Judgment :- 1. Petitioner herein is the husband of the respondent. He filed O.P. 124/ 1984 before the District Court. Trichur under S.12 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 1955 (for short'the Act') seeking decree of nullity of the marriage on the ground that the wife was and is insane and by fraud this information was suppressed from him before and at the time of the marriage which took place on 29-4-1984. O.P. was filed on 12-7-1984. Petition is still pending. While so. wife filed I.A. 66/1985 under S.24 of the Act seeking direction to the husband to pay her maintenance pendente lite at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month and as litigation expenses Rs. 1.000/-. This application was opposed by the husband. Matrimonial court awarded maintenance pendente lite at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month and as litigation expenses Rs. 500/-. This order is now challenged. 2. On the factual position there could be no serious dispute. Admittedly. there was a marriage ceremony between the parties. Wife filed an affidavit stating that she has no means or property for her livelihood and has no means for meeting the expenses of the litigation while her husband is a skilled worker earning over Rs. 60/- per day. Husband filed counter statement denying these averments and contending that he is getting only Rs.15/-per day as wages. There was no contention that the wife has means of her own. Before the court below he did not contend that he had any other commitments. It was in these circumstances that the court directed him to pay maintenance pendente lite and litigation expenses at the rates already referred to. On facts I do not find any ground to interfere with the order. 3. Main contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner is that S.24 of the Act cannot be made applicable to parties to a void or voidable marriage. 4. S.5 of the Act prescribes conditions for valid Hindu marriage. One of the conditions prescribed is that at the time of marriage neither party is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or though capable of giving a valid consent. has been suffering from mental disorder of such kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children. Case of the husband is that at the time of marriage. has been suffering from mental disorder of such kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children. Case of the husband is that at the time of marriage. wife. by unsoundness of mind. was incapable of giving a valid consent to it. S.11 deals with void marriages. in which case either party can seek declaration that the marriage is a nullity. S.11. however. is not invoked in this case. What is invoked is S.12. Sub-section (1) of S.12 states. inter alia. that any marriage solemnized shall be voidable and may bo annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the grounds mentioned therein. Ground mentioned in clause (b) is that the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in clause (ii) of S.5. It is by virtue of S.12(1) (b) read with S.5 (ii) of the Act that. according to the husband. the marriage is voidable and is liable to be annulled by a decree of nullity. Whether the marriage contravenes S.5(ii) of the Act and if so whether it is liable to be annulled under S.12 is a matter in dispute between the parties. and is to be decided in the main proceedings. However. it is relevant to notice that when the husband sought appointment of guardian for the wife before the court below. court conducted an inquiry and prima facie found that the wife was not insane and dismissed the petition. In the course of inquiry. wife had appeared before the court. 5. Claim of the wife is under S.24 of the Act which reads as follows: "24. Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband. as the case may be. has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding. it may. on the application of the wife or the husband. order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding. and monthly during the proceeding such sum as. having regard to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent. it may seem to the court to be reasonable." 6. S.24 of the Act deals with claim of maintenance pendente lite and expenses of the proceeding. If any proceeding under the Act is pending. and monthly during the proceeding such sum as. having regard to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent. it may seem to the court to be reasonable." 6. S.24 of the Act deals with claim of maintenance pendente lite and expenses of the proceeding. If any proceeding under the Act is pending. either the wife or the husband having no independent income sufficient for support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding may apply to the court under this section; whereupon the court. if so satisfied. may order the respondent in the application to pay to the petitioner in the application expenses of the proceeding and monthly during the preceding an amount. which appears reasonable. having regard to the income of both parties. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that S.24 of the Act contemplates an application being filed by the wife or the husband and since expressions "wife" and "husband" are used only a person. who. in the eyes of law. has such status can file an application under S.24. Learned counsel invited my attention to certain other provisions where these expressions have not been used and instead. expressions "petitioner". "applicant" and "respondent" have been used. This feature is sought to be used to contend that the Legislature made a conscious departure in enacting S.24. 8. S.5 of the Act lays down conditions for solemnization of marriage between any two Hindus S 7 lays down the ceremonies to be observed in such solemnization. 9. S.9 deals with remedy of restitution of conjugal rights. The section states that when either the husband or the wife has. without reasonable excuse. withdrawn from the society of the other. the aggrieved party may file a petition seeking a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. While the section mentions that a petition may be filed in order that a decree may be passed. the section requires that the court must be satisfied that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted. 10. S.10 states that either party to a marriage may present a petition praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in S.13(1) and in the case of a wife also on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (2) thereof. Sub-section (2) states. inter alia. that where such a decree has been passed. 10. S.10 states that either party to a marriage may present a petition praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in S.13(1) and in the case of a wife also on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (2) thereof. Sub-section (2) states. inter alia. that where such a decree has been passed. it shall no longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent. S.11 states that any marriage solemnized after the commencement of the Act shall be null and void and may. on petition presented by either party thereto against the other party. be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i).(iv) and (v) of S 5. 11. S.12 deals with remedy regarding voidable marriages. Any marriage solemnized shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on anyone of the grounds mentioned therein as (a) to (d). 12. S.13 deals with decree of divorce. Sub-section (1) states that any marriage solemnized may. on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife. be dissolved by a decree of divorce on anyone of the grounds mentioned in clauses (i). (ia). (ib) and (ii) to (vii). Explanation which explains expression "desertion" states that that it means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party. Sub-sec. (1A) states that either party to a marriage may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) therein. The two clauses also refer only to "parties to the marriage". Sub-sec. (2) enables a wife to present a petition on anyone of the grounds mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv). These clauses refer to husband and wife. S.13B deals with divorce by mutual consent. A petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented by both the parties to a marriage together. subject to other conditions mentioned therein. This section does not refer to expression "wife" or "husband". 13. S.14 states that it shall not be competent for any court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce. subject to other conditions mentioned therein. This section does not refer to expression "wife" or "husband". 13. S.14 states that it shall not be competent for any court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce. unless at the date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed since the date of the marriage. Sub-s.(1) has a proviso which refers indiscriminately to "petition" and "application". Sub-s. (2) also refers to "application" and "petition". S.19 relating to jurisdiction refers to expressions "petition". "respondent" and "parties to the marriage". 14. S.24 refers to expressions "wife". "husband" and an application being made by "either of them" under that section and enables the court to order the respondent to pay to the petitioner such sums as may be ordered. S.25 deals with permanent alimony and maintenance. Sub-s.(1) states that any court exercising jurisdiction under the Act may at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband as the case may be order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant permanent alimony and maintenance. 15. From the provisions of the Act referred to above. it is clear that the statute has been very clumsily drafted. Words "petition". "petitioner". "application" and "applicant" have been used without any discrimination. Similarly. expressions "wife". "husband" and "party to the marriage" also have been used without any particular discrimination. Therefore. no particular inference can be drawn from the fact that the particular word or expression has or has not been used in a particular section. As the Punjab and Haryana High Court observed in Dayal Singh v. Bhajan Kaur (AIR 1973 Punjab and Haryana 44). the Act has not been very carefully drafted and therefore the provisions should not receive very strict construction. In Kadia Harilal Purushottam v. Kadia Lilavati Gokaldas (AIR 1961 Guj. 202) a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court noticed that the Act contains several provisions which are not noted for good drafting and words used in some sections are not very happy. Therefore. the court should hesitate to draw any particular inference from the fact that expressions "husband" and "wife" have not been used in S.12. or for that matter. in S.11 of the Act. 16. Therefore. the court should hesitate to draw any particular inference from the fact that expressions "husband" and "wife" have not been used in S.12. or for that matter. in S.11 of the Act. 16. S.24 deals with maintenance pendente lite while S.25 deals with permanent alimony and maintenance. Both these sections use expressions "wife" and "husband". If the expressions "wife" and "husband" would mean only those who have such legal status as on the date of the application. then the provisions of S.25 would make no meaning. S.25 contemplates an order being passed "at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband. as the case may be." If the decree granted is one for divorce under S.13 of the Act. any application filed after the decree as contemplated. in the section could not be regarded as an application filed by either the wife or the husband. The section confers on the court power to pass an order at the time of passing any decree. Expression "any decree" is not limited by indicating the particular section under which the decree is passed. The Act contemplates decree for restitution of conjugal rights under S.9. decree for judicial separation under S.10. decree of nullity under S.11. decree of nullity under S.12 and decree of divorce under S.13. All these are decrees which fall within the meaning of the expression "any decree". There is nothing in S.25 to limit the efficacy of the expression "any decree" only to decrees for judicial separation and restitution of conjugal rights. It is only in the case of such decrees can it be that even after the decree parties have the status of wife or husband. In these circumstances. it would be clear that under S 25 court has jurisdiction to pass an order relating to permanent alimony and maintenance in the context of the court passing any decree under any of the provisions of S.9 to 13 of the Act. Expressions "husband" and "wife" used in the section are only descriptive and not indicative of legal status. 17. I am fortified in the above view by decisions of various High Courts. In Amar Kanta Sen v. Sovana Sen (AIR 1960 Cal. 438). Dharmashi Premji v. Bai Sakar Kunji (AIR 1968 Guj. 150). Expressions "husband" and "wife" used in the section are only descriptive and not indicative of legal status. 17. I am fortified in the above view by decisions of various High Courts. In Amar Kanta Sen v. Sovana Sen (AIR 1960 Cal. 438). Dharmashi Premji v. Bai Sakar Kunji (AIR 1968 Guj. 150). Nathulal v. Mana Devi (AIR 1971 Raj. 208) and Yogeshwar Prasad v. Jyoti Rani (AIR 1981 Delhi 99). it has been held that under S.25 of the Act order for permanent alimony can be passed even when the applicant does not have the legal status of a wife. It is also indicated therein that the expression "any decree" in S.25 would take in decrees passed under any of the S.9 to 13 of the Act. See also observations in Harilal v. Lilavati (AIR 1961 Guj. 202) and Minarani v. Dasarath (AIR 1963 Cal. 428). With specific reference to decree passed under S.11 of the Act. it has been held in Dayal Singh v. Bhajan Kaur (AIR 1973 Punjab and Haryana 44) and Govindrao v. Anandibai (AIR 1976 Bom. 433) that an order of permanent alimony could be passed under S.25. Similarly. with specific reference to decree passed under S.12 of the Act. it has been held in Sisir Kumar v. Sabita Rani (AIR 1972 Cal. 4) and Soumyanarayanan v. Jayalakshmi Ammal (AIR 1975 Mad. 196) that an order for permanent alimony could be passed under S.25 of the Act. In Dharmashi Premji's case (AIR 1968 Guj. 150) and Kuldip Chand v. Geeta (AIR 1977 Delhi 124). it has been held that the words "wife" and "husband" in S.25 are used in a descriptive sense and not as indicating their legal status. 18. Divorce was not recognized in Prestine Hindu Law. Marriage. according to Hindu Law. is a holy union for the purpose of religious duties and not a contract at all. It is considered entirely to be a sacrament creating an indissoluble tie between the husband and the wife. Naturally'. therefore. the wife under Hindu Law is entitled to be maintained by the husband. whether he possesses property or not. It is a matter of personal obligation arising from the very existence of the relationship. These principles of Prestine Hindu Law have been statutorily modified by way of several statutes including the Hindu Marriage Act and Adoptions and Maintenance Act. therefore. the wife under Hindu Law is entitled to be maintained by the husband. whether he possesses property or not. It is a matter of personal obligation arising from the very existence of the relationship. These principles of Prestine Hindu Law have been statutorily modified by way of several statutes including the Hindu Marriage Act and Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The statutory Hindu Law provides for divorce; it also provides for payment of maintenance. Therefore. notions of the Hindu Law cannot be used as a key for the interpretation of the statutory provisions. See observations in Amar Kanta Sen's case (AIR 1960 Cal. 438). Dharmashi Premji's case (AIR 1968 Guj. 150) and Nathulal's case (AIR 1971 Raj. 208). 19. Just as the concept of divorce was statutorily introduced in Hindu Law. concept of permanent alimony was also a statutory innovation. These ideas were borrowed from the laws prevailing in England for the first time in enacting the Indian Divorce Act. 1869 and later the Hindu Marriage Act and other statutes. Inspiration. apparently. was derived from the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act. 1857 which provided for permanent alimony being granted in any decree passed under. that Act. Parallel provision was enacted in the later Statutes including the Matrimonial Causes Act. 1973 also. Courts in England have been taking a broad and liberal view in regard to these provisions. Even a guilty wife who was entirely without means or support and unable through health to earn her own living was granted permanent alimony in Ashcroft v. Ashcroft (1902 P 270). See also Squire v. Squire (1905 P 4). Sydenham v. Sydenham and Illingworth. (1949) 2 All Eng. Reports 196 and Clear v. Clear (1958) 2 All E.R. 533. In Dailey v. Dailey. (1947) 1 All. E.R. 47. Court allowed permanent alimony to the wife though the marriage was annulled on the ground of refusal to consummate the marriage. Under English law. reason for awarding permanent alimony seems to be that if a marriage solemnized. which was at one time regarded as indissoluble. is allowed to be dissolved in the larger interests of the society. the same considerations of public interest and social welfare also require that the wife should not be thrown on the street but should be provided for in order that she may not be compelled to adopt a disreputable life. which was at one time regarded as indissoluble. is allowed to be dissolved in the larger interests of the society. the same considerations of public interest and social welfare also require that the wife should not be thrown on the street but should be provided for in order that she may not be compelled to adopt a disreputable life. See also Raydens' Law and Practice is Divorce and Family Matters. 1983 Edition. Volume 1. at pages 737 and 709. 20. There could be no doubt that in passing a decree under S.12 of the Act. or even after the decree. on an application by the erstwhile wife. Matrimonial Court has jurisdiction to award permanent alimony and maintenance under S 25 of the Act. If that be so. one could see no objection in principle to an order being passed for maintenance pendente lite under S.24 of the Act. Words "wife" and "husband" used in S.24 of the Act are only descriptive of the parties and not indicative of their status. Absence of these words in S.12 of the Act also cannot be invested with any significance. as we have already seen. It is the solemnisation of a marriage which makes parties husband and wife. S.12 enables decree of nullity being passed in regard to a marriage solemnized. Once a marriage is solemnized in accordance with the provisions of the Act. parties must be regarded as husband and wife for the purpose of the Act. even if the marriage could be declared to be void or nullified under other provisions of the Act. Even the argument which may be available in regard to S.11 of the Act will not be available in regard to S.12 of the Act. S.12 of the Act clearly refers to marriages which are voidable and which are to be annulled by decree of nullity. As long as decree of nullity is not passed. marriage shall be treated as valid. Even after decree of nullity is passed. permanent alimony and maintenance can be granted under S.25 of the Act. There is no reason to hold that maintenance pendente lite in such a case cannot be ordered under S.24 of the Act. 21. In this connection. we may notice S.16 of the Act. According to this provision. Even after decree of nullity is passed. permanent alimony and maintenance can be granted under S.25 of the Act. There is no reason to hold that maintenance pendente lite in such a case cannot be ordered under S.24 of the Act. 21. In this connection. we may notice S.16 of the Act. According to this provision. notwithstanding that a marriage is null and void under S. H. any child of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid. shall be legitimate. whether or not a decree of nullity has been granted in respect of that marriage. Similarly. where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of a voidable marriage under S.12. any child begotten or conceived before the decree is made. who would have been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if at the date of the decree it had been dissolved instead of being annulled. shall be deemed to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the decree of nullity. Similarly sub-section (3) invests rights in the property with such children. In these circumstances. it cannot be said that a marriage which is annulled by a decree of nullity is a void marriage in the general sense of the expression. Parties to the marriage are recognized to be possessing certain rights. Issues of such parties are also recognized to be possessing certain rights. Therefore. I see no difficulty in holding that S.24 of the Act would apply to parties to a proceeding under S.12 of the Act. This is all the more so when we understand the purpose of S.24 of the Act. Purpose is to ensure that the parties standing in need of the relief contemplated in S.24 should be assured relief. I am supported in the view I have taken by a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Kamala Shama Sindhi v. Shama Rupchand Sindhi (LX) 1958 Bom. L.R 633) and decisions of the Delhi High Court in Arti Singh v. Kanwar Pal Singh and Yogeshwar Prasad v. Jyoti Rani (AIR 1981 Delhi 99). In these circumstances. I reject the contention of the petitioner that S.24 of the Act cannot be invoked in this case. On facts. I do not find any ground to interfere. Revision petition is therefore dismissed.