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1985 DIGILAW 253 (ALL)

Janardhan Mittal v. IInd Additional District Judge, Muzaffarnagar

1985-02-26

V.K.KHANNA

body1985
JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - This writ petition has been filed against the judgment and order of the IInd Additional District Judge, Muzaffarnagar dated 13.11.1984 as modified by the order dated 23.1.1985 passed on a review petition moved by the landlord. 2. The only controversy involved in the present writ petition is as to whether to the disputed constructions the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 apply or not. An amendment was sought at the revisional stage and issue was remitted to the Judge, Small Causes Court by the revisional Court for recording a finding on the question as to when the accommodation in dispute was constructed. On the basis of the evidence led by the parties the trial Court returned a finding that the building in dispute was constructed in the year 1979 inasmuch as the first assessment of the newly constructed building was made in the year. The petitioner filed objections to the aforesaid findings before the revisional Court and also filed two documents which have been annexed as Annexures 8 and 9 to the writ petition showing that the premises in dispute were assessed during the year 1963-68 and 1968-73. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the aforesaid additional evidence was admitted but the revisional Court has not at all adverted to the aforesaid evidence. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner at some length and have also seen the evidence led by the parties. In my opinion, even if these two documents contained in Annexure 8 and 9 are taken into account, the finding that the provisions of the Act did not apply to the premises in dispute cannot be set aside. The plaintiff had filed sanction for construction of the house which was given in the year 1976. Admittedly, the petitioner occupied the disputed premises in November, 1977. The plaintiff had clearly stated that there were old constructions which were demolished and in its place new constructions have been made in pursuance of the sanctioned plan. The statement of the plaintiff's witness that assessment was enhanced in the year 1979 can give no doubt to the petitioner inasmuch as on these facts what the plaintiff's witness meant was that there was an assessment on the old building and after the construction of the new building the assessment was enhanced. The statement of the plaintiff's witness that assessment was enhanced in the year 1979 can give no doubt to the petitioner inasmuch as on these facts what the plaintiff's witness meant was that there was an assessment on the old building and after the construction of the new building the assessment was enhanced. In my opinion, the finding recorded by the Court below on the aforesaid question is thus based on correct appraisal of evidence and cannot be said to be either perverse or based on no evidence. 3. It has also been urged that the review application has not been allowed in accordance with law inasmuch as first notice should have been issued and thereafter the review application should have been decided. I am not prepared to accept the aforesaid contention, in view of the fact that what has been held by the revisional Court does not suffer for any error of law apparent on the face of the record. 4. No other point has been pressed before me. 5. It may be noticed that at the admission stage notice was given to the respondent who has filed a counter-affidavit. A rejoinder-affidavit has also been filed. The present writ petition has, thus, been decided finally at the admission stage in accordance with the Rules of the Court. 6. For the reasons stated above the present writ petition is dismissed. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. 7. In the end the learned counsel for the petitioner has made a prayer that some reasonable time be granted for vacating the premises in dispute. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made a statement that the petitioner gives an undertaking to this Court that he shall handover peaceful possession to the landlord within the time granted by this Court. I have also heard the learned counsel for the respondents on this question. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case the petitioner is granted three months time from today to vacate the premises. The petitioner shall also pay the entire arrears of rent for remaining in use and occupation of the premises (including the period allowed by this Court) within a period of one month from today. A certified copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel for the parties on usual charges within 24 hours.