Judgment Birendra Prasad Sinha, J. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. A prayer has been made for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing an award dated 14.3.1981 (Annexure-I) given by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhagalpur in Reference Case No. 10 of 1978. 2. Oil 15th June, 1978 a reference was made by the Government of Bihar of an Industrial dispute existing between the management of Firtilizer Corporation of India; Ltd. Barauni Unit, the petitioner herein and their workman Shri C.K. Dwivedi, respondent no.2, represented by Khad Karkhana Mazdoor Union, Urbaraknagar, Barauni to the Labour Court for adjudication under section 10 (1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1974. The matter referred to was "whether Shri C.K. Dwivedi, Steno-assistant has been allowed to supersede by the management of Feriliser Corporation of India Ltd. Barauni if so is that super-session justified ? If not, what relief he is entitled to." 3. The petitioner is a Government Company registered and Companies Act, and incorporated under the is engaged in manufacturing and sale of fertilizer. The company has a factory at Barauni in the district of Beguarai, Respondent no.2 C.K. Bhaumik and S.E. Pathak on being selected were appointed as temporary steno-assistants in Barauni Division with effect from the date they took over charge. They were to be on probation for a period of six months in the first instance, which could be extended for a further period not exceeding six months at the discretion of the management. It was stipulated in the memorandum of appointment (Annexure-2) that their 8etvir.es as steno, assistant will not be regarded as confirmed until a letter of confirmation has been issued in writing by the management. Respondent no.2 C.K. Dwivedi joined on 26.9.1970, S.B. Pathak on 30.9.1970 and S.C. Bhaumik on 3.11.1970. S.C. Bhaumik and S.B. Pathak were confirmed on expiry or six months from the date of their joining. But the probationary period of respondent C.K. Dwivedi was extended for another six months by Shri P.S.A. Raman, Stores Officer, on behalf of the Head of the Department (vide Annexure-3). He was confirmed as steno-assistant on 26.9.1971. The seniority list of steno-assistant was published on 22.7.1972 and 19.6.1974 in which respondent C.K. Dwivedi was shown as senior to S.C. Bhaumik and S.B. Pathak. He was confirmed as steno-assistant on 26.9.1971. The seniority list of steno-assistant was published on 22.7.1972 and 19.6.1974 in which respondent C.K. Dwivedi was shown as senior to S.C. Bhaumik and S.B. Pathak. On 29.8.1974 S.C. Bhaumik and S.B. Pathak made a representation objecting to the seniority list published on 19.6.1974. An employee could represent against the fixation of his seniority within 16 days of the issue of the letter fixing seniority but ignoring that the management made a necessary correction in the seniority list placing S.C. Boaumik and S.B. Pathak over respondent C.W. Dwivedi. This seniority list was published on 30.9.1974. Respondent C.K. Dwivedi objected to this seniority list within the stipulated period of 15 days and requested the management to restore his position as number one. This was turned down on the ground that the seniority has been changed duo to extension of his probationary period and of confirmation of Shri Bhaumik and Pathak. It may be stated here that the seniority list published on 22.7.1972 had never been challenged. Ultimately respondent C.K. Dwivedi was not promoted to the post of senior steno-assistant/Personal Assistant. The objection of respondent Dwivedi was that he was not informed of his shortcomings before the expiry of original probationary period according to the Rules or soon after expiry of probationary period about the intention of the management for extending his probationary period. He was never issued any chargesheet communicating that time was any deficiency in him. According to him the probationary period could not be extended in terms of the model standing orders and in any case more then three months at a time according to the certified standing orders. Respondent Dwivedi challenged the extension of the probationary period and ultimately the union raised the industrial dispute before the Labour Superintendent and Cancellation Officer On 14.2.1975. During the conciliation proceeding and interview as held for the post of Senior Steno-assistant/Personal Assistant on 16.4.1975, and persons who were junior, according to respondent Dwivedi, were promoted to that post ignoring his cases. He represented his case through his Head of Department but his representation was not forwarded to the Head office. 4. The Case of the management, inter alia, was that there was a genuine mistake in the earlier seniority list which was finally corrected on 30.9.1974 placing respondent Dwivedi below Bhaumik and Pathak. He represented his case through his Head of Department but his representation was not forwarded to the Head office. 4. The Case of the management, inter alia, was that there was a genuine mistake in the earlier seniority list which was finally corrected on 30.9.1974 placing respondent Dwivedi below Bhaumik and Pathak. According to the management the probationary period of the workman and their confirmation were governed by the provisions contained in the standing orders of the Company and other labour laws. The fundamental rules and supplementary rules did not apply. That standing Orders of the Corporation were certified On 30th June, 1971. Respondent Dwivedi prior to his appointment at Barauni Division with effect from 29.6.1970 was working at Gorakbpar unit of the Corporation as junior stenographer and joined Barauni Division as a steno-assistant with effect from 26.9.1970 and was placed on six months probation on the new post. His work was not found satisfactory but instead of reverting him to the post of Junior stenographer it was recommended to extend his probation period for another six months, According to the management the model standing orders do not prohibit the management from extending the period of probation. Tl1ere was no sub-stance in the allegation that the management was prejudiced against respondent Dwivedi, He was allowed to appear at the interview held no. 14.6.1975 for the post of Personal Assistant along with his senior colleagues but was not found suitable for the post. 5. Evidence both oral and documentary, were led before the Labour Court. A preliminary point was raised by the management before the Labour Court that super-session of respondent Dwivedi never assumed the character of industrial dispute and could not be referred for adjudication. That was rejected by the Labour Court. It was found that the reference made by the Government was quite competent and valid. The Labour Court formulated following points for consideration: (i) Whether C.K. Dwivedi the steno-assistant had been allowed to be superseded by the management ? (ii) If so, is that super-session justified ? (iii) If not what relief be is entitled to ? 6. It was found that the reference made by the Government was quite competent and valid. The Labour Court formulated following points for consideration: (i) Whether C.K. Dwivedi the steno-assistant had been allowed to be superseded by the management ? (ii) If so, is that super-session justified ? (iii) If not what relief be is entitled to ? 6. On the first point the Labour Court found that the probation period of respondent Dwiedi was extended for another six months from 23.3.1971 by letter dated 25.6.1971 i.e. after three months from the expiry of the original period of probation, This step was not taken up either during or immediately after the first six months probationary period, According to the model standing orders 2(b) (c) the workmen is required to be on probation for period or three months only and on expiry of that period he secures the status of a permanent appointment. It was, therefore, found that the special agreement putting respondent Dwivedi on a probation of six months was inconsistent with the model standing order. According to Labour Court the employer was bound to follow the model standing orders and any Act, of the employer in contravention of the model standing order was illegal the inconsistent part of the special agreement, that is to say, the appointment letter could not, therefore, prevail over the model standing order and was unenforceable. The Labour court farther round that even assuming that the appointment, made was binding as regards the period of probation, the probationary period of six months was never extended during the first six months period not immediately thereafter. It was extended after the expiry of three months. In extending the period of probation for another six months the management acted arbitrarily and malafide as there was no reasonable cause for such extension. It was held that the extension of the probationary period of respondent Dwivedi was unjustified. Respondent Dwivedi, therefore, should have been confirmed from 25.3.1971 instead of 25.9.1971. The management committed an error in changing the seniority list placing respondent Dwivedi below Bhaumik and Pathak. The ultimate finding of the Labour court is that respondent Dwivedi was allowed to be superseded by the management. 6. Respondent Dwivedi, therefore, should have been confirmed from 25.3.1971 instead of 25.9.1971. The management committed an error in changing the seniority list placing respondent Dwivedi below Bhaumik and Pathak. The ultimate finding of the Labour court is that respondent Dwivedi was allowed to be superseded by the management. 6. On the second question the Labour court has found that the performance of respondent Dwivedi 88 steno-assistant was found to be of highest category in merit rating, the Promotional Committee had not given any valid reason for not finding him suitable for the post of senior steno assistant and there was no reason for finding respondent Dwivedi unsuitable for the said post and promoting him. 7. On the third question the labour court has held that in view of the findings respondent Dwivedi should have been promoted with effect from 22.4.1975 instead of 30.4.1979 In the result the reference was answered, accordingly, holding that respondent Dwivedi was superseded by the management, that the super-session was unjustified and that he was entitled to get benefit of promotion with effect from 22.4.1975. 8. Mr. K.D. Chatterjee learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the Labour Court has travelled beyond the terms or reference in deciding the question regarding extension or period of probation and confirmation of respondent Dwivedi. He submitted that confirmation of an employee is not automatic. According to him although the standing order incorporated automatic confirmation but the same was not in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) and the standing order to that extent was void. 9. Respondent Dwivedi joined as steno-assistant on 26.9.1970. His appointment shows that he was put on probation for a period of six months in the first instance which could be extended for a further period not exceeding six months. It was also stipulated that he would not be confirmed until a letter of confirmation is issued by the management. By memorandum dated 25.6.1971 the period of his probation was extended for another period of six months with effect from 23.3.1971. The letter extending the period of probation was issued on 25.6.1971 that is to any, three months after the expiry of original period of probation. Standing orders of the Corporation (Ext. 5) were certified on 30.6.1973 and came into operation with effect from 30.7.1973. The letter extending the period of probation was issued on 25.6.1971 that is to any, three months after the expiry of original period of probation. Standing orders of the Corporation (Ext. 5) were certified on 30.6.1973 and came into operation with effect from 30.7.1973. Section 12-A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order), 1946 provides that before the establishment had a certified standing order the prescribed model standing order shall be deemed to have been adopted in that establishment and provisions of section 9 and 13-A shall apply to such model standing order as they apply to the standing orders so certified. As such the prescribed model standing orders were applicable In Barauni Unit of F.C.I. prior to 30.7.1973. The model standing order provides that "a probationer is a workman who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent post and has not completed three months service there..............” It further, provides that "if a permanent workman is a workman who has been engaged on a permanent basis and includes any person who has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months' in the same or in any other office...” This shows that according to the model standing order a workman is required to be on probation for a period of three months only and after the expiry of the period of three months he acquires the status of a permanent workmen. As stated above the appointment of respondent Dwivedi was on probation for six months' having a further clause that period of probation could be extended for another six months. This was in clear violation of the model standing orders. In other words the special agreement (appointment letter) was inconsistent with the model standing order which was then in force. In the case of Western India Match Company Ltd. Vs. Workman it was held that the contract for six months probation was inconsistent with the certified standing order. In that case a watchman had been employed as a probationer for six months when the certified standing orders only provided for two months probation. He was discharged during the period of probation of six months for reason that his service during probation period was not approved. The Labour Court found that the order of discharge was invalid on the ground that provisions for six months' probation was inconsistent with the certified standing orders as in the present case. He was discharged during the period of probation of six months for reason that his service during probation period was not approved. The Labour Court found that the order of discharge was invalid on the ground that provisions for six months' probation was inconsistent with the certified standing orders as in the present case. It was contended in the case of Western India Match Company Ltd. (supra) that the Labour Court had gone beyond the terms of reference when it sought to decide whether the provision for six months probation was valid or invalid that it was a special agreement not inconsistent with the standing orders and was valid as a settlement under section 18 of that Act, the Supreme Court held that validly or invalidity of the discharge obviously depended on the validity or invalidity of the term regarding six month probation. If the term was invalid and the order of discharge also would be invalid. It was also held that the special agreement of six months probation was inconsistent with the standing order to the extent of additional four months and that terms of employment specified in the standing order would prevail over the corresponding terms in the contract of service. It was further held that while the standing orders were in force it was not permissible for the employer to seek statutory modification of them so that there may be one set of standing order for one set of employee and another set for the rest. In the case of V.P. Co-operative Spinning Mills Ltd Vs. State of U.P. and others it was held that if the standing order prescribes three months' probation period the workmen becomes permanent on completion of three months' service satisfactorily and that the standing order prevails over the contract. It will, therefore, be not correct to say that the Labour Court in the instant case travelled beyond the terms of reference in deciding the question regarding extension of period of probation and confirmation of respondent Dwivedi it is the admitted position that the model standing orders were applicable at the relevant time and the provisions of sections 9, 13 (2) and 13 (4) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) apply to such model standing order all they apply to certified standing order. The petitioner-Corporation was bound to follow the model standing, order. The petitioner-Corporation was bound to follow the model standing, order. The inconsistent para of the special agreement (appointment letter) could not prevail over the model standing order which was then applicable. Respondent Dwivedi had completed three months of probationary period and there was no complaint against him. The labour court has found on the basis of evidence, adduced that his performance as stenographer was very good. He should have been automatically confirmed with effect from 25.12.1979 according to the mode standing order. Even assuming that the special agreement of appointment patting Dwivedi on six month,' probation was valid and binding the said period could not be extended for another six months as it was extended in the present calc. Admittedly the probationary period of six months was not extended during the first six months of probation nor immediately thereafter. The letter extending the probationary period was issued on 26.6.1971 and was received by Dwivedi on 1.7.1971. This was three months after the expiry of first six months probationary period. On the basis of evidence the Labour Court has found that there was no reasonable ground to extend the period of probation of Dwivedi. The Labour Court has also found that the Act, of management in extending the period of probation was arbitrary and mala fide therefore unjustified. I do not find any reason to interfere with this finding of fact. Even according to the terms and canditions or appointment, therefore, Dwivedi should have been confirmed with effect from 25.3.1971 instead of 25.9.1971. The seniority lists published on 22.7.1972 and 19.6.1974 showed the correct position and no objection was reaised either by Bhaumik or by Pathak within the stipulated period of 15 days from these dates. By publishing another seniority list on 30.9.1974 putting Dwivedi below Bhaumik and Pathak was obviously an error committed by the management. On either ground, therefore the Labour Court appears to be correct in holding that Dwivedi was senior than Bhlumik and Pathak and was wrongly superseded by the management. 10. It was however submitted that promotion was the function of management and the Labour Court should not have interfered in this matter. The Labour Court held that the Act, of super-session of Dwivedi was arbitrary and mala fide. In fact Dwivedi was promoted later on by the management to post of personal Assistant with effect from 30.4.1979. 10. It was however submitted that promotion was the function of management and the Labour Court should not have interfered in this matter. The Labour Court held that the Act, of super-session of Dwivedi was arbitrary and mala fide. In fact Dwivedi was promoted later on by the management to post of personal Assistant with effect from 30.4.1979. The Labour Court has held that he should get benefit of promotion to post of Senior steno-Assistant Personal Assistant with effect from 22.4.1975. In the case of Management of Brook Bond India (P) Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen. It was held that it was generally speaking promotion was It managerial function but there may he occasion when a tribunal may have to interfere with promotion made by the management where it was felt that persons superseded had been so superseded on account of mala fides or victimization. It was also held that if it was found that promotions had been made which were unjustified on the ground of mala fides or victimization the proper course for the Labour Court was to set aside the promotions and ask the management to consider the case of superseded employees and decide for itself whom to promote. In the present case I am satisfied that the Labour Court has rightly held that the Act, of super-session of Dwivedi was mala fide and I find no reason to interfere with this finding Dwivedi was also promoted later on. The Labour Court instead of setting aside the promotion of other had only changed the date of promotion of Dwivedi and other. In my opinion the Labour Court was justified in doing so it is not a case where the case of Dwivedi was still to be considered for promotion. Reference in this connection may also be made to case or Workman of M/s Williamson Magor and Company Ltd Vs. M/s Williamson Magor and Company Ltd.' 11. Having considered the facts and circumstance of this case and the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties I do not find any valid reason to interfere with the award of the Labour Court. The result is that this application fail and is dismissed but in the circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to cost. Application dismissed.