P. A. KULKARNI, J. ( 1 ) 1. This is a revision by defendants 1 to 3 against the judgment and decree dated 10-8-3982 passed by the Civil Judge, bellary, in S. C. 308 of 1980, decreeing the suit. ( 2 ) ONE Chinna Ayyanna, father of defendants 1 to 3, borrowed Rs. 1,800/- from defendant No. 4 on 27-9-1977 and executed the pronote agreeing to repay the loan. with interest at 18 percent per annum. Defendant No. 4 assigned the pronote in favour of the plaintiff for valid. . consideration on 10-9-1980 at bellary The plaintiff is a holder of the pronote in due course. Chinna Ayyanna died leaving behind defendants 1 to 3 as his legal representatives, in the first week of October 1977. Notwithstanding the notice, the defendants did not pay the amount. Hence, the suit. ( 3 ) DEFENDANTS 1 to 3 resisted the suit. Defendant No. 4 remained absent. ( 4 ) ULTIMATELY the Court below decreed the suit. Hence, the revision by the defendants. ( 5 ) THE Court below, on the strength of the evidence of the plaintiff and Linganagowd P. W. 2 and on perusal of the pronote Exhibit P. 1 and on comparison of the signature found at the foot of Exhibit P. 1 with the admitted signatures of Chinna Ayyanna, has come to the conclusion that Chinna Ayyanna had executed the pronote on receiving the consideration. The defendants' contention that Chinna Ayyanna died on 6-8-1977, has not been accepted by the court below. The lower Court has rejected the so called death certificate exhibit D. 1. Even the so called condolance resolution was found by the Court below as highly suspicious and concocted. P. W. 2 Linganagowd is the creditor, who advanced the money to chinna Ayyanna and in whose presence the pronote has been executed. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of defendant No. 4. Therefore, the trial court, rightly believing the evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 2 disbeliev'ng the evidence of D Ws. 1 and 2, concluded that Chinna ayyanna had executed the pronoie in favour of defendant No. 4 and that defendant No. 4 in turn had assign d the pronote in favour of the plaintiff for consideration. Therefore, the trial court, rightly believing the evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 2 disbeliev'ng the evidence of D Ws. 1 and 2, concluded that Chinna ayyanna had executed the pronoie in favour of defendant No. 4 and that defendant No. 4 in turn had assign d the pronote in favour of the plaintiff for consideration. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel Smt. Bhushani Kumar submitted that the pronote had been executed in Adoni and the consideration had passed to Chinna ayyanna in Adoni and that therefore, it is only the Court at Adoni that had got the jurisdiction. According to her, the simple assignment of the pronote by defendant No. 4 in favour of the plaintiff at Bellary did not give rise to any cause of action at Bellary. Thus, in short, she contended that the Court at bellary had no jurisdiction. The argument advanced by Smt. Bhushani Kumar, at the first blush, appears to be rather tempting. But on a closer perusal of section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, I do not find any substance in the contention raised by her. She placed before me Rameshwar lal, Ram Karan and others v Gulab Chand puranmal. AIR 1960 Rajasthan, 243. It is stated in the said case as -"an assignment of debt cannot be treated as forming part of a cause of action for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to the Court at the place of the assignment. If this were so, the defendant could be compelled to defend the suit at the choice of the plaintiffs and this would cut at the basic principle underlying S. 20, c. P. C "the facts in the said case were-"the defendant had a shop at kanpur under th. e name and style of nanagram Chauthmal. It was alleged that the plaintiff's firm at Karachi had certain dealings with the Kanpur firm, as a result whereof the plaintiffs were entitled to recover Rs 5,147-6-6 inclusive of interest on their claim"thus, it becomes clear that it was a suit based rather on accounts. It was not at all a case based on Negotiable instrument. It was alleged that the plaintiff's firm at Karachi had certain dealings with the Kanpur firm, as a result whereof the plaintiffs were entitled to recover Rs 5,147-6-6 inclusive of interest on their claim"thus, it becomes clear that it was a suit based rather on accounts. It was not at all a case based on Negotiable instrument. ( 7 ) IN Abdul Gafoor v Sensmal and others, AIR 1955 Rajasthan, 53, it has been held as-"the expression 'cause of action' means all that bundle of facts which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. In the case of assignment of a debt the plaintiff will be bound to prove that the debt was assigned in his favour by the assignor and therefore the assignment is a part of the cause of action. Therefore, in a suit brought by an assignee of a debt, the cause of action partly arises because of the assignment of debt and therefore the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the assignment is made would be competent to entertain and decide the suit subject of course to the pecuniary and other limitations. This decision is rendered by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court. The subsequent Division Bench of the rajasthan High Court, reported in AIR 1960 Rajasthan, 243, without any reasons has refused to follow this decision. " ( 8 ) IN Muzaffar Ali Khan and another v L. Jawanda Mal Lala Ditmal and another, a. I. R. 1966 Punjab, page 93, it has been stated as-"the expression 'cause of action', may be defined as being the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action or the existence of which entitles a party to seek redress in a Court of law. The facts which comprise the cause of action are those which must, if traversed, be proved by the plaintiff to enable him to obtain a judgment in ms favour. This expression came up for interpretation in the well known case of - 'read V. Brown', (1889) 22 qbd 128 (D ). In that case the plaintiff brought an action in the Mayor's court as assignee of a debt alleged to be due in respect of the price of goods sold and delivered to the defendant by the assignor. This expression came up for interpretation in the well known case of - 'read V. Brown', (1889) 22 qbd 128 (D ). In that case the plaintiff brought an action in the Mayor's court as assignee of a debt alleged to be due in respect of the price of goods sold and delivered to the defendant by the assignor. The sale and delivery had taken place without the city of london, but the debt had been assigned in writing to the plaintiff pursuant to S. 25, sub-S. 6, Judicature Act, 1873, within the city of London. It was held that the assignment of the debt was part of the cause of action, and that the cause of action havirg arisen in part within the city of London there was no ground for a prohibition. " ( 9 ) IN Manepalli Magamma and others v Manepalli Sathiraju, AIR 1917 Madras, 271, a Division Bench of the Madras high Court has held that- "the assignment of a promissory note by the payee is a part of the 'cause of action' within the meaning of S. 20 (c), Civil P C and the assignee can sue on it in the Court having jurisdiction where the assignment took place. ' a similar view has been taken in Official receiver if the Estate of Mohandns Chatan das v Naraindas Lotaram and others, AIR l926 Sindh,31 and Abdul Hamind v Prakash Chandra Nandi and others, AIR 1934 calcutta, 175. ( 10 ) THE learned Author Sri Mulla in his Code of Civil Procedure, Fourteenth Edition, Volume I, on pages 215 and 216 has stated as - "there has been some conflict of judicial opinion on the question whether a suit can be filed in a Court within whose jurisdiction a negotiable instrument has been assigned. In support of the view that an assignment is not in itself part of the cause of action, it is said that otherwise the provision in Sec 20, clause (c) might be evaded (Jupiter General Assurance co. v Abdul Aziz, 1 Rang. 231, (1924) a. Rang. 2; Rameshwar Lal v Gulab chand (1960) A. Raj. 243.) But the preponderance of authority is in favour of the view that the words 'cause of action' would, in their accepted sense, include assignment and that the Court where the assignment took place would have jurisdiction under Sec. 20 (c ). v Abdul Aziz, 1 Rang. 231, (1924) a. Rang. 2; Rameshwar Lal v Gulab chand (1960) A. Raj. 243.) But the preponderance of authority is in favour of the view that the words 'cause of action' would, in their accepted sense, include assignment and that the Court where the assignment took place would have jurisdiction under Sec. 20 (c ). (Suganchand v mulchand, 9 Bom. High Court 272, mangamma v Sathya Raju, 31 M. L. J. 816: Dilbagh Raj v Valuram (1933) A. Lah. 940; Harnath Raj v Choramani Sha (1934) A. C. 175; Gopal v Narayana (1953) A. N. 192.) This view would bring the law relating to assignment of negotiable instruments in line with that relating to assignment of chcses in action and other rights. " ( 11 ) IN S. Row's the Negotiable instruments Act, 6th Edition, 1968, on page 165, it is stated as -"in a suit by an indorsee of a negotiable instrument, the indorsement forms a material part of the cause of action, and, if the indorsement has taken place vithin the limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of a high Court, the indorsee may institute the suit in that court, having first obtained the leave of the court under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Where a firm in Benares drew a hundi on its branch firm at Bombay in favour of a firm hat was carrying on business at calcutta and Mirzapur, and the hundi was indorsed at Calcutta and dishonoured by the firm at Bombay. Held, that the indorsement of the hundi constituted a part of the cause of action, and that the indorsee could, with the leave of the court, bring a snit on the hundi at Calcutta, under the 12th clause of the charter of the calcutta High Court. "the assignment of a negotiab'e instrument is a part of the tranaction recognised under the Negotiable Instruments Act itself. Even the assignment of debt is also recognised by law. Thus, assignment of a debt or a negotiable instrument is a part of the transaction itself, and therefore, when a part of the cause of action takes place in a particular place, the Court having jurisdiction over that place would have the jurisdiction to entertain and try. the suit. Therefore, under these circumstances, the argument advanced by the learned counsel Mrs. Bhushani Kumar is rejected. the suit. Therefore, under these circumstances, the argument advanced by the learned counsel Mrs. Bhushani Kumar is rejected. ( 12 ) THEN the learned counsel submitted that the past interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum was highly abnoxious. This is a case where the original debtor himself was dead and his children are now sought to be made liable Hence, I find some force in her contention. Therefore, the past interest is reduced to 9 percent per annum. ( 13 ) THEREFORE, under these circumstances, the decree passed by the Court below is modified. The revision is allowed in part. For the purpose of clarification, it is ordered that the plaintiff do recover Rs. 2,300/- from defendants 1 to 3 with future interest on rs. 1,800/- at the rate of 6 percent per amum from the date of suit till its recovery from defendants 1 to 3. ( 14 ) DEFENDANTS 1 to 3 should pay proportionate costs in the trial Court and should bear their own in the trial court. As the revision involves, to a very large extent, consideration of a question of law relating to jurisdiction, it is ordered that all the parties. should bear their own costs in the revision. Further, it is made clear that defendants 1 to 3 are not personally liable to pay the debt. They are liable only to the extent of the property of deceased chinna Ayyanna, that has come to their hands. --- *** --- .