Judgment :- 1. Appellant is the accused in S.C. 29/1982 of the Sessions Court, Quilon. Appellant was charged under S.302 of the IPC. for having caused the death of his wife by cutting her with a chopper. The learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty and convicted him under S.302 of the IPC. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. Accused, his wife Maria and their three children were residing in the house of accused's brother pw 1 some 14 days prior to the incident. On 20-8-1981, accused, his wife (deceased), their eldest son pw. 2 and pw. 3 went to a forest area to collect bamboo. The prosecution case is that while they were engaged in collecting bamboo, accused posed a challenge to his wife regarding his intimacy with pw. 5, that the deceased's reply was not liked by the accused and that he inflicted a cut on the neck of the deceased with M.O.1 chopper causing her serious injury which proved fatal. The injured was taken by pw. 3 to a nearby place area pw.1 was informed about the incident and he came and saw accused's wife lying dead. pw.1 went to Kadakkal police station and lodged Ext. P1 first information statement. The investigation of the case was done by pw. 11, Circle Inspector. 3. The prosecution examined pws.1 to H and marked Exts. P1 to P8. M Os.1 to 8 were also identified. 4. The main witness of the prosecution is pw. 2 who is none other than the son of the accused. pw. 2 deposed that he along with his father, mother, pw. 3 and pw. 35 son Prakasan went to the forest area to collect bamboo, that his parents quarreled, that pw. 3 pacified them, that his father asked his mother Rm3 that his mother asserted her right to question him and that then accused inflicted a cut with M. 0.1 on her neck. Nothing has been brought out from the cross-examination to discredit the testimony of pw. 2. Despite lengthy cross-examination pw. 2's evidence stands unscathed. 5. pw.1 who is the brother of the accused and pw. 3 (Pw.1's wife) were declared hostile to the prosecution. pw.1 stated that he got information about the incident from his son Prakasan. Ext. P1 mentions that accused, deceased, pw. 1's wife pw. 3, pw. 2. Despite lengthy cross-examination pw. 2's evidence stands unscathed. 5. pw.1 who is the brother of the accused and pw. 3 (Pw.1's wife) were declared hostile to the prosecution. pw.1 stated that he got information about the incident from his son Prakasan. Ext. P1 mentions that accused, deceased, pw. 1's wife pw. 3, pw. 2 and Prakasan went to the forest area to gather bamboo and it was there that the incident happened. pw. 3 though declared hostile to the prosecution admitted that M. 0.1 chopper was used by the accused to collect bamboo and that he sharpened the same. It is admitted by her that when the deceased sustained injury accused alone was near her. She candidly admitted that she has been very affectionate towards the accused and she always bestowed motherly affection on him, As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, the above evidence would show the reason why pw. 3 retracted from her statement before the police and took up the diagonally opposite stand that she did not witness the incident. Though she was declared hostile to the prosecution her evidence really lends support to the testimony of pw. 2 with regard to bis presence and the presence of the accused and the deceased at the place of incident. 6. Before the trial court the defence contention was that he (accused) aimed at the bottom of the sheaf of wild growth and by chance the blade of the chopper fell on the neck of his wife. Such an incident is beyond comprehension especially in view of the medical evidence of the case. Having realised the difficulty to project such a contention before this court Advocate Mr. Jacob Murickan did not advance such a plea before this court and on the other hand contended that at any rate offence under S.302 of the IPC. has not been made out and from the prosecution case itself it could be seen that the accused committed the act while he was deprived of his power of self control due to provocation caused to him by the deceased. We have to consider whether the facts and circumstances of the case would lead to such a conclusion. 7. Counsel for the appellant argued that evidence of pw. 2 would show that deceased had posed a challenge to the accused and it was then that he used the weapon against her. We have to consider whether the facts and circumstances of the case would lead to such a conclusion. 7. Counsel for the appellant argued that evidence of pw. 2 would show that deceased had posed a challenge to the accused and it was then that he used the weapon against her. Evidence of pw. 2 does not lead to such an inference. The evidence would only show that the accused obviously referring to pw. S made a challenge to his wife and asked her who was she to question him of his intimacy with pw. 5. The very natural response of the wife was that she would question him. It was then that the accused cut on her neck with M. 0.1 chopper. 8. To attract exception 1 of S.300 it is essential that the provocation was not sought by the offender. Evidence of pw. 2 who is none other than the son of the accused would unambiguously show that accused put a provocative question to his wife as if he cared a two-pense for her. No wife would expect such a question. To a wife, in whichever economic strata she belongs it would have caused mental storm. When her husband asked her the provocative question as to who was she to question bis relationship with pw. 5 she only responded that she would question it. This can never be construed as sufficient provocation for him to have used the deadly assault on her. But for his taunting remark and raking up the issue she would not have uttered so to her husband. Even if it is assumed that the answer of the deceased was provocative, it would not alter the position as it was invited or sought by the accused. Having done so, accused cannot fail back on Exception 1 of S.300 to mitigate the nature of the offence. 9. Proviso to Exception 1 of S.300 of the IPC. indicates that the provocation cannot be deemed to be grave and sudden when that provocation is sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for filling or doing harm to any person. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on 1971 KLT. 604 (Krishnan Udayan v. State of Kerala) and contended that anger is a passion which even good men are subject and mere human frailty is not punished with ferocity. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on 1971 KLT. 604 (Krishnan Udayan v. State of Kerala) and contended that anger is a passion which even good men are subject and mere human frailty is not punished with ferocity. From Para.2 of the aforesaid judgment it is seen that the accused stabbed the deceased when she refused to go along with the former. As the evidence in the case is not before us we cannot say whether the deceased's words were sufficiently provocative to the accused or not. In a case where accused used provocative words against the victim and when the latter retorted in the same coin, the former cannot come within Exception 1 of S.300 of the IPC as the initial provocation came from the former. The facts and circumstances of the case in 1971 KLT. 604 are not in any way applicable to the case in hand. 10. What would constitute grave and sudden provocation for a reasonable and average man would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Law does not expect every man to adopt a saintly attitude when he is provoked. Society based on law and order cannot tolerate the deeds of hot tempered persons on the ground that they did the acts being provoked. It is true that when a person loses his self control he cannot be expected to act in accordance with reason or equanimity. In AIR. 1969 All. 61 (Shyama Charan v. State) it has been held as follows: "Where a person causes death of another person it is for him to show that his act was removed from the category of murder by one of the exceptions to the Section. The provocation must be such as will upset not merely a hasty, hot tempered and hyper-sensitive person but would upset also a person of ordinary sense and calmness. The law does not take into account abnormal creatures reacting abnormally in given situations. The law contemplates the acting of normal beings in given situations and the protection that is offered by the exception is the protection for normal beings reacting normally in a given set of circumstances. A court has to consider whether a reasonable person is placed in the same position as the accused was, would have reacted under that provocation in the manner in which the accused did. A court has to consider whether a reasonable person is placed in the same position as the accused was, would have reacted under that provocation in the manner in which the accused did. Where the provocation is sought by the accused it cannot furnish any defence against the charge of murder." The evidence of pw. 2 is sufficient to show that the assault on the deceased was not the result of any provocative words uttered by the deceased against the accused. By no stretch of imagination it can be held that deceased's answer was sufficient so deprive the accused of the power of self control. It has been held in R. v. Duffy (1942 (1) All E. R.932) as follows: "Provocation is some act or series of acts done by the dead man to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person and actually causes in the accused a sudden and temporary loss of self control rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind." As there is no evidence to show that deceased uttered any abusive words when she replied to the question put to her by her husband it is indeed difficult to infer that accused assaulted the deceased while he was deprived of his power of self control. To crown everything, even if the words uttered by the deceased was in any way provocative still the accused cannot claim Exception I of S.300 as it is evident that it was he who sought the reply from his wife. Having done so, appellant cannot make the offence committed by him to fall under any exceptions of S.300 of the IPC. It is also pertinent to note that when the accused was questioned under S.313 Cr. P. C. he did not have a case that he did the act as he was provoked by his wife. On a consideration of the entire evidence we find that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant under S.302 of the I.P.C. We do not find any merit in the appeal and hence the same is dismissed. Dismissed.