ORDER V.P. Mathur, J. - This revision is directed against an order passed on 7-11-83 by the Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad, in suit No. 150 of 1982, whereby he has allowed an application for amendment in the plaint and has repelled the objections filed by the present revisionist. 2. The parties to the suit are real brothers, being sons of late Sri A.C. Mukerjee. The brief facts of the matter were that Sri A-C Mukerjee had left bunglow No. 18, Tagore Town Allahabad, consisting of residential portion and open land, of which the plaintiff along with the defendant and two other brothers became co-owner to the extent of th share. A part of the open land was found by the four brothers to be of no use to them and therefore, it was agreed that it may be sold. It was stipulated that the defendant would for and on behalf of the vendors, receive cheques from the vendees for the entire sale consideration in his name and encash these cheques and would pay th amount of the sale consideration to each of the brothers including the plaintiff, retaining his th share to himself. The sale deeds were executed and the defendant obtained the entire sale consideration of Rs. 87,000/- through cheques from the vendees. He encashed these cheques and is retaining the entire amount without making payment of the share of other brothers. The plaintiff, therefore, sued for a decree for Rs. 21,750/-, being his th share in the sale consideration and Rs. 3,250/- as interest thereon, total Rs. 25,000/-, with costs of the suit. 3. For a long time the defendant did not file written statement. The record shows that the written statement was ultimately filed on 2-1-84. Before this, however, the plaintiff moved application for amendment in the plaint seeking to incorporate three additional paras 6-A, 6-B and 6-C and making some additions in para No. 6. The original contention of the plaintiff was that Sri A. C. Mukerjee was the sole owner of the entire land and constructions of the premises No. 18, Tagore Town, Allahabad, and he died on 2-5-68 leaving his for sons including the plaintiff and defendant as his heirs and successors and in this manner all the four sons inherited the property. The original contention of the plaintiff was that Sri A. C. Mukerjee was the sole owner of the entire land and constructions of the premises No. 18, Tagore Town, Allahabad, and he died on 2-5-68 leaving his for sons including the plaintiff and defendant as his heirs and successors and in this manner all the four sons inherited the property. By amendment it is now sought to be mentioned that beside the four sons, the widow of late Sri A C. Mukerjee and his daughters Smt. Maya Gangoli, Smt Chinmoyee Basu and Smt Renu Banerji were also co-sharers and inherited the property. In paras No. 6-A, 6-B and 6-C it ought to be mentioned that all the remaining seven heirs gifted their entire shares in favour of the widow of the deceased through a registered deed of gift, dated 21-7-69 thus Smt Shiv Dasi Devi, widow of late Sri A. C. Mukerjee became exclusive owner of the entire bunglow No. 18 Tagore Town, Allahabad This lady, however, executed a will on 23-9-69 bequeathing the property absolutely to the four sons to the exclusion of the daughters and in this manner the four sons after the demise of Smt Shiv Dasi Devi, which took place on 19-5-75 became co-sharers in equal shares. The relief is not changed. 4. The learned court below came to the conclusion that the amendment did not change the subject matter of the suit, the relief or even the cause of action and therefore, he allowed it. Against this order the present revision has been filed. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that this amendment could not have been allowed In the case of Ma Shwe Mya v. Maung Mo Maung, AIR 1922 PC 249 it has been laid down that all rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure to the proper administration of justice and it is, therefore, essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised but none-the-less no power has been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by amendment, the subject matter of the suit In this Privy Council case the plaintiff had sued for specific performance of a verbal agreement allegedly made in 1912. The suit was filed in 1913. The court found the verbal agreement not proved. The plaintiff then applied for amendment of the plaint by claiming damages for breach of an earlier contract allegedly arrived in the year 1903. It was held that it was not open to the court to permit a new case to be made out and the amendment was refused. 6. We will have, therefore, to find out whether by the amendment which has been allowed by the court below the subject matter of the suit and cause of action get changed or whether they remain the same. My attention is drawn to the case of Ram Agya v. Bhanu Prakash, 1978 All LJ 422 where it has been held that one of the basic tests is to find out whether the evidence required to prove the case after the amendment would be in any way different from the one that was required to prove the case as it originally stood before the amendment. It was a case in which the plaintiff had come alleging that the marriage had taken place before an idol and by amendment the case was sought to be changed by saying that the marriage had taken place according to Hindu rites. The Court came to the conclusion that the evidence which was required to be given as the plaint originally stood would be entirely different from the evidence which will now be required to be given if the amendment is allowed and taking it to be the basic test, it rejected the application for amendment. 7. In the case of Zila Parishad v. Smt Shanti Devi, AIR 1965 All 590 a Full Bench of this Court has held that a cause of action consists of all facts which it is essential for the plaintiff to allege and establish (if denied or controverted) e.g. the bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them give to the plaintiff right to some relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant. In the case of Ram Singhasan Chaubey v. Sudama Prasad Shah, AIR 1982 Pat. 200 it was held that there is distinction between the amendment which seeks to bring a cause of action which was conspicuously absent and one which though present in the plaint is, however, defective. It must include some act done by the defendant. In the case of Ram Singhasan Chaubey v. Sudama Prasad Shah, AIR 1982 Pat. 200 it was held that there is distinction between the amendment which seeks to bring a cause of action which was conspicuously absent and one which though present in the plaint is, however, defective. To rectify this defective cause of action amendment can be allowed. The case before Patna High Court was in respect of a suit for specific performance of a contract and in the plaint there was no mention whatsoever of the ingredients of S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. During the course of the hearing of the arguments an amendment was sought to bring on record the allegation that the plaintiffs had always been prepared and were still prepared to perform their part of contract. This amendment was not allowed because it was held that there was no mention of this specific ingredient of S. 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act in the plaint right from the very beginning. 8. In the case of A. K. Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, (1966) 1 SCR 796 : AIR 1967 SC 96 , the Supreme Court made the following observations while dealing with the "cause of action" :- "The expression "cause of action' in the present context does not mean "every fact which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed" as was said in Cooke v. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107, in a different context, for if it were so, no material fact could ever be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to change or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That expression for the present purpose only means, a new claim made on a new basis constituted by new facts. Such a view was taken in Robinson v. Unicos Property Corporation Ltd., (1962) 2 All ER 24, and it seems to us to be the only possible view to take. Any other view would make the rule futile." 9. The latest Supreme Court dictum in this respect is contained in the case of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984) 3 SCC 352 : 1984 All LJ 102, wherein it has been held that normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action. Any other view would make the rule futile." 9. The latest Supreme Court dictum in this respect is contained in the case of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984) 3 SCC 352 : 1984 All LJ 102, wherein it has been held that normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action. But it is well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute an addition of a new cause of action, or raise a new case, but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record, the amendment would be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation. The earlier Supreme Court cases of A. K. Gupta & Sons, AIR 1967 SC 96 (supra) and Robinson, 1962-2 All ER 24 (supra) were followed. 10. In the light of this legal position when we peruse the facts of the present case, it becomes absolutely clear that the plaintiff simply sued for his share in the sale consideration with the allegations that he was entitled to th share in the property, having been owned by his father, and that the defendant has usurped the entire sale consideration and refuses to pay the plaintiff s share to him. The cause of action, therefore, arose by the defendant's receiving the entire sale consideration for and on behalf of all the co-sharers and his refusing to part with the plaintiffs share even after repeated demands. The subject matter of the suit was the amount which the plaintiff claims as due to him on account of all these facts and which he assesses at Rs. 25,000/-. The amendment which is sought retains the subject matter of the suit as it is and the cause of action also remains the same. It is not necessary that out of the bundle of facts all should remain intact. The amendment in some of them is permissible, if it is by way of addition of facts to elucidiate the matter. In the present case the plaintiff simply came with the allegations that the property belongs to his father and hence he has th share. Subsequently, it appears, he was advised that since his mother and three sisters were also alive when the father died, they will also be inheriting equal shares in the property. In the present case the plaintiff simply came with the allegations that the property belongs to his father and hence he has th share. Subsequently, it appears, he was advised that since his mother and three sisters were also alive when the father died, they will also be inheriting equal shares in the property. He had sought amendment of this fact and wanted to bring on record the further fact that all the co-sharers had transferred their rights and interest (equal to ?th) to the mother and the mother ultimately executed the will in favour of all the four sons excluding daughters and in this manner the plaintiff still remained entitled to th share. This amendment, of course, adds to the facts already enumerated on record. It is not in contradiction with the same. Therefore, it cannot be said to completely change the case inasmuch as no new claim is made on a new basis constituted by new facts. This being so, the amendment was rightly allowed. 11. The provisions of S. 115 of the CPC give to the High Court a discretionary power to interfere with the lower court's orders. In that context the Supreme Court in the case of Major S. S. Khanna v. Brigadier F.J. Dhillon, (1964) 4 SCR 409 : AIR 1964 SC 497 , has laid down that exercise of the jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C. by the High Court is discretionary and that Court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of that section are satisfied. 12. In the case of Brij Gopal Mathur v. Kishan Gopal Mathur, AIR 1973 SC 1096 , the case of Major S. S. Khanna, AIR 1964 SC 497 (supra) was considered and followed and the following observation made in that earlier case was reproduced : - "The interlocutory character of the order, the existence of another remedy to an aggrieved party by way of an appeal from the ultimate order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the High Court, even in cases where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction. It follows that while exercising its discretion the High Court can take into consideration such circumstances and facts as may disentitle the petitioner in a revision petition from being granted any relief. One of such relevant considerations would be whether the order sought to be revised has occasioned a substantial failure of justice. The facts set out in the order of the High Court under appeal were sufficient for coming to the conclusion that it was not a fit case for interference in revision. We are, therefore, unable to accede to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court did not exercise the discretion in accordance with the well settled principles or that the exercise of discretion was such as would justify any interference." 13. In the present case there can be no doubt that substantial justice has been done. The defendant, vide his written statement, which he has filed so late on the record admits most of the facts mentioned in the plaint including the amended portions of the plaint. He, therefore, does not suffer at all by this amendment. It is still open to him to take the plea that the suit is not maintainable, as alleged by his counsel before me, because the defendant is the executor of the will of the mother and it is alleged that no suit can be filed by a legatee against an executor. The court below would obviously strike an issue on this point, if taken, and record its finding. If ultimately it comes to the conclusion that the plaintiffs suit was not maintainable, the plaintiff would be de-suited but so far as the amendment is concerned, the impugned order is perfectly justified and the revision is liable to be dismissed. 14. In the result, the revision has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs. The record of the court below shall go back forthwith so that the suit is expeditiously disposed of.