AVADH BEHARI ROHATGI ( 1 ) THIS case is classicillustration of law s delay. The purchasers agreed to buy aparcel of land on 13-1-1961. The suit for specific performancewas instituted on 18/09/1961. The trial court decreedthe suit in favour of one of the purchasers on February 2,1973. The present appeals were filed in 1973. And nowin 1985 we are deciding the appeals. Thus this litigation hastaken a quarter of a century. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs Siri Niwas, and the two minors Satishkumar and Brij Narain Singh, sued Roomal and Jodha forspecific performance. The suit was decreed in favour ofsiri Niwas. As regards the minor plaintiffs the suit wasdismissed. From the order of the Subordinate Judge dated2-2-1973 two appeals have been brought. R. F. A. 52 of 1973is the appeal of the vendors. Roomal and Jodha. Theychallenge the decree of specific performance obtained bysiri Niwas against (hem. R. F. A. 80 of 1973 is the appeal ofthe two minor plaintiffs namely, Satish and Brij Narain Singh. They contest the view of the trial court that they cannot suefor specific performance. This judgment will govern themboth. ( 3 ) THESE are the facts. On 13-1-1951, the defendantsroomal and Jodha, agreed to sell a residential plot beatingkhasra No. 208113211 measuring "about one bigha" withinthe abadi of Zamrudpur, Delhi, to the plaintiffs, STi Niwas,and the two minors, Satish Kumar and Brij Narain Singh. The agreement to sell was executed. The defendant agreedto complete the sale by 28-2-1961. The defendants did notperform their part of the agreement. They did not executethe sale deed. The plaintiffs brought the suit for specificperformance. As we have said, the suit was decreed " favourof Siri Niwas. The minors claim was declined. ( 4 ) IN the appeals three question. , arise for decision. Thefirst question is whether the minors can sue for specific performance. The trial judge held that. the agreement to sellcould be specifically enforced only by Siri Niwas. plaintiffno. 1, since he was a major and that the minor plaintiffs2 and 3 could not sue for specific performance. He held thatthe agreement to purchase (PX) was beyond the capacity ofthe guardians and did not bind the minors personally. Forthis view he followed the decisions in Sunder Singh v. Jiwansingh, (1970) 72 Punjab Law Reporter 218 (1 ). Mir Sarwarjanv. Fakruddia, 39 Indian Appeals 1 (2) and Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao, AIR 1948 PC 95 (3 ). He held thatthe agreement to purchase (PX) was beyond the capacity ofthe guardians and did not bind the minors personally. Forthis view he followed the decisions in Sunder Singh v. Jiwansingh, (1970) 72 Punjab Law Reporter 218 (1 ). Mir Sarwarjanv. Fakruddia, 39 Indian Appeals 1 (2) and Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao, AIR 1948 PC 95 (3 ). ( 5 ) WE cannot accept this view. This question is nowconcluded by a recent decision of the. Supreme Court Manik Chand v. Ramchandra, AIR 1981 S. C. 519 (4 ). Thecase settles an important point of Hindu Law on whichthere was much controversy. In the High Courts (here wasa conflict of opinion. There were two schools of thought. Oneschool held that the Privy Council decision in Mir Sarwarjanv. Fakruddin (supra) held the field and therefore a contractentered into by a natural guardian of a Hindu minor for thepurchase of property was not enforceable on behalf of theminor. They held that he must fail if he sucs for specific. performance for the reason that it is not within the competence of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or minor sestate by a contract for the purchase of immovable propertyas there is no mutuality. This school believed in the doctrineof mutuality on which the decision of the Privy Council inmir Sarwarjan is based. On the other hand, the other school held that Mir Sarwarjan was no longer good law afterthe decision of the Privy Council in Subrahmanyam v. Subbarao (supra) and therefore a minor s contract entered into byhis guardian can be enforced if it is for the benefit of theminor or his estate, In the governing decision of Mohri Bibiv. Dhurmadas Ghose (1903) 30 I. A. 114 (5) the Privy Councilheld that a minor s contract is void and cannot be ratified. Nor there can be estoppel against the minor. But where theguardian of a minor enters into a contract on behalf of theminor the position is different. The powers of the naturalguardian are defined in Hindu Law. He can only functionwithin doctrine of legal necessiry or benefit. (Hanoomanpershad v. Mst. Babooe (1836) 6 M. I. A. 393 (6 ). This schoolargued that the validity of the transaction of sale or purchaseto be judged reference to the scope of the guardian spower to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor. He can only functionwithin doctrine of legal necessiry or benefit. (Hanoomanpershad v. Mst. Babooe (1836) 6 M. I. A. 393 (6 ). This schoolargued that the validity of the transaction of sale or purchaseto be judged reference to the scope of the guardian spower to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor. ( 6 ) THE controversy started in 1911 when Mir Sarwarjanwas decided by Lord Macnaghten. Indian Courts werebound by that decision. In 1948 when the Privy Councildecided Subrahmanyam the view of Lord Macnaghten inmir Sarwarjan began to he doubled, but as both the decisions were of the Privy Council controversy continued. In1956 the Indian Legislature passed the Hindu Minority andguardianship Act. In Section 8 the powers of the naturalguardian of a Hindu minor were codified. In 1963 the newspecific Relief Act was passed. Section 20 (4) was enactedfor the first time abolishing the doctrine of mutuality. Thelaw Commission had recommended the abolition of the discredited doctrine of mutuality. The legislature abrogated it. Inthe light of the new legislation the question arose whether thetwo deepens were still good law. The Supreme Court hasnow resolved this long standing controversy. ( 7 ) THE Supreme Court has categorically held that a contractentered into by a guardian on behalf of the. minor is enforceable. The court did not follow Mir Sarwajan, and overruledthe view taken in that case. Under the Hindu law the naturalguardian is empowered to enter into a contract on behalf ofthe minor and the contract would be binding and enforceableif the contract is for the benefit of the minor. The Courtsaid: "the position under the Hindu Law is that a guardianhas legal competence to enter into a contract onbehalf of the minor for necessity or for the benefitof the estate. " ( 8 ) THE court approved of the decision of the Madras Highcourt in Krishnaswami v. Sundarappayyar, (1894) ILR 18mad. 415 (7) and held that : "the English Law that a minor cannot claim specificperformance which proceeds, on the ground ofwant of mutuality has no application to thiscountry. " ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court followed the view of the Privy. Council expressed in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao. AIR 1948p. C. 95 and held that a guardian of a minor is competent toenter into a contract on behalf of the minor so as to bind himit it is for the benefit of the minor. " ( 9 ) THE Supreme Court followed the view of the Privy. Council expressed in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao. AIR 1948p. C. 95 and held that a guardian of a minor is competent toenter into a contract on behalf of the minor so as to bind himit it is for the benefit of the minor. The court approved ofthe view of the Full Bench of Andhra High Court in Suryaprakasam v. Cangarain AIR 1956 A. P. 33 (8), 40 (FB)and agreed with the High Court that Mir Sarwarjan had beenimpliedly overruled by Subranmanyam. Mir Sarwarjan istherefore no longer good law. There are two reasons whymir Sarwarjan has lost all authority. One is that mutuality isno longer the test. Secondly in cases of transfer of propertyit is not the minor s contract with which the court is concerned. The court is concerned with the guardian s powers in Hindulaw when he makes the contract on behalf of the minor. If the contract is for the benefit of the minor and within thecompetence of the guardian the contact is valid and enforceable, whether it is for sale or purchase of property. Theguardian has substantial legal capacity to act on behalf of theminor. He has full contractual powers. The restriction onhis powers is that he must act for the benefit of the minor andnot to his detriment. ( 10 ) SUBRAHMANYAM is a clear authority for propositionthat mutuality does not apply to a minor s contract made bybis guardian on his behalf. The importance of Subrahmanyamlies in this that it did away with mutuality and rested thedecision on the guardian s capacity to enter into a contractfor the benefit of the minor. The Judicial Committee heldthat a guardian could enter into an agreement for the sale ofthe property which would be binding on the minor if theagreement was for legal necessity or for the benefit of theminor and such a contract was capable of specific performance (See Pollock and Mulla Contract 9th ed. p. 115 ). It took37 years before the true principle of Hindu Law was authoritativelystaled. How slow and painful is the development ofthe law. Subrahmanyam is a landmark decision in the historyof minor s incapacity. But the controversy did not end withsubrahmanyam. In fact it began with it. Some courts continued to follow Mir Sarwarjan. Some applied Subrahmanyam. p. 115 ). It took37 years before the true principle of Hindu Law was authoritativelystaled. How slow and painful is the development ofthe law. Subrahmanyam is a landmark decision in the historyof minor s incapacity. But the controversy did not end withsubrahmanyam. In fact it began with it. Some courts continued to follow Mir Sarwarjan. Some applied Subrahmanyam. This conflict was set at rest only in 1931 by the Supreme Courtin Manik Chand. Thus ended the long domination of thedoctrine of mutuality in India. ( 11 ) THE Andhra High Court has held that there is noessential distinction between the comtract of sale and contractof purchase. One change has certainly been made now bythe statute. For sale of the minor property sanction of thecourt is now necessary (See Section 8. Hindu Minority andguardianship Act ). Finally the Supreme Court held: ". . . . AFTER the passing of Hindu Minority Act, 1956,the guardian of a Hindu minor has power to doall acts which are necessary or reasonable andproper for the benefit of the minor or for realisation, protection or benefit of the minor s estate. This provision makes it clear that the guardian isentitled to act so as to bind the minor if it isnecessary or reasonable and proper for the benefitof the minor. The power thus conferred by thesection is in no way more restricted than that wasrecognised under the Hindu Law. It is not disputed in this case that the contract entered intoby the guardian is for the benefit of the minor. Itappears quite strange that the respondent shouldplead that the transaction is not for the benefit ofthe minor when the minor is convinced it is inhis benefit and that it is worth pursuing the litigation up to this Court. 1. is common knowledgethat the prices of immovable property have beenon the rise and there can he no doubt that thetransaction is for the benefit of the minor. " ( 12 ) THE court rejected the argument that a contract topurchase property on behalf of the minor amounted to imposinga personal covenant on the minor. The court concluded: "we are unable to accept this contention for it cannotbe said that the guardian by the contract wasbinding the minor by his personal covenant. " ( 12 ) THE court rejected the argument that a contract topurchase property on behalf of the minor amounted to imposinga personal covenant on the minor. The court concluded: "we are unable to accept this contention for it cannotbe said that the guardian by the contract wasbinding the minor by his personal covenant. Asit is within the competence of guardian, the contract is entered into effectively on behalf of theminor and the liability to pay the money is theliability of the minor under the Transfer of Propertyact. We are unable to accept the plea that in acontract for purchase of property, the guardianwould be binding the minor by his personal covenantin the result, we find that the contractentered into by the guardian on behalf of theminor is enforceable. " ( 13 ) THE following passage from Pollck and Mulla s Indiacontract. and Specific Relief Acts, 7th ed. p. 70 sums up thelegal position : "it is, however, different with regard to contracts enteredinto on behalf of a minor by his guardian or bya manager of his estate. In such a case it hasbeen held by the High Courts of India, in caseswhich arose subsequent to the governing decisionof the Privy Council that the contract can bespecially enforced by or against the minor, if thecontract is one which it is within the competenceof the guardian to enter into on his behalf so asto bind him by it, and, further, if it is for thebenefit of the minor. But if either of these twoconditions is wanting, the contract cannot bespecifically enforced at all. " ( 14 ) THIS passage was quoted with approval by the Privycouncil in Subrahmanyam and by the Supreme Court inmanik Chand. ( 15 ) THE legal petition is this. The minor "transferor" and a "transferee". Of course subject to the restrictonsenacted in the Hindu Minority and Gaurdianship Act on thepowers of the Guardian of a Hindu minor A contract entered into by a guardian of a Hindu minor for purchase or saleof immovable property is specification enforceable by or againstthe minor, the substantial case law which grew around thedoctrine of mutuality since 1877 when old specific Reliefact was passed may now safely be consigned to the legal wastepaper basket. ( 16 ) THE trial judge followed the Punjab decision of Pandit J. in Sunder Singh v. Jiwan Singh (1970) 72 PLR 21 S. in ouropinion that case was not correctly decided A minor purchaser of land was the plaintiff. He agreed to purchase landfrom one Jai Singh. The vendor did not execute conveyance. The. minor sued of specific performance. Following Mirsarwarjan Pandit J. held that before holding that the minorplaintiff can enforce the contract the court must find (1) whether the contract was within the competence of the guardian,and (2) whether it is for the benefit of the minor. Heremitted the case to the trial court to give a finding on thesetwo points in the light of the provisions sec. 9 (1) of the Hinduminority and Guardianship Act. ( 17 ) WITH respect what the learned judge missed is that the airthority and competence of the guardian he was the father before Pandit J.) can be challenged only by the minor orsomeone en his behalf, say maternal uncle or mother. It cannot be challenged by the vendor. He is not the minor s keeper. Nor parens patriae. Nor patria potestas The vendor Jaichand knew that the purchaser was a minor and on his behalfhis father had made the contract to purchase land. It will beunjust if the vendor, after making the contract, can questionthe competence of the guardian and require the court to findwhether thecontract is for the benefit of the minor. A contract breaker, a wrong doer, will then he taking advantage of his own wrong. On his own breach he will gloat with satisfaction. He will rejoice in his wrong doing. The law will becomean instrument of fraud No one will buy in the name of theminor. This is introducing the doctrine of mutuality in disguise. And mutuality doctrine the legislaturs has abolished. ft has disappeared from the legal vocabulary of the Specificrelief Act Mr. Sarwajan is based on the leading Englishcase of Flight v. Bolland (1828) 38 PR. 817 (9 ). This wasreferred to in arguments before the Privy Council. (See P. 2 of39 I. A. 1 ). ( 18 ) FLIGHT v. Bolland is an illustration of the rule thatwhere mutuality is lacking the court will not order specificperformance. The minor was held unable to obtain specificperformance on the basis that. specific performance, would notbe decreed against him. This wasreferred to in arguments before the Privy Council. (See P. 2 of39 I. A. 1 ). ( 18 ) FLIGHT v. Bolland is an illustration of the rule thatwhere mutuality is lacking the court will not order specificperformance. The minor was held unable to obtain specificperformance on the basis that. specific performance, would notbe decreed against him. But after the abolition of the doctrineof mutuality by sec. 20 (4) Flight v. Bolland has no applicationin India. Though mutuality the legislature buried in 1963still it continued to govern us from the grave till the Supremecourt decided Manik Chand in 1981. Mutuality is no longerthe test. The true test is the authority and competence of theguardian to enter into the contract for the benefit of the minoror his estate. (Bhupal v. Mamchand. AIR 1973 All. 543 ) (10 ). But competence can bs challenged by some one on behalt of the minor who is interested in his welfare and not bythe vendor. It is only the minor who can raise the objectionbased on sec. 8 (1) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianshipact, 1956 and not a third party. (Linga Reddy v. Ramchandrappa, AIR 1971 Mysore 194) (11 ). It is strange asthe Supreme Court said, that the vendor car. plead that thetransaction is not for the benefit of the minor when the mineris convinced that it is for his benefit. ( 19 ) THOUGH Lord Macnagthen s opinion in Mir Sarwarjan isentitled to the greatest respect due to that. great master of thelaw, we may be forgiven for saying that Homer sometimes nods. Mir Sarwarjan is mutuality run riot, as Viswanatha Sastri J. said in. Ramalingam v. Bavanambal Ammal, AIR 1951 Mad,431 (12), 433. He held that in Subrahmanyam the doctrine ofmutulity was discarded by the very tribunal which was responsible for its introduction in India, and that we need no longerfeel oppressed by the doctrine of mutuality as it was pot onlyunjust but also illogical. His view was accepted by the Fullbench of Andhra in Suryprakasam v. Gangaraju. AIR 1956a. P. 33. The Supreme Court approved of the Andhra Fullbench as a correct exposition of the law. ( 20 ) THE truth is that Mir Sarwarjan was decided purely onenglish law. It did not take note of the personal law of thehindus. That the question is essentially of Hindu Law wasemphasised by Lord Morton in Subrahmanyam. In Imambandiv. AIR 1956a. P. 33. The Supreme Court approved of the Andhra Fullbench as a correct exposition of the law. ( 20 ) THE truth is that Mir Sarwarjan was decided purely onenglish law. It did not take note of the personal law of thehindus. That the question is essentially of Hindu Law wasemphasised by Lord Morton in Subrahmanyam. In Imambandiv. Mutsaddi (1918) 45 LA. 73 (13) Sir Ameer Ali in Privycouncil decided the question on the rules of Muslim law. ( 21 ) WE have, therefore, come to the conclusion that thecontract was not void on account of minority of plaintiffs 2 and3 and that it was enforceable at the instance of all the threeplaintiffs. The learned judge was in error in dismiss the claimof the minor plaintiffs 2 and 3. ( 22 ) THE second defence raised by the vendors was that thepurchasers were not prepared to pay the price of onebigha i. e. 1008 sq. yards and were therefore not willing toperform their part of the agreement. In this connection counselfor the vendors, referred us to the statement of Siri Niwas wherein unambiguous terms the said : "we were not prepared to payprice of one bigha land to the defendants because this questiondoes not arise. " Was this stand justified ? In other words, thequestion is whether the purchasers were bound to pay theprice of one bigha or less. ( 23 ) BY contract dated 13-1-1961 the vendors agreed tosell "approximately" one bigha of land. The agreement to sellbays "about I bigha". What then is the meaning of the word"about"? This is partly a matter of fact and partly a matterof law. The! expressions "approximately" and "about" meanmuch the same as the phrase "more or less". Approximatelymeans very nearly but not absolutely. Near in quantity. Withrelation to quantity, the term suggests only an estimate ofprobable quantity. Its import is that the actual quantity is anear approximation to that mentioned, and it has the effect ofproviding against accidental variations. The term is of relativesignificance, varying with circumstances. When the vendor usessuch a phrase as say about his purpose is to guard himselfagainst being supposed to have made any absolute promise asto quantity (Benjamin on Sale 8th ed. p. 707 ). The term is of relativesignificance, varying with circumstances. When the vendor usessuch a phrase as say about his purpose is to guard himselfagainst being supposed to have made any absolute promise asto quantity (Benjamin on Sale 8th ed. p. 707 ). ( 24 ) THESE words or similar expression as be the same moreor less" are used in contracts for the sale of land and conveyances to cover any slight inaccuracy in the area as stated. Thedescription would run, "containing ten acres be the same moreor less". They would cover only a very slight deficiency in thearea. What precisely they cover has never been accuratly laiddown: and for any considerable deficiency the purchaser wouldbe entitled to an abatement of the agreed price (Cross v. Eglen (1831) 109 E. R. 1083) (14 ). The more general form now is "tenacres of thereabouts. " The effect of the words "about" or"approximately" has never been yet absolutely fixed by decision. ( 25 ) IN the present context the expression "about bigha"left the quantity of land altogether uncertain. The precisequantity was not mentioned in the agreement. The parties contemplated some other criterion of the quantity of land that wasagreed to be sold. The area was precisely described in the planincorporated in the agreement. The agreement refers to theplan and says: "the map of the land is with this" agreement. The plan is the criterion. What was left uncertain the agreementwas defined with precision in the plan. The. exact quantity ofland comprised in the boundaries of the plan, was agreed to beconveyed. ( 26 ) EVEN in the conveyances of skilful conveyances suchexpression as more or less or about so much are frequentlyused. The ambiguity in the instrument is explained in the plan. The expression about one bigha are words of estimate andexpectation. The words of incorporation of the plan inthe instrument are "words of contract". The vendor is sayingto the purchaser: "you are buying the enclosed land as shownin the diagram. " The word about or nearly is the direct opposite of extactly or precisely . ( 27 ) NOW what are the facts found by the trial judge ? Onthe question of actual area of the plot he found that at thetime of the execution of the agreement the land was notmeasured. An architect was produced in evidence who had measured the plot and prepared a plan (Ex. P-5 ). ( 27 ) NOW what are the facts found by the trial judge ? Onthe question of actual area of the plot he found that at thetime of the execution of the agreement the land was notmeasured. An architect was produced in evidence who had measured the plot and prepared a plan (Ex. P-5 ). He stated that thearea of the plot was about 817. 9 sq. yards excluding the galiif the gali is included the area comes to 857. 9 sq. yards. In theplaint the plaintiffs had given the area on a rough estimate as887 sq. yards approximately. The only question is. whether galishould be included in or excluded from the land, agreed: to besold. ( 28 ) THE learned judge accepted the testimony of the architect and held that the area of the gali cannot be included in thearea of the plot. He found as a fact that the area of the landwhich was agreed to be conveyed by the vendors was 817. 9 sq. yards. For this area the purchaser Siri Niwas was directed todeposit the balance price of Rs. 12,084. 00 at the agreed rate ofrs. 16. 00 per sq. yard. . ( 29 ) IN our opinion the findings of the learned judge cannotbe faulted. From the evidence one thing is clear. The area of theplot was not measured at the time the agreement to self wasexecuted. The area sold was described as "about bigha". Thisis why the rate was fixed as Rs. 16/.- per square yard. It was nota lump sum price. The purchasers were to pay at the rate ofrs. 16. 00 per square yard for the land found on measurementand delineated in the plan (A-1 incorporated in the agreementto sell. ( 30 ) NOW it is a settled principle of law that where there is adispute regarding the area of the property sold but boundariesof the property are not disputed, the boundaries. shall prevailover the measurements. (See Subbayya v. M. Muthra Goundanair 1924 Mad. 493 (15); Raghunandan v. Kishundeo, AIR1926 Pat. 257 (16); Province of Bengal v. Mohd. Yusuf, AIR1943 Cal. 122 (17); and Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichura Kuer,air. 1963 S. C. 1879 (18 ). Here the plan is not just annexedto the agreement. It is incorporated in the agreement. Thedelineation of the parcel of land in the plan is the controllingfactor. The agreement states the land approximately. 257 (16); Province of Bengal v. Mohd. Yusuf, AIR1943 Cal. 122 (17); and Sheodhyan Singh v. Sanichura Kuer,air. 1963 S. C. 1879 (18 ). Here the plan is not just annexedto the agreement. It is incorporated in the agreement. Thedelineation of the parcel of land in the plan is the controllingfactor. The agreement states the land approximately. The planfines it with certainty. The land dcscribed in general terms inthe agreement is sufficiently described in the plan by the particular description of the boundaries enclosing the land on allthe four sides. ( 31 ) THERE is another good reason why we should exclude thegali from the land agreed to be sold. The agreement dated13-1-61 says : "before the registration of the land, the landwill have to be got vacated. " This means that the vendorsagreed to give vacant possession of the land to the purchasers. Ofthe gali vacant posession cannot be delivered. We therefore agreewith the trial judge that the land agreed to be sold is 817. 9 sq. yards and the purchasers are to pay for this only at the agreedrate of Rs. 161- per sq. yard. ( 32 ) WE were referred to Tata Industrial Bank v. Rustomjeebramjee Jeegebhoy (1920) 57 IC 957 (19) and section 12 ofthe Specific Relief Act to persuade us that in this case weshould refuse specific performance because the land agreed tobe sold was 1008. sq. yards and on measurement it was foundto be only 817. 9. sq. yards and the difference between the twoareas does not bear "a small proportion to the whole", in thewords of See. 12. We have no hesitation in rejection this argument. We have held on the interpretation of the contract thatthe vendors agreed to sell and the purchasers agreed to buyonly that area of the land which was depicted in the diagram. We have held that the plan is an integral part of the deseriptionof the lard Neither Sec. 12 nor the Bomway ruling in tataindustrial Bank has any relevance. We have not ordered thevendors to pay compensation because the area is found to hesmaller than that which they agreed to sell. That is just thetype of case contemplated in Sec. 12 (2 ). What we have foundis that the area agreed to be sold was in reality and substance817. 9 sq. yards. There is no difference in quantity. We have not ordered thevendors to pay compensation because the area is found to hesmaller than that which they agreed to sell. That is just thetype of case contemplated in Sec. 12 (2 ). What we have foundis that the area agreed to be sold was in reality and substance817. 9 sq. yards. There is no difference in quantity. There isno question of award of compensation under Sec. 12, Specificrelief Act. ( 33 ) WE do not sec why we should not order specific performanceagainst the vendors when we find that thepurchasers conduct is blameless and there are no disqualifying circumstancesdisentitling them to the discretionary remedy of specific performance. The rule is that "the Court will grant specific performance if it can be done without injustice or unfairness to thedefendent. " (Price v. Strange (1978) Ch. 337 (20) at p. 357 pergoff LJ. ). ( 34 ) THE third defence raised by the vandors was that thepurchasers were not ready and willing to perform their part ofthe agreement. On this issue the learned judge accepted theevidence of the purchasers. He came to the conclusion that thepurchasers had the balance consideration of Rs. 16,500. 00 readywith them on 28-2-61, the date fixed for the completion of thesale. He held that as the vendors admittedly did not attend thesub-Registrar s office on 28-2-1961 and did not complete thesale they had failed to perform their part of the agreement. On the evidence adduced by the purchasers in the case we haveno hesitation in endorsing these findings. There is no evidenceto the contrary to displace the finding of the learned judge. ( 35 ) FOR these reasons we dismiss the vendors appeal (RFA52 of 1973: Roomal and Jodha v. Siri Niwas and others,) withcosts. ( 36 ) THE purchasers appeal RFA 80 of 1973 : Satish Kumarand ors. v. Roomal and others) we allow with costs. We havebeen informed that the purchasers have deposited the balancesals price i. e. Rs. 12,0841- in Court. The vendors are orderedto execute the sale deed within one month from today failingwhich the trial court will execute the conveyance at the costof the vendors.