Judgment S.B.Sanyal, J. 1. In these writ petitions the crucial question for determination is the true effect and meaning of Notification No. S.O. 1145 dated 31st December, 1980, or S.O. 639 dated 16th April, 1982, issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec.20A of the Bihar Ordinance No. 115 of 1980 as amended by Bihar Ordinance No. 165 of 1980 and under Sub-section (1) of Sec.23, Part I, of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 (Bihar Act 5 of 1981). The 31st December, 1980, notification came into force with effect from 1st October, 1979 and remained in force till 31st March, 1984, whereas notification dated 16th April, 1982, came into effect from 1st April, 1982. Either, the petitioners have not been given the benefit of these notifications or assessments have been made ignoring these notifications and/or misconstruing these notifications with threats to realise illegal demands with penalty under Sec.16(9) of the Bihar Finance Act, Part I of 1981. 2. C.W.J.C. Nos. 1222, 1521 and 1559 of .1983 (R) and C.W.J.C. Nos. 122, 123, 176, 442, 444, 499, 753, 768 and 1325, 117, 312 of 1984 (R) and C.W.J.C No. 1376 of 1983(R) relate to the benefit claimed under Notification No. S.O. 1145 dated 31st December, 1980, whereas C.W.J.C. Nos. 1321, 1290, 756 and 1314 of 1984(R) relate to similar benefit with respect to interState trade and commerce said to have been conferred by Notification No. S.0. 639 dated 16th April, 1982. 3. In C.W.J.C. No. 155 of 1984(R) the petitioner has claimed the benefit of both the notifications. 4. M.J.C. No. 37 of 1984(R) is an application for initiation of contempt of court proceeding for violation of some directions given by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1521 of 1983 (R), whereas M.J.C. No. 38 of 1984(R) relates to initiation of similar proceeding with respect to C.W.J.C. No. 155 of 1984(R). 5. Since a common question of law arises in all these writ applications, I have taken up the cases together for convenience and this judgment will govern all the cases. 6. 5. Since a common question of law arises in all these writ applications, I have taken up the cases together for convenience and this judgment will govern all the cases. 6. It may be stated here that the benefit conferred under Notification No. S.O. 1145 dated 31st December, 1980, relates to the adjustment of tax paid on the purchase of raw materials used for the manufacture of goods for sale within the State of Bihar, against the Bihar sales tax payable on the sale of finished products in Bihar for the period 1st October, 1979, till 31st March, 1984, whereas, Notification No. S.O. 639 dated 16th April, 1982 relates to such adjustment with respect to sale of finished products in course of interState trade and commerce, viz., accrued liability under the Central Sales Tax Act. 7. All the petitioners claimed to be industrial units in the small sector in the State of Bihar. Some of them have gone into production prior to 1st October, 1979, or have gone into production on or after 1st October, 1979. They manufactured various items such as engineering goods, chemicals, auto goods, slag wool, steel castings, candles, wax products, sodium silicate, G.I. pipes. etc. These industrial units are registered dealers engaged in the State for manufacturing the aforesaid items. Raw materials purchased by them are solely used for obtaining the finished products which are either sold in the State or in course of interState trade or commerce. 8. In the past for industrial growth and to give encouragement and incentive to the newly set up smallscale industries for increasing their production by diversifying the line and manufacture of products, the State of Bihar had given concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials by issuance of notification under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government. It is, however, not necessary to give details of those notifications. Earlier notifications have been noticed by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gupta Brick Works V/s. Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Patna 1985 BLT 91 (FB). It may, however, be made clear that the said Full Bench case has no bearing for determination of the question involved in these writ petitions but I have referred to it for the purpose of showing the notifications issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government conferring concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials. 9. It may, however, be made clear that the said Full Bench case has no bearing for determination of the question involved in these writ petitions but I have referred to it for the purpose of showing the notifications issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government conferring concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials. 9. Since the controversy centres around the language of the notifications dated 31st December, 1980 and 16th April, 1982, it seems apt to extract the relevant part thereof at the very outset : Order Dated the 31st December, 1980. S.O. 1145.-In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 20A of the Bihar Sales Tax Third Ordinance, 1980 (Bihar Ordinance No. 115 of 1980) as amended by the Bihar Sales Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (Bihar Ordinance No. 165 of 1980), the Governor of Bihar, on being satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interest of industrial growth, is pleased to permit every registered dealer who is a manufacturer and is running an industrial unit of the category and description mentioned respectively in columns 2 and 3 of the Table below, to adjust the amount of tax paid on the purchase of raw materials used in the manufacture of goods for sale within Bihar against the tax payable on sale of finished products in Bihar in the manner indicated in paragraph 2 of this Order. Table Sl. No. Category Description 1. Industrial units in small sector. The unit, if having gone into production prior to 1st October,1979,should not be availing of any concession of taxfree purchases of raw materials under any notification issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government and, if having gone into production on or after 1st October, 1979, should not have opted for the concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials. 2. Industrial unit in medium and large sector. The unit, if having gone into production on or after 1st October, 1979, should not have opted for the concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials. 3. Industrial unit in medium and large sector. 2. Industrial unit in medium and large sector. The unit, if having gone into production on or after 1st October, 1979, should not have opted for the concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials. 3. Industrial unit in medium and large sector. A unit in medium and large sector having gone into production prior to 1st October, 1979, if upon a consideration of the case on individual basis by the Industries Depart ment and the Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department it has been found and agreed that it deserves concession, and if the unit is not availing of any concession of tax free purchases of raw materials under any Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government.Explanation. For the purpose of this order an industrial unit in small sector, medium sector, or large sector means a unit respectively approved and registered as such by the Industries Department of the Government of Bihar and accepted as such by the officer incharge of the Circle of the Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department of the said Government within whose jurisdiction such a unit is located. 2. (A)(1) The amount of sales tax paid on purchase of raw materials consumed in manufacture of goods for sale in Bihar during the period 1st October, 1979, to 31st March, 1980, shall be allowed as deduction in the final demand of tax created in the assessment order for the year 1979-80. If there be any excess, it shall be refunded to the dealer either by adjustment against any other dues or by cash refund. (2) The amount of sales tax paid on purchase of raw materials consumed for manufacture of goods for sale within Bihar during the period from 1st April, 1980, to the date of publication of the Order in the Official Gazette may be adjusted against the tax payable for the remaining months or quarter, as the case may be, of the year 1980-81. (B) The amount of sales tax paid on purchase of raw materials used for manufacture of goods for sale within Bihar after the publication of this Order in the Official Gazette may be deducted from the amount of tax payable on the sale of finished products for the month or the quarter, as the case may be, but shall be limited only to the extent of the amount of tax actually payable on sales within Bihar. (C) ---- This Order shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from the 1st October, 1979 and shall remain in force till 31st March, 1984. By Order of the Governor of Bihar (Sd.) Illegible Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Government of Bihar, Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department. Order Dated the 16th April, 1982. S.O. 639.-In exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of Part I of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 (Bihar Act No. 5 of 1981), the Governor of Bihar, on being satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the industrial growth, is pleased to permit an industrial unit established as per procedures and conditions laid down in Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department Order No. S.O. 1145 dated 31st December, 1980 and registered under the aforesaid part, to adjust the amount of tax paid on the purchase of raw material in the State and used in the manufacture of goods for sale in course of inter State trade and commerce against the tax payable under the said part in the manner so prescribed. 2. The procedure laid down in Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department Order No. S.O. 1145 dated 31st December, 1980, for adjustment of tax shall also be applicable in the same manner for adjustment under this Order. 3. This Order shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 1st April, 1982. By Order of the Governor, Bihar. (Sd.) B.P. Verma, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Secretary to Governor, F.D., Bihar, Patna. 10. The apple of discord between the petitioners and the Revenue is the true meaning of the words "should not be availing of any concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials under any notification issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government". Whereas the petitioners contend that the benefit has been denied to such units, who are already availing some concession under the notifications issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State of Bihar, the Revenue on the other hand contend that the benefit has also been denied to those units, who have already availed concession under the old scheme. Whereas the petitioners contend that the benefit has been denied to such units, who are already availing some concession under the notifications issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State of Bihar, the Revenue on the other hand contend that the benefit has also been denied to those units, who have already availed concession under the old scheme. In substance, the petitioners contend, that the bar provided under the notification, is to the simultaneous enjoyment of benefit of the notifications issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme and the benefit conferred under the impugned notifications, the Revenue submits if once enjoyed the benefit under the Industrial Incentive Scheme, such industries are excluded from taking advantage of the impugned notifications. 11. Mr. S.B. Sinha, learned Advocate for one of the petitioners, has drawn my attention to Hindi version of the table as notified in the Gazette [see annexure C.W.J.C. No. 117 of 1984(R)]and I feel tempted to quote description part of the original notification which reads as hereunder : THALIKA VIVARAN Icee ikayee jisme 1 October, 1979 ke pahale utpadan suru ohgaya oh aur jise Rajyasarkar ki audyogik Prerana scheme ke adheen jari ki ghayee kisi adisuchana dwara kachay mal ki kar muktha kareed sambhandhi aur jisme yadhi utpadan 1.10.1979 ko ya uske badh suru hua ho thobi jisme kachy mal ki kar mukth kareed sambhandhi chhut ke liye vigalp nahi dhiya ho. It would be seen that the Hindi version of should not be availing of any concession" reads in Hindi as Koi chhut nahi milti ho." 12 My attention has also been drawn to the latest notification in this regard. This notification bears No. S.0. 614 dated 14th May, 1984 and was published in the Bihar Gazette on 14th May, 1984 and came into force with effect from 1st April, 1984, to remain in force till 31st of March, 1985 (see 1985 BLT Part IV-25). This notification bears No. S.0. 614 dated 14th May, 1984 and was published in the Bihar Gazette on 14th May, 1984 and came into force with effect from 1st April, 1984, to remain in force till 31st of March, 1985 (see 1985 BLT Part IV-25). The principal part of this notification is the same, but the description part entitling to the benefit which is relevant for my purpose reads as follows : The unit, if having gone into production prior to 1st April, 1984, have not availed of any concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials under any notification issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government and if having gone into production on or after 1st April, 1984, should not have opted for the concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials. It is no doubt true that Notification No. 614 dated 14th May, 1984, which came into force from 1st April, 1984 and purported to continue the benefit conferred by earlier notifications, support the view of Revenue propounded before me, viz., have not availed of any concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials under any notification issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government. Revenue wants me to read these words in the earlier notifications as well and/or to construe the earlier notifications in the light of this notification that being what was the real intention and object for issuance of those notifications as well. 13. Mr. Gadodia, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, submits that this Court must give literal meaning to the words used by the legislature. It is not the function of the court to attribute an intention to the legislature which is not justified by the language used nor can a court bend the language of any enactment, in order to carry out the presumed intention of the legislature. Mr. Gadodia by reference to several decisions asked the court to forbear from launching "an obscure fiscal astrology" but merely to construe the words which have been expressed in plain language. 14. Mr. Mr. Gadodia by reference to several decisions asked the court to forbear from launching "an obscure fiscal astrology" but merely to construe the words which have been expressed in plain language. 14. Mr. S.B. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, as indicated earlier, took me through the Hindi version of the said notification and contended that the court must not forget that cardinal rule for construction of statute and/or statutory notification is to read the statute literally, that is giving the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning unless the words are susceptible of another meaning or leads to absurdity. Learned counsel further submitted that the court must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none in courts anxiety to advance beneficient intention of the legislature. According to the learned counsel "intention of the legislature is a slippery phrase". The intention has been embodied in a positive enactment. It would be sheer speculation on the part of the court as to what the. legislature and/or the Government probably have meant although there has been omission to enact it. 15. While hearing the argument of the learned counsel of the parties, I am reminded of the saying of that famous Judge, Rowlatt, J : "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used (see Cape Brandy Syndicate V/s. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1921] 1 K.B. 64, 71). Lord Simonds once said in the case of Inland Revenue Commissioners V/s. Wolfson [1949] 1 AER 865, 868, "it is not the function of a court of law to give to words a strained and unnatural meaning, because had the legislature thought otherwise they would have used appropriate words for the same". Lord Reid said, "It is sometimes said that we should apply the spirit and not the letter of the law so as to bring in cases which, though not within the letter of the law, are within the mischief at which the law is aimed. Lord Reid said, "It is sometimes said that we should apply the spirit and not the letter of the law so as to bring in cases which, though not within the letter of the law, are within the mischief at which the law is aimed. But it has long been recognised that our courts cannot so apply taxing Acts" (Inland Revenue Commissioners V/s. Saunders [1958] AC 285). 16. Generally four principles are applied for interpretation of statutory provisions ; provisions creating substantive rights or taking away substantive rights are prospective, unless by express words or by implication it has been made retrospective ; the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning ; if in any legislation the general object is to benefit a particular class of persons and the provision is ambiguous in the sense capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the benefit, should be adopted ; if strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose, the legislature may reasonably consider to have had will be put on the words, if necessary, by modification of the language used. But in the anxiety to advance beneficient purpose of legislation, courts must not, however, yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none. It will not be right for the court to attribute an intention to the legislature, though not justified by the language used by it, as it accords with what the court conceives to be reasonable and fair and then bend the language so as to carry out such presumed intention of the legislation as that would be overstepping its limits. It has rightly been said that intenti6n of the legislature is a "slippery phrase" which popularly understood may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion what the legislature would probably have meant, although there has been omission to enact it. 17. Krishna Iyer, J., observed, in the case of Martand Dairy and Farm V/s. Union of India (1975) 4 SCC 313 . 17. Krishna Iyer, J., observed, in the case of Martand Dairy and Farm V/s. Union of India (1975) 4 SCC 313 . "It is not for the court to launch on obscure fiscal astrology but merely to construe what has been expressed in plain words" and only when such a meaning leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. S.R. Das, J., observed in the case of Jugalkishore Saraf V/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376 that "the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation". 18. The construction of a statute equally applies to the construction of a statutory notification (see Gupta Brick Works V/s. Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna 1985 BLT 91 and Nawalkishore Agrawal V/s. State of Bihar 1984 BR & LJ 158). 19. Bearing in view the law aforesaid as well as the observation of the Full Bench in the case of Gupta Brick Works 1985 BLT 91 that "it is a settled rule of construction of taxing statutes that one does not easily tend to the extension of a class privilege of exemption from the general rule of taxation unless the language of the statute is unequivocal and categoric and admits of no other interpretation", I approach the rival contentions with respect to the correct interpretation of the words "should not be availing" of any concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials under any notification issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government". 20. At the outset, it may be mentioned that I am not dealing with an exemption notification under Sec. 4(3)(b) of Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, which dealt with the topic "Exemption" but a newly added provision under Sec.20A of the Bihar Ordinances 115 of 1980/165 of 1980 and Sec.23 of Bihar Finance Act, 1981, which deal with the topic "Adjustment of tax" incorporated for the first time in the interest of industrial growth of the State. The impugned notifications, therefore, are not exemption notifications from the payment of general sales tax and/or sales tax, therefore, the observation of Lord Young in Hogg. V/s. Parochial Board of Auchtermuchty (1880) 7 (RETTI) 986 relied upon in the case, Gupta Brick Works 1985 BLT 91 "to reject any construction of a modern statute which implied the extension of a class privilege of exemption from taxation, provided the language reasonably admitted of another interpretation" is inapplicable. The stress of Mr. T.K. Das, learned counsel, on the said observation approved by the Full Bench in Gupta Brick Works 1985 BLT 91 to my mind is therefore unacceptable. We are not dealing here with the question of exemption "but adjustment of tax". 21. The core question, therefore, is what is the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the words "should not be availing of any concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials". On a structural construction, reading the principal part of the notification along with the table laying down the description of the industries, I am of the opinion, benefit of adjustment as envisaged in the principal part of the notification is admissible provided : firstly the unit must fall in some category of the units noticed in the notification, viz., in the instant case industrial unit in the small sector ; secondly, the unit must have gone into production prior to 1st October, 1979 ; thirdly, for the purpose of enjoying the benefit extended under the notification, it "should not be availing of any other concession" of taxfree purchase of raw materials under any notification issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government; fourthly, industries going into production on or after 1st October, 1979, should not have opted for the concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials. Mr. S.B. Sinha, in my opinion, is right in his contention that where statute uses the word "should" it ordinarily signifies present tense. Learned counsel buttresses his submission by referring to the Hindi notification used for the said words "Koi choot nahi milti ho". Mr. S.B. Sinha, in my opinion, is right in his contention that where statute uses the word "should" it ordinarily signifies present tense. Learned counsel buttresses his submission by referring to the Hindi notification used for the said words "Koi choot nahi milti ho". Therefore, the ordinary natural grammatical meaning indicate that the concerned unit must not simultaneously be enjoying two benefits, one under any notification issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State issued under Sec. 4 of the previous Act and/or under Sec. 6 of the 1976 Act and the benefit conferred under the instant notification issued either under Section 20A of the Ordinance or Sec.22 or 23 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 . As there is no ambiguity in the language used and/or the words capable of another meaning, I cannot bend or modify the words used and replace it as "have not availed". This will be really reenacting the provision, which is beyond the courts power. 22. Notification dated 16th April, 1982, does not need a separate consideration inasmuch as the procedure laid down for adjustment of tax obtainable for the benefit of this notification is the same as laid down in the notification dated 31st December, 1980. Under this notification an industrial unit falling in the enumerated category has been provided to adjust the amount of tax paid on the purchase of raw materials in the State and used in the manufacture of goods for sale, to adjust towards the liability accruing under the Central Sales Tax Act, for the sale of those manufactured goods in course of interState trade and commerce. Therefore, the interpretation made with respect to the notification dated 31st December, 1980, is equally applicable to the notification dated 16th April, 1982. 23. From the discussions aforesaid I am of the opinion that ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the words "should not be availing" mean that an industrial unit is entitled to the benefit of the notification dated, 31st December, 1980 and 16th April, 1982, provided it had ceased to avail concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials under any notification issued under the Industrial Incentive Scheme of the State Government. I will, therefore, direct the revenue authorities to reconsider the demand raised and the notices issued in the light of the interpretation given in this judgment. I will, therefore, direct the revenue authorities to reconsider the demand raised and the notices issued in the light of the interpretation given in this judgment. If it is a fact that the petitioners fulfil all the requirement of the notification being in the small sector and gone into production prior to 1st October, 1979 and have ceased to enjoy any other concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials under the incentive scheme they are entitled to adjustment of purchase tax paid by them against liability accruing for the sale of those products within the State or in the course of interState trade and commerce. 24. So far as C.W.J.C. No. 753 of 1984 (R) and C.W.J.C. No. 756 of 1984 (R) are concerned admittedly they have started production after 31st December, 1980. The former writ petition relates to the notification dated 31st December, 1980 and the latter relates to the notification dated 16th April, 1982. These writ petitions therefore concern the second limb of the description part of serial No. 1 of the notification, viz., "should not have opted for the concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials", the Hindi version whereof reads as "Kareed sambhandhi chhut ke liye vikalp nahi dhiya ho". In none of these petitions, there is any averment that the petitioners never "opted" for taxfree purchase of raw materials. It is not, therefore, possible to allow the prayer sought for in these two writ petitions, those words being sine qua non for grant of relief. I, however, direct if the petitioner did not opt for the concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials before presentation of these writ petitions, the benefit of adjustment shall be admissible to it. It will be open to the petitioner to take this point, as to its entitlement under the said two notifications, if it had never opted for the concession of taxfree purchase of raw materials. So far as this class of dealers are concerned, the question whether it availed and/or availing the concession of taxfree purchase of raw meterials is not relevant. These words have not been used for those who have gone into production on or after 1st October, 1979. So far as this class of dealers are concerned, the question whether it availed and/or availing the concession of taxfree purchase of raw meterials is not relevant. These words have not been used for those who have gone into production on or after 1st October, 1979. This is the plain and literal interpretation of the words used in the second part of the said notification and the court in a taxing statute is required "to look merely at what is clearly said" with no room for equity. 25. M.J.C. Nos. 37 and 38 of 1984 (R) were not pressed at the time of hearing of their respective main petitions by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and are accordingly dismissed. 26. In the result all the writ petitions are allowed in the light of the observations aforesaid with the exception of C.W.J.C. No. 753 of 1984 (R) and C.W.J.C. No. 756 of 1984 (R) which are dismissed with the observation made in paragraph 24 of this judgment. Similarly M.J.C. Nos. 37 and 38 of 1984 (R) are also dismissed for having not been pressed. Penalty imposed in C.W.J.C. No. 155 of 1984 (R) is set aside. Respondents are directed to consider the cases of the petitioners and give effect to the two notifications dated 31st December, 1980 and 16th April, 1982, as interpreted by this judgment and give relief to the petitioners provided they fulfil the factual requirement of those two notifications. There will be no order for costs.