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1985 DIGILAW 241 (MP)

CHARAN KAUR v. STATE OF M P

1985-04-08

J.S.VERMA

body1985
JUDGMENT : J. S. VERMA, J. This is plaintiffs second appeal. The relief claimed in the suit is a declaration that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of house No. 1137 in Madanmahal Ward, Nagpur Road, Jabalpur. The plaintiff claims title to this house by virtue of a gift deed dated 19th February, 1963 in her favour by her husband, deceased Mehtab Singh, who was admittedly the owner of the house. The occasion for the suit is the recovery proceedings by the defendants against Mehtab Singh for recovery of sales tax dues of the firm M/s. Mehtab Singh and Sons, for the period 1st January, 1958 to 31st December, 1964, amounting to approximately Rs. 78,000. There is no controversy that the defendants are entitled to recover the sales tax dues by proceeding against the suit house in case title to it has not been transferred to Mehtab Singhs wife, the plaintiff Smt. Charan Kaur, by the gift deed dated 19th February, 1963. This is clear from the liability of Mehtab Singh at least as a partner of the firm for the entire relevant period in accordance with the provisions of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. The plaintiffs claim of title to the suit house has been negatived by both the courts below. It has been held that the gift dated 19th February, 1963 was executed by Mehtab Singh in favour of his wife merely with intention to defraud the Revenue and, therefore, the gift is void in accordance with section 33-A of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. The only question involved in this appeal is whether this conclusion of the courts below is contrary to law. 2. The facts beyond controversy are alone sufficient for the dismissal of this appeal. Mehtab Singh was admittedly liable for payment of the sales tax dues and this liability had been incurred by him prior to execution of the gift deed dated 19th February, 1963 in favour of his wife, the plaintiff. His intention to defraud the Revenue by making such a gift, as found proved by the courts below, is obvious. The essential requirements of section 33-A of the Act have been rightly held to be proved. 3. His intention to defraud the Revenue by making such a gift, as found proved by the courts below, is obvious. The essential requirements of section 33-A of the Act have been rightly held to be proved. 3. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that section 33-A of the Act was inserted in the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 with effect from 1st November, 1964 and, therefore, it was not available in respect of sales tax dues for an earlier period. This argument does not merit any serious consideration. In the first place, the sales tax dues are up to the period ending on 31st December, 1964, which is subsequent to 1st November, 1964. That apart, the right of a creditor to avoid such a fraudulent transfer was available even earlier in the general law and it is sufficient to refer to section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 33-A introduced in the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 merely enabled such a conclusion to be reached by the sales tax authorities themselves. Moreover, this argument does not even arise where a suit has been filed claiming title in a civil court and the question whether any title has been acquired by the plaintiff, the alleged transfer being a fraudulent transaction, arises for consideration. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the plaintiff should have at least been given a notice before proceeding to recover sales tax dues from the suit house. There is no basis to hold that the plaintiff was entitled to such a notice on the basis of her claim to ownership of the suit house by virtue of the aforesaid gift deed. It was for the plaintiff to assert and prove her title when action was taken to recover the amount due and this she attempted to do by first filing an objection before the recovery officer and then by the suit after rejection of her objection by the recovery officer. 5. There is no ground to interfere in this appeal. It is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee according to schedule, if certified. Appeal dismissed. .