GUJARAT HOUSING BOARD v. NAGAJIBHAI LAXMANBHAI — 1985 DIGILAW 230 (GUJ)

I. C. BHATT, P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE Gujarat Housing Board is the petitioner in Civil Revision Application No. 1687 of 1983. The Civil Revision Application is filed against the order passed by the Civil Judge (S. D.) Bhavnaga in Order below Exh. 20 dated 23. 7. 1981. ( 2 ) THE 1st respondent herein filed Regular Civil Suit No. 151 of 1981 on the file of the Civil Judge (S. D.) Bhavnagar praying for setting aside section 4 and section 6 notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act. In that suit the present petitioner herein put in an application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) Civil Procedure Code praying to join him as party-defendant No. 3 in the main suit. According to the petitioner herein it is a body corporate and it carries activity of constructing residential buildings for weaker section of the people. It has constructed buildings in lands situated at the outskirt of Vadhva in the City of Bhavnagar and for further construction of buildings for weaker section of people as well as for the middle class people it required further area. It submitted its representation to the State Government and the State Government by its Notification under the Land Acquisition Act acquired the lands bearing Survey Nos. 384 385 and 386 situated at the outskirt of Vadhva. Thus the lands were acquired by the State Government. who is the 1st defendant in the suit for achieving the objects and activity of the petitioner herein. While so the 1st respondent herein who is the plaintiff and his relatives and other interested persons originally filed suits in which the petitioner was also a party-defendant. Having failed in those proceedings the plaintiff. who is the 1st respondent herein has come forward with the present suit without making the petitioner as the party-defendant. It is the case of the petitioner herein in the application filed by him that he is a necessary and proper party that if the suit is proceeded without the petitioner being a party irreparable loss and hardship would be caused to him and that the petitioner being the acquiring body of the disputed lands he should be joined as a party-third defendant to the suit. With the abovesaid prayer the petitioner herein wanted the Civil Judge (S. D.) before whom the Regular Civil Suit No. 151 of 1981 was pending. With the abovesaid prayer the petitioner herein wanted the Civil Judge (S. D.) before whom the Regular Civil Suit No. 151 of 1981 was pending. to join him as party-third defendant to the suit. The 1st respondent herein opposed the application filed by the petitioner herein before the Civil Judge (S. D.) stating that the petitioner is neither a necessary nor a proper party and that the plaintiff in the suit cannot be compelled to litigate against a person from whom he does not seek any relief. ( 3 ) THE Civil Judge (S. D.) Bhavnagar after referring to Mahuva Municipality v. Mehta Kiritkumar Umedchand and Ors. (ATR 1973 Gujarat 97) wherein the Gujarat High Court has held that the acquiring body is not a party interested in the subject matter of the suit nor said to be a proper party to the suits rejected the application filed by the petitioner herein under Order Rule 10 CPC. ( 4 ) IT is as against this order the present Civil Revision Application has been filed by the proposed party. Mr. Justice R. A. Mehta the learned single Judge of our High Court after referring to various decisions of our High Court and that of Supreme Court found that Mahuva Municipality v. Mehta Kiritkumar Umedchand and ors. (AIR 1973 Gujarat 97) and The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and others (1973 (3) SCC 821) are taking a view that the body for the benefit of which the acquisition is made is not a necessary party while Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) is observing that the said body is a necessary party and referred the matter to the larger Bench for decision. It is thus the matter is before us. ( 5 ) IT is clear from the facts of the case that the land in question is being acquired by the Special Land Acquisition Officer Bhavnagar to benefit the petitioner herein. The plaintiffs in the suit referred above are questioning the validity of such acquisition. In that suit the petitioner has come forward with the present application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC to add themselves as the patty-respondent in the suit stating that they are vitally interested and as such they are necessary and proper party to the suit. The plaintiffs in the suit referred above are questioning the validity of such acquisition. In that suit the petitioner has come forward with the present application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC to add themselves as the patty-respondent in the suit stating that they are vitally interested and as such they are necessary and proper party to the suit. ( 6 ) ORDER 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC reads as follows:-"the Court may at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of either party and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just order that the name of any party improperly joined whether as plaintiff or defendant be struck out and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit be added". Thus Rule 10 (2) CPC provides for addition (1) of necessary parties and (2) of proper parties. The necessary party is that party without whom no decree at all can be passed. In order that a party may be considered a necessary party there must be a right to some relief against him in respect of the matter involved in the suit and that his presence should be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. This implication is derived from the words ought to have been joined occurring in Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC. In the very same rule the sentence whose presence before the Court may be necessary by implication refers to proper parties. A person may be added as a defendant to a suit though no relief may be claimed against him provided his presence is necessary for a complete and final decision of the question involved in the suit. Such a person is called a proper party as distinguished from a necessary party. Thus the above sentences occurring in Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC clearly establish that a party can be added if he is either a necessary party or a proper party to the suit. Such a person is called a proper party as distinguished from a necessary party. Thus the above sentences occurring in Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC clearly establish that a party can be added if he is either a necessary party or a proper party to the suit. In Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum ( AIR 1958 SC 886 ) the Supreme Court has occasion to consider the power of the Court to add parties under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. It laid down the following conclusions as guidelines:-" (1) That the question of addition of parties under R. 10 of O. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case but in some cases it may raise controversies as to the power of the court in contradistinction to its inherent jurisdiction or in other words of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in S. 115 of the Code; (2) That in a suit relating to property in order that a person may be added as a party he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation; (3) Where the subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration as regards status or a legal character the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case Where the court is of the opinion that by adding that party it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy; (4) The cases contemplated in the last proposition have to be determined in accordance with the statutory provisions of Ss. 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act; (5) In cases covered by those statutory provisions the court is not bound to grant the declaration prayed for on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant it the court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission; (6) The result of a declaratory decree on the question of status such as in icontroversy in the instant case affects not only the parties actually before the Court but generations to come and in view of that consideration the rule of present interest as evolved by case law relating to disputes about property does not apply with full force; and (7) The rule laid down in S. 43 of the Specific Relief Act is not exactly a rule of res judicata. It is narrower in one sense and wider in another. The above said guidelines clearly establish that the adding of parties under Order 1 Rule 10 is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of as the facts and circumstances of a particular case. A reading of Order 1 Rule 10 (2) clearly establishes that the Court can either upon the application or suo motu join the party in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. ( 7 ) IN the light of the abovesaid decision we have to now consider whether the petitioner is a necessary or a proper party for being added as party-defendant to the suit. ( 8 ) AS far as the present case is concerned it is clear from the facts of the case that the petitioner herein is the acquiring body and for whose benefits the lands are acquired. Whether such an acquiring body is a necessary party or a proper party as subject matter of various decisions of the High Courts in India including that of the Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to deal with every one of those cases and in our opinion it will suffice to deal with Mahuva Municipality v. Mehta Kiritkumar Umedchand and Ors. (AIR 1973 Gujarat 97 ). The Municipal Corporation wi the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Ors. It is unnecessary to deal with every one of those cases and in our opinion it will suffice to deal with Mahuva Municipality v. Mehta Kiritkumar Umedchand and Ors. (AIR 1973 Gujarat 97 ). The Municipal Corporation wi the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Ors. ( 1971 (3) SCC 821 ) Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) and Noormohmad Hahshama v. Anand Mohan Bhardwa; and Ors. (XXII GLR 332 ). ( 9 ) MR. Trivedi the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent pressing into service Mahuva Municipality v. Mehta Kiritkumar Umedchand and Ors. (AIR 1973 Gujarat 97) and also submitting before this Court that the law propounded in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Ors. ( 1971 (3) SCC 821 ) is more apposite contended that the petitioner is neither necessary nor a proper party. According to the learned Counsel if the Court can grant the relief even in the absence of the petitioner who is the Housing Board then the Board cannot be deemed as a necessary or a proper party to be added in the suit. Even without the presence of the petitioner according to the learned counsel Mr. Trivedi the suit can be effectually and completely decided by the Civil Court. ( 10 ) MR. Nanavati the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that in the light of the latest Supreme Court decision Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) the petitioner who is interested in acquiring the land in question is a proper party and that the later decision in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) has to be followed in preference to the decision in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and others ( 1971 (3) SCC 821 ). According to Mr. Nanavati if two decisions of the Supreme Court of equal Bench are contradictory to each other the later decision has to prevail. According to Mr. Nanavati if two decisions of the Supreme Court of equal Bench are contradictory to each other the later decision has to prevail. ( 11 ) IN Mahuva Municipality v. Mehta Kirtikumar Umedchand and others (AIR 1973 Gujarat 97) it has been clearly held that the acquiring body for whose benefit the land is proposed to be acquired cannot be said to have any interest in the subject matter of the suit. In Noormahamad Hahshama v. Anand Mohan Bhardwaj and Ors. (XXII of GLR 332) a learned single Judge of our High Court considering a suit arising out of Evacuee Properly Act wherein the allottee wanted to get himself impleaded observed that the allottee is not at all necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions regarding the legality of the declaration made by the Government. In The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Ors. ( 1971 (3) SCC 821 ) a Division Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of two learned Judges had occasion to consider as to whether the Municipal Corporation for whose benefit the lands were acquired by the State Government was a party interested in the proceedings. That is a case in which the aggrieved party whose lands were acquired by the State Government filed a writ petition to quash the notification issued by the Government. In that the aggrieved party has added the Municipal Corporation as the 4th defendant. The High Court quashed the Notification. As against that the Municipal Corporation preferred appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court holding that the Municipal Corporation cannot have any interest in such acquisition proceedings dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. Thus reading the abovesaid decision cited. it is clear that the acquiring body such as the petitioner herein cannot be termed as a person interested in the proceedings and as such it is not a proper or a necessary party. Before referring to the decision in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 which. in our opinion. clearly contradicts the view taken in the abovesaid decision it will be relevant to look into certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in order to appreciate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ). in our opinion. clearly contradicts the view taken in the abovesaid decision it will be relevant to look into certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in order to appreciate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ). Sec. 2 of the Land Acquisition Act defines the expression person interested. It reads as follows:-". . . . . (B) the expression person interested includes all persons claiming all interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an casement affecting the land;"sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act deals with reference 10 court and procedure thereon. Here it is stated that any person interested can make a reference. Sec. 50 of the Land Acquisition Act deals with acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or Company and the same reads as follows:-"50 Where the provisions of this Act are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any company the charges of and incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by such fund or company (2) In any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or Company concerned may appear and adduce evidence of the purpose of determining the amount of compensation; provided that no such local authority or Company shall be entitled to demand a reference under section 18there is an amendment to this section by land Acquisition (Gujarat Unification and Amendment) Act XX of 1965 wherein the amendment runs as follows:-"in Section 50 of the principal Act in sub section (2) for the words may appear and adduce evidence the words shall be called upon to appeal and adduce evidence if any shall be substituted"sec. 50 which deals with acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or Company gives right to the acquiring body to appear and adduce evidence The Gujarat Amendment referred above makes it compulsory for the authority to call in the acquiring body to appear and adduce evidence if any. From this it is clear that the acquiring body is termed as an interested person in such acquisition proceedings. From this it is clear that the acquiring body is termed as an interested person in such acquisition proceedings. Thus it is clear from a combined reading of all these provisions that the words person interested given in sec. 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) Supreme Court had occasion to consider as to whether the body for whose benefit the land is acquired is a party interested in the proceeding challenging such acquisition. The Government in that case acquired the land for the benefit of a private party. This was questioned by the owner of the land on the ground that the Company for which the land is acquired is a private company. that such acquisition cannot be considered for public purpose under sec. 4 of the Act and that such acquisition has to be quashed. This plea taken by the plaintiff in the suit found favour with a single Judge who allowed the writ petition and quashed the land acquisition proceedings along with the Notification. Against that order the appellant before the Supreme Court for whose benefit the land was acquired filed a Letters Patent Appeal to the Bench of the Bombay High Court. The Letters Patent Bench which con firmed the view taken by the single Judge dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal before the Bench inasmuch as it was not a person interested within the meaning of sec. 18 (1) of the Act. Dealing with this question as to whether the body for whose benefit the land is being acquired is an interested person or not the Supreme Court observed:-"7 It seems to us that the definition of a person interested given in Sec. 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government after acquisition it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus it cannot be said that the Company had no claim or) title to the land at all. Secondly since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money For this purpose the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation". The Supreme Court after referring to various other decisions finally observed;"13 Thus the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include a body local authority or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion this view accords with the principles of equity justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital? For instance the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is pro posed to be given to him. Similarly if such a person is not heard by the Collector or a Court he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which in case he is allowed to appear before a court he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extract of the land. We are therefore unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or eve by the Calcutta High Court that a company local authority or a person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are therefore unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or eve by the Calcutta High Court that a company local authority or a person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also In the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him seriously prejudice his rights. Moreover in view of that decision of this Court referred to above we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by S. 18 (1) of the Act. The High Court therefore committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the Bench". Thus the Supreme Court had definitely held that the person for whose benefit the land is acquired is a person vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him will seriously prejudice his rights. In view of the above said decision of Division Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of two Judges in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) the petition herein is an interested party and the decision to be effective and complete has to be made in the presence of such an interested party. Now we have to consider as to whether the decision in Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and others ( 1971 (3) SCC 821 ) prevails or that the decision in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) prevails. Mr. Trivedi the learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent submitted that the decision in Municipal Corpora ion of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and others ( ( 1971 (3) SCC 821 is more accurate and as such the said decision has to prevail. In support of his contention he cited the decision reported in M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited Dundahera v. Umrao and others (AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 213 ). In support of his contention he cited the decision reported in M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited Dundahera v. Umrao and others (AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 213 ). In that Full Bench decision the majority vies is spoken to as follows"23 Now the contention that the latest judgment of a co-ordinate Bench is to be mechanically followed and must have pre-eminence irrespective of any other consideration does not commend itself to me. When judgments of the superior Court are of co-equal Benches and therefore of matching authority then their weight inevitably must be considered by the rationale and the logic thereof and not by the mere fortuitous circumstances of the time and date on which they were rendered. It is manifest that when two directly conflicting judgments of the superior Court and of equal authority are extent then both of them cannot be binding on the courts below. Inevitably a choice though a difficult one has to be made in such a situation. On principle it appears to me that the High Court must follow the judgment which appears to it to lay down the law more elaborately and accurately. The mere incidence of time whether the judgments of co-equal Benches of the superior Court are earlier or later is a consideration which appears to me as hardly relevant". In contradiction to the abovesaid decision we have catena of decisions which say that in respect of the decision of the superior Court of co-equal Benches the latter one prevails over the former. In Vasant Tatoba Hargude and others v. Dikkaya Muttaya Pujari (AIR 1980 Bombay 341) a Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that in case of conflict between earlier and later decisions of Supreme Court where each Bench consists of equal number of Judges the later decision should prevail. In Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi v. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. and another (AIR 1980 Karnataka 92) the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court has definitely held that when there are two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court one given by the larger Bench should be followed and that if both Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges the later of the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and other courts. We are in complete agreement with the principle laid down by the Bombay and Karnataka High Courts in Vasant Tatoba Hargude and others v. Dikkaya Muttaya Pujari (AIR 1980 Bombay 341 ) and Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi v. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. and another (AIR 1980 Karnataka 92) respectively. In this view we hold that the decision reported in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) holds the field and that the petitioner herein is an interested party whose presence is necessary to effectually and completely decide the issue in question. In the present case. the petitioner wants to get itself impleaded as party-third. Defendant in the suit pending before the Civil Judge (S. D.) Bhavnagar. The petition to implead was liked under the provision of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. If the Court in its discretion feels that the petitioner is an interested party and his presence is necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate and settle all questions involved in the Suit it has ample power to add the petitioner as party-defendant in the Suit. The Supreme Court decision reported in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 which we have seen is the one that which holds the field as on date definitely stales that the person for whose benefit the land is acquired is an interested party. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue Bihar and another ( AIR 1963 SC 786 ) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider in the writ proceedings the question as to the person who will he necessary and proper party to such proceedings. It observed:" (7) To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled: it is enough if we state the principle. It observed:" (7) To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled: it is enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom on order can be made effectively a proper party is one in whose absence an effectively order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding"continuing the Supreme Court held: (12) To summarise in a writ to certiorari not only tribunal or authority whose order is sought to be quashedbut also parties in whose favour the said order is issued are necessary parties. But it is in the discretion of the court to add or implead proper parties for completely settling all the questions that may be involved in the controversy either suo motu or on the application of a party to the writ or an application filed at the instance of such proper party". The above said observation made by the Supreme Court completely answers the contention put forth by Mr. Trivedi the learned Counsel appearing for the 1 respondent to the effect that if the relief can be fully granted even in the absence of the Housing Board; then the Board is neither a necessary party nor a proper party to be added. As correctly observed by the learned referring Judge of our High Court in the present case the impugned land acquisition is for the public purpose of the Gujarat Housing Board and is being acquired at the cost of Gujarat Housing Board. The entire amount of compensation is to come out of the funds of Gujarat Housing Board who is the petitioner herein. Even the cost of the present litigation irrespective of its result. is to be borne by the Gujarat Housing Board. In fact all the stake in the result of the litigation and the cost of the litigation is on the Gujarat Housing Board and as such it can he easily presumed that the Gujarat Housing Board is an interested party in this litigation. The suit can be effectually and completely decided only in the presence of the petitioner herein. In fact all the stake in the result of the litigation and the cost of the litigation is on the Gujarat Housing Board and as such it can he easily presumed that the Gujarat Housing Board is an interested party in this litigation. The suit can be effectually and completely decided only in the presence of the petitioner herein. Even if it is considered that the petitioner is not a necessary party there cannot be any two opinion in view of the Supreme Court decision rendered in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) that the petitioner is a proper party to be added as the party-defendant to the Suit. ( 12 ) IN these circumstances we answer the reference by declaring that the person for whose benefit the and is acquired is an interested party and has every right to be added as a party-defendant to the suit ill order to effectually and completely decide the dispute in issue. We also declare that when there are two conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court consisting of equal number of Judges the later of the two decisions should be followed by the High Courts and other Courts. ( 13 ) IN view of the reference answered by us in paragraph supra we feel that there is nothing left to send hack the case to the file of the learned single Judge for disposal. Hence we allow the Civil Revision Application holding that the petitioner is an interested party and the petitioners presence is necessary for effectually and completely deciding the issues involved in the suit pending before the Civil Judge (S. D.) Bhavnagar as Regular Civil Suit No. 151 of 1981 The order passed by the learned trial Judge is set aside. The application Exh. 20 filed by the Gujarat Housing Board to be added as a party-defendant is granted. The Civil Revision Application is allowed with costs. .