Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is the tenant against whom the three respondents, who are owners of the house in dispute started a proceeding for eviction on the ground that the tenant-petitioner was in arrears of rent for a period July, 1981 to June, 1982, the rent being Rs. 30 per month. The tenant, according the landlords, had committed wilful default in the payment of rent. The landlords also claimed that they wanted the premises in question for carrying on their own business in stationery. The tenant denied that he was a lessee of the premises in question. According to him, he had merely taken the open site on rent of Rs. 17 per month and that the landlords were not in the habit of issuing receipts. He contended that he had paid the rent upto August, 1981, and he had sent the rent for September, 1981 by Money Order, dated 13th October, 1981 which was refused by the landlords. He had also sent money orders on further occasions like, on 9th November, 1981 Rs. 34, on 10th April, 1982 Rs. 119, and on 14th May, 1982, Rs. 17 for April, 1982. The tenant also denied that the landlords were entitled to possession under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The principal District Munsif, Dindigul, who is the Rent Controller, found against the tenant and held that the premises belonged to the landlords. However, he found that the tenant could not be held to be a wilful defaulter and relying on the money orders sent by the tenant, the Rent Controller took the view that t he tenant, ‘had been sincere in paying the, rent’. With regard to the claim for owners occupation, the Rent Controller held that except the evidence of P.W. 1, there is no evidence to prove that the landlords really intended to start the business in stationery. On these findings, the landlords applications came to be dismissed. 2. The landlords filed an appeal. On the question of ownership, the appellate Court heid in favour of the landlords. The appellate, Authority held that the rent was Rs. 30 per month and that since the ownership of the structure had been found to belong to the landlords, the rent for the premises would be always higher than Rs. 2. The landlords filed an appeal. On the question of ownership, the appellate Court heid in favour of the landlords. The appellate, Authority held that the rent was Rs. 30 per month and that since the ownership of the structure had been found to belong to the landlords, the rent for the premises would be always higher than Rs. 17 per month, which according to the tenant was the rent for the open site only. Holding that the landlords were justified in refusing to receive the rent, the appellate Authority held that the tenant had failed to prove that he had paid rent upto August, 1981. The appellate authority further observed that though the landlords received the arrears of rent during the proceedings without prejudice to their rights, still the tenant had committed wilful default in payment of rent from July, 1981 to June, 1982, because the tenant was not regular in payment of rents. On the issue of bona fide requirement of the premises for owners occupation also, the appellate authority held that the landlords were entitled to ask for the demised premises for running a stationery shop which case, according to the appellate authority, was a bona fide one. 3. In this revision petition filed by the tenant, it is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset that there is no reliable evidence to show that the structure in question belongs to the landlords. According to the learned counsel Ex. A1 which is the sale deed the property consists of two sites and there is nothing to show that the premises in question forms the subject matter of the sale deed, Ex. A1 dated 29th March, 1958, two courts have come to a concurrent finding that the sale deed covers the property in question. Even on probabilities it is obvious that the tenants claim to the ownership of structure is wholly misconceived. According to the tenant the structure has been constructed by him about 20 years back. The sale which is dated 29th August, 1958 is much prior to the point of time and both the courts having given the finding that the sale deed covers the structure in question, it would not be possible to interfere with this finding. In this revision, nothing has be;n brought to my notice to indicate that the sale deed did not cover the structure in question. In this revision, nothing has be;n brought to my notice to indicate that the sale deed did not cover the structure in question. 4. Now so far as the wilful default is concerned the learned counsel has referred to the decision of this Court in T.S. Rajagopal v. M.N. Saraswathiammal 1 wherein it has been observed that the mere non-payment of rent would not constitute wilful default and that the expression ‘wilful default’ is a meaningful phraseology used by the statute with a definite purpose. Now undoubtedly the question as to whether in a given case an inference of wilful default in payment of rent could be drawn or not, has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of that case. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel it has been observed that the default committed by a tenant should be so telling and conspicuous that any reasonable person apprised of such circumstances and having the occasion to adjudicate upon such facts should come to the conclusion that the tenant was recalcitrant and supremely indifferent and purposely evading the performance of his legitimate obligation of sending the rents to the landlords in time. Even assuming that this has to be applied to the facts of the present case, it is obvious that the tenant, was disputing the title of the landlord to the premises in question and his contention throughout had been that Rs. 17 was the rent only of the site. Once the court recorded a finding that the premises in question belonged to the landlords, then the defence of the tenant that his liability was only Rs. 17 per month could not be held to be bona fide . If Rs. 17 was the rent for the site in question, the rent for a structure would be much more and if the petitioners case that he owned the structure is found to be false, the only inference that is possible is that the tenant was deliberately not paying the rent to the landlords and such a default will clearly be wilful in character and the appellate authority was, therefore, right in holding that the tenant had committed wilful default. 5. 5. The mere fact that a tenant had been sending some money orders and that the landlords had accepted some payments during the pendency of the litigation, would not deprive the landlord from canvassing his case on the ground of wilful default. The tenants case was that he was sending the rents by money order at Rs. 17 per month. If that was not the agreed rent, then the landlords should be justified in refusing to receive the money orders with the result that the landlords cannot be blamed for the defaults committed by the tenant. Similarly, if the payments have been made during the pendency of these proceedings, that will not in any way affect the right of the landlords to claim eviction on the ground that the tenant was a wilful defaulter. 6. The other ground on which the premises is asked for now really becomes academic. The decision on which the learned counsel has relied, is the decision of Basheer Ahamed, J. reported in Subramania Naicker v. Sivasubramania Chettiar 2 in which it was held that the intention of the Legislature in enacting S. 7(3)(a)(iii) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1949. which is analogous to S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the 1960 Act, was that the landlords must be actually carrying on business before they can claim possession of the premises for non-residential purposes, namely, the business which they are carrying on. This position does not seem to have been accepted in the later decision of this Court in Mariammal v. Kandaswami , 3 . In this decision Ismail, J. as he then was, has expressly referred to some decisions which have differed from the view taken by Basheer Ahamed, J. It would be extremely hard to construe S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of 1960 Act, as to mean that if the landlords want to start their own business, they must first start the business in rented premises, taken on rent from somebody else, and then they should take proceedings for eviction of the tenant on the ground that they require the premises for running their own business. I would therefore agree with the view taken by Ismail, J. It appears to me that having regard to the later decisions, the fact that the landlords are not actually carrying on the business when they make an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for their business would not be fatal to their claim under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. In the present case the bona fides of the landlords that they wanted to start their own business was accepted and upheld by the couit below and it would not be proper to interfere with that finding in this revision. 7. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs. 8. Though I am dismissing the revision petition, the tenant is granted five months time to vacate and deliver possession of the premises to the landlords on his filing an undertaking to this Court that he will vacate the premises in question on or before the 30th September, 1985, and in meantime he would not induct any strangers on the premises.