JUDGMENT - PURANIK S.W., J.: - This revision application is filed by the original defendants challenging the order of the trial Court allowing the plaintiff's application for amendment of plaint. 2. The non-applicant-plaintiff filed a suit for perpetual injunction against the defendants to restrain them from obstructing the suit passage. The said suit was filed in November 1974 on the basis of alleged obstruction which had taken place in the same year a little earlier. After the suit progressed, the plaintiff had applied for interim injunction, but the same was refused. The lower Appellate Court also refused to grant perpetual injunction finding that the defendants had erected a fencing across the field and had planted orange orchard in that area. The lower Appellate Court found that since there was a complete ouster the plaintiff ought to have claimed mandatory injunction for removal of the obstruction by the defendants. 3. After the said decision of the lower Appellate Court, the plaintiff filed an application for amendment of the plaint under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code asking inter alia to add the relief of mandatory injunction in addition. In the prayer clause also the plaintiff sought amendment to ask that the obstruction, if any, existing on the approach way stated above should be removed by a proper mandatory injunction at the Court of the defendants. 4. This amendment was proposed on 29-6-1981 which was opposed by the defendants. The trial Court, however, allowed it and also directed the defendants to make the consequential amendment. This Order of the trial Court, allowing the amendment on 10-8-1981, was challenged by the defendants in the High Court by a revision. That was civil revision application No. 587 of 1981. This Court, by its Order dated 13-11-1981, allowed the said revision application, set aside the order allowing the amendment and remanded the case to the trial Court for deciding whether the amendment for the new relief of mandatory injunction as proposed is barred by limitation at the time it was proposed, and whether the amendment changes the nature of the suit. 5. On remand, the trial Court heard the Counsel for both the parties at length and passed the impugned order on 8-2-1982 again allowing the application for amendment. 5. On remand, the trial Court heard the Counsel for both the parties at length and passed the impugned order on 8-2-1982 again allowing the application for amendment. The trial Judge took the view that the obstruction to the right of way of the plaintiff on the part of the defendants amounts to a continuing wrong and, as such, the proposed amendment for mandatory injunction is within the limitation. It is this Order which is impugned by the defendants in this second revision. 6. Shri M.N. Belekar, Advocate, appeared for the applicants-defendant. The respondent-plaintiff is represented by Shri M.N. Ingley, Advocate. 7. I have narrated the history of the case so as to be able to appreciate the contention of the defendants-applicants that the amendment proposed is barred by limitation on the date it was moved. As already pointed out above, in the matter of interim injunction in the original suit for perpetual injunction, the lower Appellate Court was dealing with the plaintiff's appeal against the order of refusal of permanent injunction. That was in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 35 of 1976 decided on 8-3-1977. The lower Appellate Court has made a reference to the facts and circumstances emerging from the pleadings on record as well as from the Court Commissioner's report secured during the pendency of the suit. The Court Commissioner's report was before the lower Appellate Court and the said Court has observed that the Commissioner's report in this case would also indicate that there existed a thorny fencing and plantation which appears to be quite old and the area of the alleged passage is having such permanent growth of the trees, bushes and other construction that rules out the user of the passage for several years. 8. Thus, admittedly in March 1977, when the lower Appellate Court was dealing with the matter of interim injunction, it had come to a finding that the obstruction to the right of way of the plaintiff was such that it was a permanent ouster by means of a fencing, plantations, orchard, bushes and other constructions. After this was pointed out to the plaintiff by the lower Appellate Court in 1977 when it refused to grant interim injunction, the plaintiff did not move any application for amendment till 29-6-1981 seeking to alter the original suit claim of perpetual injunction into one of mandatory injunction. 9. After this was pointed out to the plaintiff by the lower Appellate Court in 1977 when it refused to grant interim injunction, the plaintiff did not move any application for amendment till 29-6-1981 seeking to alter the original suit claim of perpetual injunction into one of mandatory injunction. 9. No doubt, in the plaint pleadings, the plaintiff has said that the cause of action arose in the year 1974 and is a continuing cause of action accruing every day. The question, therefore, is wether the obstruction caused on behalf of the defendants is a continuing wrong or whether it amounts to a complete ouster of the plaintiff from the user of the right of way thereby limiting the period of limitation to three years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. 10. Dealing with a similar question on the applicability of the correct provisions of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court, in the case of (Balakrishan Savalram Pujari others v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and others)1, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 798, has observed in paragraph 31 as follows: “xxx xxx xxx (31)... section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue...We think there can be no doubt that where the wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting injury to the right is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no scope for the application of section 23 (of the old Limitation Act) to such a case. xxx xxx xxx” 11. This ruling of the Supreme Court was distinguished by the learned trial Judge on the ground that it relates to a Sansthan and, therefore, it does not apply to a case of continuing wrong in the matters of obstruction to the right of way. However, the said view is obviously incorrect. xxx xxx xxx” 11. This ruling of the Supreme Court was distinguished by the learned trial Judge on the ground that it relates to a Sansthan and, therefore, it does not apply to a case of continuing wrong in the matters of obstruction to the right of way. However, the said view is obviously incorrect. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court, in the case of (Sheo Narayan Singh and others v. Ambica Singh and others)2, A.I.R. 1970 Patna 246, had also an occasion to deal with the case of obstruction to the right of way and the applicability of certain provisions of the Limitation Act. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balakrishan Savalram Pujari others v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and others, quoted supra, they have held that section 23 (of the Old Limitation Act) applies to a case of obstruction to a right of way unless there is a complete ouster. If there is no complete ouster, it is a case of continuing nuisance as to which cause of action will be renewed de die in diem so long as the obstruction continues. On the facts arising from the said case, the Full Bench of Patna High Court observed that there was a complete ouster by erection of a small temple over the right of way and, hence, section 23 (of the Old Limitation Act) would not apply. 12. The said case falls squarely within the facts of the present case also and the Court Commissioner's report categorically shows that there has been an old orchard developed over the suit plot in question, and that there has been other constructions of old standing and apparently, therefore, there was complete ouster of the right of way of the plaintiff. In that view of the matter for the purposes of mandatory injunction, it could not be held that there has been a continuing cause of action because of the continuity of the obstruction. It is only article 113 of the Limitation Act, the residuary article, which should be applicable to the present suit and the limitation prescribed is three years. 13. Since the initial cause of action was in 1974 by a complete ouster, the amendment proposed in the year 1981 is grossly barred by limitation and cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the plaint. 13. Since the initial cause of action was in 1974 by a complete ouster, the amendment proposed in the year 1981 is grossly barred by limitation and cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the plaint. For these reasons, the proposed amendment by the plaintiff, vide Exh. 63, has to be rejected. 14. In the result, therefore, the Civil Revision Applications No. 264 of 1982 is allowed. The impugned order of the trial Court is quashed and set aside and, instead, the plaintiff's application for amendment of the plaint-Exh. 63 is rejected. There shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----