JUDGMENT S. Saghir Ahmad, J. - The petitioners, who are members of the U.P. Police, have, by means of these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenged the orders by which they have been placed under suspension, on the grounds, inter alia, that there was neither a departmental nor a judicial enquiry pending against them and, therefore, they could not be placed under suspension. 2. In Writ Petition No. 110 of 1985 the impugned order is dated 1185 and is contained in Annexure 1. It has been passed against the petitioner on the ground that he had exhibited slackness in investigating Grime No. 1357 of 1982 under Section 338 I. P. C. registered at P.S. Hazratganj, Lucknow. 3. In Writ Petition No. 5390 of 1984 the order of suspension is dated 11884 and is contained in Annexure 1. It appears that one Om Prakash, who was arrested in connection with a case under Section 392/397 I.P.C. and was lodged in the Havalat of P.S.G.R.P. Charbagh, Lucknow, was found dead in the Havalat. The post mortem report indicated that he had died of injuries of his person and shock. A First Information Report about this incident was lodged by Sri K.P. Rai, Superintendent of Police, G.R.P. Lucknow, against the petitioner with the direction that an appropriate case be registered against him and other concerned police officials for suitable action. A copy of this F.I.R. has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. There appears an endorsement on the said F.I.R. Which indicates that a Case under Section 304 I.P.C. was directed to be registered against the petitioner. 4. In Writ Petition No. 5039 of 1984 the suspension order is dated 3lst August, 1982 and is contained in Annexure 1. It appears that on 31st August, 1982 at about 6.45 A.M. a F.I.R. was lodged against the petitioner and other police officials under Section 342/302/330 read with Section 161 I.P.C, as a result of which the petitioners who is a constable was arrested along with S.I. Munna Lal Tewari on 1982. He is said to have been released on bail but there has been no further progress in the case registered against him and although the matter was entrusted to C.I.D. for investigation, the charge sheet against the petitioner has not so far been filed in the Court nor has a final report been filed. He is said to have been released on bail but there has been no further progress in the case registered against him and although the matter was entrusted to C.I.D. for investigation, the charge sheet against the petitioner has not so far been filed in the Court nor has a final report been filed. It is stated in the suspension order dated 31882 that the petitioner has been placed under suspension because of contemplated disciplinary proceedings as he was a named accused in Crime Case No. 501 of 1982. 5. The suspension order in Writ Petition No. 4969 of 1984 is dated 22584 and is contained in Annexure 6. The suspension order has been passed against the petitioners on the ground that there was a Crime Case No. 98A/84 under Section 396 I.P.C. of P.S. Dargah Sharif, Bahraich registered against them. 6. In Writ Petition No. 4598 of 1984 the suspension order is dated 17983 and is contained in Annexure 1. The petitioner has been suspended by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow on the ground that there was a departmental enquiry Contemplated against him as he was an accused in Crime Case No. 172/84 under Section 161 I. P, G. read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 7. In Writ Petition No. 2088 of 1984 the petitioners have been suspended because of a criminal case having been registered against them, Opposite parties are represented by the Standing Counsel to whom several Opportunities were given to obtain instructions and it was also made char to him that the petitions Were likely to be disposed of finally. In Writ Petition No. 2088 of 1984, which was admitted on May 24, 1984 an order Was passed by a Division Bench to the following effect : As an important legal question, is involved, namely, whether Rule 49A should apply to subordinate police officer or not and as the earlier decisions on the subject seem to require reconsideration, the petition is admitted. Counteraffidavit may be filed within six weeks and rejoinderaffidavit within two weeks. List thereafter. 8. By an order dated 111084 passed in Writ Petition No. 4969 of 1984 it was directed that all the cases may be grouped together for an early heating. 9. Counteraffidavit may be filed within six weeks and rejoinderaffidavit within two weeks. List thereafter. 8. By an order dated 111084 passed in Writ Petition No. 4969 of 1984 it was directed that all the cases may be grouped together for an early heating. 9. By another order dated 10984 passed in Writ Petition No. 4508 of 1984 it was made clear that the petition was likely to be disposed of finally. 10. As stated earlier, counteraffidavits have not been filed but the Standing Counsel has made his submissions on the basis of the instructions given to him. 11. It is not disputed that the petitioners in all the cases have been appointed in the police force under Section 2 of the Police Act, 1861, which, interalia, provides that subject to the provisions of this Act, the pay and all other conditions of service of members of the subordinate ranks of any police force shall be such as may be determined by the State Government. 12. Section 7 of the Police Act provides as under : 7. Appointment, dismissal, etc., of inferior officers Subject to provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution and to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under the Act, the InspectorGeneral, Deputy InspectorGeneral, Assistant InspectorGeneral and District Superintendent of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate ranks whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same; or may award any one or more of the following punishments to any police officer of the subordinate ranks who shall discharge his duty in a careless or negligent manner, or who by any act of his own shall render himself unfit for the discharge thereof, namely, (a) fine to any amount not exceeding one month's pay : (b) confinement to quarters for a term not exceeding fifteen days, with or without punishment drill, extra guard, fatigue or other duty (d) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument. 13. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 7 of the Police Act, the State Government has made Police Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations). 13. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 7 of the Police Act, the State Government has made Police Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations). It is state din Para 477 of Chapter XXXIII of the Police Regulations that the rules in this Chapter have been made under Section 7 of the Police Act (V of 1861) and apply to apply to officers appointed under Section 2 of the Police Act. The provisions contained in Chapter XXXII have been held to have statutory force. The general powers under Section 7 are regulated by rules contained in the Police Regulations. As observed by a Division Bench of this Court in. The State of U.P. and another v. Mohd. Ibrahim, ( AIR 1959 All. 223 ) the section makes it clear that the powers conferred upon the officers named therein are to be exercised subject to such Rules as the State Government may make. To the same effect is the view expressed by a Single Judge in Mukhtar Singh v. State and others, ( AIR 1959 All. 569 ). 14. Para 478 of the Regulations specifics the punishments which can be inflicted on a member of the Police Force in the departmental proceedings. 15. Para 483 provides as under : 483, Subject to the special provisions contained in paragraph 500 and to any special order which may be passed by the Governor in particular cases a proceedings against a police officer will consist of (a) a magisterial or Police inquiry, followed if this inquiry shows need for further action, or (b) A judicial trial, or (c) a departmental trial, or both, consecutively:. 16. Para 484 provides as under : 484. If he nature of the inquiry in any particular case will vary according to the nature of the offence. If the offence is cognizable or noncognizable according to Schedule II of the Criminal Procedure Code and information of it is received by the District Magistrate, he may in exercise of Ms powers under the Criminal Procedure Code either (1) make of order a magisterial inquiry; or (2) order an investigation by the Police. If the information is received fey a magistrate other than District 'magistrate and he takes cognizance of the offence, he should report the 'case at once to the District Magistrate who will withdraw it to his own court finder Section 528 (now Section 410/411), Criminal Procedure Code. If the information is received fey a magistrate other than District 'magistrate and he takes cognizance of the offence, he should report the 'case at once to the District Magistrate who will withdraw it to his own court finder Section 528 (now Section 410/411), Criminal Procedure Code. The District Magistrate may then act as though the original complaint had been made by him. This power extends to case under Section 29 of the Police Act, but magisterial inquiry in cases under this section will be Ordered 'only in vey exceptional circumstances. 17. Para 485 provides as under 'When a magisterial inquiry is ordered it will be made in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code and the Superintendent of police will have rid direct concern with it until the conclusion of judicial proceedings or until and unless the case is referred to him for further 'disposal, but he must give any assistance to the inquiring magistrate that he may legally be called upon to give and he must suspend the accuse should this become necessary under paragraph 496. 18. Para 486 provides that if an offence alleged against 1 Police Officer amounts to an offence only under Section 7 of the Police Act, an inquiry will be made under the direction of the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the rules specified therein which also speak of an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer. In State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhyay, ( AIR 1961 SC 751 ) it has been held that the provisions of Para 486 are mandatory and non compliance with the provisions contained therein will render the order of punishment including the order of dismissal as illegal and Void. 19. Para 489 of the Regulations provides that a police officer may be departmentally tried 21. A perusal of the provision quoted above will indicate that a police officer can be placed under suspension during a departmental inquiry or a judicial inquiry into a charge of misconduct. He is also required to be suspended if his prosecution has been ordered by the Superintendent of Police or the Deputy Inspector General or if he Is prosecuted as a result of theMagisterial enquiry. He is also required to be suspended if his prosecution has been ordered by the Superintendent of Police or the Deputy Inspector General or if he Is prosecuted as a result of theMagisterial enquiry. If, however he is prosecuted on a complaint lodged by a private person, the suspension can be ordered only If the circumstance of the case in the opinion of the Superintendent of Police so justify. 22. The procedure for holding a departmental inquiry Is given in Para 490 while the procedure relating to cases in which the police officers are dealt with departmentally as a result of judicial trial or magisterial enquiries are given in Paras 493 and 494 of the Police Regulations. 23. In the instant eases we are concerned only with suspension 'during departmental or judicial enquiry and suspension pursuant to the Superintendent of Police's order for prosecution. 24. According Webster's Third New International Dictionary the word during means throughout the 'Continuance or course of 5 at some point in the course of. 25. In Words and Phrases (1965 EDITION) Vol. 13A, Page 517 the word during has been interpreted as follows : The word during is defined as in the time of in the course of; throughout the continuance of. (Saunders v. Fox, 178 II App 309). During means after the commencement and before the expiration. Continental Bank and Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 51 NYS 2d 903, 909. The word during is defined as in the time of; throughout the continuance or course of; or while a thing is in existence. Webster v. State Mut. Life Assr. Co. of Worcester, Mas., DD Cal 50 (F) Supp. 11, 19. 26. Applying the above meaning to the phrases during departmental inquiry'* or during a judicial inquiry used In Para 496, it would mean throughout the continuance of the departmental or judicial inquiry, That a departmental of judicial inquiry should have started is implicit in both the phraser Suspension under Para 496, therefore Can be ordered only when the departmental or judicial inquiry has started. It can be so ordered at any stage during the continuance of the judicial or departmental inquiry The question then is when does a departmental inquiry start ? It can be so ordered at any stage during the continuance of the judicial or departmental inquiry The question then is when does a departmental inquiry start ? It is obvious that It does not start on the receipt of a Complaint against an employee, On receipt of a Complaint the officer competent in that behalf has to apply his mind to the facts stated in the complaint and to take a decision whether or not a departmental or judicial inquiry is to be held into allegations made against a particular employee ors for that matter a police officer. Once that decision is taken the inquiry has to be held in the manner indicated in Para 490 of the Regulations and as a first step a charge sheet is to be issued. 27. At this stage it may be pointed out that Rub 49A bf the U.P. Civil Services (Classification. Control and Appeal) Rules provides that an employee can fee placed under suspension against whom an inquiry is either contemplated or is proceeding. The words contemplates and proceeding came to be considered by a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, (1974 ALJ 862), Hon'ble D.S. Mathur., C.J. who delivered the main judgment, first considered the meaning of the word inquiry and held that Inquiry contemplated by Rule 49A cannot have reference to an Informal preliminary Inquiry or a fact finding inquiry preceding the actual disciplinary proceeding. Inquiry contemplated by Rules 49A and 1A has reference to the formal departmental Inquiry, and not to any Informal preliminary or fact finding Inquiry preceding the initiation of the formal disciplinary proceeding. He further held that a departmental inquiry proceeds from the stags a final decision is taken to initiate such inquiry; in any case, when charges are framed and communicated to the Government servant............Once the charges have been framed and communicated to the Government servant, the inquiry comes into existence and is being proceeded with. (Emphasis supplied). Hon'ble Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) who gave a separate judgment, was more emphatic when he observed as under : Formal departmental proceedings start when a decision to hold them Is taken; because the decision directly leads to and sets in motion the various ministerial steps of the proceeding, like framing and communication of charges, calling for an explanation, hearing witnesses etc., etc. The decision to hold a formal departmental enquiry sets it in motion or initiates it rrom this point of time onwards the enquiry proceeds. 28. The Full Bench also considered the implication of the word contemplated and held that a departmental enquiry is contemplated when on an objective consideration of the material the appointing authority considers the case as one which would lead to a departmental inquiry. 29. The difference between 'contemplated' and 'initiated' was also noticed by the Supreme Court in P.N. Nayak v. Union of India, (AIR 1972 SC 584). The Supreme Court while considering the scope of the relevant rule contained in All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 held that the Scheme of the Rule did not permit suspension at a stage when disciplinary proceedings were merely contemplated. It will be significant to note that the words contemplated enquiry have not been used in Para 496 of the Police Regulations under which suspension in contemplation of the Departmental enquiry is not possible. 30. The Full Bench decision has since been followed in several cases including Kali Char an v. Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and others, (1934 UP Service Cases 407) in which it has been held that the decision of the Administrative Committee........., after considering the preliminary report, to direct the holding of a formal disciplinary enquiry has the effect of bringing about the pendency of an enquiry against the petitioner. 31. Applying the above principles and taking into consideration the law laid down by the Full Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, (supra) it has to be held that formal departmental proceedings stand initiated on a decision being taken to that effect by the competent authority, or for that matter, by the officers mentioned in Section 7 of the Police Act and it is at that stage that a subordinate Police Officer can be placed under suspension and not when the enquiry is merely contemplated or a preliminary enquiry has been ordered or is pending. 32. Whether there was really a decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings will be reflected in the attitude of the disciplinary authority in immediately issuing a chargesheet as the said decision is obviously based on the objective consideration of the material collected during preliminary enquiry so that it should normally not take more than a month to issue a charge sheet. Whether there was really a decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings will be reflected in the attitude of the disciplinary authority in immediately issuing a chargesheet as the said decision is obviously based on the objective consideration of the material collected during preliminary enquiry so that it should normally not take more than a month to issue a charge sheet. The Government, or, for that matter, the disciplinary authority, cannot keep the employee under suspension for an indefinite period under the garb of contemplated enquiry or an enquiry which, though started, is not progressed. The Court in this situation will have no option but to quash the suspension order. See Aryvir Saxena v. State of U.P., 1979 (1) SLR 52 (Alld.) and J. S. Chauhan v. State of U. P. and others ( 1977 AWC 704 ). 33. Para 496 apart from the departmental inquiry, also contemplates suspension during a judicial inquiry. We, therefore, proceed to consider the meaning of the word judicial inquiry. 34. Para 483 of the Police Regulations provides that a proceeding against a police officer may consist of: (a) a magisterial or police inquiry (b) a judicial trial, or (c) a departmental trial or both 35. Para 484 enables a District Magistrate to make or order a magisterial inquiry into an offence committed by a police officer or Order an investigation by the police. The magisterial inquiry as provided in para 485 is to be held In accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. It will be noticed that under Sections 410 and 411 of the Criminal Procedure Code the District Magistrate has power to order a magisterial inquiry. Para 485 also lays down that the Superintendent of Police will have no direct concern with the magisterial inquiry until the conclusion of judicial proceedings. The use of the words judicial proceedings in Para 485 clearly indicates that the magisterial inquiry is to be treated as judicial proceedings. Para 485 also lays down that the Superintendent of Police will have no direct concern with the magisterial inquiry until the conclusion of judicial proceedings. The use of the words judicial proceedings in Para 485 clearly indicates that the magisterial inquiry is to be treated as judicial proceedings. A magisterial inquiry can also be held in cases arising under Section 29 of the Police Act which, interalia, provides that if a police officer is guilty of any violation of duty or wilful breach or neglect of any rule or regulation or lawful order etc., he can be convicted and sentenced by a magistrate, to a penalty not exceeding three months pay or to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a period not exceeding three months, or to both. The fact that a police officer can be convicted under Section 29 and can be sentenced to imprisonment indicates that the proceedings under Section 29 of the Police Act are judicial proceedings. 36. If a Police officer commits an offence, cognizable or noncognizable, the District Magistrate, as provided by Para 484, can order a magisterial Inquiry. A magistrate other than the District Magistrate can also take cognizance of the offence committed by the police officer and can report the matter to the District Magistrate for action being taken against him. A regular judicial trial can also take place in respect of the offence committed by the police officer. 37. In Words and Phrases, Second Edition, Volume3, the word judicial has been defined as under : The word 'Judicial' has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a Judge or by Justices in Court, of to administrative duties which need not be performed in Court, but in respect of which it is necessary to bring to bear a judicial mind that is a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration (1892 1 QB 431). 38. The term Judicial does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purposes of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of fact and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others. 39. 38. The term Judicial does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purposes of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of fact and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others. 39. The word judicial has also been considered by various courts in India and the meaning assigned to this word is not different. In the context in which the word judicial has been used in Para 496 of the Police Regulations, we have to give a broader meaning to this word so that it may be in consonance with the meaning assigned to it in the Words and Phrases. 40. Since a judicial inquiry can be held into the conduct of the police officer and a magisterial inquiry can also be ordered into his conduct and he can also be tried in a regular court of law in respect of an offence committed by him, the word judicial should be held to embrace all the above situations. 41. A judicial inquiry or trial or magisterial inquiry does not commence with the lodging of the F.I.R. or the complaint with a police officer. 42. A complaint made to a departmental authority is different from a complaint filed in a criminal court. The filing of the complaint in a competent court brings about the pendency of a case like the filing of a plaint in a civil court which brings into existence a civil suit. On the lodging of the F.I.R. or making of a complaint, the facts stated therein might be required to be investigated to find out whether there was any iota of truth in those allegations so as to necessitate the taking of any further action in the matter. But the initiation of investigation would not mean that there was a judicial inquiry pending against the erring police officer. Such an inquiry comes to be pending when it is actually initiated. A magisterial inquiry begins when it is so directed by the District Magistrate an inquiry under Section 29 which is also a judicial inquiry begins when a complaint or charge sheet under that section is filed. Such an inquiry comes to be pending when it is actually initiated. A magisterial inquiry begins when it is so directed by the District Magistrate an inquiry under Section 29 which is also a judicial inquiry begins when a complaint or charge sheet under that section is filed. A regular judicial trial in a criminal court begins with the filing of a complaint in a competent court or the filing of a charge sheet in such court by the police. Under Para 496, therefore, a suspension cannot be ordered at any stage prior to the initiation of the judicial proceedings. 43. Learned counsel for the State has contended that Rule 49A of the C.C.A. Rules are applicable to the police officers and, therefore, even if he cannot be suspended under Police Regulations in a given situation, he can nevertheless be placed under suspension under C.C.A. Rules specially in cases in which the departmental inquiry was contemplated against him or a criminal offence was under investigation. 44. We have already pointed out on page 3 of the judgment (page 210 of the reportEd.) that Writ Petition No. 2088 of 1984 was admitted on the ground that an important legal question, namely, whether Rule 49A was applicable to subordinate police officers, was involved and that an earlier decision required reconsideration. 45. We have been referred to the earlier decisions on the question and we have carefully scrutinised those decisions in the light of the provisions contained in Rule 49A as also the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 46. The Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules were made by the Secretary of State in Council under Section 96B of the Government of India Act, 1919. They continue in force by virtue of Section 276 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 313 of the Constitution of India. These Rules have been adopted by the U.P. Government vide Appointment (B) Department Notification No. 2993/IIB17654 dated May 17, 1955 which provides that in case of persons serving in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh, these rules shall have effect as if the word State was substituted for the words local Provincial and Province whereever they occur. These Rules have been adopted by the U.P. Government vide Appointment (B) Department Notification No. 2993/IIB17654 dated May 17, 1955 which provides that in case of persons serving in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh, these rules shall have effect as if the word State was substituted for the words local Provincial and Province whereever they occur. Rule 3 of the C.C.A. Rules provides that the rules shall apply to every person in the wholetime civil employment except: (a) persons for whose appointment and conditions of employment special provision is made by or under any law for the time being in force, (b) (i) (ii) (iii) (c) 47. We are not concerned with other exceptions and the proviso contained in the Rule. According to the above exception, the rules would not apply to a service for which a provision has been made under any law for the time being in force. 48. A police force is raised under Section 2 of the Police Act Section 7 of the Police Act, which has been quoted on Pages 4 and 5 of this judgment (pages 211 and 212 of the reportEd,), specified the authorities who can, at any time, subject to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate rank whom they consider remiss or negligent the discharge of his duties or unfit for the same or may award any one or more of the punishments mentioned therein. It has already been specified above that in the exercise of the powers conferred by the Police Act the State Government has made Police Regulations by which the service conditions of the subordinate police officers have been regulated. There are, therefore, special statutory provisions which regulate the service conditions of police personnel. They would, therefore, be not governed by the C.C.A. Rules as they clearly fall within Exception (a) of Rule 3 of the said Rules. This question was also considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Mewa Ram v. United Provinces, ( AIR 1954 All 487 ) and it was held as under : The learned Civil Judge has held the enquiry to be irregular as it was not in accordance with the provisions of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. It appears that the learned Civil Judge overlooked the provisions of Rule 3 of these rules. It has been expressly mentioned in Rule 3 that the rules would not apply to persons for whose appointment and conditions of employment special provision is made by or under any law for the time being in force. The procedure provided in the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules would not, therefore, apply to departmental trials under Section 7 of the Police Act and they will be governed by the Police Act or by any regulations framed under the Police Act. 49. This decision Was also followed by another Division Bench of which one of us (S. Saghir Ahmad, J.) was a member and it was held that the C. C, A. Rules would not be applicable to police officers although with regard to the stage at which suspension order Can be passed against a police officer, we have examined the position. 50. Another Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Ibrahim, ( AIR 1959 All 223 ) (supra) has also taken a similar view, i.e. the C.C.A. Rules are not applicable to police officers governed by the Police Regulations. This view has been expressed by a learned Single Judge also in Mukhtar Singh v. State and others, ( AIR 1959 All 569 ) (supra). We are in agreement with the view expressed in the earlier cases and we have nohesitation in laying down that in view of the provisions contained in Rule 3 (a) of the C.C.A. Rules, there is no scope for reconsideration of the earlier decisions. 51. Before proceeding to consider the individual cases we may observe that the State Government should immediately consider the question of amending the Police Regulations so as to bring them at par with Rule 49A of the U.P. C.C.A. Rules, which is uniformally applicable to all Government servants except those, like police officers who are governed by special statutory rules. Rule 49A, as noticed earlier, empowers the appointing: authority to place an employee under suspension either in contemplation of enquiry or pending departmental inquiry. An employee can also be placed under suspension under Rule 49A If there is a criminal case against him which is either under investigation, inquiry or a trial. Rule 49A, as noticed earlier, empowers the appointing: authority to place an employee under suspension either in contemplation of enquiry or pending departmental inquiry. An employee can also be placed under suspension under Rule 49A If there is a criminal case against him which is either under investigation, inquiry or a trial. These situations, i.e. contemplated departmental inquiry or investigation of a criminal case are not envisaged by the Police Regulations with the result that even if a Police Officer has committed an act of gross misconduct, he cannot be placed under suspension till a departmental inquiry is initiated against him. Similarly, he cannot be placed under suspension even if he has committed a cognizable offence until the trial has begun. It is now well known that the standard of discipline in the Police Force has deteriorated and the police personnel, who are entrusted with the task of maintain in law and order, have been found, times out of number, to be law breakers and involved In the commission of serious cognizable offence but on account of the limited scope of the provisions of Para 496 of the Police Regulations, immediate action by way of suspension cannot be taken against them even though the situation as also gravity of the offence might require immediate suspension. The Standing Counsel has informed us that by D.O. letter No. 2847/82100(29)/75Grah Police Anubhag2, dated January 10, 1977 from the CommissionerCumHome Secretary to Inspector General of Police, U.P. Lucknow, suggestions and proposals were invited for amending the Police Regulations but It appears that no notice was taken of the suggestions and the Police Regulations have not been amended. If the Police authorities still do not wake up to realise the need for an amendment in the Police Regulations so as to widen the scope of their powers to place the police officer under suspension In appropriate cases even before the initiation of departmental inquiry of judicial trial, we cannot but thank their stars. 52. Coming now to the Individual cases, Writ Petition No. 110 of 1985 has to be allowed as a copy of the suspension order has been endorsed to the Circle Officer to hold a preliminary enquiry which indicates that a regular departmental enquiry was merely contemplated and had not Started. 53. 52. Coming now to the Individual cases, Writ Petition No. 110 of 1985 has to be allowed as a copy of the suspension order has been endorsed to the Circle Officer to hold a preliminary enquiry which indicates that a regular departmental enquiry was merely contemplated and had not Started. 53. In Writ Petition No, 5039 of 1984, the petitioner,, Kunwar Pal Singh, is a accused in a Criminal case under Sections 342/302/330 I.P.C. registered on the basis of the F.I.R. lodged on 31882, The order of suspension Was passed on the same date oil the ground that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against him as he was a named accused in a criminal case. The criminal case is still under investigation and chargesheet has not yet been filed although more than two and a half year has passed away, Departmental proceedings have also not started, 54. The Police Regulations do not provide for suspension in contemplation of departmental proceedings. They also do not provide for suspension during investigation of a criminal Case, consequently) this writ petition has also to be allowed. 55. In Writ Petition No, 4969 of 1984, the suspension order dated 22584 is Contained in AnneXure6 a perusal of which indicates that the petitioners Ram Nath Singh and Mohd. Idris have been suspended as Crime Case No. 98A has been registered against them. This Crime Case No. 98A appears to be cross Case of crime case Na. 98 registered vide Annexure1, on the report of constable Mohammad Idris, This writ petition has also to be allowed as a subordinate police officer cannot be suspended merely on the ground that a criminal case has been registered against him. 56. In writ Petition No. 4508 of 1984 the suspension order,, which Was passed on 17283 by the Senior Superintendent of Police Lucknow is contained in Annexure1 In which it is stated that the petitioner has been placed under suspension as disciplinary proceedings ware proposed to be initiated against him on account of the fact that he was an accused in Crime Case No. 172 under Section 161 read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It has been stated in the writ petition that a charge Sheet in criminal case has not been filed nor had the departmental proceedings been initiated against the petitioner. It has been stated in the writ petition that a charge Sheet in criminal case has not been filed nor had the departmental proceedings been initiated against the petitioner. It has been stated in Para 10 of the petition that neither departmental nor judicial inquiry was pending against him. The opposite parties have not filed a counter affidavit and the averments made in the writ petition, have not been denied. Since the petitioner was placed under suspension on account of disciplinary proceedings which were proposed to be initiated against him, there is no alternative except to quash the suspension order which has not been passed in accordance with the provisions of Para 496 of the Police Regulations. 57. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2088 of 1984 have been placed under suspension by a common order dated 1541984 which is contained in Annexure1 to the writ petition. It is stated in the suspension order that the allegations made by Sri Chandra Kant Rawat, Advocate, resident of Sarai Damu, Police Station Itaunja, District Lucknow against the petitioners, who were posted at P.S. Ataria district Sitapur on 5384 were inquired into and it was found that a case under Section 218 I.P.C. was made out against the petitioners and they were, therefore, placed under suspension, it is not stated in the suspension order whether any departmental proceedings were to be initiated against the petitioners or any criminal case has since been instituted against them. The opposite parties have not filed any counteraffidavit and the assertions made by the petitioners in the writ petition have not been Controverted. Since it is not established that any departmental or judicial inquiry is pending against the petitioners the suspension order cannot be sustained. 58. The suspension order in Writ Petition No. 5390 of 1984 is dated 11884 and is contained in Annexure1. A FirstInformation Report appears to have been lodged against the petitioner by Sri K.P. Roy, Superintendent of Police (Railways), Lucknow. This report is contained in Annexure2 and a case under Section 304 was ordered to be registered against the petitioner. Since the Superintendent of Police (Railways) has himself ordered the prosecution of the petitioner by lodging a F.I.R. and directed the case to be registered under Section 304 I.P.C. against the petitioner, the suspension order is fully covered by the provisions of Para 496 of the Police Regulations. Since the Superintendent of Police (Railways) has himself ordered the prosecution of the petitioner by lodging a F.I.R. and directed the case to be registered under Section 304 I.P.C. against the petitioner, the suspension order is fully covered by the provisions of Para 496 of the Police Regulations. This Writ Petition is, therefore liable to be dismissed. 59. In view of the above, Writ Petition Nos. 110 of 1985, 4508 of 1984, 5039 of 1984, 4969 of 1984 and 2088 of 1984 are hereby allowed and the suspension orders impugned in those writ petitions are quashed with the observation that it will be open to the appropriate authority to pass a fresh order of suspension if and when the departmental or judicial inquiry is initiated against the petitioners. Writ Petition No. 5390 of 1984 is dismissed. 60. There will be no order as to costs.