 12. Reliance was placed on para 6 of the report in Mirza Sulaiman Beg and others vs. Harihar Mabto and others ( 1985 PLJR 152 ) for contending that the Division Bench therein has construed the definition in section 2 (9) widely and had, indeed, freed it from the shackles of being agricultural in nature. 12. In construing the aforesaid arguments canvassed for total abatement, it may first be noticed that the law does visualise partial abatement of a suit in this context. This becomes necessary because it was vaguely hinted that no partial abatement is at all visualised. It is unnecessary to examine this limited issue on principle because it stands covered by recent precedent. In Civil Revision No. 1563 of 1978 (Chaturbhuj Prasad Singh v. Saryu Prasad Singh and others) decided on 14th February, 1985 (to which I was a party). [1985 PLJR (NOC) 48] the very question was specifically posed and then answered in the following terms : "In my opinion, therefore, a suit or a proceeding can partially abate. It will abate in respect of the lands lying in the area in respect of which the Government has declared its intention to make a scheme for consolidation of holdings by a notification in official Gazette under section 3(1) of the Act. It will not abate in respect of any land for which there is no such notification." 13. Having cleared the deck of the threshold question whether the partial abatement is possible or not, one may now revert to the examination of the contentions noticed earlier. In doing so, it is first apt to clear the matter from the shackles of precedents in view of the learned counsels insistent reliance on the observation in Mirza Sulaiman Beg and others v. Haribar Mabto and others (supra). I was a party to the said case and cannot possibly subscribe to the submission that it liberates the definition of 'land' from its basic nexus with agriculture.' Section 7.(9) is in the terms following: " 'Land' means agricultural land, and includes horticultural land, Kharaur land, land with bamboo clumps, pasture land, cultivable waste land, homesteads, tanks, wells and water channels." A close analysis of the aforesaid would show that the definition is in two parts. The basic limitation imposed is that the land is to mean agricultural land. The basic limitation imposed is that the land is to mean agricultural land. However, this basic concept is extended by expressly including therein certain things, whi.ch though may be co-related to agriculture, are not strictu sensu land as such, for example, homesteads, tanks, wells and water channels which in ordinary parlance, are not understood as land simplicitor or agricultural land as such. However, the second part of the definition brings those things also within the definition of land, by an inclusive definition. I am inclined to hold that though the inclusive portion of the definition may be interpreted somewhat widely and liberally, yet they have still to be read as ejusdem generis to the basic definition of 'land' as agricultural land. Therefore, the over-all meaning of 'land' and 'agricultural land' cannot be either wholly eroded or evaporated. The inclusive part of the definition does not liberate it from the corner stone of land being agricultural in nature or co-related to the same. Therefore, the subject matter of consolidation has still to be 'land' as defined in section 2(9) and the re-arrangement of the parcels thereof for the purpose of rendering the holding more compact. The Mirza Sulaiman Beg and others v. Harihar Mabto's case (supra), therefore, cannot be extended or expanded to mean that any or every thing dehors its relationship to either land or agriculture can come within the definition of section 2(9). This view is also in consonance with the earlier Division Bench JUDGMENT :, in 'Ram Pratap' Mahto and others v. Diplal Mahto and others ( 1979 BBCJ 738 ). 14. Apart from precedent, it seems equally impossible to hold that the nature of the property namely, whether land or agricultural land is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of consolidation. As in the present case, the in disputed stand is that a part of the property is an industrial establishment namely, a saw mill and its basic appurtenances like a yard attached thereto, storage room and other, structures as also residential quarters for the workmen of the mill. To say that a purely industrial establishment is land (and thus the subject matter of consolidation) is not easily tenable. To say that a purely industrial establishment is land (and thus the subject matter of consolidation) is not easily tenable. An extreme and illuminating example was posed at the Bar that the prestigious Steel Mill of Tata Iron and Steel Company at Jamshedpur is located in a village revenue estate, and would such industrial establishment come within the ambit of consolidation if the village area was notified therefor? The answer would plainly seem to be in the negative. 15. To sum up on this aspect, on both principle and precedent; it is not possible to accept the extreme contention that the moment an area is notified under section 3(1) of the Act, then any and every thing comprised therein, irrespective of, its being land, or otherwise, would be the subject matter of consolidation, unless excluded therefrom by the Director under clause (iv) of the Explanation to section 2(3). The submission aforesaid, therefore, must be rejected. 16. This brings us back to the question as to what would be the true rationale applicable to the Issue of abatement under section 4(c) when the property is composite in nature. Before answering this question on some of its facts, it seems apt in fairness to the learned counsel to notice their reference to a precedent. An attempt was made to rely on paragraph 16 of the Report in the Full Bench decision in Sheoratan Chamar and others v. Ram Murat alias Kishori Raman Singh and others ( 1985 BBCJ 73 : 1985 PLJR 86 ). However, that observation therein can possibly be of no assistance to either side. It was expressly held that it was unnecessary to pronounce on the question as the same was merely an alternative and hypothetical submission. Equally reliance was sought to be placed on the definition of holding under section 2(7). However, this reliance seems to be a somewhat hypertechnical because holding has itself been defined as under :- “ ‘Holding’ means a parcel or parcels of land held by a raiyat and forming the subject matter of a separate tenancy.” It is apparent from the above that this definition is itself with relevance to 'land' and by virtue of the, opening part of section 2, 'land' has again to be understood as defined in section 2(9), unless there is, anything repugnant to the subject or context. No such repugnancy could at all be pointed out. No such repugnancy could at all be pointed out. Therefore, the definition of 'holding' itself cannot be divorced from the concept of land and its nexus to agriculture. 17. Now, reverting back to the question posed earlier, it is apt to say that though it may well involve some intricacy, yet justice of the case demands a somewhat precise formulation of the answer. Therefore, if the other requisites of section 4 are satisfied then it must be held that— (i) where the suit property is wholly within the definition of 'land', the whole of the suit would abate; (ii) where the suit property does not come within the said definition at all, no question of abatement would arise even though such property may be situated within the area notified for consolidation under section 3(1); and (iii) where the suit property is composite in nature but is clearly diviable then the suit would abate with regard to the property which is within the meaning of section 2(9) but would continue with regard to property which is not so; I must, however, notice that there is undoubtedly another category where the suit property is both composite and indivisible in nature and the source of title thereto is identical. What consideration or legal result would arise in such a case we are not called upon to pronounce here on the finding arrived at hereinafter. It is a sound principle that a Court should not adjudicate on a question which goes not directly and pointedly arise for adjudication. This aspept, therefore, must await consideration in a proper case giving rise thereto. 18. Now, applying the above, it would seem patent herein that the suit property, though composite in nature, is yet clearly divisible. It is not in serious dispute that a substantial part of the land in village Narainpur agricultural in nature and a considerable part thereof continues to be so and is actually under the plough. This part of the property comes clearly within the definition of section 2(9). On the other hand, it is the common ground that the other part of the property or is an industrial establishment of the saw mill without houses, store house, residential quarters for workmen, and a yard as appurtenances thereto. As was noticed earlier, a purely industrial establishment cannot be stretched to be brought within the definition of 'land'. On the other hand, it is the common ground that the other part of the property or is an industrial establishment of the saw mill without houses, store house, residential quarters for workmen, and a yard as appurtenances thereto. As was noticed earlier, a purely industrial establishment cannot be stretched to be brought within the definition of 'land'. The total area being a large one of as much as 23.16 acres. It is nobody's case that the pristinely industrial establishment which is part of the suit property cannot be demarcated from the agricultural land and part thereof. The case would hence be governed by category (iii) noticed above, namely, where the suit property is composite in nature but is clearly divisible then suit would abate with regard to the property which' is within the meaning of section 2(9) but wou1d continue with regard to the property which is not so. l8A. Once the legal position is settled as above, it seems common ground that the courts below have not adverted to this aspect of the case. The precise area, which would come within the definition of 'land' in section 2(9), and that which would fall out side. The same have obviously not been clearly demarcated. This was indeed noticed even at the stage when the case was referred to the Division Bench. There is thus no alternative but to remit the matter back to the first appellate court for a precise demarcation of the property for the purposes noticed above. Thereafter the court in accordance with the necessary legal question, will determine as to the part of the suit property with regard to which the suit would abate and that part with regard to which the lis can continue in the civil court. The aforementioned application is allowed in these terms without any ORDER :as to cost.