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1985 DIGILAW 230 (ORI)

RAGHUNATH CHAUDHURY v. DURUJA BEHERA

1985-07-01

D.P.MOHAPATRA

body1985
JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - The plaintiff in Title Suit No. 185 of 1975 before the Munsif, Aska has filed these two applications under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, Challenging the orders of the said court expunging the evidence of Kasinath Behera (D.W. 2). one of the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants and rejecting the petitioner's application to accept the said evidence under section 33 of the Evidence Act. 2. The petitioner filed the suit for grant of permanent injunction against the opposite parties prohibiting them from interfering with his possession over the suit property or the walls or foundation standing thereon and to direct the opposite parties to construct the eastern brick wall of the petitioner on the backyard demolished by them and in case they do not do so, to direct them to pay Rs. 200/- to the petitioner for constructing the said wall. The dispute is in respect of a building out of which Kasinath Behera purchased 11'.3" from the east and the opposite parties purchased 8'.3" to the west of the land of Kasinath Behera and the petitioner purchased 10'.6" width of land to the west of the lands purchased by the opposite parties. The trouble is alleged to be started when the petitioner was putting up the wall demarcating his portion of the land from that of the opposite parties. Examination of the witnesses on behalf of the petitioner was closed on 2-2-1982. After examination of witnesses on behalf of the opposite parties commenced on 3-2-1982 and D.W. 1 was examined and cross-examined. On 4-2-1982 the opposite parties and their counsel were absent when the case was called. The court passed an order closing the evidence from their side and posted the case to 5-2-1982 for hearing arguments. Later on the same day on an application filed on behalf of the opposite parties, the court recalled the aforesaid order and examined D.W. 2 Kasinath Behera. The witness was examined and cross-examined in part and the case was posted to 5-2-1982 for further hearing. On 5-2-1982 the case could not be taken up due to the absence of the Presiding Officer. On 8-2-1982, the next date on which the suit was put up, the counsel for the defendants filed some documents along with a petition to recall d.w. 1 and to mark the said documents as exhibits in the case. On 5-2-1982 the case could not be taken up due to the absence of the Presiding Officer. On 8-2-1982, the next date on which the suit was put up, the counsel for the defendants filed some documents along with a petition to recall d.w. 1 and to mark the said documents as exhibits in the case. The court allowed the petition. In the order passed on that date the court observed : - "The defendant could not produce D.W. 2 who was cross-examined in part. Hence his evidence brought on record is hereby expunged. D.W. 3 is examined and cross-examined in full. Exhibits B' and C' are marked. Plaintiff has filed a petition for time for argument. Heard. It is allowed. Call on 11-2-1982 for argument." Subsequently, on 11-2-1982 an application was filed on behalf of the petitioner under Order XVI Rules 15 to 17 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to recall the Order dated 8-2-1982 and to secure the attendance of Kasinath Behera by coercive process if necessary. The petitioner expressed his willingness to bear the expenses for securing the attendance of D.W. 2. The court on consideration of the application of the petitioner and counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties by his order dated 15-2-1982 rejected the application. On the very next day, i.e. 16-2-1982 the counsel for the petitioner (plaintiff) filed a petition under section 33 of the Evidence Act read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to accept the evidence of D.W. 2, particularly, the statement in his cross-examination, under section 33 of the Evidence Act. This application was rejected by order dated 22-2-1982. This order is impugned in the revision petition. 3. In Civil Revision No. 164 of 1982 the petitioner seeks to challenge the order of the trial court dated 8-2-1982 expunging the evidence of D.W. 2. Since both the matters are interconnected they have been taken up together with consent of the learned counsel for both the parties and will be disposed of by this common order. 4. I would take up the order dated 8-2-1982 expunging into the evidence of D.W. 2, which is under challenge in Civil Revision No. 164 of 1982, first. Since both the matters are interconnected they have been taken up together with consent of the learned counsel for both the parties and will be disposed of by this common order. 4. I would take up the order dated 8-2-1982 expunging into the evidence of D.W. 2, which is under challenge in Civil Revision No. 164 of 1982, first. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the trial court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly in passing the impugned order merely on the ground that the witness has failed to turn up in court for further cross-examination. According to the learned counsel, the trial court should have taken steps for procuring attendance of the witness, who had been cross-examined in part. He submits that the real reason for non-appearance of the witness in the court before completion of his cross-examination, is that he has made some statements which went against the case of the opposite parties and at their instance the witness has stayed away from the court. The learned counsel for the opposite parties on the other hand submits that the court below was justified in expunging the evidence of D.W. 2 since the witness was not available for further cross-examination on the date fixed. 5. the position is not in controversy that the trial court has the discretion to direct that evidence of any witness, who fails to submits himself for cross-examination or fails to appear in the court for further examination or cross-examination should be ignored, but the discretion is not to be exercised mechanically without due application of mind. There might be cases where the absence of the witness may not be for reasons wholly unavoidable or may be for reasons temporary in nature. There may also be cases where a witness is kept back from the court deliberately by any party or other for different purposes. There might be cases where the absence of the witness may not be for reasons wholly unavoidable or may be for reasons temporary in nature. There may also be cases where a witness is kept back from the court deliberately by any party or other for different purposes. When the question of taking further steps regarding examination of a witness who has been examined or cross-examined in part arises, the court is to consider various matters like relevance of the testimony of the witness, whether his examination is necessary to get at the truth of the matter ; whether the cause for his absence is of temporary character for example, illness ; whether there is any possibility that the witness is being purposely, deliberately kept back in the court at the instance of one of the parties to the case so that his evidence may not be on record in the case. The court has ample power to procure attendance of a witness whose evidence is relevant for the case. The court whoso principal attempt should be to get at the truth of the matter, should, not be hesitant to exercise its power to procure attendance of any witness whose evidence is relevant and if necessary, by use of coercive steps in an appropriate case. The court should not readily expunge the evidence of a witness examined or cross-examined in part, simply because, he did not turn up on the date fixed and one of the parties wants his evidence to be expunged. 6. In the present case, a bare reading of the order insufficiently indicative of the fact that court without consideration of the relevant aspects of the case has accepted the request made on behalf of the opposite parties (defendants) to expunge the evidence of their own witness, D.W. 2, simply because, he had not turned up on the date fixed. This by no means is a satisfactory manner of exercise of judicial discretion by the court. This is likely to encourage a party, who feels that his interest is likely to be adversely affected if the evidence of the witness is kept on record, to some how or other see that the witness does not turn up on the date fixed. This is likely to encourage a party, who feels that his interest is likely to be adversely affected if the evidence of the witness is kept on record, to some how or other see that the witness does not turn up on the date fixed. This is more so when the opposite parties who thought that the evidence of Kasinath Behera, D.W. 2 was relevant for the purpose of their case, themselves prayed that his evidence should be expunged from the record. It is to be noted that the reason given for the absence of the witness on 8-2-1982 was illness. This is not a reason of a permanent nature from which the court could reasonably be satisfied that it would not be worthwhile awaiting for further cross-examination of the witness. However, the court has also not applied his mind to this aspect and has recorded no finding regarding it. 7. The argument of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that since the counsel for the petitioner did not raise any objection for expunction of evidence of D.W. 2 on 8-2-1982, his subsequent complaint to the said order cannot be entertained is devoid of substance. As discussed earlier, it is for the court to exercise its discretion whether to take steps for to procuring attendance of the witness concern or to ignore the statements already made by the witness. Exercise of discretion by the court cannot be left entirely at the desire of the parties or any of them. 8. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order passed by the trial court on 8-2-1982 expunging the evidence of Kasinath Behera, D.W. 2 from record is unsustainable and has to be set aside. The trial court should take steps in accordance with law for procuring attendance of the witness, if the defendant-opposite parties fail to produce the witness on a date to be fixed by the court. 9. In view of the order passed in the foregoing paragraph in Civil Revision No. 164 of 1982, it is not necessary to consider in detail the questions raised in Civil Revision No. 163 of 1982, which is directed, as noticed earlier, against the order dated 23-2-1982 of the court below rejecting the petitioner's application for accepting the evidence of D.W. 2 under section 33 of the Evidence Act. This application was made on the assumption that further cross-examination of the said witness was not possible. The trial court rejected the application mainly on the ground that since he had already passed the order (on 8-2-1982) expunging the evidence of Kasinath Behera (D.W. 2) in toto, the question of accepting the statement made by the said witness under section 33 of the Evidence Act did not arise. Since the order dated 8-2-1982 of the trial court is being set aside the reasons given in the order dated 23-2-1982 becomes unsustainable and hence the order cannot stand. However, since the trial court is being directed to take steps for further examination and cross-examination of Kasinath Behera (D.W. 2) the application of the petitioner under section 33 of the Evidence Act does not arise for a consideration at this stage. 10. The Civil Revision No. 164 of 1982 is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, the trial court is directed to take further steps in accordance with law to procure the attendance of witness, Kasinath Behera, D.W. 2 for recording his evidence. 11. The impugned order dated 23-2-1982 passed by the trial court rejecting the petitioner's application for accepting the statement made by the witness Kasinath-Behera (D.W. 2) under section 33 of the Evidence Act is set aside and the Civil Revision No. 163 of 1982 is disposed of in terms indicated above. Both the parties to bear their respective costs of this proceeding.