Judgment :- 1. The defendant in O. S. No. 12 of 1976 of the Sub Court, Alleppey is the appellant. The plaintiffs (three in number) are the respondents The suit was laid for recovery of possession of plaint schedule property "Kannitta" (drying yard for copra) with arrears of rent. The suit property is 741/2 cents of land in Sy. No. 826/5 and 829/8 in Alleppy village together with the buildings (sheds) appurtenant thereto. The monthly rent was Rs 440/-. The defendant was holding under the mother of the plaintiffs. It could be seen from Ext. B8 dated 11-1-1972 that the tenancy expired on 30-4-1974. The deceased mother of the plaintiff sent a notice dated 22-10-1974 terminating the tenancy on 30-11-1974. Even after the expiry of the tenancy the defendant is continuing in possession. Repeated requests and demands to vacate the premises were of no avail. At one stage plaintiffs' mother demanded the defendant to paya sum of Rs. 750/- per mensem. This was not acceded to. A suit notice, Ext. Al. dated 1-1-1975 was sent. By Ext. A20, dated 22-1-1975, the properties were gifted to the plaintiffs. On behalf of the plaintiffs Ext. A2 notice dated 26-9-1975 was sent to the defendant, calling upon it to surrender possession. The defendant did not accede to the request. Finally the suit was laid for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property with arrears of compensation at Rs. 1000/-per mensem from 1-11-1975, the last date fixed for surrender of possession as per Ext. A2 being 31-11-1975. 2. The defendant resisted the suit. It was contended that the suit is barred since it relates to eviction of the defendant from the buildings as defined under Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The requirement of the plaintiffs is not bona fide and they are not entitled to demand vacant possession. Even after the expiry of the tenancy on 30-4-1974 the plaintiffs accepted the rent for the property till 31-8-1974. The tenancy was not terminated by an appropriate notice. The claim for enhanced rent, Rs, 750/-was excessive. Exts. Al and A2 notices are invalid and cannot enable the plaintiffs to demand possession of the property. There is no cause of action for the plaintiffs and so the suit should be dismissed. 3. The tenancy was not terminated by an appropriate notice. The claim for enhanced rent, Rs, 750/-was excessive. Exts. Al and A2 notices are invalid and cannot enable the plaintiffs to demand possession of the property. There is no cause of action for the plaintiffs and so the suit should be dismissed. 3. The court below held that what was leased out to the defendant is 'Kannitta' (yard for drying copra) and the lease is not in respect of building. It will not come within the ambit of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The plaintiffs are entitled to get recovery of possession of the property from the defendant. Even if the suit is one for eviction from the buildings, the civil suit is not barred. According to the lower court, the evidence showed that the lease expired on 30-4-1974 and thereafter the plaintiffs or their mother, have not received any rent from the defendant. The tenancy is also terminated by sending notice to the defendant company. The plaintiffs have cause of action to institute the suit and the tenancy has been validly terminated. The defendant has no case that any rent has been paid after 30-4-1974. The defendant offered rent at Rs. 550/- per month when the plaintiffs? mother demanded the defendant to vacate the premises and claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 750/-per mensem. The compensation payable after 31-8-1974 can be taken to be Rs. 550/-per month, which is reasonable. The plaintiffs are entitled to such amount from the defendant for the continued occupation of the premises after 31-8-1974. A decree was passed for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property with arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.440/- per mensem from 30-4-1974 to 31-8-1974 and thereafter from 1-9-1974 till surrender of possession at the rate of Rs. 550/-per mensem for use and occupation. The defendant has come up in appeal. 4. Appellant's counsel Mr. E. R Venkiteswaran raised three points: (1) The lease in the instant case is of the plaint schedule building and the land appurtenant thereto. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. (2) There is no valid termination of tenancy. (3) The notice sent on the earlier occasion was "waived". There was fresh tenancy. Exts. Al and A2 notices would substantiate this. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. (2) There is no valid termination of tenancy. (3) The notice sent on the earlier occasion was "waived". There was fresh tenancy. Exts. Al and A2 notices would substantiate this. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents, Mr. T S. Venkateswara Iyer, contended that in the instant case, the demise is of "Kannitta", (drying yard for copra) the land with the appurtenant building and so the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are inapplicable. The suit is maintainable. It is also contended that the tenancy expired on 30-4-1974 and thereafter no rent was received by the landlord, nor any payment made. Indeed, arrears from 30-4-1974 is claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit. This is not disputed. No notice, terminating the tenancy, was necessary. Even 'so, a notice was sent on 22-10-1974 terminating the tenancy on 30-11-1974. There were subsequent notices also terminating the tenancy. Sending of a notice terminating the tenancy is a surplusage in this case. The tenancy expired on 30-4-1974. Since after the expiration of the lease on 30-4-1974, no rent was received or accepted or paid to the landlord, and the landlord also did not otherwise assent to the tenant continuing in possession, there is no holding over. There was no fresh tenancy, either. It was neither pleaded nor proved. The claim for enhanced payment by the landlord was at no point of time accepted by the defendant-tenant. In such circumstances, there was neither holding over, nor afresh tenancy. The court below correctly held that the suit is maintainable. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule property with arrears of rent. 5. We heard counsel for the appellant, Mr. E R. Venkateswaran and counsel for the respondents Mr. T. S. Venkateswara Iyer. We are of opinion that none of the contentions raised by the appellant's counsel are tenable. 6. Ext. A21 is the sketch of the plaint schedule property. The total area is 741/2 cents. It is roughly 29,450 sq. feet. The building portion occupies only 1920 sq.feet. The 'Kannitta' the drying yard is 27000 sq. feet. The demise is not evidenced by any deed. On a perusal of Exts. 6. Ext. A21 is the sketch of the plaint schedule property. The total area is 741/2 cents. It is roughly 29,450 sq. feet. The building portion occupies only 1920 sq.feet. The 'Kannitta' the drying yard is 27000 sq. feet. The demise is not evidenced by any deed. On a perusal of Exts. A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8 and A9, the communications addressed by the defendant to the plaintiffs' predecessor, it is evident that what was demised is only the 'kannitta' the land used for drying copra. The sheds existing then (building) are only appurtenant to the said 'kannitta'. It is well-known that 'kannitta' is a yard used for drying copra. What was demised has to be understood only by reference to the correspondence between the parties. The said correspondence evidenced by Exts. A3 to A8 and A H leave no room for doubt in our mind that what was demised was only 'kannitta', the vacant land used for drying copra. We are unable to hold that the demise was of the building. Delivering the judgment of the bench, in Nanu Nair v. Krishnan Nair (1957 KLT. 286) Varadaraja Iyengar J. observed as follows: "Now the question whether a particular lease concerns a building and its site together with the garden or land appurtenant thereto or it is the other way, viz., it is in respect of a land or garden with a building appertaining thereto, is ordinarily a question of fact depending upon various considerations viz., the extent and nature of the land, the nature of the building, the income from the land and the probable rent of the building. The land here is about 11/2 acres in extent with a large number of yielding trees thereon and clearly a building attached to it does not turn the scale." Vaidialingam J. in Thressia v. Saraswathi Amma (1960 KLJ. 258) at page 259, held: "In my opinion, before the provisions of Kerala Act XVI/1959 could be invoked by the party, that party must be able to establish that the main and sole object of the transaction relied upon by him and covered by any document relates to the lease of a building. The fact that in a particular lease or property, a building also is situated will not by itself bring the said lease within the ambit of Kerala Act XVI/59. The fact that in a particular lease or property, a building also is situated will not by itself bring the said lease within the ambit of Kerala Act XVI/59. The definition of 'landlord' as a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of a building and also of a 'tenant' as a person by whom and on whose account rent is payable for a building and also the various other provisions of the said Act clearly give an indication that before a lease can be brought within the ambit of the said Act. it must be essentially a lease of a building. No doubt, under the definition of 'building' it is also stated that it will include the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures, if any, appurtenant to such building. But the emphasis is in the main that it should be the lease of a building." We concur with the above decisions. We affirm the finding and conclusion of the court below that what was leased out to the defendant is the 'Kannitta' (yard for drying copra) and the lease in question is not one in respect of a building coming within the ambit of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. We hold that the suit is maintainable. 7. The 2nd point raised was that the tenancy was not validly terminated In Para.2 of the plaint it has been categorically stated that the tenancy expired on 30-4-1974. It is also stated that no rent was received or paid to the landlord subsequent thereto. In Para.4 of the written-state-ment this is denied. It is stated, that the defendant continued to occupy the premises even after 30-4-1974 and the plaintiffs accepted the rent for the plaint schedule property till 31-8-1974. It is common ground that no rent was paid to the landlords or accepted by them after the expiry of the lease on 30-4-1974. In Para.11 of the judgment the court below has found that the lease expired on 30-4-1974 and thereafter the plaintiffs or their mother had not received any rent from the defendant. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the provisions of S.116 read with S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, can be invoked in the instant case? In Para.11 of the judgment the court below has found that the lease expired on 30-4-1974 and thereafter the plaintiffs or their mother had not received any rent from the defendant. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the provisions of S.116 read with S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, can be invoked in the instant case? There is no material to hold that after the expiration of the tenancy on 30 4-1974 any rent was paid to or received by the landlord. There is also no evidence to hold that the tenant was continuing in possession with the assent of the landlord. Indeed, the evidence in this case indicates the contrary, and that there was dissent by the landlord after the expiry of the term. The landlord sent a notice dated 20-10-1974 purporting to terminate the tenancy by 30-11-1974. This was followed up by subsequent notices evidenced by Ext. Al dated 1-1-1975 and Ext. A2 dated 26-9-1975. In these circumstances, it is idle to invoke the provisions of S 116 read with S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The question of termination of tenancy by sending a notice does not at all arise in this case. Even so, it is evident that by notice dated 22-10-1974 the tenancy has been terminated on 30-11-1974 as could be seen from the recitals in the suit notice, Ext. Al, dated 1-1-1975. There was even a subsequent notice evidenced by Ext. A2 dated 26-9-1975 terminating the tenancy by 31-10-1975. There is sufficient compliance with the provisions of law even assuming that notice terminating the tenancy is required We are of opinion that no question of termination of tenancy by notice arose in this case. Even so, the notice sent on 22-10-1974, and the notice, Ext. A2, dated 26-9-1975 are sufficient in law. 8. The last point raised was that by sending the notices on 22-10-1974, Ext. Al dated 1-1-1975 and Ext. A2 dated 26-9-1975. whereby the landlord claimed enhanced rent, the earlier notices have been waived and there is a fresh tenancy. This plea was not put forward in the lower court. Even so, it is common ground that the demand for higher rent was never agreed to or accepted by defendant-tenant. The tenant never agreed. In such circumstances, it is futile to contend that the earlier notices have been waived. There is no waiver in this case. This plea was not put forward in the lower court. Even so, it is common ground that the demand for higher rent was never agreed to or accepted by defendant-tenant. The tenant never agreed. In such circumstances, it is futile to contend that the earlier notices have been waived. There is no waiver in this case. It is also futile to contend that any new tenancy came into existence. The parties never intended to bring forth a fresh tenancy. This is a matter for agreement. No such case was set up or proved. We may, in this connection, quote the observations from'Hill & Red man's Law of Landlord and Tenant', 17th Edn. (1982) Vol. I, at page 495: "A mere demand for rent in respect of a period after the expiration of the notice, not followed by a promise to pay by the tenant, cannot so operate for want of the tenant's consent, (c) Even payment and acceptance of such rent, which requires the concurrence of both parties, will only operate in favour of the tenant if it is shown that the parties intended that there should be a new tenancy." The above observations; are fully applicable to the instant case. None of the requirements stated above are present in this case. We reject the plea of "waiver" also. 9. All the contentions urged by the appellant's counsel fail. The judgment and decree of the court below are confirmed. The appeal is without merit. It is dismissed with costs. 10. Appellant's counsel Sri. E. R. Venkateswaran pleaded, that in case, we are not inclined to accept his contentions, and the appeal is dismissed, the defendant may be allowed time to vacate the premises. The suit is of the year 1976. It was decreed on 23-11-1977. The court below granted time to surrender, two months. The appeal, filed as early as 1979, was pending for nearly five years. However, we are inclined to give a direction that in case the appellant-defendant files an unconditional undertaking in the court below within 15 days from today, agreeing to give vacant possession of the land and building to the plaintiffs-respondents on or before 30-4-1985, the appellant-defendant, shall not be dispossessed till then. Ordered accordingly. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced counsel for the appellant Mr. Ordered accordingly. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced counsel for the appellant Mr. E. R. Venkateswaran prayed that the appellant may be given a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. We are not satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance which, in our opinion, needs to be decided by the Supreme Court of India. We reject the prayer. The prayer to grant a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of India is rejected. Dismissed.