Punjab Ice Factory & Cold Storage v. Commissioner Of Income Tax
1985-09-09
NAZIR AHMAD, UDAY SINHA
body1985
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment 1. This is a batch of four reference cases, one at the instance of the Revenue and three at the instance of the assessee. The four cases relate to the assessment years 1961-62, 1962-63, 1964-65 and 1966-67. Taxation Case No. 140 of 1976 relates to 1961-62. Taxation Cases Nos. 137 to 139 are for other three years. Reference in each case is under Sec.256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act."). 2. The points arising for consideration in Taxation Cases Nos. 137 to 139 are exactly identical. The point in Taxation Case No. 140 of 1976 is, however, slightly different, as I shall show subsequently. 3. The questions referred to us by the Tribunal at the instance of the assesses are the following: " (i) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the cancellation of registration of the firm under Sec.186(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 1962-63, 1964-65 and 1966-67? (ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for the assessment year 1964-65 in upholding the cancellation of registration under Sec.186(1) on a ground different from that taken by the Income-tax Officer in his order ?" 4. There is yet another question referred to us at the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax. This question relates to the assessment year 1961-62 and reads as follows: " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cancelling the order of the Income-tax Officer refusing registration to the assessee-firm for the assessment year 1961-62 within the meaning of Section 186(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? " 5. The assessee was a firm. It consisted of three partners, Sardar Gian Singh Purewal, Sardar Ravinder Singh Purewal and Sardar Jugtar Singh Purewel. The agreement of partnership came into being on March 3, 1958. For the assessment year 1958-59, the firm applied and was granted registration. The registration was being renewed year after year and the assessee was assessed in accordance with the law applicable to a registered firm.
The agreement of partnership came into being on March 3, 1958. For the assessment year 1958-59, the firm applied and was granted registration. The registration was being renewed year after year and the assessee was assessed in accordance with the law applicable to a registered firm. While making an application for continuation of the registration for the a assessment year 1964-65, the attention of the Income-tax Officer was drawn to the deed of agreement evidencing the partition. In that deed, it was recited that Sardar Ravinder Singh and Sardar Jugtar Singh, the two sons of Sardar Gian Singh, would be contributing labour to the partnership. The Income-tax Officer was possessed of some materials which showed that Sardar Ravinder Singh was residing in the United States and Sardar Jugdar Singh was not available for contributing labour. He was, therefore, of the view that there was no genuine partnership and the deed was merely a device to reduce tax liability of Sardar Gian Singh. He, therefore, issued notice to Sardar Gian Singh and after a hearing in regard to the cancellation of registration for the above four years cancelled the registration. Needless to say that the notice of cancellation of registration of the firm was given after obtaining the approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. 6. For the assessment years 1962-63 and 1966-67, the Income-tax Officer cancelled the registration granted to the assessee on yet another ground, basides the ground already mentioned. That ground was that Sardar Ravinder Singh was a minor on March 31, 1958, when the deed of partnership had been executed. 7. The assessee being aggrieved by the order of the Income-tax Officer cancelling the registration for the aforesaid assessment years went in appeal. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal of the assessee in regard to the assessment year 1961-62, but dismissed it in regard to the other three years. The appeal for the year 1961-62 was allowed on the footing that the assessee had not been given any notice by the Income-tax Officer to show cause why registration granted for that year be not cancelled.
The appeal for the year 1961-62 was allowed on the footing that the assessee had not been given any notice by the Income-tax Officer to show cause why registration granted for that year be not cancelled. The cancellation of registration for other years was upheld on the footing that Sardar Ravinder Singh was a minor at the time of execution of the agreement and there was no other agreement or there was no legal partnership which could be recognised by the Income-tax Officer in terms of the Act. 8. The Revenue being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowing the appeal in respect of the assessment year 1961-62 filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee, in turn, filed separate appeals against the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in regard to all the four cases. 9. The assessee and the Revenue being aggrieved by the respective orders of the Tribunal against them moved under Sec.256 of the Act and the Tribunal has referred the four cases to us for our opinion. 10. The points advanced before us must be divided into four categories. The point advanced in respect of the assessment year 1961-62 is, in my opinion, by itself, different from the points advanced for the assessment years 1962-63, 1964-65 and 1966-67. They must, therefore, be discussed separately. 11. We shall now consider the weight of the submission urged in Taxation Cases Nos. 137 to 139 of 1976. The submission urged on behalf of the assessee in these three references is that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner having not accepted the grounds given by the Income-tax Officer for cancelling the registration had no jurisdiction to uphold the order on a, different ground and on different materials. As an extension thereto, Mr. Rama Kant Verma for the assessee also made a grievance with respect to the procedure adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in calling upon Sardar Gian Singh to give his statement without issuing special notice in this behalf. 12. In order to appreciate the above contention, we must look at the findings arrived at by the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In terms of chronology, the first case which was disposed of related to the assessment year 1964-65 on October 30, 1969.
12. In order to appreciate the above contention, we must look at the findings arrived at by the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In terms of chronology, the first case which was disposed of related to the assessment year 1964-65 on October 30, 1969. In the order of the Income-tax Officer for the said year, the finding was as follows: " ...The statement of Sardar Gian Singh was recorded, He admitted that after Sardar Ravinder Singh went to the U.S.A., no change in the partnership was made. No change in the deed was made even when the working partners were not contributing labour and enterprise. All facts clearly indicate that there was no partnership business as stipulated in the deed of partnership. The partnership deed, executed on March 31, 1958, was nothing but a mere device to reduce the tax liabilities of Sardar Gian Singh. This was proved beyond an iota of doubt by the fact that when the alleged working partners were not available to contribute their labour and enterprise, no change was made in the partnership deed." 13. The above statements clearly show that Sardar Ravinder Singh and Sardar Jugtar Singh were not contributing their labour and exertion to the firm and, therefore, there was no partnership which could be registered under Sec.184 of the Act. Upon that finding, he cancelled the registration. After the order of the Income-tax Officer, the matter fell for consideration before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who disposed of the appeal in regard to the same assessment year on February 20, 1971, Surprisingly, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner observed in paragraph 3 of his order that the Income-tax Officer had not given any finding that Sardar Jugtar Singh and Sardar Ravinder Singh were not contributing their labour during the previous year (relevant to A. Y. 1964-65). We have mentioned earlier that there was a clear finding by the Income-tax Officer, yet the Appellate Assistant Commissioner observed that there was no finding, Be that as it may, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not hold that Sardar Jugtar Singh and Sardar Ravinder Singh were available in India or were contributing their labour and exertion to the partnership firm. He, however, came to the same conclusion as the Income-tax Officer that there was no valid partnership in existence and registration could not have been allowed, but on an entirely different ground.
He, however, came to the same conclusion as the Income-tax Officer that there was no valid partnership in existence and registration could not have been allowed, but on an entirely different ground. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner examined Sardar Gian Singh Purewal and recorded his evidence on oath. The evidence shows that Ravinder Singh was not a major on the date of execution of the deed. He, therefore, rejected the appeal but on a ground different from that of the Income-tax Officer. 14. The assessee contested the conclusion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in regard to the finding for the year 1964-65. It was not contended that Sardar Ravinder Singh was not a minor at the time of execution of the deed of partnership but it was contended that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner could not arrive at a conclusion on a ground different from that given by the Income-tax Officer. The same ground has been urged before us. 15. Having considered the submissions urged on behalf of the assessee, we are of the view that the submissions lack substance and must be rejected. In this connection, Sub-section (4) of Sec.250 and Clauses (a) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.251, which are relevant and are in force, are quoted below : 250. (4) The Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, before disposing of any appeal, make such further enquiry as he thinks fit, or may direct the Income-tax Officer to make further inquiry and report the result of the same to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 251. (1) In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall have the following powers- (a) in an appeal against an order of assessment, he may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment; or he may set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the Income-tax Officer for making a fresh assessment in accordance with the directions given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and after making such further inquiry as may be necessary, and the Income-tax Officer shall thereupon proceed to make such fresh, assessment and determine, where necessary, the amount of tax payable on the basis of such fresh assessment; ................. (c) in any other case, he may pass such orders in the appeal as he thinks fit. " 16. From the above provisions it.
(c) in any other case, he may pass such orders in the appeal as he thinks fit. " 16. From the above provisions it. will be seen that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is empowered to hold such further inquiry as he may think fit. It is open to him either to direct the Income-tax Officer to make further inquiry and submit a report to him or he may himself hold an inquiry. In the instant case, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held further inquiry and in this regard, recorded the statement of Sardar Gian Singh Purewal on oath. The statement of Sardar Gian Singh Purewal itself brought out the revealing fact that Sardar Ravinder Singh was minor on the date of execution of the partnership deed. Sub-section (4) of Sec.250 of the Act clearly empowered the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to hold any inquiry as he considered appropriate. The provision of Sec.251(1)(c) empowers an Appellate Assistant Commissioner to pass any order which he may consider fit while hearing an appeal. It was, therefore, open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner while hearing an appeal against the registration to call upon Sardar Gian Singh to give his statement. No exception can, therefore, be taken to the step taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 17. Learned counsel for the assessee in support of his submission placed reliance upon the case of CIT V/s. Amritlal Bhogilal & Company [1958] 34 ITR 130 (SC) and CIT V/s. Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry [1962] 44 ITR 891 (SC). None of those two cases have any relevance to the question falling for consideration before us. 18. In the case of Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. [1958] 34 ITR 130 (SC), the facts were that the Income-tax Officer made an estimate about the profits of the assessee under the proviso to Sec.13 and computed the total income of the assessee, who had applied for and obtained renewal of registration of the firm. Against the order of assessment, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, The Appellate Assistant Commissioner reduced the estimated profit. The assessees appeal for another year was pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
Against the order of assessment, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, The Appellate Assistant Commissioner reduced the estimated profit. The assessees appeal for another year was pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Meanwhile it had come to the notice of the Commissioner that the assessee-firm, which had been granted renewal of registration by the Income-tax Officer, was not a firm which could be registered under the Act as one of the partners of the firm was a minor. The Commissioner then took action under Sec.33B(1) of the Act and issued notice to the assessee to show cause why assessment made under Sec.23(3) of the Act and the registration granted under Sec.26A be not cancelled. After hearing the parties, the Commissioner cancelled the registration of the firm under Section 26A and directed the Income-tax Officer to make fresh assessment against the assessee as an unregistered firm for all the three years. As a result of this revisional order passed by the Commissioner, the Income-tax Officer passed a fresh assessment order. The assessee filed appeals to the Tribunal. 19. Two of them were against the orders passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under Sec.31 while another set of three appeals was directed against the order of the Commissioner in relation to the orders passed under Sec.33B(1) of the Act. The stand of the assessee was that the Commissioner was not competent to pass an order setting aside an assessment which had been confirmed or modified by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It was also contended that the order passed by the Commissioner under Sec.33B(1) was bad in law as he directed the Income-tax Officer to pass orders in a particular manner and that the order of cancellation of registration of the firm was bad in law. In that situation, the question referred to the High Court was whether the Commissioner of Income-tax acting under Sec.33B(1) can set aside the orders passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner for the years for which assessment had already been passed ? 20. The other question referred to the High Court was: Whether the Commissioner of Income-tax could direct the Income-tax Officer to pass an order in a particular manner ? 21. The question thus falling for consideration before the Supreme Court was entirely different from that before us.
20. The other question referred to the High Court was: Whether the Commissioner of Income-tax could direct the Income-tax Officer to pass an order in a particular manner ? 21. The question thus falling for consideration before the Supreme Court was entirely different from that before us. On the question raised, the Supreme Court held that as under Sec.31, there is no appeal from an order granting registration to a firm under Sec.26A, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot cancel, in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction under Sec.31, an order granting registration to a firm. The Supreme Court also held that however wide the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may be in an appeal from an order of assessment, they can be exercised only in respect of matters which are specifically made applicable under Sec.31. 22. In my view, the case of Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. [1958] 34 ITR 130 (SC) has no relevance to the question before us. In the instant case, the question of registration had fallen for consideration before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in an appeal under Sec.246 of the Act. 23. In the case of Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry [1962] 44 ITR 891 (SC), the Supreme Court held that in an appeal filed by the assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has no power to find a new source of income not mentioned in the return and not considered by the Income-tax Officer and assess it under his powers granted under Sec.31. The situation thus in that case also was entirely different. 24. In the instant case, the question is whether there was a valid partnership. The circumstances for cancelling the registration taken into account by the Revenue were two. First was that Sardar Ravinder Singh was a minor on the date the agreement was executed. The second was that Sardar Jugtar Singh and Sardra Ravinder Singh were not contributing their labour to the firm. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner found wrongly that the Income-tax Officer had not recorded any finding about the sons of Sardar Gian Singh contributing their labour. He, therefore, proceeded to examine Sardar Gian Singh. It must, therefore, be held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was exercising his power under Sections 250(4) and 251(1)(c) of the Act.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner found wrongly that the Income-tax Officer had not recorded any finding about the sons of Sardar Gian Singh contributing their labour. He, therefore, proceeded to examine Sardar Gian Singh. It must, therefore, be held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was exercising his power under Sections 250(4) and 251(1)(c) of the Act. The two read together fully empowered the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to record the statement of Sardar Gian Singh and proceeded to consider whether the registration of the firm be cancelled or not. In this connection, reliance by Mr. B.P. Rajgarhia, senior standing counsel, on the case of CIT V/s. Kanpur Coal Syndicate [1964] 53 ITR 225 (SC) is well placed. In that case, the Supreme Court laid down that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has plenary powers in disposing of an appeal. The scope of his powers is co-terminous with that of the Income-tax Officer. He can do what the Income-tax Officer can do and can also direct him to do what he has failed to do. It is thus obvious that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was well within his powers in recording the statement of Sardar Gian Singh and to proceed to give a finding in that regard. It goes without saying that Section 13l(1)(b) empowers an Appellate Assistant Commissioner to examine any person on oath. Thus, the joint effect of sections 131, 250(4) and 251(1)(c) is that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner could examine Sardar Gian Singh in the instant case and no objection can be taken to the procedure adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. No fresh notice was required to be served on the assessee. Thus the objection taken on behalf of the petitioner with respect to the procedure adopted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has no substance and must be rejected. 25. The next question relates to the assessment for the year 1961-62. This is the subject-matter of Taxation Case No. 140 of 1976. The order of cancellation of the registration for this year was set aside by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. The Revenue has, therefore, got this case referred for our opinion. 26. We have set out earlier the question referred to us.
This is the subject-matter of Taxation Case No. 140 of 1976. The order of cancellation of the registration for this year was set aside by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. The Revenue has, therefore, got this case referred for our opinion. 26. We have set out earlier the question referred to us. The last question which has been referred to this court by the Tribunal is : Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cancelling the order of the Income-tax Officer refusing registration to the assessee-firm for the assessment year 1961-62. Learned senior standing counsel submitted that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal erred in law in setting aside the order of the Income-tax Officer on the ground that no notice had been issued to the assessee in respect of the assessment year 1961-62 to show cause why the registration for that year be not cancelled. The submission has substance and should be accepted as we shall indicate hereinafter. 27. A chronology of events will bring out clearly that the assessee had reasonable opportunity of showing cause against cancellation of registration for the year 1961-62. The firm had been granted registration since the assessment year 1958-59. The registration was being continued year after year. In the course of assessment for the year 1964-65, the Income-tax Officer came by some materials which showed that there was no legal partnership. He, therefore, issued a notice to the assessee to show cause why the registration be not cancelled. There can be no running away from the fact that the notice was issued in the course of assessment for the year 1964-65 (A. Y.). The notice did not refer to any particular year but was in general terms. The notice was as follows ; GOVERNMENT OF INDIA Office of the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Patna. No. GIR/302 P/64-65 Dated, Patna, the 25th October, 1969. To M/s. Punjab Ice Factory and Cold Storage, Kankarbagh, Patna. On perusal of the deed of partnership, it is seen that on May 31, 1958, the deed was executed. Sri Sardar Jugtar Singh and Sri Sardar Ravinder Singh were admitted as working partners as per following narration in page 3 of the deed. Party of the second part as also party of the third part shall contribute their labour and enterprise. 2.
Sri Sardar Jugtar Singh and Sri Sardar Ravinder Singh were admitted as working partners as per following narration in page 3 of the deed. Party of the second part as also party of the third part shall contribute their labour and enterprise. 2. I have information in my possession according to which Sardar Ravinder Singh is residing outside India. Sardar Jugtar Singh is also not available to contribute his whole labour to this business. 3.Under the circumstances, it appears that there was no partnership business in name and style of M/s. Punjab Ice Factory as stipulated in the partnership deed dated May 31, 1958. 4. You are, therefore, requested to show cause as to why the registration should not be cancelled under the provision of Section 186(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. You are requested to submit your reply on or before October 27, 1969. In case you fail to submit your reply, the case will be decided on merits. (Sd) A. K. Ghose, Income-tax Officer, Ward B, Special Circle, Patna. 28. From the above notice, it will be seen that it did not relate to any particular year. In fact, it was in general terms and the assessee had been called upon to show cause why the registration should not be cancelled, as there was no valid partnership in terms of Sec.186 of the Income-tax Act. It must again be accepted that the only material then available with the Department was that both the sons of Sardar Gian Singh, who were partners in the firm, were not available to contribute to the partnership activities in any manner. But it is obvious that notice had been issued in regard to the cancellation of the registration on the ground that the partnership agreement of May 31, 1958, was of no consequence and the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of registration. In response to the notice, the assessee showed cause on October 20, 1969. The Income-tax Officer by order dated October 30, 1969, cancelled the registration of the firm for the year 1964-65 on the footing that Sardar Ravinder Singh, one of the partners, was not contributing his labour and enterprise to the partnership firm. In appeal against the said order, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner examined Sardar Gian Singh Purewal on oath.
The Income-tax Officer by order dated October 30, 1969, cancelled the registration of the firm for the year 1964-65 on the footing that Sardar Ravinder Singh, one of the partners, was not contributing his labour and enterprise to the partnership firm. In appeal against the said order, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner examined Sardar Gian Singh Purewal on oath. From the statement of Gian Singh himself, it came out that Ravinder Singh was a minor on May 31, 1958. I have stated earlier that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner committed an error of record in observing that the Income-tax Officer had not given any finding in regard to Ravinder Singh and Jugtar Singh not being available to contribute their labour and enterprise. Be that as it may, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the order of cancellation of the registration though on a ground different from that of the Income-tax Officer, namely, that Sardar Ravinder Singh, son of Sardar Gian Singh, was not a major on the date of execution of the deed. The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was passed on February 20, 1971. The finding that Sardar Ravinder Singh was a minor was recorded on February 20, 1971, and that was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal as well. 29. The question of cancellation of registration for the year 1961-62 was taken up for consideration after the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had passed an order on February 20, 1971, while passing the order for 1964-65 (assessment year). This matter was taken up for the. years 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1966-67 by the Income-tax Officer at the same time and orders were passed by the Income-tax Officer on the same day, namely, March 31, 1971. The assessment orders of the Income-tax Officer for these three years are annexures A-1, A-2 and X. For the present, I shall leave out the question relating to 1961-62, but for the years 1962-63 and 1966-67, the assessee had been called upon to show cause why the registration be not cancelled on two grounds. Firstly, on the ground that Sardar Jugtar Singh and Sardar Ravinder Singh were not contributing their labour and, secondly, that Sardar Ravinder Singh was not a major when the partnership deed was executed on May 31, 1958. Thus the assessee had ample notice in relation to 1962-63 and 1966-67, that he was required to establish that Ravinder, Singh was a major on May 31, 1958.
Thus the assessee had ample notice in relation to 1962-63 and 1966-67, that he was required to establish that Ravinder, Singh was a major on May 31, 1958. No attempt was made by him to establish it. On his own statement, therefore, it was found consistently by the Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal that Sardar Ravinder Singh was a minor on the date the partnership deed was executed. Since the order for 1961-62 (assessment year) was also passed by the Income-tax Officer on the date the orders for the years 1962-63 and 1966-67 (assessment years) were passed, it is not difficult to presume that the assessee was required to show that Sardar Ravinder Singh was a major on May 31, 1958. We have not much difficulty in accepting the stand of the Revenue that the cancellation matter in regard to all the three years, i.e., 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1966-67, was heard at the same time. The assessee knew the circumstance being used against him. He knew that the fact of minority of Sardar Ravinder Singh was being used against him. In my view, therefore, the assessee, Sardar Gian Singly had certainly been afforded reasonable opportunity in regard to 1961-62 (assessment year) as well to show cause why the registration should not be cancelled. There is no provision for issuance of notice for cancellation. All that Sec.186 lays down is that the registration may be cancelled " after giving the firm a reasonable opportunity of being heard ". 30. The words enclosed are nothing but requirement of compliance with the rules of natural justice. If the law laid down specifically that a notice must be issued, I would have taken a different view of the matter, but since the requirement of law is only to afford reasonable opportunity of being heard, that opportunity can be given even across the table when the assessee is before the Income-tax Officer when the latter is hearing a matter. Rules of natural justice are not hide bound. They have a salutary purpose and must be complied with, but they cannot be raised to the status of slogans or a jargon. In the instant case, the assessee knew full well that he was called upon to sustain the registration on two counts. The two counts were common for all the three years in question.
They have a salutary purpose and must be complied with, but they cannot be raised to the status of slogans or a jargon. In the instant case, the assessee knew full well that he was called upon to sustain the registration on two counts. The two counts were common for all the three years in question. Further, the Income-tax Officer has mentioned in his order for the year 1961-62 (assessment year) as follows: "A show-cause notice was issued to the assessee requesting him to explain why registration should not be cancelled. In his reply dated October 20, 1969, the assessee admitted that Sardar Ravinder Singh was residing in the U.S.A. and was not in a position to contribute his labour". (See annexure "X "). 31. We are, therefore, fully satisfied that the assessee had reasonable opportunity of being heard and that the provisions of Sec.186(1) of the Act in that regard were substantially complied with. The non-issue of the separate notice for 1961-62 (assessment year) could not vitiate the order of the Income-tax Officer, even if it is assumed that no separate notice had been issued in regard to the cancellation of registration for the year 1961-62 (assessment year). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner thus erred in law in setting aside the order of the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal erred in law in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner setting aside the order of the Income-tax Officer. The question thus referred to us in Taxation Case No. 140 of 1976 must, therefore, be decided in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. 32. We are now left with the order of cancellation of registration for the years 1962-63 and 1966-67. The point urged in regard to 1964-65 on behalf of the assessee is not available for these two years. In regard to these two years, the assessee had been specifically called upon to show cause why the registration be not cancelled, as the agreement was invalid on account of the fact that Sardar Ravinder Singh was a minor on the date of execution of the deed. It is well established that if any of the partners to a partnership agreement is a minor, that partnership is invalid in law which learned counsel for the assessee was candid to concede that that provision is correct in law.
It is well established that if any of the partners to a partnership agreement is a minor, that partnership is invalid in law which learned counsel for the assessee was candid to concede that that provision is correct in law. Thus, in regard to the cancellation of registration for the year 1964-65, no error was pointed out to us. We are satisfied that the Tribunal was Justified in upholding the cancellation of registration under Sec.186(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 1964-65, 1962-63 and 1966-67. 33. The questions in all the four references are thus answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal through its Assistant Registrar.