JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs against the judgment & decree passed by the Civil Judge, Alwar, reversing the judgment & decree passed by the Munsiff, Laxmangarh, Alwar, who had decreed the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants for redemption of property. 2. Kishanlal, father of the plaintiffs appellants under be mortgage deed dated the 12th April, 1921, mortgaged property situated in Laxmangarh town of Alwar District for a sum of Rs. 999/- with Shri Jamnalal, the predecessor-in interest of the defendant-respondents. Kishnalal died in 1942 A.D. and, Jamna died in 1923 AD. When the plaintiffs wanted redemption of the mortgage, the defendants denied the mortgage and asserted that the shop has been purchased by him from Kishan Lal father of the plaintiffs on 27th August, 1955 under a sale deed. Consequently, the suit was filed. 3. After the suit was contested, the issues were framed and the trial court on 11th May, 1964 decided issue No. 6 in favour of the plaintiffs and issue No. 7 in favour of the defendants. While deciding these issues, the trial court held that prior to the year 1941, there was no law of' registration and no law of transfer of property in the then Alwar State; and this position was admitted by the learned counsel for the parties. 4. The trial court then decided the case after taking into consideration the evidence and held that the alleged sale deed is not genuine and granted a decree for redemption. 5. The first appellate court reversed the judgment holding that the sale deed was genuine and diversed the various points used by the trial court in against the defendants. In this second appeal the learned counsel for the appellant. has submitted that, the entire approach of the first appellate court is perverse that, the finding; are perfunctory and superficial in nature; that, a bare perusal of the sale deed would show that it is a fabricated and forged; that the presumption raised under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act could not have been done: and that the sale deed required registration, since it was not registered it cannot i.e admissible and could not be looked into. Shri . Shri . M. Mehta the learned counsel for the appellant, further pointed out that the reasons given by the first appellate court for discarding the evidence of the appellants and further for believing the evidence of the defendants and for discarding the reasons given by the trial court, are not sustainable. The relevant documents and evidence were referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Shri H.C. Rastogi, the learned Advocate for the respondents, on the contrary, submitted that the judgment of the first appellate court, as a whole, is a comprehensive one based on the reasoned discussion of the facts and law; that, the reasons given by the trial court for discarding the sale deed and treating it forged were not sustainable and, therefore, the first appellate court was justified in reversing it, that, even if the findings on the question of proof of the sale deed assumes to be erroneous, no interference can be made in second appeal by this court; that, the presumptions had been drawn for holding that the document is genuine: and that, when there is having presumptions, all the facts and circumstances have been considered by the first appellate court for holding that the document-sale deed in proved. 7. Shri Rastogi pointed out that the arguments of Shri Mehta that the registration should have been done of the sale deed is against the admissions made before the trial court that the law of, registration was not in force in the year 1925 when the sale was executed. The law regarding registration came into force in the erstwhile Alwar State in 1941. 8. So far as the question of requirement of 'Patta' is concerned, Shri Rastogi pointed out that it may be an additional factor in favour of the transaction but the absence of 'Patta' would not invalidate a document 9. I have given a very serious and thoughtful consideration to the detailed arguments which were made by the learned counsel for the parties. The first and foremost question which requires consideration is whether the sale deed (Ex.A. 3) required registration. Obviously, as per the order dated the 11th May, 1964 of the trial court, it was common ground and agreed by the learned counsel for both the parties that law of the registration and transfer of property was not in force in the ers while Alwar State prior to the year 1941. Obviously, as per the order dated the 11th May, 1964 of the trial court, it was common ground and agreed by the learned counsel for both the parties that law of the registration and transfer of property was not in force in the ers while Alwar State prior to the year 1941. This is corroborated by the fact that the mortgage-deed of the plaintiff is unregistered. 10. I would have allowed this point to be assailed in spite of the admission if Shri Mehta would have been able to show any Registration Act or Transfer of Property Act or the judgment mentioning & accepting that in the erstwhile Alwar State in the year 1925, the Registration or Transfer of Property Act analogous to one which were prevelent in that area, were in existence. No such law has been shown and, therefore, I have got no reason, not to uphold the finding of the trial court as well as the first appellate court on this point. Con- sequently, it is held that sale deed (Ex. A. 3) is not required to be a registered one, and cannot be rejected on that ground. 11. It was then argued that a 'Patta' should have been produced if the sale was to be treated as valid. Here again, though the 'Patta' has been produced in other context for different purposes but the requirement of a 'Patta' as sine qua non for valid sale has not been shown. 12. Shri Mehta submitted that there was some orders of Hidayat for 'Patta' but it has not been possible to point out any one either in the form of an Act or Rules or Notification or Circulars because, none of them are available here, and he has not been able to get any one. 13. The fact remains that no requirement of law in the form of Patta, under any Act or Rules, in the erstw hile State in order to make the sale valid, has been shown to this court. in this case. No reported or unreported decision has been cited arising from the other State whether this Court or any other Courts of Alwar State has held that for the valid sale, 'Patta' was necessary requirement. in this case. No reported or unreported decision has been cited arising from the other State whether this Court or any other Courts of Alwar State has held that for the valid sale, 'Patta' was necessary requirement. In the absence of that, whatever might have been the position, it is difficult for this Court to hold as a proposition of law that since the sale deed (Ex. A. 3) was not followed by 'Patta' it would be invalid or its genuineness would be doubtful. It was then argued by Shri Mehta that the presumption raised by the first appellate court under Section 90 of the Evidence Act was not justified because the document was not genuine and in any case its genuineness is highly doubtful. 14. Shri Mehta. in this connection, relied upon the decision of this Court in (1) Kapoorchand V. Lalchand, 1974 RL.W 579 , wherein it was held that the age of document, its unsuspicious character, its production from proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation for the presumption of genuineness under S 90 of the Evidence Act. 15. In that case S. N. Modi. J., observed that a bare look at the document would show that it is not free from suspicion, and the parties are required to prove the manner in which it is written, the spreading of the ink on the back side of the paper and the condition in which the thumb impressions alleged to be of the Patti's appear, and if they indicate that the document is to beyond suspicion, the court cannot follow the provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act. 16. On the above bedrock, Shri Mehta argued that a bare look at the document 'Patta' shows that this is suspicious document and the trial court was justified in holding it to be a forged document. Shri Mchta took pains to show me that the document is having some differences in the form of the endorsement which were missing. Shri Mehta argued that this was not inadvertent but delibe rate act. 17. Shri Mchta took pains to show me that the document is having some differences in the form of the endorsement which were missing. Shri Mehta argued that this was not inadvertent but delibe rate act. 17. I have, on a thoughtful consideration of the entire matter, come to the conclusion that the reasons given by the first appellate court before raising presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act in order to show that the document was genuine and, further in order to show that the reasons given by the trial court were not justified, are the first important aspect of the case. If those reasons and circumstances, which have been taken notice of by the first appellate court are non-existent or extraneous or based on misreading of the evidence or, based on presumptions and assumptions without foundation then certainly it can be said that the raising of the presumptions on the basis of the genuineness prime facie drawn by those circumstances, could not he accepted by this court. However, though it is true that part of the endorsement on the document is missing and that particular part would have been shown the date of the purchase of the stamp even it would have been available. But the first appellate court has given the reasons which are in details about the effect of the missing parts, and these reasons can not be said to be unreasonable or such which cannot be said to be unreasonable or such which cannot be given by any court of fact. In this connection. it must be noticed that the first appellate court first examined the evidence of the handwriting expert & then held that no reliance can be placed upon them. It was then held that at the place where some portions of the endorsement is missing, the name of Kishan s/o Chhoteylal, the purchaser is available and the signatures of the persons who sold the stamps is also available. Kishanlal died in Smt. year 1999 and, therefore, these stamps were purchased before Smt. year 1999 corresponding to 1942 A. D. It then said that if the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the name has been forged is to be accepted, then there is no reason why the date could not have been forged. Kishanlal died in Smt. year 1999 and, therefore, these stamps were purchased before Smt. year 1999 corresponding to 1942 A. D. It then said that if the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the name has been forged is to be accepted, then there is no reason why the date could not have been forged. It was also pointed out than according to Bhonreylal (DW 3), Narainlal (stamp vendor) died in the year 1945. On these grounds, it was held that the finding of the trial court that deliberately the portion in question has been forged, is not acceptable. It then examined the other reasons given by the trial court and said that other reason; are equally unacceptable. According to the first appellate court, it is not necessary that the signatures must be by the same ink by which the document was scribed. It then arrived at the finding that even otherwise, on a bare look at the document (Ex. A. 3) it appears that there is no difference in the ink. 18. The first appellate court then considered the importance given by the trial court to Patta (Ex. a1) and arrived at the finding that if the document would have been forged then it would not have contained a mention of the Patta. Contrary to it, it shows its genuineness. 19. The first appellate court also observed that the learned counsel has not been able to show that in the erstwhile State of Alwar, what was the effect of absence of a Patta in law. The first appellate court then considered the reasons given by the trial court that Kishanlal was an educated person, is equally fallacious. It then discussed the other evidence regarding the defendants evidence of Laxmanram S/o Govindram (DW 1). Pyarelal (DW 2) and observed that their evidence could have been accepted. After an elaborate discussion of the entire evidence, the first appellate court then came to the conclusion that Ex. A. 3 bears the signature of Kishanlal. The actual finding reads as under : " bl izdkj lkjh 'kgknr ds vk/kkj ij eSa bl urhts ij igqaprk gwa fd ,Xth&,&3 c;ukek ij fd'kuyky ds nLr[kr gS ftlds }kjk mlus fooknxzLr tk;nkn dks 400@& :0 esa xksfoUnjke dks c; dj nh FkhA " 20. It was only after this that the applicability of Section 90 of the Evidence Act was considered. 21. It was only after this that the applicability of Section 90 of the Evidence Act was considered. 21. I am therefore, of the opinion that the principles laid down in the judgment cited by Shri Mehta cannot apply in the present case. I am further convinced that the reasons given by the first appellate court suffers from no infirmity. 22. Shri Mehta then argued that the reasons given by the 1st appellate court are not sufficient for reversing the reasons given by the trial court. Be that as it may I am deciding this case in second appeal under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, and, therefore, even if two views are possible, namely that, this document in question could have been declared as forged by the court of fact, and similarly that this document could have been declared as genuine and proved by court of fact then, I sitting and hearing in the second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C., cannot take a view different from the one which has been taken by the first appellate court. 23. In this connection, Shri Mehta invited my attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in (2) Madanlal v. Mst. Gopi, AIR 1980 SC 1754 , wherein it has been observed by their Lordships that there are certain exceptions where in second appeal a finding of fact can be interfered with and one was, where the courts allowed their judgments to be influenced by inconsequential matters and ignored the weight of preponderating circumstances. 24. Shri Mehta referred to other judgments of Bombay & other High Courts in the following cases ; 3. Trilok Chand v. Surja (AIR 1966 Allahabad 618) . 4. Bhikha Bhai Nana Bhai Patel v. Chimanlal (AIR 1953 Bombay 437) . 5. Chandi Charan Naskar v. Bhagyadhar ( AIR 1976 Cal. 356 ) . 6. Surajmal v. Shrikishan (AIR 1973 Bombay 313) . Trilok Chand v. Surja (AIR 1966 Allahabad 618) . 4. Bhikha Bhai Nana Bhai Patel v. Chimanlal (AIR 1953 Bombay 437) . 5. Chandi Charan Naskar v. Bhagyadhar ( AIR 1976 Cal. 356 ) . 6. Surajmal v. Shrikishan (AIR 1973 Bombay 313) . But, I feel that in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in (7) Kshitish Chandra v. Commissioner, Ranshi ( AIR 1981 SC 707 ) , wherein a series of decisions of the Supreme Court and earlier decision of the Privy Council have been referred to, and it has been observed that the High Court sitting in second appeal cannot interfere in finding of fact even though the finding was grossly erroneous and the reasons given may be in excuseable; it is not necessary to go into the decisions of the High Courts, cited by Shri Mehta. I am convinced that in the instant case, though there may be possibility of two opinions but it cannot be said that the findings of the first appellate court are vitiated on account of any error of law nor it can be said that the judgment of the first appellate court is based on inconsequential facts and circumstances after ignoring preponderence of evidence and the circumstances. 25. Consequently, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******