JUDGMENT U.L. Bhat, J. 1. This is a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to quash Ext. P-3 and writ of mandamus directing respondents to approve petitioner's appointment in the vacancy which arose on 20th June 1983 and to appoint her in the vacancy which arose on 22nd July 1983. 2. Petitioner is a trained graduate teacher working in the upper primary section of the Mundoor High School since 1978. Second respondent is a U.P.S. Assistant in the school, senior to the petitioner. First respondent is the Manager of the school. In the High School section of the school a leave vacancy in the post of High School Assistant (Social Studies) arose on 1st June 1981. At that time though the second respondent was senior most U.P.S. Assistant in the subject, he was not qualified to be promoted as H.S. Assistant. Therefore his junior, petitioner who was qualified, was temporarily promoted as H.S.A. from 1st June 1981 to 4th September 1981 and the promotion was duly approved by the third respondent, District Educational Officer as seen in Ext. P-1. The teacher who was on leave extended the leave period. Meanwhile the second respondent had become qualified for promotion as H. S. A. Assistant. The first respondent allowed the petitioner to continue in the post of H.S.A, but for this action the third respondent declined to grant approval. The first respondent filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education and the same having been dismissed, preferred a revision which is said to be pending. Another temporary vacancy arose and the petitioner was posted to that vacancy on 20th June 1983 and the post continued up to 16th August 1983. The third respondent declined to approve the promotion as seen in Ext. P-3. A new post of H.S.A. (Social Studies) was sanctioned with effect from 22nd July 1983. The first respondent meanwhile reverted the petitioner as U.P.S. Assistant. Apprehending that the second respondent was likely to be promoted to that vacancy, petitioner submitted Ext. P-2 representation to the first respondent and thereupon filed this original petition for appropriate reliefs. 3. The petitioner rests her case on R.43 and 51A of Chap.14A of the Kerala Education Rules (for short, the rules). Apprehending that the second respondent was likely to be promoted to that vacancy, petitioner submitted Ext. P-2 representation to the first respondent and thereupon filed this original petition for appropriate reliefs. 3. The petitioner rests her case on R.43 and 51A of Chap.14A of the Kerala Education Rules (for short, the rules). Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner has a preferential claim under R.51A and in any event, even if R.43 governs the case, it must be taken that the second respondent lost his seniority over the petitioner when the petitioner was first promoted temporarily in 1981. On that ground petitioner must be deemed to be senior when the vacancy arose on 20th June 1983 and 22nd July 1983 and she was entitled to be promoted even under R.43. 4. R.51A states that qualified teachers who are relieved as per rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Educational Agency, provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency. What the petitioner seeks is promotion from the post of U.P.S. Assistant to the post of H.S. Assistant. Such a promotion is governed by R.43 which states that subject to rules 44 and 45 and considerations of efficiency and any general order that may be issued by the Government, vacancies in any higher grade of pay shall be filled up by promotion of qualified hands in the lower grade according to seniority, if such hands are available. 5. Rules 43 and 51A must be harmoniously construed; any interpretation which would bring them into conflict with each other has to be eschewed. R.43 governs promotions from posts in the lower grade of pay to posts in the higher grade of pay. The rule confers right of promotion on persons working in lower grade of pay in aided schools. R.51A confers rights on persons who are outside the school and who have been relieved earlier under rules 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies. It could not be the intention of the rule making authority to confer right of promotion under R.43 to persons in lower grade of pay in a school, but only to destroy the right by conferring a preferential right over persons no longer working in the school under R.51A. It could not be the intention of the rule making authority to confer right of promotion under R.43 to persons in lower grade of pay in a school, but only to destroy the right by conferring a preferential right over persons no longer working in the school under R.51A. If the rules are to be read in harmony, the reasonable conclusion would be that it is R.43 which governs promotions and R.51A does not operate in the area of promotion. R.51A cannot effect the right of promotion of an existing teacher. This rule does not confer any right on an existing teacher. The right it confers is restricted to teachers who have been relieved from schools. 6. I am fortifield in this view by the decision of this Court in Mary v. The Regional Deputy Director of Public Instruction and others ILR 1974 (2) Ker. 274. That was a case where a person coming squarely under R.51A sought preference over a person claiming right of promotion under R.43 of the Rules. Balakrishna Eradi, J. (as he then was) stated as follows:- "It is a fundamental principle of interpretation of statutes inclusive of subordinate legislation that the attempt of the court should be, as far as possible, to harmonise the different provisions contained in the statute or in the rule so long as it is possible to achieve the same without doing violence to the language used by the legislature or by the rule making authority. A construction which leads to a direct conflict between different provision should, as far as possible, be avoided. If the said principle is kept in mind I think the correct way of interpreting and reconciling R.43 and 51A is to limit the applicability of R.51A to cases where vacancies arising in the school are to be filled up otherwise than by promotion of personnel already in the service of the school, i.e., by recruiting persons from outside. Thus, on this interpretation, R.51A will come into operation in the matter of filling up vacancies of posts in a higher grade only when no qualified hands are available in the lower grade in the institution and where consequently the vacancies have to be filled up by recruitment of persons from outside. Thus, on this interpretation, R.51A will come into operation in the matter of filling up vacancies of posts in a higher grade only when no qualified hands are available in the lower grade in the institution and where consequently the vacancies have to be filled up by recruitment of persons from outside. In such a case a person who has put in a previous temporary service in the school will be preferred over everyone else in the matter of filling up a vacancy by direct recruitment. If R.51A is to be understood as conferring a right on an outsider to be appointed to a vacancy in a higher grade merely on the ground on his having acted in the school on a previous occasion when there was no qualified hand in the lower grade, the provisions of R.43 will be rendered entirely nugatory." This approach has been approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Babu v. Manager, S.N.V.H. School, Paravur ILR 1978 (2) Ker. 40. I therefore hold that petitioner cannot set up a preferential right to promotion under R.51A of the Rules. 7. Petitioner sets up preferential claim based on R.43 of the rules. R.43 confers preferential right of promotion from the lower grade to the higher grade based on seniority. Under R.34 of Chap.14A of the Rules every management is required to prepare and maintain in the prescribed form seniority list of teachers. Clause (1) to R.37 states that seniority of a teacher in any grade in any unit shall be decided with reference to the length of continuous service in that grade in that unit provided he is duly qualified for the post. Length of continuous service must determine seniority. Admittedly in the post of U.P.S. Assistant for which both the petitioner and the second respondent were all along qualified, second respondent has longer continuous service than the petitioner. Therefore the second respondent is senior to the petitioner in the grade of U.P.S. Assistant and by virtue of R.43 the second respondent is entitled to claim priority in promotion over the petitioner. 8. Petitioner contends that the second respondent's seniority was destroyed when the petitioner was promoted in 1981 as High School Assistant, while the second respondent continued as U.P.S. Assistant. Petitioner's promotion was only a temporary one against a leave vacancy. 8. Petitioner contends that the second respondent's seniority was destroyed when the petitioner was promoted in 1981 as High School Assistant, while the second respondent continued as U.P.S. Assistant. Petitioner's promotion was only a temporary one against a leave vacancy. She was promoted because her senior the second respondent was not qualified to hold the post of H.S. Assistant at that time. When the vacancy terminated naturally she has to face reversion. Her temporary promotion to a post in the higher cadre in a leave vacancy cannot affect seniority in the lower cadre. The position vis-a-vis seniority continues till one of them ceases to be in the lower grade and consequently in the seniority list relating to the lower grade. The rules do not contain any provision by which a junior who receives temporary promotion under R.43 is pushed up in the seniority list over the heads of seniors who happened to be unqualified at the time of promotion. Seniority in the lower grade continues unchanged despite the temporary promotion of another teacher. It is the seniority in the lower grade which determines the priority to promotion under R.43. In this view I reject the contention of the petitioner that she has a right of priority in regard to promotion to the higher post over the second respondent. I find no ground to interfere with Ext. P-3 or give any direction of the nature sought in the O.P. The Original Petition is dismissed, but without costs.