JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack acquitting the respondent and other accused persons of the charge under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for violation of clause 3 of the Orissa Declaration and Prices of Essential Commodities Order, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Order'). 2. The prosecution case in short was that P.W. 9 an Inspector of Vigilance along with other officers conducted a raid of the shop of the respondent on 9-6-1976. He made physical verification of essential commodities such as torch light batteries, oil and paper. He detected that the price board displayed in the shop premises reflected the stock position as on 5-6-1976. As such, it was not maintained up-to-date as on 9-6-1976 and further there was substantial discrepancy between the actual stock of some items of essential commodities with those reflected on the price board. Accordingly, after making necessary seizure of the price board, essential commodities and cash and credit memo etc., charge sheet was submitted against the respondent and five other partners of the firm. 3. The respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defence that he was a whole-sealer of goods and the business premises raided by P.W. 9 were not the shop where he carried retail sale, but were the godown to which clause 3 of the Order did not apply. Further, on account of his illness he did not open the godown and did not make any transactions. Therefore, the price board could not be made up-to-date. The other accused persons, while pleading not guilty, raised the defence that they were sleeping partners of the firm and were not actively associated with the day to day business transaction thereof. 4. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate held that the business premises raided by P.W. 9 were not the godown but were the shop of the respondent. He, however, accepted the defence plea that the shop was closed from 6-6-1976 to 9-6-1976 and so it was not possible to make the price board up-to-date for which the discrepancy as alleged was detected. He further held that the other accused persons were the sleeping partners of the firm and were not actively associated with the business. He, however, accepted the defence plea that the shop was closed from 6-6-1976 to 9-6-1976 and so it was not possible to make the price board up-to-date for which the discrepancy as alleged was detected. He further held that the other accused persons were the sleeping partners of the firm and were not actively associated with the business. Accordingly, he held that the charge against the respondent and the other accused persons was not established by the prosecution and so he acquitted them. The Government Appeal was admitted as against the respondent only. 5. Learned Additional Standing Counsel vehemently urged that the shop was actually open on 9-6-1976 and the respondent was carrying on business transactions. The price board, however, was neither up-to-date nor reflected the actual stock position of essential commodities stored in the shop and exposed for sale along with other particulars required to be mentioned according to clause 3 of the Order. The respondent was not at all ill on 9-6-1976. According to him, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate went wrong in accepting the defence case. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the findings recorded by the trial court. I have gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and have considered the documentary evidence on record. It will appear therefrom that the business premises were actually the shop of the respondent and not his godown. The price board was inside the shop. The trial court assigned cogent reasons in order to conclude that the premises were not the godown but the shop of the respondent. This aspect of the case was not disputed. 6. The main and only point for consideration is whether the respondent on account of his illness did not open the shop from 6-6-1976 to 9-6-1976, as a result of which, the price board seized from inside the same reflected the stock position and other particulars as on 5-6-1976 when the shop was last open. If this point is decided in favour of the respondent, the order passed by the trial court acquitting him must be upheld. If this point is decided in favour of the respondent, the order passed by the trial court acquitting him must be upheld. If, on the other hand, the answer to this point will be in the negative, it must have to be held that the shop was open on 9-6-1976, the respondent was carrying on regular transactions and as the price board was not made up-to-date and was not maintained in accordance with the provisions of clause 3 of the Order, the respondent was guilty of the charge brought against him. P.W. 3 was an Inspector of Vigilance who had accompanied P.W. 9 and was present at the time of the raid. It appears from his evidence that the price board was inside the shop of the respondent and it revealed the stock and price as on 5-6-1976. The respondent was present in the shop along with another and was transacting business. In cross-examination he stated that the shop was a whole-sale establishment and he did not recollect whether the respondent was ill or not. He did not recollect if other persons made purchases during his presence. If the shop was open, the price board must have been exposed outside the shop, but as the shop was not open for transaction it was found inside. Although the witness stated that the respondent was present along with another to carry on transactions, he did not actually see any transactions being made. P.W. 4 was a neighbouring merchant who did not at all support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. In answer to questions put to him by the counsel for the respondent, he stated that the respondent was a whole-sale dealer. On the date of the raid, the respondent was ill. He had covered his entire body with warm clothes. He did not say that the shop was open on 9-6-1976, but was a witness to the seizure list (Ext. 2). P.W. 5 was an Inspector of Supplies, who had accompanied P.W. 9 and was present at the time of the raid. He stated that during his presence there were no sale transactions in the shop. The shop-cum-godown was open and the respondent was inside the shop along with three of his servants. P.W. 6, an Inspector of Commercial Taxes was also present at the time of the raid. He stated that during his presence there were no sale transactions in the shop. The shop-cum-godown was open and the respondent was inside the shop along with three of his servants. P.W. 6, an Inspector of Commercial Taxes was also present at the time of the raid. He stated that the shop was open and the respondent was present inside the shop. In cross-examination, he stated that he had verified the purchase and sale accounts, as well as, the sale memos, but they were not seized. He did not make any enquiry as to whether the shop was open between 5-6-1976 and 9-6-1976. He could not say if any business transactions had taken place in the shop by the time the raid commenced. He did not ascertain the opening time of the shop. P.W. 9, the investigating officer stated that the shop was open for transactions at the time the raiding party arrived on 9-6-1976. The respondent was present in his shop. By the time of their arrival, transactions had been made as revealed by cash memo Nos. 5361 and 5362. The cash and credit memos were seized by seizure list (Ext. 2). He admitted in the cross-examination that he did not examine the customers who had transactions in the shop on the day of the raid. P.W. 10, a former employee of the respondent who turned hostile stated that the shop house which was a godown was closed from 5-6-1976 to 9-6-1976 as the respondent was ill. The aforesaid evidence will show that except the official witnesses whose evidence has not found independent corroboration, there is no other evidence to conclusively prove that the shop was open on 9-6-1976. On the other hand, a neighbour and a former employee of the respondent stated that the shop was not open and was closed from 6-6-1976 to 9-6-1976 on account of the respondent's illness. P.W. 9 did not make any attempt to produce other evidence such as the evidence of the customers who might have made purchases from the respondent's shop on 9-6-1976 to dispel the defence version. He did not also produce in court the clinching evidence, namely, the cash memos showing transactions made on 9-6-1976 which he had seized by Ext. 2. P.W. 9 did not make any attempt to produce other evidence such as the evidence of the customers who might have made purchases from the respondent's shop on 9-6-1976 to dispel the defence version. He did not also produce in court the clinching evidence, namely, the cash memos showing transactions made on 9-6-1976 which he had seized by Ext. 2. Curiously enough the cash memos were given in the name of the respondent and there is nothing on record to show that any attempt was made by the prosecution to cause production of the memos in court for proving the same. In view of the aforesaid lacunae in the prosecution case, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate entertained genuine doubt and accepted the defence version of closure of the shop from 6-6-1976 to 9-6-1976 for the reasons of which the price board was not made up-to-date and was not maintained in accordance with the provisions of clause 3 of the Order. In view of the discussion of the evidence which I have made, it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion different from that of the learned trial Judge which was reasonable and plausible. It is true that the defence is ingenious, nevertheless, it finds support from the evidence. 7. It is settled position of law that a judgment of acquittal should not be interfered with unless the assessment of the evidence and the conclusion drawn by the trial court are unreasonable, erroneous or perverse. Reversal of a judgment of acquittal will not be justified merely on the ground that the appellate court's view on the evidence on record may be different from that of the trial court or on the same set of evidence, two views are reasonably possible (see Smt. Dhara Dei v. Prafula Swain and others (1984) 58 C.L.T. 101 ). In this connection, I am tempted to quote the following passage from the decision reported in Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 S.C. 135 , which succinctly lays down the law on the subject:- "The dictum of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. Emperor, (A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 227 : 61 Ind. App. In this connection, I am tempted to quote the following passage from the decision reported in Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 S.C. 135 , which succinctly lays down the law on the subject:- "The dictum of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. Emperor, (A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 227 : 61 Ind. App. 398) and a beadroll of decisions of this Court have firmly established the position that although in an appeal from an order of acquittal the powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions are as extensive as in an appeal against an order of conviction, yet, as a rule of prudence, it should to use the words of Lord Russel of Killowen - "always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the Trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at a by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." Where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court should, as a matter of judicial caution, refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the Court below. In other words, if the main grounds on which the Court below has based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and cannot be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the acquittal." 8. For the reasons stated above, it is not possible for this Court to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed