P. R. GOKULAKRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Application has been referred to the Full Bench by A. M. Ahmadi. J. for determination of the following questions:- (1) Can it be validly contended that the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Babubhais case (1980) 21 G. L. R. 103 i. e. per incuriam as it totally ignores the decision of the Supreme Court in J. S. Murarjis case (A. I. R. 1973 S. C. 772) rendered by a larger bench of four learned judges approving the ratio in Anand Nivas case (A. I. R. 1965 S. C. 414) ? or In any case in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Ganapati Sitarams case (1981) 4 SCC 143 A. I. R. 1981 SC 1956 holding that the ratio of J. S. Murarjis case still holds the field can it be said that the decision of the Full Bench in Babubhais case stands impliedly overruled ? (2) If it is held that the ratio of Anand Nivas case as approved by the Supreme Court in J. S. Murarjis case still holds the field can the petitioner claim to be a tenant by virtue of the bequest made in his favour? (3) Even if it is assumed that the deceased Maniben had an interest in the demised premises. was the character of her interest such as could be bequeathed by a will in favour of a total stranger i. e. the petitioner? and (4) Does the bequest made in favour of the petitioner tantamount to `transfer by Maniben of her interest in the premises since the bequest takes effect after her death a Mr. D. F. Amin the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S. M. Shah the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents agreed for disposing of the main Civil Revision Application itself and advanced arguments on the merits of the main Civil Revision Application. ( 2 ) THIS Civil Revision Application arises out of the order passed by the Extra Assistant Judge Baroda in Regular Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1977. The respondent herein filed newly-numbered Rent Suit No. 47 of 1975 on the file of the Small Causes Court at Baroda for recovering vacant possession of a rented shop situated near Kalamandir Talkies Baroda. The respondent herein filed newly-numbered Rent Suit No. 47 of 1975 on the file of the Small Causes Court at Baroda for recovering vacant possession of a rented shop situated near Kalamandir Talkies Baroda. The short facts of the case are that the suit shop is owned by the plaintiff in the suit and he let out the shop to one Maniben Dhirajlal on a monthly rent of Rs. 22. 00. Maniben was carrying on ghee business in the said shop and before her death she bequeathed the tenancy right in the suit shop by will to the defendant in the suit. The will in favour of the defendant was probated. The defendant contended that Maniben had heritable interest in the tenancy right and as such she has validly bequeathed the tenancy right in Favour of the defendant in the suit. The defendant has also contended that Maniben is a contractual tenant. The Small Causes Court at Baroda holding that Maniben has heritable interest in the tenancy right and that she has validly bequeathed the said right in favour of the defendant dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal the plaintiff in the suit preferred appeal to the Extra Assistant Judge Baroda. The Extra Assistant Judges Baroda holding that the tenancy right could not have been bequeathed by way of a will to a third party who was not doing business with the deceased tenant nor in any way connected with the members of the deceased family allowed the appeal and decreed the suit as prayed for by the plaintiff. It is as against this order the defendant in the suit has come forward with the present Civil Revision Application. The learned single Judge of our High Court who heard the application for final disposal observed that the question that arises in the Revision Application is as to whether Maniben who was entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rents Hotel and lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 after the determination of the lease by efflux of time had an interest in the shop which she could bequeath by will in favour of any person of her choice? During argument before the learned single Judge Mr. During argument before the learned single Judge Mr. Amin the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner herein conceded that the question whether Maniben was entitled in law to bequeath her tenancy rights in the suit shop if any by a will had to be decided on the footing that she was a statutory tenant. The learned single Judge after referring to the decisions in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanjis Pedhi and others ( AIR 1965 SC 414 ) Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd. and another v. Happy Homes (Private) Ltd. ( AIR 1968 SC 471 ) J. C. Chatterjee and Others v. Shri Sri Kishan Tandon and another ( AIR 1972 SC 2526 ) and Jai Singh Murarji and Co. v. M/s. Sovani (P) Ltd. and Ors. ( AIR 1973 SC 772 ) observed that the law as it stood before the decision rendered in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) was that the tenants rights to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy was personal and could not be transferred or assigned to any person during the tenants lifetime and on the death of the tenant it devolved only in the manner provided by the satute. In the decisions prior to Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) according to the learned single Judge the Supreme Court approved the law laid down by the Courts in England to the effect that a statutory tenant has no estate or property in the premises he occupies because he retains possession by virtue of the Rent Act and not as being entitled to a tenancy. In Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) the Supreme Court interpreting sec. 2 (i) along with sec. 12 (i) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (41 of 1961) came to the conclusion that the statutory tenant has a heritable interest in the premises occupied by him. In Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) the Supreme Court interpreting sec. 2 (i) along with sec. 12 (i) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (41 of 1961) came to the conclusion that the statutory tenant has a heritable interest in the premises occupied by him. The learned Judge has also adverted to our Full Bench decision in Babubhai v. Bharatkumar ( (1980) 21 G. L. R. 103) in which the Full Bench after relying on the decisions in Damadilal others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) and V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal ( AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) laid down that a statutory tenant has an interest in the property which can be inherited on his demise. The learned Judge found that there is conflict between the decision rendered before Damadilal case and the principle propounded in Damadilals case. While the decision in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) is rendered by a Bench of three Judges the position in Jai Singh Murarji and Co. v. M/s. Sovani (P) Ltd. Ors. ( AIR 1973 SC 772 ) which follows the prior decisions referred above is rendered by a Bench of four Judges. This larger Bench decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges who rendered the decision in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) but in the subsequent decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Ganapati Sitaram Balvalkar v. Waman Shripal Mage ( (1981) 4 SCC 143 ) a Division Bench held that the principle laid down in Jai Singh Murarji and Co. v. M/s. Sovani (P) Ltd. and Ors. (AIR 11973 SC 772) holds the field in so far as the Bombay Rent Act is concerned. The learned single Judge after referring to the decision in Ganpat Ladha v. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde ( AIR 1978 SC 955 ) and Ravindra Ishwardas Sethna v. Official Liquidator High Court of Bombay (AIR 1983 SC 1016) wherein it was held that the Rent Act completely prohibits giving the possession of the premises on licence or on sub-lease in view of secs. 13 and 15 of the Rent Act referred the matter to the Full Bench after formulating the questions we have already mentioned in paragraph supra. 13 and 15 of the Rent Act referred the matter to the Full Bench after formulating the questions we have already mentioned in paragraph supra. It is thus before the Full Bench for our decision. ( 3 ) AS we have seen from the facts of the case the petitioner herein got the property from Maniben through will and wants to enjoy the suit property which is a non-residential one as the heir of Maniben. This is questioned by the respondent-landlord and he has filed the suit for eviction. The Act which applies to this case is the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (Act 57 of 1947 ). This Act defines tenant under section 5 as follows:-"5 tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is pay able for any premises and includes (a) such sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title under a tenant (before the commencement of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1935 (aa) any person to whom interest in premises has been transferred under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 15; (b) any person remaining after the determination of the lease. in possession. with or without the assent of the landlord of the premises leased to such person or his predecessor who has derived title before the commencement of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance. 1959; (b) (i) in relation to premises let for residence. any member of the tenants family residing with the tenant at the time of or within three months immediately preceding the death of the tenant as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court and (ii) in relation to premises let for business trade or storage any member of the tenants family carrying on business trade or storage with the tenant in the said premises at the time of the death of the tenant as may continue after his death to carry on the business trade or storage as the case may be in the said premises and as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court section 5 (11) (c) (ii) deals with the mode of devolution of tenancy regarding the premises let for business trade storage etc. To come under the class of tenant to get the benefit of the Act the person concerned must be the member of the tenants family carrying on business trade or storage with the tenant in the said premises at the time of the death of the tenant. Thus to come under the category of tenant one must satisfy the condition such as that he must be the member of family of the original tenant and he must be carrying on the business trade or storage with that tenant in the demised premises at the time of the death of the tenant. Section 13 deals with cases wherein Landlord may recover possession. Section 13 (1) (e) states:"13 Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of section 15 a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied x x x x x (c) that the tenant has. since the coming into operation or this Act unlawfully sublet the whole part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein; or Section 15 deals with cases of transfer of tenancy in the absence of contract and reads as follows:"15 Notwithstanding anything contained in any law but subject to ally contract to the contrary it shall not be lawful after the coming into. operation of this Act for any tenant to sub-let the whole or any part of the premises let to him to assign or transfer in any other manner his interest therein: Provided that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette permit in any area the transfer of interest in premises held under such leases or class of leases and to such extent as may be specified in the notification. (2) The bar against sub-letting assigning or transferring premises contained in sub-section (1) shall be deemed not to have had any effect before the commencement of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1959 in any area in which this Act was in operation before such commencement; and accordingly notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or in the judgment decree or order of a Court any such sub-lease assignment or transfer in favour or such persons as have entered into possession despite the bar as sub-lessees assignees or transferees and have continued in possession at the commencement of the said Ordinance shall be deemed to be valid and effectual". The decision in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ran counter to the observations made in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanjis Pedhi and other ( AIR 1965 SC 414 ) Calcutta Credit Corporation Ltd. v. Happy Homes (Private) Ltd. ( AIR 1968 SC 471 ) J. C. Chatterjee and others v. Shri Kishan Tandon and another ( AIR 1972 SC 2526 ) and Jai Singh Murarji and others v. M/s. Sovani (P.) Ltd. and others ( AIR 1973 SC 772 ) by observing that the tenancy has its origin in contract that there is no dispute that a contractual tenant has an estate or property in the subjectmatter of the tenancy that heritability is an incident of the tenancy that with the determination of the tenancy the estate need not necessarily disappear that the statute can only preserve the tenants status of irremovability and not the estate he had in the premises in his occupation and that a statutory tenant just like it contractual tenant also retains interest in the property let out and as such it is heritable. But in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) the Supreme Court did not advert to the effect of limitations that is put on the right of heritability by statute. It is unnecessary to refer to the decisions prior to Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) since the principles laid down therein have been clearly stated in the referring judgment. It is unnecessary to refer to the decisions prior to Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) since the principles laid down therein have been clearly stated in the referring judgment. At the time of the reference the learned Judge did not have the benefit of the decision reported in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ) presided over by five learned Judges of the Supreme Court. It had occasion to consider the decisions in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanjis Pedhi and others ( AIR 1965 SC 414 ). Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde ( AIR 1978 SC 955 ) Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) and V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal ( AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) before it rendered its decision in that case. No doubt the Supreme Court in that decision ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ) construed the Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958 In the Delhi Rent Control Act the definition of tenant after giving the usual definition which we find in our Act also states that the tenant means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is or but for a special contract would be payable and includes. . . . In the Delhi Rent Control Act though the category of persons on whom the tenancy devolves in a residential building is given it did not mention the mode of devolution in respect of the tenants of the non-residential building. . . . In the Delhi Rent Control Act though the category of persons on whom the tenancy devolves in a residential building is given it did not mention the mode of devolution in respect of the tenants of the non-residential building. The Supreme Court after elaborately discussing the provisions of M. P. Rent Control Act and Delhi Rent Control Act and after approving the legal position laid down in Damadilal and others v. Parasham and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) and V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal ( AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) observed :"36 Accordingly we hold that if the Rent Act in question defines a tenant in substance to mean a tenant who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of the contractual tenancy till a decree for eviction against him is passed the tenant even after the determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate or interest in the tenanted premises and the tenancy rights both in respect of residential premises and commercial premises are heritable. The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any provision in the Rent Act to the contrary will step into the position of the deceased tenant and all the rights and obligations of the deceased tenant including the protection afforded to the deceased tenant under the Act will devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. As the protection afforded by the Rent Act to a tenant after determination of the tenancy and to his heirs on the death of such tenant is a creation of the Act for the benefit of the tenants it is open to the Legislature which provides for such protection to make appropriate provisions in the Act with regard to the nature and extent of the benefit and protection to be enjoyed and the manner in which the same is to be enjoyed. If the Legislature makes any provision in the Act limiting or restricting the benefit and the nature of the protection to be enjoyed in a specified manner by any particular class of heirs of the deceased tenant on any condition laid down being fulfilled the benefit of the protection has necessarily to be enjoyed on the fulfilment of the condition in the manner land to the extent stipulated in the Act. The Legislature which by the Rent Act seeks to confer the benefit on the tenants and to afford protection against eviction is perfectly competent to make appropriate provision regulating the nature of protection and the manner and extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after the termination of contractual tenancy of the tenant including the rights and the nature of protection of the heirs on the death of the tenant. Such appropriate provision may be made by the Legislature both with regard to the residential tenancy and commercial tenancy. It is however entirely for the Legislature to decide whether the Legislature will make such provision or not. In the absence of any provision regulating the right of inheritance and the manner and extent thereof and in the absence of any condition being stipulated with regard to the devolution of tenancy rights on the heirs on the death of the tenant the devolution of tenancy rights must necessarily be in accordance with the ordinary law of succession". Thus from the abovesaid observation it is clear that a tenant after the lapse of the contractual tenancy continues to be a statutory tenant has interest in the tenancy and that he same is heritable subject to the limitations prescribed by the Legislature restricting the benefit to the particular class of the heirs. In the case of Delhi Rent Control Act as regards non-residential building we do not have any restriction placed by the legislature on the ordinary law of inheritance with regard to succession. But as far as Bombay Act 57 of 1947 is concerned section 5 (11) (c) (ii) places restriction as to the persons on whom the tenancy right devolves in respect of premises let out for business etc. It an assignment goes beyond the persons envisaged under section 5 (11) (c) (ii) such a person cannot be considered as a tenant and as such the assignment of tenancy will be construed as unlawful in view of the provisions under section 15 of the Act. If the assignment is unlawful the landlord is entitled to recover possession under section 13 (1) (e) of the Act. If the assignment is unlawful the landlord is entitled to recover possession under section 13 (1) (e) of the Act. ( 4 ) FURTHER in Jaspal Singh v. The Additional District Judge Bulandshahr and others ( AIR 1984 SC 1880 ) the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act (13 of 1972) wherein the meaning of tenant came to be discussed in relation to the U. P. Act. The Supreme Court found that the heirs of the tenant are protected but refused to appreciate the claim of the legatee under a Will who was the nephew of the original tenant to be included in the category of tenant. The heritability of the tenancy right in relation to the heir of the tenant was discussed by the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court observed:-" The word heir has been construed by the High Courts both in a wider as well as in a narrower sense. Which sense will be applicable to the facts of a particular case will depend upon the intention and scheme of a particular legislation in which the question occurs. If a tenant parts with possession of the premises in his possession the same would be treated as vacant. There are restriction in the case of a residential building that the tenant will live only With the members of his family and after he has allowed the same to be occupied by any person who is hot a member of his family the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. In the case of a non-residential building when a tenant is carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner. as the case may be the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building. It a tenant sublets the premises he is liable to ejectment. Obviously therefore there are restrictions placed by the Act on the right of the tenant to transfer or sublet the tenancy rights and he can keep possession of the building or premises for himself and for the purpose of his family for his business and for the business of his family members. Obviously therefore there are restrictions placed by the Act on the right of the tenant to transfer or sublet the tenancy rights and he can keep possession of the building or premises for himself and for the purpose of his family for his business and for the business of his family members. He obviously cannot be allowed to transfer tenancy right A fortiori the scheme of the Act does not warrant the transfer of the tenancy right for be effective after his lifetime Hence where the application filed by landlord under S 12 read with S. 16 after the death of the tenant who had non male issue for a declaration that the shop was vacant and he required it for his personal use was resisted by the nephew of the tenant on the ground that he was the heart of the deceased tenant as the deceased had executed a Will conveying all his rights and properties including the tenancy rights in the disputed shop to him and so he was entitled to the benefit of S 14 it was held that the nephew could not be said to be the heir of the original tenant in respect of the tenancy rights of the disputed shop" ( 5 ) THE ratio of the abovesaid decision rendered by the Supreme Court will squarely apply to the facts of the present case. In our case a stranger got the right by Will made by the original tenant and wants to retain the tenancy right on the ground that he has inherited such right from the original tenant Maniben. From the foregoing discussions it is clear that the decision in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others clearly disagreed with the principles laid down by the decision in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandii Kalyanjis Pedhi anal others ( AIR 1965 SC 414 ) and the other decisions of the Supreme Court which followed the said principle enunciated in Anand Nivas case. Thus the principle laid down by those decisions is no more good law in the light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ). Thus the principle laid down by those decisions is no more good law in the light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ). In as much as the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ) accepted the principle regarding the heritability mentioned in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 the decision rendered in Babubhai v. Bharatkumar (1980) 21 G. L. R. 103 which follows the decision in Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) cannot be considered as has become per incuriam. In the backdrop of the above discussion the first question referred to us stands answered by holding that in the light of the decision rendered in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ) the Full Bench decision of our High Court in Babubhai v. Bharatkumar ( (1980) 21 G. L. R. 103 has not become per incuriam. Further the ratio of the decision in and Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanjis Pedhi and others (AIR 1955 SC 414) and other cases that followed Anand Nil as case is no more good law in view of the decision rendered in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ). If that be so the Full Bench decision of our High Court rendered in Babubhai v. Bharatkumar ( (1980) 21 GLR 103) is not liable to be treated as impliedly over-ruled. If that be so the Full Bench decision of our High Court rendered in Babubhai v. Bharatkumar ( (1980) 21 GLR 103) is not liable to be treated as impliedly over-ruled. We may however mention that the observations of the Full Bench in Babubhais case (supra) in paragraph 23 of the Report to the effect:" If there does not exist a well recognised distinction between a contractual tenancy and a statutory tenancy governed by the Rent Control Legislations and if the difference is erased to such an extent that no apparent distinction is visible and that is the position indeed in view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court the view of the Division Bench in Nanumals case that there is a special mode of succession under sec 5 (11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act cannot be affirmed since the very premise of the decision of the Fall Bench of the Supreme Court in Dhanpals case is that restricted area where the Rent Acts operate particularly having regard to the definition of word tenant in almost tall the Rent Acts that a person continuing in occupation with or without the assent of landlord after determination of the contractual tenancy is for all intents and purposes a tenant entitled to all the rights and subject to all the obligations under the relevant Rent Act. and in para 24 to the effect that24 The next question which would therefore arise is that it all the heirs of a deceased tenant especially a statutory tenant are entitled to inherit the tenancy rights whether the provisions contained in sec. and in para 24 to the effect that24 The next question which would therefore arise is that it all the heirs of a deceased tenant especially a statutory tenant are entitled to inherit the tenancy rights whether the provisions contained in sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act providing for transmission of such rights only to the members of the family residing with the tenant warrants the view which we are inclined to take that all the heirs of a deceased tenant would be entitled to inherit the tenancy rights since the Division Bench of this Court in Nanumals case has ruled that one the recognized principles of interpretation of statutes the said provision should be so construed that only one person is entitled to be nominated by agreement or declared by Court as tenant though the Division Bench did recognize and express its anxiety that this view was fraught with some dangers inasmuch as the qualified members other than lane nominated or declared as tenant would be at the mercy of the latter and in a given ease the rights inter se of such persons shall have to be decided. and"if the connotation of word any defies limitation or qualification unless its generality is restarted by the subject matter or the context its import would be as wide as possible and it is only the subject matter or the context which can impose limitation or qualification on the meaning of the said word. We are unable to find in the subject matter or the context in this part of the definition any qualification or limitation other than the prescribed period of residence with the deceased tenant of a residential premises or the requirement of the conduct of business etc. of the tenant so far as non-residential premises are concerned. We would therefore not be justified in spelling out the restrictive meaning of the word any as has been done by the Division Bench in Nanumals Case (supra ). If the import of word any cannot be restricted the necessary consequence is that there can be more than one member who can be nominated by the agreement amongst the qualifying members or appointed by Court in default of such agreement. If the import of word any cannot be restricted the necessary consequence is that there can be more than one member who can be nominated by the agreement amongst the qualifying members or appointed by Court in default of such agreement. will have to be now read subject to the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gian Devi Anands case ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ) and will stand diluted of modified accordingly. ( 6 ) AS regards the second question referred to the Full Bench we hold that in the light of the decision rendered in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and ors. ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ) the decisions in Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanjis Pedhi and others ( AIR 1965 SC 414 ) and Jai Singh Murarji and Co. v. M/s. Sovani (P) Ltd. and ors ( AIR 1973 SC 772 ) do not hold the field. The question as to whether the petitioner can claim to be a tenant by virtue of the bequest made in his favour depends upon the interpretation of the statute i. e. The Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 In this connection we have already discussed in paragraph 3 supra the principles laid down by the decision in Smt. Gain Deli Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others ( AIR 1985 SC 796 ) wherein the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that a tenant after the lapse of the contractual tenancy continues to be a statutory tenant has interest in the tenancy and that the same is heritable subject to the limitations prescribed by the Legislature restricting the benefit to the particular class of the heirs. ( 7 ) AS regards the third question referred to the Full Bench we answer it by stating that in the light of the decision in Jashpal Singh v. The Additional District Judge Bulandshahr and others ( AIR 1984 SC 1880 ) which we have discussed in paragraph supra the bequest by the Will to a total stranger who is not protected by section 5 (11) (c) (ii) will bring such a bequest under the mischief of section 13 (1) (e) of the Act. ( 8 ) AS regards the last question referred to the Full Bench we are of the view that the bequest made in favour of the petitioner is not transfer inter vivos by Maniben of her interest in the premises and that at best it is an assignment made by Maniben which will definitely attract the mischief under section 13 (1) (e) of the Act on the facts of the present case. ( 9 ) INASMUCH as we have answered all the questions referred to the Full Bench we can now consider as to the right of the petitioner on the merits of the Civil Revision Application he has filed. The learned counsels appearing for the respective parties as has been stated already want to dispose of the main Civil Revision Application itself. The petitioner is a stranger and has got the assignment of the right by virtue of the Will executed by Maniben. As discussed in paragraph supra he cannot come under the definition of tenant envisaged in section 5 (11) (c) (ii) of the Act. If that be so the landlord can correctly invoke sections 13 (1) (e) and 15 of the Act and get an order for possession as prayed for by him. Mr. Amin as mentioned by the learned single Judge of our High Court correctly did not pursue the argument and conceded that the question whether Maniben was entitled in law to bequeath her tenancy rights in the suit shop if any by a Will had to be decided on the footing that she was a statutory tenant. Hence the Civil Revision Application has to be dismissed on the ground that the tenant has incurred the prohibition under sections 13 (1) (e) and 15 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 The result is that the suit filed by the respondent will stand allowed as decreed by lower appellate court. In these circumstances the Civil Revision Application is dismissed with costs. The petitioner is granted 4 weeks time to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondent herein. .