Judgment :- 1. Anthony Carter. after an intensive study of an area in India observed: "Co-operative Societies are an important source of political power" and gave the reasons: "A large part of the economic activity of the region is channelled through co-operatives and they control patronage in the form of jobs. credit. access to valuable equipment and marketing contracts." (See 'Elite Politics in Rural India' by Anthony Carter. (1975) page 39). 2. Whether the observation has relevance for the State of Kerala may be a matter for profitable study. if it leads to an effective remedy in the event of there being deleterious effects in the working of the societies due to struggle for power. 3. That political squabbles have been prevalent in the Iriveri Service Co-operative Bank appears to be self-evident in the light of accusations and counter-accusations made by the petitioner and the party-respondents. Thus in ground D of the original petition the petitioner asserted: "The Administrator with a malafide intention to capture power enrolled members who belong to a particular political group. whereas membership are denied for a section of people." (sic) The reference to the Administrator is to the one who took over the management of the society on 19-8-1982. superseding an elected committee of which the petitioner was a member. The 4th respondent retorted: "It may also be pertinent to point out that when the Nayanar Ministry came to power in 1980 the elected Board of the Bank was superseded and the Administrator was imposed at the helm of affairs of the Society" It may be difficult for either group to claim a 'holier than thou' attitude. The court. however. is not concerned with such issues about the morality. or the lack of it. in the acts and omissions of rival groups. Whatever be the other overtones. legal complaint brought to the notice of the court has to be resolved on the basis of the facts and materials available and on the application of the correct legal principles. 4. The Society appears to have been under the spell of an Administrator's regime. almost throughout the period from 1980 with a brief break in between 1-2-1981 to 19-8-1982 when the previous committee had been elected and was functioning as such. 4. The Society appears to have been under the spell of an Administrator's regime. almost throughout the period from 1980 with a brief break in between 1-2-1981 to 19-8-1982 when the previous committee had been elected and was functioning as such. The circumstances leading to the ouster of that committee and the installation of the Administrator in its place had been the subject matter of an earlier writ petition O.P. No. 6125 of 1982. It is unnecessray to refer to the minute details of the controversies which had raged between the parties during the pendency of that writ petition. Ext. P1 is the judgment in that writ petition. The findings and directions contained in that judgment may briefly be noted so as to furnish the background for the appreciation of the current controversy. This court found that proceedings of the joint Registrar dated 19-8-1982 which purported to disqualify four of the Directors mentioned therein was illegal. it having been issued in violation of an interim order passed by this court on 16-8-1982. The court further held that the proceedings by which a part-time Administrator was appointed for the Society were vitiated by an omission to conform to the first proviso to S.33(1) of the Act. It was found that the assumption about the lack of quorum for the committee was without any justification. When that assumption was baseless. the further action by which the part-time Administrator was appointed for the Society had necessarily to collapse. After consideration of the various facts and materials and the scrutiny of the files made available. it was held: "It is fairly clear that the report of the Asst. Registrar is an arranged one. to give effect to a pre-planned idea to supersede the Board of the Society." The various features disclosing unjustified hurry and ugly action on the part of the officials had been elaborately dealt with in the judgment. Ultimately it was held: "I have no doubt whatever that the orders have not been passed in the normal manner or in the usual course of transaction of business The materials in the files may not justify a clear finding about the allegation of mala fides as the basis for the impugned order. That the order was passed out of extraneous considerations however. appears to be fairly clear." The findings would have ordinarily entitled the displaced Directors to be reinstated. That the order was passed out of extraneous considerations however. appears to be fairly clear." The findings would have ordinarily entitled the displaced Directors to be reinstated. had it not been for some supervening events like the expiry of the term of that Board and the desirability of having a fresh election for the Society. The reliefs were therefore modulated taking note of the changed situation. Elections were directed to be held within a period of three months. Other reliefs sought for in the writ petition were declined. in the background of the factual findings and the actual directions given taking note of the changed situation. 5. According to the petitioner. the same pattern of mala fide functioning on the part of the Administrator continued. The basis for the conduct of the election itself was vitiated by non-compliance with the requirements of law. The electoral list prepared contained persons who. according to the petitioner. were not entitled to be enrolled as members. The eligibility of large number of them to become members of the Society was questioned. It was pointedly complained that the illegality in enrolling large number of persons who did not have the requisite qualifications for membership had been pointed out but had been summarily and arbitrarily rejected. The voters list was therefore objectionable. The competence of the Administrator to enrol members was questioned. The enrolment. it was contended. was totally opposed to the finding in Ext. P1 judgment of this Court about the Administrator being a virtual usurper of office. Most of the new members were residing outside. The voters list. prima facie. established that fact. The violation of R.16(2) (a) and (b) of the Co-operative Societies Rules thus prima facie made out. was not taken note of when the voters list was finalised. The omission to take action even in respect of the complaints which had been filed before the Administrator was particularly pointed out. It was with these allegations that the petitioner came before this Court on 1-6-1984 for quashing the intimation Ext. P2. for a direction to have the election conducted with the voters list as on 5-8-1982 (the date on which the previous Board was declared as unqualified by the Joint Registrar. wrongly. as it turned out in the light of Ext. P1 judgment of this Court) for stopping the enrolment of the new members and for other incidental reliefs. P2. for a direction to have the election conducted with the voters list as on 5-8-1982 (the date on which the previous Board was declared as unqualified by the Joint Registrar. wrongly. as it turned out in the light of Ext. P1 judgment of this Court) for stopping the enrolment of the new members and for other incidental reliefs. This Court declined to stay the election process. The elections were permitted to proceed with. In the order dated 15-6-1984 in C.M.P. No. 13996 of 1984. it was. inter alia. observed: "The rights of the petitioner will be sufficiently safeguarded by a direction that a separate box will be kept in respect of the votes polled by the persons enrolled as members subsequent to 5-8-1982. The results of the election will be announced only after obtaining orders of this court." 6. The elections were ultimately held. Both sides have alleged unlawful and unjustified acts on the part of the opposing side. However. the report of the Returning Officer Ext. R3(a) filed along with the counter-affidavit of the 3rd respondent. would indicate the completion of the election process and the votes polled by the various candidates. the break up of pre-5-8-1982 and post-5-8-1982 members also having been given. There is no dispute that the group opposing the petitioner would stand elected. if all the votes are reckoned. There will be substantive change in the situation if the votes of persons enrolled after 5-8-1982 are excluded. The result of the election would thus depend upon. among others. the legality and validity of the enrolment of members by the Administrator after 5-8-1982. That question has to be examined in all its facets. in the light of the detailed arguments advanced by all the parties. Even on the assumption that the voters list was valid. it was contended that the election was not properly held in accordance with the rules. The notice Ext. P2 dated 24-5-1984 contained. in addition to the schedule of election as notified by the Returning Officer; directions by the Secretary of the Bank with a notation "N.B." They were (1) to the effect that those members who intended to participate in the general body should produce before the general body their share certificates. The notice Ext. P2 dated 24-5-1984 contained. in addition to the schedule of election as notified by the Returning Officer; directions by the Secretary of the Bank with a notation "N.B." They were (1) to the effect that those members who intended to participate in the general body should produce before the general body their share certificates. and (2) that those members who had not received the share certificates should get the same from the office of the Bank during the working days up to 15-6-1984. This direction was totally denuded of jurisdiction or authority. It had the effect of depriving a large section of the members of the Society their right to vote. Share certificates were withheld. according to the petitioner. to the supporters of the petitioner's group. where as the other faction was freely afforded the facility of voting in the elections without consideration of the qualification. This contention also is sufficiently serious; and various allied aspects would have to be considered for evaluating the contention. 7. There were some technical hurdles in the hearing of the writ petition. It was pointed out that if the membership of a large number of persons enrolled after 5-8-1982 was being challenged. the affected parties should be brought on the party array. The maintainability of the writ petition without impleading such parties was itself challenged. This prompted the petitioner to file C.M.P. No. 21593 of 1984 to cure that defect. Additional respondents Nos. 8 and 9 were sought to be made representatives of the group of all persons enrolled by the Administrator. That petition was allowed by order dated 21-8-1984. Notice by publication in a newspaper was also permitted. Publication was duly effected. Counter-affidavits were filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 1.3.4. and 5 on 3-8-1984.11-7-1984.19-7-1984 and 24-7-1984 respectively. Though respondents Nos. 8 and 9 entered appearance. and was represented by the same counsel who appeared for the 7th respondent. no counter-affidavit has been filed on their behalf. 8. After the election was over. the petitioner filed C.M.P. No. 17995 of 1984 seeking to amend the original petition by including an additional prayer for declaration that the election held on 17-6-1984 is null and void. Additional grounds E to G were also sought to be incorporated. The petition for amendment was allowed. In the light of the amendment so allowed. additional counter-affidavits have been filed by respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Additional grounds E to G were also sought to be incorporated. The petition for amendment was allowed. In the light of the amendment so allowed. additional counter-affidavits have been filed by respondents Nos. 4 and 5. On 28-9-1984 a further petition to receive certain documents had been filed by the 4th respondent. 9. The petitioner had invoked the statutory remedy under S.69(2)(c) of the Act by filing an arbitration case before the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Cannanore. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the writ petition was not maintainable in as much as the petitioner had actually invoked a statutory remedy. Counsel for the petitioner. then submitted that the petitioner would withdraw the arbitration case; and on 1-10-1984. counsel for the petitioner filed a memo stating that the petitioner had withdrawn the arbitration case. 10. In the light of the contentions between the parties. the following points may arise for consideration. 1) Is the enrolment of members by the Administrator valid and legal. when the appointment of the Administrator was declared by this court to be illegal? 2) Assuming that the Administrator was competent to enrol the new members. is the admission vitiated by an omission to conform to the procedure mentioned and the requirements stipulated in R.16 of the Co-operative Societies Rules? 3) Whether the direction of the Secretary contained in the notice of election obligating the production of the share certificate as a condition precedent for the exercise of franchise legal? If not. what is the effect of such a direction on the result of the elections? 4) Even if the election is found to be vitiated and therefore liable to be declared as null and void. should reliefs be declined to the petitioner on the ground of availability of an alternate statutory remedy? 11. Is the enrolment of members by the Administrator valid and legal. when the appointment of the Administrator was declared by this Court to be illegal: The petitioner challenged the very competence of the Administrator to enrol new members within the period of stop gap arrangement during which he was functioning. A learned Single Judge of this Court (Bhaskaran. J. as he then was) in Sudhakaran v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies. 1980 K. L. T. 658. took the view that the Administrator has such powers. A learned Single Judge of this Court (Bhaskaran. J. as he then was) in Sudhakaran v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies. 1980 K. L. T. 658. took the view that the Administrator has such powers. It was argued that very many important aspects arising out of the statutory scheme and the concept of the powers of 'management' of an Administrator had not been projected before the learned judge and had not therefore been considered in the aforesaid decision. An attempt was made to canvass the correctness of that decision. It was contended that the 'management' of a Society is entirely different from the incorporation of a Society and the enrolment of the members thereof. S.33 which relates to the appointment of an Administrator. is contained in Chapter IV relating to 'Management of Co-operative Societies'. S. 33 (1) contains words of limitation as regards the field of operation of an ad hoc committee or Administrator. the words of limitation being "to manage the affairs of the Society till a new committee enters upon office." Thus. notwithstanding the apparent plenitude of powers contained in S.33 (2). they are all to be exercised in the limited area of 'management'. No doubt. S.33 (2) states that the Administrator shall have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the committee or of any officer of the society. But this power operates only in a limited area and for a limited purpose. namely in the management of the affairs of the Society. Inherent in the concept of management is a limitation and restriction. Thus. an owner of an undertaking may deal with it in any manner he likes. However. if a manager is appointed. his powers are conditioned by the terms of appointment and the actual authority conferred on him or necessarily implied. He may not be in a position to deal with the corpus of the undertaking or to take such decisions as pertain to the very structure of the undertaking. The analogy available under the Companies Act is useful in this connection. It will be open for the Board of Directors in whom the management of a company vests to appoint a Manager. (Vide Chapter IV of the Companies Act. 1956). The powers of such a General Manager are. however. not as wide as those of the Board of Directors. The analogy available under the Companies Act is useful in this connection. It will be open for the Board of Directors in whom the management of a company vests to appoint a Manager. (Vide Chapter IV of the Companies Act. 1956). The powers of such a General Manager are. however. not as wide as those of the Board of Directors. Powers such as the enrolment of the new members in the company which could be exercised by the Board of Directors in accordance with the Articles of Association. Would be totally out of reach for the General Manager. though he has necessarily the authority to manage the affairs of the company. The matters pertaining to the share structure or the enrolment of the new members and the like. would not come within the purview of 'management' of the company. The power of enrolment of a member is provided in S.16 of the Co-op. Societies Act. which occurs in Chapter III having its heading: "Members of Co-operative Societies and their rights and liabilities." The statutory scheme is such that the membership in a Society is a matter of crucial importance. That is why qualifications for membership are statutorily provided. The disabilities are also specifically enumerated. Attainment of the age of 18 years. and residence within. or occupation of land in the area of operation of the society. are such qualifications. An unsound mind is a disqualification. apart from the disqualification arising out of membership of another society. A denial of membership is to be intimated to the applicant with reasons therefor. Expulsion of members is to be done only by the general body. These provisions do indicate that membership of a society is something more important and more fundamental than a matter relating to the routine management of a society. The importance pertaining to membership is reflected in the rules providing for the procedure for admitting a person as a member of the society. Under R.16. a person has to make an application in Writing in the form if any. laid down by the society. His application must be approved by the committee of the society. He must have fulfilled all the conditions laid down in the Act or bye-laws. These are matters which are properly left to such a committee. which. Under R.16. a person has to make an application in Writing in the form if any. laid down by the society. His application must be approved by the committee of the society. He must have fulfilled all the conditions laid down in the Act or bye-laws. These are matters which are properly left to such a committee. which. due to its intimacy with men and matters of the locality would be well-equipped to assess the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant. It is not to be treated as a routine act. In any event it is not to be treated as a matter of management. If it is not a matter of management. the Administrator. who is after all only a passing phase and a stop-gap arrangement. cannot. tinker with the constitution and membership of the society. 12. Though in different context. the word 'manage'. has received judicial consideration in various decisions. The import of the word'management' while considering the term management of a vessel in a Bill of Lading has been considered in various decisions starting from Norman v. Binnington. (1890)25 Q.B D. 475. at 477. The Rodney. 1900 Probate Division 112 and other cases. Lord Greene M.R. gave the word 'management' the widest significance in Shelley v. London County Council. (1948) 1 K..B 274 at 286. This decision is referred to in Attorney General v. Cray ford Urban District Council. (1962) Ch. 575 at 589. a case where the scope of the word 'management' was considered in relation to the provisions in the Housing Act. 1957 whereunder the general management. regulation and control of houses provided by a local authority had vested in and to be exercised by the authority. A welfare element in the functions connected with the management by a local authority in the statutory background was one factor which prompted the court to give a wider interpretation of that term. 13. Looking at the role the Administrator has to play in relation to a Co-operative Society. and the limited duration for which he is to function. and the nature of the constitution. equipment and local knowledge a committee of a society would have while discharging the function of admitting members to the society. it is possible to contend that only a restricted meaning should be given to the word 'manage' as occurring in S.33 (2) of the Act. and the nature of the constitution. equipment and local knowledge a committee of a society would have while discharging the function of admitting members to the society. it is possible to contend that only a restricted meaning should be given to the word 'manage' as occurring in S.33 (2) of the Act. It is unnecessary to labour this point further. The considerations referred to above had not been. as noted earlier. placed before the learned Judge. There is much force in the strand of reasoning demanding a restricted view of the functioning of the Administrator and his management of the affairs of the society. It is. however. unnecessary for the purpose of the present case. to consider whether a second look at the decision in 1980 K.L.T. 658 supra is necessary. for. even assuming that the decision is correct. the enrolment of the members by the Administrator. is found to be incompetent and invalid. for the reasons indicated later. 14. The statutory scheme in relation to the enrolment of members confides the power in the committee. In Ext. P1 judgment. this Court had found that the supersession of the committee was thoroughly unjustified and that the installation of the Administrator was dictated by extraneous considerations. A declaration that the Administrator was appointed without the support of the legal provisions. had been given. That being so. the necessary corollary would be to ignore the legal existence of the Administrator and his actions. If the Administrator did not have legal authority to function as such. he could not validly exercise the functions of a committee. As observed by Wade: "An order which is ultra wires because of unreasonableness or wrong grounds or violation of statutory requirements. can only be void: once the court condemns it as being void. it is seen to have been destitute of all legal effect from the outset." (See H.W.R. Wade's Administrative Law. Fifth Edition. Page 311). The doctrine no doubt is not without the deviations and complications. As to in what all situations collateral challenge is allowed. and not allowed. have been dealt with at pages 296 and 297 of the above book. At page 299. the opinion is summed up as follows: "The correct conclusion is probably that there can be no hard and fast rules for determining when the court may or may not allow collateral challenge. and not allowed. have been dealt with at pages 296 and 297 of the above book. At page 299. the opinion is summed up as follows: "The correct conclusion is probably that there can be no hard and fast rules for determining when the court may or may not allow collateral challenge. In some situations it will be suitable and in others it will be unsuitable. and no classification of the cases is likely to prove exhaustive." One class of cases where collateral challenge is impermissible is where there is as unknown flaw in the appointment or authority of some officer or Judge. The de facto doctrine with its long history has been discussed by our own Supreme Court in the decision reported in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P.. A.I.R. 1981 S.C.1473. It must. however. be noted that what is tabooed is a. collateral challenge. A direct challenge appears to be permissible and what has been attempted in the present case is a direct challenge. The incompetence of the Administrator to function as such and the ineligibility of the newly enrolled members to be members as such have been directly agitated in the present writ petition. with the affected persons on the party arary. Such an attack is not a mere collateral one. In such a situation. where the appointment of the Administrator is found to be denuded of statutory backing and therefore invalid. the consequential acts which are also challenged in the present writ petition. have only to be declared as equally invalid. 15. While considering the above aspect. it was contended that in the judgment Ext. P1. only the declaration about the invalidity of the appointment of the Administrator had been given and other reliefs had been declined. This refusal of other reliefs has to be understood in its proper setting and background. The Court in Ext. P1 was only modulating the reliefs taking note of the subsequent developments. The validity of the status of the newly enrolled members could not be the subject matter of that writ petition. for. that was essentially in relation to the activities subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. The newly enrolled members were not before the court. It cannot therefore be said that the judgment Ext. P1 had in any way upheld the validity of the enrolment of the new members by the Administrator. for. that was essentially in relation to the activities subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. The newly enrolled members were not before the court. It cannot therefore be said that the judgment Ext. P1 had in any way upheld the validity of the enrolment of the new members by the Administrator. That question arises directly in the present proceedings. When the Administrator has been declared by this Court to have been appointed without conforming to the statutory requirement. his further actions which are now in challenge. are to be declared as invalid and ineffective. as the actions of the Administrator cannot stand when the Administrator himself lacks support and sustenance by the statute. In that view of the matter. I would hold that the enrolment of the new members numbering 941 by the Administrator was unauthorised. illegal and invalid. This illegal enrolment of the members has obviously vitiated the preparation of the voters list and the ultimate election. Consequently the election has also to be declared as void. 16. Even on the basis that the appointment of the Administrator is valid. could enrolment of the members by the Administrator be said to be in accordance with the statutory requirements? R.16 noted supra envisages among other things a qualification either based on residence or ownership or possession of land within the area of operation of the society. The registers and minutes produced in pursuance to the orders passed by this Court. disclose a wholesale enrolment of members. They do not appear to be enrolment of members in the ordinary course. The enrolment is not based on the landed property qualification. The only alternative for admitting them as members must be the residence qualification. It is in this connection that Ext. P3 complaint becomes very relevant. The names of hundreds of persons have been enrolled. according to that complaint. even though they were not residents within the area of the society. The voters list evidencing the residence of such persons outside the area of the society had been produced along with Ext. P3. Prima facie therefore the admission of new members by the Administrator had been made without any application of mind as to the essential qualification for enrolment as members. The complaint was reiterated even at the time of the finalisation of the voters list. P3. Prima facie therefore the admission of new members by the Administrator had been made without any application of mind as to the essential qualification for enrolment as members. The complaint was reiterated even at the time of the finalisation of the voters list. Here again the objection was summarily and arbitrarily dismissed with the observation: "The objection is over-ruled as the evidence is inadequate." This is a perverse decision. on the basis of the materials available before the authority. If a person is shown to be a voter in a constituency outside the area of the society. that would be prima facie evidence of his lack of residential qualification. There is no indication whatever as to how an opinion that the evidence is inadequate has been reached. The opinion is one which no reasonable authority could. in the circumstances. come to. The materials thus disclose that the Administrator had not acted bona fide in en masse enrolling about 1000 members during his short tenure. without satisfying himself in a reasonable manner about the basic qualification necessary for enrolment of members. It is not a case of a voters list being finalised having regard to the exigencies of an election schedule. The very act of enlisting the members is without adherence to the statutory requirements and without any reasonable exercise of the functions expected of the authority entrusted with the responsible duty of enrolling members for the society. A desperate attempt was made by the 4th respondent to produce on the last hearing date an affidavit purporting to produce therewith some nativity certificates issued by the Revenue officials between 18th and 20th September. 1984. Here again the originals had not been produced. It is therefore difficult to act on such certificates. The petition for reception of the documents filed so belatedly could not be entertained in the circumstances. It is not as though the violation of R.16 in the matter of admitting hundreds of persons as members had been put forward at a later stage by the petitioner. As noted earlier. along with the original petition itself Ext. P3 complaint had been filed and that in turn referred to the evidence (voters list) in support of the complaint that admission of members was contrary to R.16. In the above circumstances I would dismiss C.M.P. No. 26093 of 1984. Even if that petition is allowed. it will not improve the situation. along with the original petition itself Ext. P3 complaint had been filed and that in turn referred to the evidence (voters list) in support of the complaint that admission of members was contrary to R.16. In the above circumstances I would dismiss C.M.P. No. 26093 of 1984. Even if that petition is allowed. it will not improve the situation. The question is not whether the ten persons whose nativity certificates had been produced are really residing within the area of the society. The question is whether the Administrator had applied his mind about such residential qualification at the time of admitting them as members. No material whatever is available among the files and records available. which would in any way show that these large number of persons did possess the residential qualification. which is a condition precedent for seeking membership in the society. 17. The circumstances indicated above demonstrate that the functioning of the Administrator was also of the same pattern as in relation to the previous proceedings resulting in the illegal and unjustified supersession of the committee and the installation of the Administrator. The action of the Administrator in the matter of admitting the new members is also vitiated by extraneous considerations and is not a bona fide exercise of a function which the Administrator had necessarily to discharge in the prevailing situation. In that view of the matter. it cannot be said that only a mere defect in the appointment of the Administrator vitiates enrolment of the members and the preparation of the voters list. That being so. the invalid actions cannot be salvaged by resort to S.105 of the Co-operative Societies Act which. without the proviso. reads: "105. Acts; of societies not to be invalidated by certain defects: - No act of a society or any committee or of any officer shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the existence of any defect in the constitution of the society or the committee or in the appointment or election of the officer or on the ground that such officer was disqualified for his appointment." (emphasis supplied) 18. The election is to be declared as null and void. in as much as persons who have not been properly admitted as members of the society have been permitted to decide the destiny of a society in which they could not. in law. participate at all. 19. The election is to be declared as null and void. in as much as persons who have not been properly admitted as members of the society have been permitted to decide the destiny of a society in which they could not. in law. participate at all. 19. Whether the election is vitiated for the reason that the Secretary of the society unauthorisedly stipulated in the notice Ext. P2 that only those who produce the share certificate would be allowed to exercise their franchise? The fact that the Secretary issued such a directive is not in dispute. This is evident from the answer given to that allegation by the 4th respondent in Para.2 of his counter-affidavit dated 25-6-1984 wherein it is stated: "The allegation that the Secretary had demanded share certificates from all the members who had come for polling is without any substance whatsoever. Ext. P2 notice specifically directs all the members to collect their share certificates from the Bank on or before 15-6-1984. It is therefore incorrect to state that this respondent had on 17-6-1984 demanded share certificates from all the members who had come for polling. It may also be relevant to point out that the Secretary has no role as the Returning Officer either to verify the share certificate or demand the share certificates from the voters." A curious defence is made in the counter-affidavit of the 5th respondent that such insistence on the share certificate was "as a safety measure and to avoid unnecessary delay and confusion in the event of the challenge to the vote being cast." That there is no substance whatever in such a contention will be evident from a reference to R.35 0) of the Rules. That rule reads: "35 0). A candidate contesting the election may. by a letter to the Returning officer. appoint an agent to represent him at every booth where polling is held to identify the voters and to watch the recording of votes. Such letter shall contain the consent in writting of the agent concerned." Thus the rules have stipulated the manner in which the identity of the voter is to be established in the case of a dispute. When a rule has specifically stipulated the mode of identifying a voter. Such letter shall contain the consent in writting of the agent concerned." Thus the rules have stipulated the manner in which the identity of the voter is to be established in the case of a dispute. When a rule has specifically stipulated the mode of identifying a voter. (by employing an election agent) the Secretary of the society cannot incorporate a different provision in a notice relating to election and make it obligatory for a voter to produce the share certificate for exercising his franchise. Such a requirement will be totally unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of any fair election procedure. For a variety of reasons. a member may not be in possession of the share certificate. So long as the rules do not insist on the production of the share certificate as a condition precedent for the exercise of the franchise. such a stipulation cannot be imposed by any authority whatever. It therefore follows that the impugned stipulation was totally unjustified and unauthorised and therefore illegal and invalid. 20. There is a complaint that many persons could not exercise their vote in view of the above stipulation. That is evident from Exts.P4 and P5. No doubt. the allegations contained in Exts.P4 and P5 have been denied by some of the respondents. However. the fact that the unauthorised stipulation had the distinct. possibility of dissuading the voters from exercising their franchise due to their not having the share certificate for the time being. cannot be overlooked at all. The further question would be whether an illegal stipulation so made would have the effect of vitiating the election. 21. This question. in turn. is an important and interesting one. More than a century back. it has been said in Hackney's case. 2 O' M & H. 77 at page 83: "...there should be means fairly taken to give the electors the opportunity of voting with as little trouble as possible." May be. every trivial irregularity would not be sufficient to upset an election. The principles underlaying S.100 of the Representation of People Act. 1950 may be suggestive of the situation. However. when there is a prima facie non-compliance with the rules. the question whether it had not materially affected the election would arise for consideration depending upon the peculiar facts of each case. As observed by Grove J. in the Hackney Case supra: "The objection must be something substantial. 1950 may be suggestive of the situation. However. when there is a prima facie non-compliance with the rules. the question whether it had not materially affected the election would arise for consideration depending upon the peculiar facts of each case. As observed by Grove J. in the Hackney Case supra: "The objection must be something substantial. something calculated really to affect the result of election. The judge has to look to the substance of the case to see whether the informality is of such a nature as to be fairly calculated in a reasonable mind to produce a substantial effect upon the election." In Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar. V. E.L.R. 156. it was found that there was an infringement of S.56 of the Representation of the People Act. 1951 which stipulated that the period of polling should not be less than eight hours. It was held that the election was invalid for that reason. Reference has been made to the case law. Indian and American. (Ahamad Thambi Maracayar v. Basava Maracayar. I.L R.46 Madras 123 and Shyam Chandra Basak v. Chairman. Dacca Municipality. I.L.R. 47 Calcutta 524). 22. No doubt. a mere violation of the rules will not invalidate the election. "The onus rests on the respondent on proving that the result of the election i.e.. success of one candidate over the other and not merely the amount of the majority was not and could not be affected." (See Rogers on Elections. 20th Edn. Page 166). The idea is expressed by Lord Coleridge C.J.. in Woodwards. Sarsons.1875 L.R. 10 C.P. 733 at 743: "Tribunal should be satisfied that there was reasonable ground to believe that a majority of electors may have been prevented from electing the candidate they preferred." But then it has also been held in such situations that the law of averages. or any working out of the theory of probability. cannot furnish a safe guide in this respect or a foundation of judicial principle. There is no rational principle involved in assuming that voting would follow a particular pattern or that the general voting in the whole constituency could be a complete or safe guide for deciding how the voters in a particular station would have behaved. 23. Having regard to the circumstances as revealed from the materials in the case. There is no rational principle involved in assuming that voting would follow a particular pattern or that the general voting in the whole constituency could be a complete or safe guide for deciding how the voters in a particular station would have behaved. 23. Having regard to the circumstances as revealed from the materials in the case. it has to be held that a stipulation had the effect of scaring away many voters entitled to vote. from the actual exercise of the vote. In such a situation. it will be reasonable to hold that the election is itself vitiated. as the stipulation was to have general effect and was peremptory in nature. It is to be borne in mind that out of the total number of 3653 voters only about half had exercised their franchise. On the basis of the principle gatherable from judicial decisions rendered in analogous situation. I am of the view that the election in the present case has been vitiated and has to be declared as invalid on that ground too. 24. A contention was raised on behalf of the 4th respondent that in some other societies also an insistence on production of share certificates had been made on previous occasions. Exts. R4(a) and (b) are notices relating to election in Mauvancherry Co-operative Rural Bank and Cannanore Taluk Co-operative Coconut Marketing Society. the former being one of 1976 and the latter of 1984. The fact that some other persons also erred is not an answer to permit a deviation from the rule to go unchecked. A violation of the rule and a deviation from proper practice cannot be supported by reference to the similar sins committed by others. Such an argument cannot be countenanced by a court of law. 25. Having come to the conclusion that the election is vitiated. the further question is whether the discretion of the court should be exercised by interfering with such an illegal election for the reason that the party can have recourse to a statutory remedy. It is now well-settled that the existence of an alternative remedy. would not. by itself. dissuade a court from exercising its discretion and interfering with the decision. if justice demands it. No doubt. the existence of that remedy would normally be taken note of. before the extra-ordinary jurisdiction is invoked. It is now well-settled that the existence of an alternative remedy. would not. by itself. dissuade a court from exercising its discretion and interfering with the decision. if justice demands it. No doubt. the existence of that remedy would normally be taken note of. before the extra-ordinary jurisdiction is invoked. 26.The process and nature of an election has to be noticed by the Court in this connection. Mahajan. Chief Justice speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court said: "though the election of a candidate is not be lightly interfered with. one of the essentials of that law is also to safeguard the parity of the election process and also to see that people do not get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices." (See Jagan Nath v. Jaswdnt Singh. (1954 S.C.R. 892 at 895). In expressing those sentiments the Supreme Court was only echoing the views expressed almost a century back by Morris J. in Tipperary County Case. (1875) 3 O' M & H 19. 25. It was stated there that "an election petition is not a suit between two persons. but is a proceeding in which the constituency itself is the principal party interested." (This view will answer a subsidiary contention of the respondents that against the voters' list and against the imposition of impediments in the exercise of the franchise caused by insistence of the production of share certificate. the petitioner himself had not made any complaint. The petitioner can justifiably espouse the cause of the constituency. having regard to the peculiar characteristics of an election process). In Sreenivasan v. Election Tribunal. Madras. 11 E.L.R. 278 at 293. it was observed: "An election petition is not a matter in which the only persons interested are candidates who strove against each other at the elections. The public also are substantially interested in it and this is not merely in the sense that an election has news value. An election is an essential part of democratic process. The citizens at large have as interest in seeing and they are justified in insisting that all elections are fair and free and not vitiated by corrupt or illegal practices. In a civil action the only persons who are interested are the individuals arrayed as plaintiffs or defendants but that is not so in an election petition." (emphasis supplied) 27. The citizens at large have as interest in seeing and they are justified in insisting that all elections are fair and free and not vitiated by corrupt or illegal practices. In a civil action the only persons who are interested are the individuals arrayed as plaintiffs or defendants but that is not so in an election petition." (emphasis supplied) 27. The views expressed above have been approvingly referred to in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and others. XIV E. L. R.270. a case in which apart from the parties. there was intervention on behalf of Y. B. Chavan and M. R. Masan. 28. Every attempt must therefore be made by all concerned to ensure that the purity of election process is not in any way impaired. whether it be to the Lok Sabha or to the local authority; or to a co-operative society. A co-operative society is also a socially relevant democratic institution functioning at the grass-root level. In that view of the matter. the court should be anxious to ensure that proper functioning of the democratic institutions is not interfered with. for short term benefits of a few. or a group of. individuals. These considerations have persuaded me to exercise the discretion under Art.226 and declare the election as null and void. On an examination of the materials. files and records. I have come to the conclusion that the election process has been vitiated. from its commencement to its culmination. 29. In this connection. I may refer to the decision of Paripoornan J. in Govindan v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies. 1983 K.L.T. 1038 where the learned judge did exercise the power under Art.226 of the Constitution and declared the election as invalid. A violation of R.26 was found in the above case and having found such a violation of the statutory rule. the learned judge observed that the complaining parties should not be relegated to the statutory remedies. I am in agreement with the views expressed by my brother Paripoornan J. in the aforesaid decision. 30. In a recent case. the Supreme Court did interfere with a Co-operative election. (vide B.K. Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. A.I.R. 1984 S.C.192). the learned judge observed that the complaining parties should not be relegated to the statutory remedies. I am in agreement with the views expressed by my brother Paripoornan J. in the aforesaid decision. 30. In a recent case. the Supreme Court did interfere with a Co-operative election. (vide B.K. Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. A.I.R. 1984 S.C.192). The importance of the co-operative movement was picturesquely portrayed by Desai J. who spoke for the court thus: "Article 43 of the Constitution set the goal that the State shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas. In our onward march of economic independence. India was destined to be a co-operative commonwealth Since independence. co-operative movement proliferated in all directions. its activities were diversified. more especially in the rural areas. Every activity of a person devoted to agriculture in the rural area is considerably influenced by the co-operative movement. such as seed distribution. credit. disposal of agricultural produce etc." 31. In the light of the above discussion. I declare that the election held on 19-6-1984 is null and void. No consequential declaration is necessary in the present case in as much as in pursuance to the directions contained in the order of this Court. the results of the election have not been declared. It is. however necessary that a proper election is held and without delay. There will therefore be a direction that a proper election be held of the committee within a period of four months from today. with the eligible members as on 5-8-1982 in the voters list. The petition is accordingly allowed with costs. costs payable by respondents 1. 2.4 and 5.