JUDGMENT : M.P. Menon, J. 1. This case is about acquisition of land for a public purpose. The basic facts could have been set out with more clarity in the Original Petition and the counter affidavit at least should have presented a clearer picture. Be that as it may, the factual background, to the extent it could be ascertained from the files and assistance of counsel, appears to be the following. 2. The notification under S.3 of the Kerala Act was published in September, 1976. On service of notice under R.3 the petitioners filed Ext. P-1 objection on 13th October 1976; but before the same could be processed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the petitioners moved the Panchayat Minister on 11th November 1976 and obtained an order staying all further proceedings. The stay was vacated on 28th April 1977. Notice under R.5(b) for enquiry under S.5(2) was thereafter served on the petitioner, requesting him to appear on 21st July 1977. After enquiry, a report was submitted to the Revenue Board and S.6 declaration was made in September, 1978. 3. It appears that in the meanwhile, the petitioners were making further representations to the Government, this time to the Revenue Minister. Ext. P-5, dated 8th August 1980 is one such representation; and one of the prayers in the petition was that the Collector be directed to conduct a hearing on the petitioners' petition, dated 5th November 1970, before proceeding with the acquisition proceedings: “There was also a reference to the need for a proper enquiry under S.5(2) of the Act. On 24th January 1981 Government wrote to the Collector directing him “to hear the petitioners.” The Land Acquisition Officer complied with this direction also, he heard them on 18th March 1981 and passed an order on 16th June 1981 overruling their objections to the acquisition. He then proceeded with the enquiry, passed an award, and issued notice thereof as per Ext. P-9, dated 24th August 1981. 4. The reliefs claimed in the Original Petition are: (i) certiorari to quash Ext. P-9. (ii) mandamus “to refer the matter to Government as provided under S.5(2) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act.” (iii) appropriate directions for disposing of Exts. P-1 and P-6. P-9, dated 24th August 1981. 4. The reliefs claimed in the Original Petition are: (i) certiorari to quash Ext. P-9. (ii) mandamus “to refer the matter to Government as provided under S.5(2) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act.” (iii) appropriate directions for disposing of Exts. P-1 and P-6. but at the hearing counsel wanted the entire acquisition proceedings to be set aside on two grounds: (i) there was no enquiry under S.5(2) at all, either in 1977 or in 1981, and therefore all further proceedings beginning with the S.6 declaration were illegal. (ii) even if there was a proper enquiry in 1981, after the orders of the Revenue Minister, that was insufficient in law because such an enquiry should have been conducted before the declaration under S.6. 5. As regards the first ground, the first question to be answered is whether there was an enquiry under S.5(2) in 1977, prior to the S.6 declaration in 1978. The averments in the O.P. would indicate that there was atleast an attempt to hold such an enquiry, after due notice to the petitioners, as is suggested by the following statement in paragraph (3): “...... the petitioners were served with a notice No. K3. 69318/76, dated nil under S.5 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, read with R.5(b) of the rules, directing that the petitioners may appear on 21st July 1977. The petitioners received no reply (to Ext. P-3 letter addressed to the Minister). The petitioners then filed another objection stating that he has not so far received any reply to their earlier petitions before determining the compensation amount.” Though it is somewhat difficult to see what exactly the purport of the above averments are, it is possible to infer that the petitioners were offered at least an opportunity of being heard, on 21st July 1977. But when we turn to the counter affidavit, instead of any clear averment as to whether the petitioners did or did not avail of the said opportunity, what we find stated is this: “......the petitioner has been served with a notice under S.5(2) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act directing him to appear before the Land Acquisition Officer on 2Ist July 1977. The objection petition said to have been filed on 5th November 1977 is not seen received. The objection petition said to have been filed on 5th November 1977 is not seen received. As per the Government direction in letter No. 52607/B1/80/RD, dated 22nd August 1980 forwarding a copy of the objection petition, dated 8th August 1980, the petitioner was heard on 16th June 1981 and after considering all the aspects the petition was rejected.........” The averments, it bears repetition, are sufficient to show that notice for an enquiry on 21st July 1977 was given; they are insufficient to show that an enquiry was actually held on the day specified. But in the nature of the pleadings extracted earlier, and the state of affairs disclosed by the concerned file, I think that it will be imprudent to proceed on the basis that no enquiry at all was held on 21st July 1977.” 6. Even assuming for a moment that no enquiry was actually held in 1977, prior to the making of the declaration under S.6 in 1978, I think the writ petition should fail because if the petitioners had a case based on failure to hold an enquiry before the making of S.6 declaration in 1978, they should have challenged that declaration before this court within a reasonable period of time, without waiting till September, 1981 and without obtaining directions for an enquiry from the Minister. 7. On the question whether there was a proper enquiry or not in 1981, in pursuance of the Minister's directions in Ext. P-7, there could only be one answer and that must be in the affirmative. Except the bald suggestion in the Original Petition, contradicted by the notings in the file and the averments in the counter affidavit, there is nothing to suspect that no such enquiry was held in 1981. 8. The next question is whether the 1981 enquiry would have satisfied the requirements of S.5 and 6 of the Act. It is needless to answer this question, in view of the finding already recorded that there was an enquiry in July, 1977 as required by S.5(2). That apart, even after the S.6 declaration in 1978, the petitioners' request in Ext. P-5 representation of 1980 was that a further and more elaborate enquiry should be held into the question of the public purpose claimed in the S.3 notification, and the legality and propriety of the proposed acquisition. That apart, even after the S.6 declaration in 1978, the petitioners' request in Ext. P-5 representation of 1980 was that a further and more elaborate enquiry should be held into the question of the public purpose claimed in the S.3 notification, and the legality and propriety of the proposed acquisition. That request was granted, and the petitioners took the chance of getting a favourable decision from the Land Acquisition authorities by participating in the 1981 enquiry. They cannot now be permitted, in the present proceedings under Art.226, to turn round and contend that that enquiry could not be taken into account. So far as this court is concerned, the discretionary nature of its jurisdiction in such cases has been more than fully explained in Madambi vs. Kunhukutty Amma and Others, 1975 KLT 118 and T.D.C.W. Society vs. Dy. Registrar, 1975 KLT 589 . 9. The writ petition must accordingly fail, but the facts of this case as well as other similar cases heard recently prompt me to make some general observation about the extent of the Government's jurisdiction to interfere with proceedings pending before a Land Acquisition Collector, after the publication of S.3 notice. 10. The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act seems to be that it is for the Land Acquisition Officer to hold the enquiry under S.5(2), prepare the ground for the declaration under S.6, take follow-up steps after the declaration, conduct the award enquiry and determine the compensation payable, give notice of the award, take possession of the land thereafter and make references under S.20 where that is found necessary. Ordinarily the Government stands outside these proceedings leaving it to the Land Acquisition Officer, who is either the Government's agent or a statutory authority, to do all that is necessary under the statute in connection with the acquisition. S.52 of the Act authorises the Government to withdraw from the acquisition before taking over of possession, and from this provision, a power could probably be implied in Government's favour for ordering a stay of the acquisition proceedings, as part of a holding-up operation pending a decision on the question whether it should withdraw from the acquisition in a given case. But that is a power to be sparingly exercised, in those rare situations where Government is satisfied that a good prima facie case for dropping the proceedings exists. But that is a power to be sparingly exercised, in those rare situations where Government is satisfied that a good prima facie case for dropping the proceedings exists. It is not as if a notification under S.3 is to be issued lightly, and then all further proceedings are to be stayed on the slightest provocation in the form of some representations. And when stay orders are issued successively by the sponsoring department, the Revenue Department and also by others, the entire proceedings became a tamasha, even capable of committing hara kiri by crossing the time-limit specified in the proviso to S.6(1). The Land Acquisition Officer/Collector must be presumed to be a responsible officer with capacity to safeguard Government's interests and properly decide the question of public purpose arising under S.(3) to (6) of the Act, without king goaded or prompted by others at every stage. 11. As for issue of directions to Land Acquisition Officers as was done in this case, I fail to see any specific power conferred on the Government by the Act and the Rules, for that purpose. Again, it is for the Land Acquisition Officer holding the enquiry under S.5(2) to decide who should be heard, when and how, subject of course to the statutory prescriptions. Other questions arising in the course of his other duties have also to be resolved by him, without interference from above. If the officer is to be considered as a statutory authority (as in the case of exercising power under S.20), he should act independently, and should totally eschew all other considerations, apart from those specified by the statute. If he is to be treated as an agent, even then the principal's direction should be only within the limits of the agency as circumscribed by the statute. 12. In short those in authority should always bear in mind that in performing the functions and duties specified by a statute, an officer of the Government is not just a “your most obedient servant” who could be compelled to act against the statute of overlook its provisions. O.P. dismissed. No costs.