B. N. Kirpal ( 1 ) THE appellant was a lawful sub-tenant in House No. 2130, Katra Gokul Shah, Bazar Sita Ram. The aforesaid premises, prior to 1968, were owned by Shri R. N. Kaul and two of his brothers. At that time Dr. Zutshi was the tenant. The appellant herein was a sub-tenant of Dr. Zutshi. According to the concurrent findings of the Courts below lawful sub-tenancy had been created in favour of the appellant by Dr. Zutshi with the consent of the then landlord, in Feb. , 1952. ( 2 ). In 1968 Sultan Khan, the decree holder bought the premises in question. He filed an application for eviction of Dr. Zutshi and one Smt. Sushila Devi. The appellant was also impleaded as one of the respondents. The application was filed by the respondent for seeking eviction on the grounds in S. 14 (1), (a) (b), (d) and (h ). It is not disputed that Dr. Zutshi deposited the rent in Court and therefore, the claim for eviction u/s 14 (1) (a) came to an end. ( 3 ). During the pendency of eviction proceedings landlord made a statement to the effect that he wanted to give up the appellant. The appellant was deleted from the array of respondents and the eviction petition against him was dismissed as withdrawn. Subsequently the respondent entered into a compromise with Dr. Zutshi and Smt. Sushila Devi. As a result of that compromise, an order of eviction was passed on 2. 6. 71 in favour of Respondent No. 1 on the grounds in 14 (1), (d) and (h ). ( 4 ). The respondent thereafter moved an application for execution of the aforesaid order of eviction. Naturally the appellant herein filed objections to the same. It was, inter alia, contended by the appellant herein that he was a lawful sub-tenant and he had served a notice dated 12 5. 59 of the creation of a sub-tenancy and this notice u/s 17 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 had been sent under Certificate of Posting. It was also contended that the decree dated 2. 6. 71 was a collusive one and was not binding on the appellant. ( 5 ). In reply the respondent landlord denied the receipt of the alleged notice u/s 17 (2) of the Act. The other contentions raised by the appellant were also controverted. ( 6 ). It was also contended that the decree dated 2. 6. 71 was a collusive one and was not binding on the appellant. ( 5 ). In reply the respondent landlord denied the receipt of the alleged notice u/s 17 (2) of the Act. The other contentions raised by the appellant were also controverted. ( 6 ). After recording the evidence of the parties, the trial court came to the conclusion that the appellant was a lawful sub-tenant having been inducted as such in Feb. 1952 with the consent of the then landlord. The trial court, however, held that no notice u/s 17 (2) had been served by the appellant on the previous owner/landlord, and that the Certificate of Posting which had been filed was not a genuine document. It was further held that service of the alleged notice had not been effected in the manner prescribed under Rule 22 of the rules framed under the Act. The trial court, therefore, concluded that the appellant had not become a direct tenant under the D. H. and was, therefore, not entitled to get the benefit of S. 18 of the Act. ( 7 ). Being aggrieved an appeal was filed. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Controller and rejected the objections which were filed. ( 8 ). Before me the first contention which is raised by Shri Makhija, the learned counsel for the appellant is that even if it be assumed that a notice u/s 17 of the Act had not been sent nevertheless the appellant was admittedly a lawful sub-tenant and therefore, even if an order of eviction was passed against Dr. Zutshi, the appellant could not be evicted. The learned counsel contends that the purpose of giving notice of the creation of sub-tenancy u/s 17 of the Act is merely to inform the landlord and with a view that if the landlord chooses to contest he can move an application u/s 17 (3) of the Act. It was, therefore, contended by the learned counsel that no order of eviction against a tenant can result in the eviction of a lawful sub-tenant. ( 9 ). The argument of Shri Makhija that the provisions requiring the giving of notice u/s 17 (1) or 17 (2) of the Act are only to enable Ihe landlord to file an application u/s 17 (3) appears to be attractive at first sight. ( 9 ). The argument of Shri Makhija that the provisions requiring the giving of notice u/s 17 (1) or 17 (2) of the Act are only to enable Ihe landlord to file an application u/s 17 (3) appears to be attractive at first sight. It is however, not open for the learned counsel to urge this contention with any force because, on this point, the matter is no longer res Integra. A D. B. of this Court in the Murari Lal vs. Abdul Ghaffar, 1973 R. C. R. 748= 1974. Raj. LR. 39 has held that if no notice is given u/s 17 of the creation of the sub-tenancy, then sub-tenant cannot get the benefit of S. 18, and he cannot be deemed to have become a tenant holding directly under the landlord after an order of eviction has been passed against the tenant. As I am bound by the said decision, I must hold that the order of eviction passed against Dr. Zutshi would not make the appellant a tenant directly under the respondent landlord. ( 10 ). It is true that sub-tenancy was lawfully created in favour of the appellant. A subtenant, in general law, cannot get a better title than the person through whom he derives the title, viz. , the tenant is liable to be evicted, then all the persons including the sub-tenant have to vacate alongwith the tenant. S. 18 of the Act, however, sought to carve out an exception to this general rule, S. 18 provides that where a notice u/s 17 has been given for the creation of a. sub-tenancy, then if an order of eviction has been passed against the tenant, then the sub-tenant will be deemed to have become a tenant holding directly under the landlord. Order of eviction may be passed against the tenant under - any of the clauses (a) to (1) of S. 14 (1) of theAct, if the benefit of S. 18 of the Act is not available to the sub-tenant, then the sub-tenant, will have to vacate the premises alongwith the tenant and if the provisions of the S. 18 are applicable, then the sub-tenant can legitimately claim to be regarded as a tenant directly under the landlord. S. 18 categorically states that the benefit thereof is available only to a subtenant who is referred to in S. 17 and who has given a notice of the creation of the sub-tenancy to the landlord. In other words, in order to obtain the benefit of S. 18, it is necessary that the sub-tenant should show and prove that a notice envisaged u/s 17 (1) has been given to the landlord. If such a notice is given, then the sub-tenant cannot be evicted if a decree of eviction has been passed against the tenant without impleading the sub-tenant in these proceedings. S. 14 (3) makes this position very clear. If no such notice is given, the sub-tenant will have to vacate the premises when an order for eviction is passed against the person through whom he is deriving the title, viz. , the tenant. ( 11 ). Paced with the aforesaid difficulty Mr. Makhija made a valiant attempt to try and convince me that the finding of the Courts below that valid notice had not been served as envisaged by S. 1 7 is not correct. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. Firstly, whether a valid notice u/s 17 had been given or not is a pure question of fact. On this question there is a concurrent finding against the appellant. I do not see any reason why that concurrent finding should be interfered with. In any case, the contention of the learned counsel is that a notice was sent under Certificate of Posting. It is not disputed that notices are to be given in the manner prescribed by the rules. Rule 22 states that unless other- wise provided by the Act, any notice which is required to be given shall be served on any person either by delivering it to the person or by forwarding it to the person by Registered Post with acknowledgement due. It is not denied that the notice was not sent by Registered Post with acknowledgement due. It this be so, then the appellant has to prove that the said notice was actually delivered to the then landlord. Apart from leading evidence that a notice u/s 17 was sent under Certificate of Posting, there is admittedly no direct or other evidence which can lead to the conclusion that the notice was in fact delivered to the addressee. It this be so, then the appellant has to prove that the said notice was actually delivered to the then landlord. Apart from leading evidence that a notice u/s 17 was sent under Certificate of Posting, there is admittedly no direct or other evidence which can lead to the conclusion that the notice was in fact delivered to the addressee. The delivery of the notice to person concerned contemplated by Rule 22 (a) means actual physical delivery of the notice. There is no record to this effect. Merely because notice is alleged to have been sent under Certificate of Posting cannot lead to the conclusion that the notice was actually delivered to the landlord. Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument that a postman who carries the letter sent under Certificate of Posting is an agent of author of letter, it must still be shown that the postman actually physically delivered the letter to the addressee. If there had been any evidence to this effect, it could possibly have been duly served in the manner provided by Rule 22 (a ). Evidence to this effect is, however, lacking in the present case. Mere sending of notice even by writing the correct address, but not by Registered Post acknowledgement due but by Certificate of Posting would not amount to complying with the provisions of Rule 22. Under these circumstances, the only conclusion which can follow is that there has been no proof of service of notice in the manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules. Therefore, as there was no valid notice served on the landlord u/s 17 of the Act, the subtenant is unable to get the protection of S. 18. This would mean that the order of eviction having been passed against the tenant, then by virtue of the provisions of S. 25 of the Act, the sub-tenant will also have to vacate the premises in question. In my opinion, therefore, the objections of the appellant were rightly rejected.