JUDGMENT - S.J. DESHPANDE, J.:---This Civil Revision Application filed under section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Act arises out of execution proceedings started by the petitioner before me to obtain the fruits of eviction decree passed by the Rent Controller on 31st of May, 1963. This decree was passed in respect of shop premises. This decree was confirmed by the Appellate Court and the tenant was unsuccessful in challenging the said decree. The Appellate Court confirmed the decree on 15th of June, 1964. 2. The petitioner-decree holder has sought actual possession of plot bearing No. 122/5 at Gunj, Latur, which was the subject-matter of the main Rent Control Suit No. 29 of 1961, which was finally decided by the Appellate Court as stated above. After the decree was passed in 1964 in regard to this shop and the plot, the decree-holder commenced its execution after a period of six years. He filed an execution petition on 26th September, 1970. Two objections were raised by the tenant. One objection related to the limitation, this is, that the execution is barred by limitation. The second objection was by way of answer to the admitted claim of eviction. It was stated that after the decree for eviction was made, a fresh tenancy under a compromise was created in respect of the very subject-matter in regard to which controversy was involved in the Rent Control case. 3. During the pendency of these proceedings, it appears, some evidence was also led. Finally, on 9th of October, 1973, an application was filed by the tenant judgement-debtor challenging the validity of the decree on the ground that the decree is passed by the Court, i.e., the Rent Controller, which lacked inherent jurisdiction. This application was based on the fact that an admission was made by the landlord-decree-holder in the notice, which he had issued prior to the suit, and also in his own evidence on oath in the Court. These admissions were the basis of challenging the inherent jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. This application was based on the fact that an admission was made by the landlord-decree-holder in the notice, which he had issued prior to the suit, and also in his own evidence on oath in the Court. These admissions were the basis of challenging the inherent jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. It was stated that the decree related to an open plot on the admission made by the decree-holder and so, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction as provisions of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as "The Rent Act"), did not extend to an open plot in view of the definition of the 'house' given in section 2(b) of the Rent Act. This objection was upheld by the Executing Court by its judgement dated 26th August, 1974. 4. It appears that this judgement was challenged by way of an appeal, which was dismissed on 15th of December, 1975. Against this appellate order of 15th of December, 1975, it appears a Civil Revision Application came to be filed in the High Court on the limited point as to the competency of the Assistant Judge, who had heard and decided that appeal, to entertain the appeal. The High Court remanded the matter in revision and directed the learned District Judge to decide the appeal, which perhaps, was decided by the earlier Court which had no competence to decide it. Under these circumstances, the initial order of the Executing Court dated 26th of August, 1974 came to be decided by the learned District Judge on 14th of December, 1979 in appeal filed by the landlord-decree-holder. The learned District Judge confirmed the order of the Executing Court and dismissed the appeal by his order dated 14th of December, 1979. Inter alia, he held that the provisions of the Rent Act are not attracted in this case. The Rent Controller, after going through the record, has noticed the admission of the decree holder and on the basis of that admission it cannot be said that the decree of the Rent Controller was a valid decree. In the result, the learned District Judge upheld the objection about the nullity of the decree and dismissed the appeal. 5. It is against this appellate judgment that the present Civil Revision Application has been filed by the decree-holder-original landlord challenging the orders of the courts below. 6. In the result, the learned District Judge upheld the objection about the nullity of the decree and dismissed the appeal. 5. It is against this appellate judgment that the present Civil Revision Application has been filed by the decree-holder-original landlord challenging the orders of the courts below. 6. At the out set, it may be pointed out that the reasoning of both the courts below is centred round the proposition that the Executing Court can go behind the decree if the decree is challenged on the ground of nullity. There is no dispute about this proposition. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, however, invited my attention to two defects in the judgments of the courts below. First error, which was pointed out, was that the courts below had before them a controversy in regard to the existence of the nature of the plot given to the tenant. It was pointed out that the evidence, which was relied on by the courts below, was not strictly in accordance with the procedure, that, is, the application which was filed by the judgement-debtor mentioned a fact in regard to the certain compromise alleged to have taken place between the landlord and the tenant in respect of the subject-matter of controversy. Evidence of three witness was recorded including the tenant on his behalf. It was pointed out by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that these witness have stated in their evidence that open plot, which was given initially, was enjoyed by the tenant after constructing a roof thereon and he was conducting a hotel therein. This evidence has been referred to in the memorandum of revision application setting out the details at page 6. The respondent's i.e., the tenant's witness, Sadasiv admitted that the disputed premises consisted of a shop. This witness also admitted that the plot was of petitioner and over the said plot, Raghunathsingh had put the zinc sheet and had opened the hotel. He also admitted that since last 30 years the respondent was in occupation of the shop. These admissions are to be compared with the admissions of the landlord himself, according to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, given in the two notices dated 7th of October, 1959 and 21st of July, 1961 as also his deposition, i.e., the evidence on oath given in the Rent Controller's Court. These admissions are to be compared with the admissions of the landlord himself, according to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, given in the two notices dated 7th of October, 1959 and 21st of July, 1961 as also his deposition, i.e., the evidence on oath given in the Rent Controller's Court. It was stated that both the Court have committed an error in not discussing the evidence of three witnesses, who were positive as against the admission given by the landlord that the plot was an open plot. 7. It is true, and it was pointed out by the learned Advocate for the tenant, that landlord gave an admission in this fashion in his statement on oath in the Rent Control proceedings. He stated, ^^HkkM;kph tkxk vkgs**- In cross-examination also, he stated ^^tkxk HkkM;kps fnyh [kqyk IykWV fnyk=-** The learned Advocate for the tenant strongly relied on this admission and contended that in view of this admission the whole proceedings taken by the Rent Controller were without jurisdiction as that Court lacked initial jurisdiction to take cognisance of the matter. 8. It is true that these admissions are on record. There are three things which are to be noticed in this case. A tenant had suffered an appellate order of eviction, which becomes final as being not challenged by way of revision. The finality is indicated by the statute in the provisions contained in section 25 of the Rent Act, sub-section (4) of section 25 provides, "Save as provided in section 26 the decision of the appellate authority and subject to only such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of Law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal". It must be noticed that in this case it is undisputed that the tenant did not choose to relay on these admissions specifically till 1973 when, for the first time, he made an application pressing into service these admissions to oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. In my opinion, sub-section (4) of section 25 of the Rent Act has to be borne in mind while entertaining the objections in regard to the validity of the decree passed by the Rent Controller. In my opinion, sub-section (4) of section 25 of the Rent Act has to be borne in mind while entertaining the objections in regard to the validity of the decree passed by the Rent Controller. It specifically mentions three things : that (1) the order of the Controller is final and cannot be called in question in any Court of law in a suit, (2) in any other proceedings, or (3) by way of appeal. The intention of the Legislature is made clear that these orders, which are passed by the Rent Controller, and subject to appeal, are final and binding on the parties and the Legislature intended that they should not be displaced as far as possible. It may be mentioned here that the objection to the lack of inherent jurisdiction is an exception to this and if, in a given case, it is shown that any order of any authority suffers from lack of inherent jurisdiction, the prohibition contained in section 25(4), to which I have referred may not apply. However, the intention of the Legislature must be borne in mind while entertaining objections in regard to the validity of such proceedings and, for that limited purpose. I have made reference to this provision of the Rent Act. 9. In this case, this particular objection relating to the jurisdiction was not taken earlier, although the tenant knew fully well and went to the trial after leading evidence in the case and suffered a decree for eviction in the year 1963. 10. The short question which arises for consideration in such cases is whether the objection to the lack of inherent jurisdiction is apparent on the face of record, that is, it is so patent on the record that there is no need for investigation of further examination of any evidence. In this case, admissions of landlord are on the record, but, on the principle of merger, these admissions have now merged into the decree is a fact which cannot also be ignored. What is today being executed is the decree as passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Court. To reopen the evidence led in the Court and to reassess it in order to judge whether it accords with the identity of the subject-matter, which was involved in the controversy, may not be proper. What is today being executed is the decree as passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the Appellate Court. To reopen the evidence led in the Court and to reassess it in order to judge whether it accords with the identity of the subject-matter, which was involved in the controversy, may not be proper. All this evidence in the proceedings which related to the subject-matter of a particular property and which ultimately culminated in passing of the decree, it should be deemed to have been merged in the decree and it is that decree which is sought to be executed in the execution proceedings. 11. The objection to jurisdiction may be taken even in execution proceedings also on the ground of nullity of a particular decree. The limitations, which are necessary to be borne in mind in regard to this objection, are to be noted. The objection may relate as to the subject-matter. It may relate as to the person, i.e., the competence of the Court to pass the decree. It may also relate to the pecuniary value of the subject-matter involved in the suit. It may relate as to the place of suing. When the proceedings are started in a Court of a limited jurisdiction, such as the Rent Controller's Court, the subject-matter of the proceedings is to be under stood in the light of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for. In this particular case, when the landlord started the proceedings following the provisions of the Rent Act, it cannot be forgotten that he had a statutory cause of action as provided for by the provisions of the Rent Act and the cause of action and the relief both are to be taken into consideration for the identity of the subject-matter. It will always depend on the nature of cause of action and the relief prayed for and, in this case, it is obvious that when the landlord started the proceedings, he started them on the statutory grounds only, which are available for eviction and in regard to the subject -matter mentioning it as Shop No. 122-5-C on the open plot. This was the basis of his claim and if that is so, it cannot be forgotten that an objection in regard to this matter could have been taken by the tenant himself at the initial stage. This was the basis of his claim and if that is so, it cannot be forgotten that an objection in regard to this matter could have been taken by the tenant himself at the initial stage. It is true that this is an exceptional case where objections are taken on the ground of nullity, but then the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure which require that the objection to the jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest stage cannot be easily overlooked to destroy the jurisdiction of a particular Court. I am conscious that in this case the objection is raised on the ground of subject-matter of the suit not being cognisable by the Rent Controller on the ground that it was an open plot. It is true that such an objection can be taken even at the late stage but there is one qualification attached to it and it is whether the objection is so apparent on the record that the Court can at once look to the record and find that it is so or whether it requires any investigation. If this question is answered, then the foundation for challenging the decree on the ground of invalidity can be raised. In this particular case, it is undisputable that the parties led evidence in regard to the nature of the premises. The evidence was recorded by the Court and the evidence showed that there was a controversy in regard to the actual subject-matter, i.e., whether it was an open plot initially and at the time of suit there was some construction on it or whether the actual decree which was passed was in respect of a hotel as stated by some witnesses. This factual dispute raised in regard to the subject-matter will be sufficient to answer the question that the petition challenging the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground of the decree being nullity was not apparent on the face of the record, but certain investigation, at least, required in the matter. If that be the position, it would not be open for the Executing Court to reopen the whole issue which is once decided and merged in the decree. 12. If that be the position, it would not be open for the Executing Court to reopen the whole issue which is once decided and merged in the decree. 12. In support of the contention that this objection to the nullity of the decree can be taken at the stage of execution also, the learned Advocate for the tenant invited my attention to a series of judgements beginning with (Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others)1, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340 and ending with (Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash)2, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1201, as also (Chandrika Misir and another v. Bhaiyalal)3, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2391. In all these judgments, the proposition which is emphasised is that objection to the nullity can be taken at any stage. In Kiran Singh's case, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340 (cited supra), which is the earliest, the observations are to be effect that consent does not operate as waiver or defect of jurisdiction and a distinction has to be made in respect of an objection in regard to the subject-matter which is cognisable by a Court and in regard to the territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction seized by a Court while passing a decree. It is stated by the Supreme Court (at page 342) :--- "It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings...." 13. In this case of Kiran Singh (supra), the provisions of section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887, were in dispute and the nature of the jurisdiction depended on the operation of those provisions. 14. The same proposition was again emphasised by the Supreme Court in Sunder Das, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1201 cited (supra), where it was again laid down (at page 1204) :--- "Now, the law is well-settled that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in execution proceeding. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the Court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any Court in which it is presented....... The Executing Court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity..." 15. The last judgment which was relied on by the learned Advocate for the tenant was the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in (Ahmed Khan v. Mohamad Khasim Sab)4, A.I.R. 1976 Karnt. 13 This judgment was relied on for the same proposition that lack of inherent jurisdiction goes to the root of competence of Court to try such a case and renders decree a nullity. This judgement is very illuminative and it is in this very judgement, the learned Judge at paragraph 10 observed (at page 16) :--- "It is clear, therefore, that the Executing Court cannot hold an investigation in order to determine whether the Court which passed the decree lacked jurisdiction to do so." 16. The principles which are to be borne in mind while permitting a judgment-debtor to raise objection in regard to the nullity of the decree are (1) whether the decree is nullity on the face of it; and (2) is it apparent from the record, i.e., the decree or any such other authentic record, for example, a decree in a matter in which the Court could not take cognisance at all, as was the case in Chandrika Misir, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2391 (cited supra). In that case, the Civil Court had passed a decree in regard to the occupancy rights, which were cognisable only by the Revenue Court. By merely seeing the decree, the Executing Court could see that the Civil Court had passed the decree and not the Revenue Court. In the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, which was under consideration, such a provision was enacted and, so, apparently in passing the decree involved in that case, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, which was under consideration, such a provision was enacted and, so, apparently in passing the decree involved in that case, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In the present case can it be said that the question raised by the judgement-debtor tenant does not involve any investigation ?. 17. In fact, in the present case, the courts below, on investigation, have found, that is, on relying on admissions, that the premises involved are an open plot. Is such an investigation open to be done ? That is the true question involved, on the facts of the present case. 18. The learned Advocate for the petitioner invited my attention to a judgement of the Supreme Court in (Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others)5, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1475. In my opinion, this judgment applies to the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court, it cannot be said, was not aware of its earlier pronouncements and despite these facts, the Supreme Court has observed in this judgment (at page 1476) :--- "When the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record. But where the objection as to jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the Executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction." In this case, the decree for ejectment of a lessee was passed by the Court exercising powers vested in it by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. Under the said Act, the Court exercising the power had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for possession of a land used for agricultural purposes. Also, in ascertaining whether the land was used for agricultural purposes, the crucial date was the date on which right conferred by the Act was sought to be exercised. The trial Court had dismissed the suit. Also, in ascertaining whether the land was used for agricultural purposes, the crucial date was the date on which right conferred by the Act was sought to be exercised. The trial Court had dismissed the suit. The decree was reversed by the Appellate Court and that decree was confirmed by the High Court. No objection was raised before the Small Causes Court that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. For the first time, when the decree was sought to be executed, this objection was taken. The Executing Court rejected this objection and an appeal against that order of rejection filed to the Bench of the Small Causes Court was also unsuccessful. But, in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court, the High Court reversed the order of the Small Causes Court and ordered that the petition for execution be dismissed. The High Court was of the view that the land leased was at the date of the lease used for agricultural purposes, and interpreting the expression 'premises' used in the said Act which was involved in that particular case, the High Court held that the decree passed by the Small Causes Court was a decree without jurisdiction. When the matter went to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court upset the High Court's finding and observed as aforesaid, which I have quoted above. In that case, the Supreme Court further referred to a judgment of the Privy Council in (Janendra Mohan Bhaduri v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarti)6, A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 61. Proceeding further, the Supreme Court also observed (at page 1477) :--- "These questions cannot be permitted to be raised in an execution proceeding so as to displace the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree. If the decree is on the face of the record without jurisdiction and the question does not relate to the territorial jurisdiction... objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to make the decree may be raised; where it is necessary to investigate facts in order to determine whether the Court which had passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, the objection cannot be raised in the execution proceeding." (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the decree of Small Causes Court. 19. 19. In my judgment, the view taken by the Supreme Court in Vasudeo's case (cited supra) furnishes real guidance in regard of two matters : (1) in regard to the understanding of the nature of the decree passed in a particular case, and (2) the necessity of investigation of facts which are required in order to sustain an objection in respect of the validity of the decree on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. 20. The admissions which are relied on in this case by the tenant also can be said to be a part of process of evidence and if this objection could have been taken at the time of trial, I think that the landlord would have been in a position to displace the effect of these admissions. 21. In this particular case, I am also impressed by a counter-admission by the tenant himself when he asserted that there was a compromise in respect of the very subject-matter, which was involved in the suit, and he asserted that compromise gave a fresh lease or tenancy, which clinches the issue as far as the admission made by the landlord is concerned. In view of these facts and special features of this case, which are disclosed by the admissions and counter-admission of the parties and which requires certain investigation, which appears to have been made by the courts below, I feel that the orders of the courts below are vitiated by material irregularity, in as much as the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to investigate all these facts, as they were not apparent on the face of the record, and they required at least some investigation, which is borne out by the record. In this case, the evidence was actually led and the courts have considered that evidence. In my judgment, therefore, the courts below were wrong in upholding the objection raised by the tenant judgment-debtor in regard to the validity of the decree, though, apparently, it was suggested that it went to the root of the matter and the Executing Court could take cognisance of it on the principles laid down and supplied by various judgments of the Supreme Court. As I am taking the view that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vasudeo's case (supra) really furnishes the guidance to be had in such cases, I hold that both the courts below were wrong in upholding the said objection to the validity of the decree. 22. I, therefore, set aside the orders of the courts below and hold that the decree is executable and the execution petition will have to be allowed and the decree will have to be executed on the basic of the description of the property as given, that description being Shop No. 122-5-C on open plot, which was given by the Rent Controller in his original proceedings. 23. In the result, rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to the costs. -----