JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india filed in January 1983 for quashing the order dated 17-3-1981 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Indore. Respondent No. 2 whereby in the Departmental Enquiry No. 21 /80 held against the petitioner and others, he had been dismissed from service, the appellate order dated 9-7-1982 and also the similar order dated 1-1-1981 passed by the said respondent in Departmental Enquiry No. 22/80. ( 2. ) IT is not in dispute that at the relevant time the petitioner was holding the post of Sub-Inspector of Police at Police Station Palasia, indore, and the Deputy Inspector General is competent to dismiss a Sub-Inspector. The petitioner was subjected to two Departmental Enquiries, one in respect of the activities at about !-30p. m. on 14-12-1980at Police Station, Palasia, Indore and the other in respect of the incident which took place in the evening the same day at Central Kotwali, Indore and their numbers are respectively 22 of 1980 and 21 of 1980. The Departmental Enquiry no. 21 was held by Shri Tiwari and the Departmental Enquiry No. 22 of 1980 was held by Shri Sarwe. Both these Inquiring Authorities were working under the Superintendent of Police, Indore. Charges were framed by shri Ashok Patel, the Superintendent of Police, Indore. ( 3. ) AMONGST other matters, the charges dated 18-12-1980 and 30-12-1980 included allegations that the petitioner along with others indulged in slogan-mongering against Shri Ashok Patel the Superintendent of Police, Indore. In both these Departmental Enquiries there were others who were joined with the petitioner as delinquents. ( 4. ) THE petitioner and the other delinquents had moved an application dated 30-1-1980 to the Superintendent of Police, Indore, respondent No. 3 to the effect that in the charge-sheet the allegation is of slogans and demonstration against him and he is thus directly involved and that they had no hope of justice from any of his subordinates. There was prayer for Departmental Enquiry by other Inquiring Authority. This application was rejected by Shri Ashok Patel, Superintendent of Police, Indore by his order dated 4-2-1981 on the ground that there is no express allegation against the inquiring Officer. ( 5. There was prayer for Departmental Enquiry by other Inquiring Authority. This application was rejected by Shri Ashok Patel, Superintendent of Police, Indore by his order dated 4-2-1981 on the ground that there is no express allegation against the inquiring Officer. ( 5. ) IN the petition it has been stated that Shri Ashok Patel, Superintendent of Police, Indore was against the members of the M. P. Non-gazetted Police Union and he wanted to punish them for their activities. The petitioner was not a member of that union but was dragged in without any basis, ft was contended that the Superintendent of Police was not competent to frame charges against him. The Inquiring Officers were subordinate to the Superintendent of Police and, therefore, they were not impartial. In the Departmental Enquiry reasonable opportunity of hearing was denied to the petitioner. In all there were five Departmental Enquiries in connection with the same occurrence and in two of them the petitioner was involved. There should have been only one enquiry. It was also contended that there was no material for holding that the charges are proved and yet the dismissal orders were passed. The findings were characterised as perverse. At the end it was stated that the departmental enquiries were a farce. There has been violation of Article 311 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. ( 6. ) THE respondents in their joint return denying the petitioners averments in the petition, contended that the Departmental Enquiries were in order and there has been no violation of Article 311 of the Constitution or of the principles of natural justice. ( 7. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended at the outset that in view of Regulation 228 of the Police Regulations, framed under the police Act, 1861 (for short the Regulations) which uses the expression removal from service instead of dismissal from service which was the expression used in the C. P. and Berar Police Regulations framed under a different Act and dealt with in the Supreme Court decision in State of M. P. v. Shardul Singh 1971 MPLJ 363 (SC), it has to be held that the Superintendent of Police was not competent to frame the charges which have eventually resulted in the impugned dismissal orders. ( 8. ( 8. ) ON the other hand, the contention canvassed on behalf of the respondents is that the expression removal from service as used in regulation is of wider amplitude and covers cases of dismissal from service and the regulation viewed in its proper context-leaves no scope for the construction which the petitioner is seeking to place on it. ( 9. ) dictionaries it is said, are not the dictators of interpretation and and the words and expressions which are the skin of living thoughts must take their colour from the context in which they occur. ( 10. ) FOR a proper appreciation of the respective contentions of the parties, it is pertinent to refer to Regulation 214 which provides the various punishments for a member holding a post in a subordinate Police Service as distinguished from Indian Police Service and the State Police Service referred to in the earlier regulation, and the regulations 228 and 229. ( 11. ) THE relevant portions of the aforesaid regulations read as under :-214 : Without prejudice to the provisions of any law or any special orders for the time being in force, the following penalties may for good and sufficient reason, be imposed upon any member holding a post in a subordinate Police Service :- (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iv ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (v) Removal from the service which does not disqualify from future employment. (vi) Dismissal from the service which ordinarily disqualifies for future employment. 228. In every case of removal from service, reduction in rank, grade, or pay, or withholding of increment for a period in excess of one year, a formal proceedings must be recorded by the Superintendent in prescribed form setting forth- (a) the charge; (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e) the finding of the Superintendent, with the reasons on which it is based; (f) the Superintendents final order or recommendation, as the case may be. 229. If the Superintendent is empowered to pass the final order in the case, the papers will be filed in his office, a copy of order being sent to the Deputy Inspector General with the monthly punishment return. In other cases they will be forwarded as follows : (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) All proposals for the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of an officer of and above the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector should be forwarded to the proper authority through the District magistrate except in cases where an officer is not serving in district. " ( 12. ) IT is true that the appointing Authority for the post of Police sub-Inspector is not the Superintendent of Police but the Deputy Inspector general but this is inconsequential so far as framing of charge is concerned. It is pertinent to point out that Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India pertains only to the final order. It reads thus : 311. (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. " As held in the decision in State of M. P. v. Sardul Singh (supra) the constitutional guarantee under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution does not include within itself the further guarantee that the departmental enquiry should also be initiated or conducted by the authority named therein. The decision in State of M. P. v. Parasramsingh, 1982 MPWN 383 . is also pertinent. ( 13. The decision in State of M. P. v. Parasramsingh, 1982 MPWN 383 . is also pertinent. ( 13. ) IT is also pertinent to point out that there is no separate provisionlike the one embodied in Regulation 214 in respect of dismissal from service. It is a well established canon of construction that the provisions have to be harmoniously construed to effectuate the object behind them. ( 14. ) FOR the foregoing reasons, on a careful consideration of the respective contentions of the parties and the various provisions referred to above, I am of the view that the expression removal from service used in regulation 228 of the Police Regulations takes within its ambit cases of dismissal from service and the petitioners contention to the contrary cannot be subscribed to. I hold that in view of the express provision in regulation 228 of the Regulations, the Superintendent of Police was competent to frame charges against the petitioner. ( 15. ) AS pointed out in the decision in Hukum Singhs case, 1979 MPLJ 625 = 1979 JLJ 632 . the principle of doctrine of pleasure embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution is subject to the guarantee given by Article 311. Except to the extent of guarantee contained in Article 311 and the provisions of the Rules made under Article 309, the common law right of the Government to terminate the services of its servant continues. The result is that whenever a Government servant claims that the termination of his services is void and he is entitled to continue in service, he must show the breach of any 6f these provisions in order to substantiate his claim that the termination of his services is void and ineffective. In the decision in Manager. Govt. Branch press v. D. B. Baliappa AIR 1979 SC 429 , it has been pointed out that the rule of master and servant in its original absolute form, to bring it in tune with vastly changing socio-economic conditions and mores of the day, has been eroded by judicial decisions and legislations particularly in its application to persons in public employment to whom the constitutional protection of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 is available. ( 16. ( 16. ) DUE to the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution no government servant shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. ( 17. ) IT must be remembered that Departmental Enquiry is not a matter of empty formality. It is a serious proceeding intended to give the servant concerned a chance to meet the charge and to prove his innocence. It has to be conducted according to the relevant statutory rules regulating it and the principles of natural justice. Impartiality and fairness amongst other matters are the essential elements of natural justice. In this connection the following observations in the Full Bench decision in Bal Krishna Tiwari v. Registrar, A. P. S. University, 1978 MPLJ 172 (F B)= 1978 JLJ 182 . may usefully be reproduced : "rules of natural justice are not codified. Principles of natural justice are not statutory. They are fundamental rights of judicial procedure which have been evolved to ensure fair adjudication wherever rights of an individual are affected. Their aim is to prevent miscarriage of justice. Where there is violation of principles of natural justice proceedings can be quashed by certiorari. Acts of public authorities, judicial, quasi judicial or administrative, can be challenged when the rules of natural justice have been contravened. However, the rules of natural justice are not capable of definition. They vary according to the constitution of the statutory body and the statute under which they function. But they depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case and the frame-work of the law applicable to it. " ( 18. ) IN the decision in O. K. Ghoshs case, AIR 1963 SC8 12. it has been held that prohibition against demonstration is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. As to the limitation to the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the decision in Bhagwat Parshad v. I. G. Police AIR 1970 Pandh 81, is pertinent. ( 19. ) THE petitioners contention is that initiation of the two joint departmental inquiries against him was in violation of the principles of natural justice. As to the limitation to the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the decision in Bhagwat Parshad v. I. G. Police AIR 1970 Pandh 81, is pertinent. ( 19. ) THE petitioners contention is that initiation of the two joint departmental inquiries against him was in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is urged that in the agitation giving rise to the departmental inquiries slogans were shouted against Shri Ashok Patel, the superintendent of Police and the initiation of the inquiries by him and the appointment of his subordinates as inquiring authorities involve violation of the principles of natural justice. ( 20. ) IT is rightly observed that the role of the accuser of the witness and of the Judge cannot be played by one and the same person and it is futile to expect when those roles are combined that the Judge can hold the scales of justice even. In this connection the following observations in the decision in Arjun Chaubeys case AIR 1984 SC 1356 , are pertinent: - "evidently, respondent No. 3 assessed the weight of his own accusations against the appellant and passed a judgment which is one of the easiest to pass, namely, that he himself, was a truthful person and the appellant a liar. In doing this, respondent No. 3 violated a fundamental principle of natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the appellant related to his conduct qua respondent No. 3. Therefore, it was not open to the latter to sit in judgment over the explanation offered by the appellant and decide that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge in his own case and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Any one who has a personal stake in an enquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the inquiry. " (Emphasis supplied ). The decisions in Rameshwars case, AIR 1962 MP 372 . and S. Venkata Chalans case, AIR 1957 Mad. 623 . are also pertinent. ( 21. ) IN the decision in Ghulam Rasool v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1957 Jandk 17. it has been pointed out that the violation of the principles of natural justice comes within the purview of Article 14 of the Constitution. and S. Venkata Chalans case, AIR 1957 Mad. 623 . are also pertinent. ( 21. ) IN the decision in Ghulam Rasool v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1957 Jandk 17. it has been pointed out that the violation of the principles of natural justice comes within the purview of Article 14 of the Constitution. The following observations in the decision in S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan AIR 1981 SC 136 . may profitably be reproduced:- "the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has been denied justice is not prejudice. " The decision in Ramchandra case AIR 1974 SC 259 ,is also pertinent. ( 22. ) THERE is another aspect involved in the petition as there were common proceedings. It may be pointed out that despite the Police Regulations governing a Departmental Enquiry against a Police Officer in subordinate service and rule 3 (1) (d) of the M. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short the Control and Appeal rules), which reads thus : "3 (1) These rules shall apply to every Government servant but shall not apply to- (d) any person for whom special provision is made, in respect of matters covered by these rules, by or under any law for the time being in force or by or under any agreement entered into by or with the previous approval of the Governor before or after the commencement of these rules, in regard to matters covered by such special provisions. " the applicability of the Control and Appeal Rules is not altogether excluded. According to the ratio of the decision in Premchandras case, 1970 MPLJ 430. where the police Regulations are silent, the provisions of the Control and Appeal rules would apply in departmental inquiries against subordinate Police staff. This is what has been laid down in the aforesaid decision: "civil Service Regulations, as in force in the State are applicable to all civil Departments including the police. where the police Regulations are silent, the provisions of the Control and Appeal rules would apply in departmental inquiries against subordinate Police staff. This is what has been laid down in the aforesaid decision: "civil Service Regulations, as in force in the State are applicable to all civil Departments including the police. Within that Department, there are the Police Regulations which naturally prevail wherever there is conflict between them and the Civil Service Regulations; but in a field like temporary employment, for which there is no special police regulation, the Civil Service Regulations as in force in this State, apply. A probationary Sub-Inspector can be removed without a proceeding under Article 311, unless he has been confirmed during the interval. Of course if a probationary Officer is to be sent away with a black-mark, then proceedings would be necessary. " (Emphasis supplied ). ( 23. ) THERE is no express provision in the Police Regulations for common proceedings against delinquent servants. Rule 18 of the Control and Appeal Rules is in these terms:- "where two or more Government servants are concerned in any case, the Governor or any other authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on all such Government servants may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding. " There is no such order by the Deputy Inspector General who is the competent authority. In the decision in Ashok Y. Naik v. The Administrator, Goa, 1979 Serlj 84. it has been held that where there is no order by the competent authority for common proceedings, the entire proceeding is vitiated being without jurisdiction irrespective of the question of proof of prejudice which must be implied. The decision in Tripura Charan v. State of West Bengal 1979 (1) Ser. L R 878. is also pertinent. As it is clear that rule 18 of the Control and Appeal Rules has been violated, the Departmental Enquiry is vitiated. ( 24. ) FROM the foregoing discussion it is clear that in the instant case the impugned order is not only in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice but is also violative of Rule 18 of the Control and Appeal Rules. ( 25. ( 24. ) FROM the foregoing discussion it is clear that in the instant case the impugned order is not only in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice but is also violative of Rule 18 of the Control and Appeal Rules. ( 25. ) IN the circumstances of the case I am of the view that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be crippled on any technical considerations allowing flagrantly unjust order to stand and defeating thereby the purpose for which that jurisdiction is conferred. ( 26. ) THE petition can be disposed of on the grounds already dealt with and other contentions need not be gone into. ( 27. ) IT may also be pointed out that in Misc. Petition No. 377 of 1982 (Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of M. P. and others) the petitioner was no other than one of the co-delinquents of the present petitioner. The prayer in that petition too was for quashing the orders of dismissal. This Court allowed that petition on 17-5-1984 observing as under in paragraph 21 of the orders: "the departmental inquiry itself though pretended to follow the letter of law but had not followed its spirit. " ( 28. ) FOR the foregoing reasons the petition is allowed. The orders dated 17-3-1981 and 1-4-1981 passed by the respondent No. 2 are set aside and so also the appellate order dated 9-7-1982 passed by the Inspector General of Police. The concerned respondents are directed to let the petitioner continue in his employment uninterrupted granting him all the intervening benefits. The parties shall bear the cost of this petition as incurred. The amount of security deposit be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.