RAMESHCHANDRA ATMARAM v. STATE — 1985 DIGILAW 262 (GUJ)

A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THESE two petitions arise out of the proceedings and orders passed under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Facts of the petitions and the questions involved are almost identical and hence at the request of and by the consent of the parties both the matters are being heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) AN intimation under Section 26 of the Act dated October 21 1981 (produced at Annexure A to both the petitions) was given to the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 stating that the land held by them and sought to be transferred was not required by the Government. In the petition the letter is described as order. Now at the stage of hearing it is sought to be described as an intimation. Thereafter on June 6 1983 the Government passed an order informing the petitioners that the Government had decided to take up the proceedings in revision under Section 34 of the Act and hence the petitioners were directed to maintain status quo and were further informed that the date of hearing and time would be intimated later on. Thereafter a notice dated October 10 1983 (Annexure C to the petition) has been served upon the petitioners calling upon them on November 10 1983 to show cause against the action to be taken under Section 34 of the Act. It is not clear from the petition as to what happened on November 10 1983 Probably the petitioners might have sought adjournment. On November 22 1983 these two petitions have been filed in this High Court praying that the show-cause notice Annexure C issued by the Government be declared illegal and void and the same be quashed and set aside and the Government be restrained from taking further proceedings. On November 23 1983 both the petitions have been admitted and by way of interim order further proceedings before the Government have been stayed. (It may be noted that the petitioners are not permitted by this Court to alter the status quo with respect to the land. The only order passed by this Court is to the effect that further proceedings in pursuance of the motion should not be taken.) ( 3 ) NOW the facts in brief. (It may be noted that the petitioners are not permitted by this Court to alter the status quo with respect to the land. The only order passed by this Court is to the effect that further proceedings in pursuance of the motion should not be taken.) ( 3 ) NOW the facts in brief. One Atmaram Mohanbhai Patel and Shankarbhai Mohanbhai Patel owned land Survey No. 19611 of village Memnagar admeasuring 1 acre and 15 gunthas i. e. 5464 sq. mts. The land is situated within Ahmedabad Urban Agglomeration Area. Said Atmaram died on Decemb-er 20 1965 It is stated that by entry No. 405 507 dated April 14 1966 the names of petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 were entered as the heirs of deceased Atmaram in the revenue records. The petitioners case is that partition in respect of this land took place between the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 on the one hand and Shankarlal Mohanlal on the other hand. As per the partition land admeasuring 2732 sq. mt. has fallen to the share of petitioners Nos. 1 to 4. The petitioners further case is that a partition inter se between the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 took place with respect to the land admeasuring 2732 sq. mt. which had fallen to their share. As far as these petitions are concerned. Shankarbhai Mohanlal Patel does not figure in the picture and the land occupied and/or held by him is not the subject of these petitions. The relevant entry in the record of rights regarding the partition between petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 has been made on August 14 1981 As stated in para 5 of both the petitions the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 decided to sell the land admeasuring 942. 22 sq. mts. to petitioner No. 5 and also decided to sell other 942. 22 sq. mts. of land to petitioner No. 6. (There appears to be some mistake of area agreed to be sold since the total does not tally with the total area covered by Annesure A to both the petitions.) The petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 gave a notice in writing as required under the provisions of Section 26 (1) of the Act and informed the competent authority under the Act regarding the proposed sale. The competent authority under the Act by order dated October 21 1981 (Annexure A) informed petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 gave a notice in writing as required under the provisions of Section 26 (1) of the Act and informed the competent authority under the Act regarding the proposed sale. The competent authority under the Act by order dated October 21 1981 (Annexure A) informed petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 individually by separate letters to the effect that the Government did not wish to exercise its right to purchase the land mentioned therein. The description of the land mentioned in each of the order addressed to petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 individually is as follows: S Name of the petitioner Revenue Area No. Survey No. Sq. mt. 1 Rameshchandra Atmaram Memnagar 417 196 (Part) 2 Lilaben Atmaram Patel 583 3 Taraben Atmaram Patel 583 4 Ramaben Atmaram Patel 336. 1 Total 1919. 1 ( 4 ) THUS the total area of land in respect of which the notice under Section 26 (1) was given and ultimate decision of the competent authority was intimated to each of the petitioners comes to little over 1919 sq. mt. It is not stated in the petition as to when the petitioner sold the land and executed the document. However when this question was put to the counsel for the petitioners he submitted that the sale was effected and document executed on October 22 1981 Mark the date immediately next day after the date of intimation i. e. October 21 1981 5 It is the case of the petitioners that they applied to the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority to sanction the plans submitted by them. Sanction was given by the Authority as stated by the petitioners on March 4 1982 The petitioners further say is that they obtained permission for non-agricultural use of the land on April 29 1982 406 ( 5 ) ON June 6 1983 the Government issued injunction order produced at Annexure B to both the petitions. The order of injunction is identical in terms and has been addressed to all the petitioners of both the petitions. By this order the Government directed the petitioners to maintain status quo with respect to the land. In this order it is also mentioned that the sanction given under Section 26 of the Act by the competent authority as per order dated October 21 1981 was contrary to the provisions of law and contrary to the facts on record. By this order the Government directed the petitioners to maintain status quo with respect to the land. In this order it is also mentioned that the sanction given under Section 26 of the Act by the competent authority as per order dated October 21 1981 was contrary to the provisions of law and contrary to the facts on record. Hence the case was required to be taken up in revision. Thereafter on October 10 1983 the show-cause notice Annexure C addressed to all the petitioners i. e. vendors as well as vendees has been issued and served upon them. By this notice intimation with regard to the date and time of hearing of the case has been given to each of the petitioners. However as stated hereinabove hearing has not taken place and on account of the interim relief granted by this Court further proceedings pertaining to the show-cause notice have been stayed. ( 6 ) THE petitioners contend that the show cause notice Annexure C to the petition could not have been issued by the Government by invoking the powers under Section 34 of the Act. The petitioners further contend that the Government has no power to revise the order dated October 21 1981 passed by the competent authority under the provisions of Section 26 (1) of the Act. Even if the Government has power contend the petitioners the same cannot be exercised after inordinate delay. According to the petitioners there is inordinate delay in exercising the power and hence this power cannot be exercised at this late stage. It is further contended that the Government is estopped from exercising this power in view of the fact that the petitioners have changed their position by putting up construction over the land. Today i. e. on April 9 1984 an affidavit has been filed by petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 purporting to show the extent of the construction made. It is also contended that the show cause notice is not issued on the grounds germane to the provisions of Section 26 of the Act. The entire show cause notice is issued mechanically and without application of mind. 5 and 6 purporting to show the extent of the construction made. It is also contended that the show cause notice is not issued on the grounds germane to the provisions of Section 26 of the Act. The entire show cause notice is issued mechanically and without application of mind. Further contention is that the Government has no power to issue injunction order such as Annexure B dated June 6 1933 ( 7 ) THE contention that the Government has no power to take up the proceeding in suo motu revision under Section 34 of the Act is based on the ground that there is no order and there is no proceeding in the instant case. Before the powers under Section 34 of the Act are invoked there must be an `order passed under the Act and/or proceedings taken under the Act. Counsel for the petitioners submits that in the instant case there is no order passed or there is no proceedings taken under the Act. ( 8 ) THE petitioners submit look at the provisions of Section 26 of the Act. The Section applies to a person who is holding vacant land below the ceiling limit. It is submitted that only if the land is vacant land within the meaning of the Act and only if a person holds land below the ceiling limit the provisions of Section 26 of the Act will be applicable. In case where the land held by a person is beyond the ceiling limit and the same is sought to be transferred such a transfer would be hit by the provisions of Section 5 (3) of the Act. The transfer effected otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act would be illegal and void. Hence the provisions of Section 26 of the Act the argument proceeds further merely gives an option to the Government to purchase the land. 407 A sort of a right of preemption is given to the Government by making statutory provision in that behalf. The Scheme of the Section is that it applies to the persons who are holding land below the ceiling limit and who intend to transfer the same by way of sale mortgage gift lease or otherwise. The only fetter put upon the right of transferee is that he should give notice in writing to the competent authority an intimation about the intended transfer. The only fetter put upon the right of transferee is that he should give notice in writing to the competent authority an intimation about the intended transfer. The competent authority is required to make up its mind as to whether it wants to purchase the land on behalf of the Government This decision should be taken by the competent authority within a period of 60 days from the date of the receipt of the intimation of the notice. After the period of 60 days it shall be presumed that the competent authority had no intention to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government. Thereafter it shall be lawful for such person to transfer the land to whomsoever he likes. In case the competent authority decides to exercise option for purchase of such land the sale deed should be executed and the price thereof should be paid within a period of three months from the date on which Such option is exercised. The price to be paid shall be on the basis of the market value on the date of giving of the notice under Sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Act. That date will be deemed to be the date of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 9 ) THE entire Scheme of Section 26 of the Act is nothing but a simple provision for giving of intimation by a person who is otherwise not covered by the provisions of the Act. The Section only provides for an intimation to be given by a person who does not hold the land beyond the ceiling limit prescribed for that particular area. The competent authority has to exercise option as to whether it desires to purchase the land on behalf of the State Government. After taking the decision it has to inform the owner of the land. Thus there is only a notice to be given on behalf of the owner of the land and ultimately the intimation is to be given by the competent authority with regard to the exercise of option. The petitioners contend between the two terminal stages of notice and intimation there is no question of any proceeding being taken under the Act and there is no question of any order being passed. under the Act by the competent authority. The petitioners contend between the two terminal stages of notice and intimation there is no question of any proceeding being taken under the Act and there is no question of any order being passed. under the Act by the competent authority. ( 10 ) THE simplicity has its beauty and distinct attraction. But the simplicity is often deceptive and one has to guard himself against being deceived on account of the substance being covered by the veil of simplicity. In the instant case the submission made is an oversimplification of the issues involved in the matter of actions to be taken and decisions to be arrived at by the competent authority under Section 26 of the Act. Beyond this facade of over-simplification if the provisions are studied with little more exercise of commonsense it will be clear that the competent authority will be required to apply its mind to the following aspects:1 As to whether the notice itself given in writing by a person is competent under Section 26 (1) of the Act? For determining this question the competent authority will have to decide a substantive question as to whether the person is holding vacant land within the Act. It will have to first ascertain the extent of vacant land held by the person giving notice under Section 26 (4) of the Act. 2 Then he will have to ascertain as to whether the requisite formalities have been complied with or not? The formalities contemplate that the transferor should give notice as per the form prescribed in guidelines. The prescribed form indicates that the person submitting the application i. e. transferee should enclose an affidavit to the effect that the holds vacant land within the ceiling limits as prescribed under the relevant provisions of the Act. The form of affidavit is given in Annexure L. In that affidavit the person giving notice is required to give particulars of land which belongs to him. He is further required to make declaration that the person to whom the vacant land belongs is holding the land within the ceiling limit laid down under the provisions of the Act. 3 A statement is required to be filed by prospective transferee as per Annexure II in the guideline. The said statement requires him to give perticulars with regard to the land held by him. 3 A statement is required to be filed by prospective transferee as per Annexure II in the guideline. The said statement requires him to give perticulars with regard to the land held by him. ( 11 ) IF one scans the material which is required to be placed before the competent authority in the prescribed form and in the affidavit and statement it is clear that the competent authority would be required to ascertain the extent of vacant land held by the transferor as well as the transferee. He would also be required to adjudge the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit. His further duty will be to verify the statements made by the prospective transferee in the statement Annexure II. It is not that the function of the competent authority is merely to pass an order as to whether he is exercising opion to purchase the land or not. He can also say that the statement and averments made and the materials produced before him disclose that the applicant is a person holding the land beyond the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act. According to his own calculation the competent authority may come to the conclusion that the person who has given notice of proposed transfer of land is holding the land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed. Therefore the competent authority has first to take decision with regard to the competency or the eligibility of the person giving notice under Section 26 (1) of the Act that is to say he must determine as to whether the person is holding the land below the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act 2 Only after deciding this question he can proceed further to decide the notice under Section 26 (1) of the Act. In case he comes to the conclusion that the applicant holds land in excess of ceiling limit he will have to take decision to that effect and pass order accordingly. ( 12 ) THE notice in writing requires that an affidavit containing the details as to the land held by the person giving notice under Section 26 (1) of the Act should accompany the notice. In the affidavit the details of the land held by him either as individual family company or association or body of individuals are required to be furnished. In the affidavit the details of the land held by him either as individual family company or association or body of individuals are required to be furnished. He is also required to submit a statement duly signed and verified by the prospective transferee. In that statement the transferee is required to give particulars with regard to the urban land-property held by him. Thus there is an indication even from the contents of the notice and the contents of the particulars required to be furnished in the affidavit and statement accompanying the notice that the competent authority is required to take a decision on the point as to whether the person giving notice is holding urban land within the ceiling limit or not. Only when he is satisfied that the person giving notice under Section 26 (1) of the Act is eligible to give intimation under the Section that is to say the person giving intimation is holding vacant land within the ceiling limit the next question regarding exercise of option to purchase the land or not will arise. ( 13 ) AFTER deciding the aforesaid question the competent authority will have to decide as to whether he wishes to exercise option to purchase the land on behalf of the State Government. This he can do only if the land is required for public purpose i. e. for locating a government office or public institution construction of a new building for government office or public institution improvement expansion or convenient use of an existing building of a Government office or public institution play grounds for schools house sites for weaker sections widening of public roads or for any other public purpose for which the land can be acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act 1894 It may be noted that as per the guidelines issued by the Government the different departments of the Government are required to submit requisition to the competent authority. The particulars of properties in respect of which notices under Section 26 are received are required to be entered in a separate register to be maintained by the competent authority. In this register the date on which the right of preemption expires is required to be clearly indicated. The particulars of properties in respect of which notices under Section 26 are received are required to be entered in a separate register to be maintained by the competent authority. In this register the date on which the right of preemption expires is required to be clearly indicated. As per clause (6) of the Circular No. 1/64/76/ucu dated May 6 1976 whenever the competent authority is of the opinion that there is no need to refuse permission and that the property in question is not required by any Department of the Government he may grant permission as early as possible without necessarily waiting for the expiry of the period of sixty days and thereby avoid inconvenience to the public. ( 14 ) THUS while exercising the option either way i. e. for refusing to purchase or for purchasing the land on behalf of the Government the competent authority is required to take into consideration all the aforesaid factors namely the need of any particular Department of the Government the purpose for which the land is required the urgency of the matter in view of the time limit prescribed under the Act itself. From the aforesaid discussion it should be clear that when the competent authority decides the questions under Section 26 of the Act it is has to take into consideration many factors. Once the veil of oversimplification is pierced it becomes abundantly clear that the actions required to be taken under the provisions of Section 26 of the Act are not mere mechanical formality involving only intimation by notice of the proposed transfer to the competent authority and information by the competent authority regarding option to purchase or not to purchase. ( 15 ) THE consequences of the decision that may be taken or the order that may be passed by the competent authority may now be examined. The competent authority may wrongly decide that an person giving notice under Section 26 of the Act is holding vacant land below the ceiling limit. This wrong decision will frustrate the entire scheme and object of the Act. Conversely the competent authority wrongly decides that a person though holding the vacant land within the ceiling limit may be held to be person holding the land in excess of ceiling limit. This wrong decision will frustrate the entire scheme and object of the Act. Conversely the competent authority wrongly decides that a person though holding the vacant land within the ceiling limit may be held to be person holding the land in excess of ceiling limit. This will have also hazardous consequences in so far as that individual applicant is concerned his right to hold acquire and dispose of property in the manner he likes shall be be affected. Though the Act permits a person holding the land below the ceiling limit after following the requisite procedure to dispose of the land held by him the wrong decision by the competent authority would impinge upon his right to dispose of the land in whichever manner he likes. ( 16 ) THE effect of other decisions regarding the option to be exercised for 410 purchase of land on behalf of the Government may be seen. The competent authority can exercise this option only for public purpose. The nature of public purpose for which such land can be acquired has been indicated hereinabove. If the decision to purchase the land is taken not for the public purpose but for some extraneous purpose it would amount to colourable exercise of power. In such a situation a person who wants to dispose of his land as per his own wish will be denied his right to dispose of the same in that manner. Similarly the right of the transferee also in whose favour the sale of land which is proposed to be made will be affected. ( 17 ) THUS it is clear that the decision that may be taken under Section 26 of the Act by the competent authority will have far reaching consequences. Even the counsel for the petitioners submitted that it is a restriction on the fundamental right of the citizens. In his submission as per the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) the right to acquire hold and dispose of the property will be included in the right to liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary for me to decide whether or not the right to hold and dispose of the property will also be a variant of fundamental right to personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary for me to decide whether or not the right to hold and dispose of the property will also be a variant of fundamental right to personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. For the purpose of decision of these petitions suffice it to say that the decision of the competent authority under Section 26 of the Act will have impact upon the right of an individual to hold and dispose of the property in the manner he likes. ( 18 ) IT is beyond dispute that this right is at least a constitutional right as per Article 300a of the Constitution of India. When such a right is to be affected by a decision under Section 26 of the Act it can never be said that the questions required to be determined by the competent authority under this particular provision of the Act will be a matter of mere formality. The competent authority will have to consider the questions under Section 26 of the Act having in mind the far reaching consequences of his decision. From the stand point of an individual the direct consequence will be that his right to hold and dispose of the property may be impinged upon. On the other hand as far as the society is concerned a wrong decision on this point may deprive the society of the beneficial use of the urban land which otherwise would have been put at the disposal of the society. It must be realised that the land in urban area is a scarce commodity. That is the reason why the Act has been enacted so that this scarce commodity can be put to the beneficial use of the society at large. ( 19 ) ORDER in the context would mean command direction or to enjoin. It may be said that the decision that may be taken by the competent authority would be an expression of a command enjoined upon him. When the competent authority decides not to purchase the land on behalf of the Government he is performing a duty cast upon him that is to say a duty enjoined upon him under Section 26 of the Act. He gives expression to the decision taken in the form of the letter of intimation. When the competent authority decides not to purchase the land on behalf of the Government he is performing a duty cast upon him that is to say a duty enjoined upon him under Section 26 of the Act. He gives expression to the decision taken in the form of the letter of intimation. Such letter of intimation may not be in the formal language of order but nonetheless it is an expression of things enjoined upon the authority and therefore it is nothing but an order. Similarly as stated hereinabove when the authority receives the notices under the provisions of Section 26 of the Act he is required to maintain a register also containing all the particulars. After the receipt of the notice of proposed transfer he is required to apply his mind as regards the com 411 petency of the person giving notice and requirement of land by the Government for public purpose etc. This would be nothing but a proceeding under the Act. Therefore the argument that whatever is being done under the provisions of Section 26 of the Act is neither an order nor a proceeding under the Act cannot be accepted. ( 20 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners submitted that the provisions of Section 34 of the Act give extraordinary power to the Government. In his submission the Act is also an extraordinary piece of legislation. It is further submitted that it was difficult to administer the Act and therefore it became necessary for the Central Government to issue guidelines. On these premises it is contended that the provisions of Section 34 of the Act should be construed strictly. . ( 21 ) IT is difficult to agree with. the basic premise that the Act is an extraordinary piece of legislation and that the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Act are also extraordinary. The Act has been enacted with a view to implement the mandate given by the Constitution. Except the bare assertion lather forceful assertion that the Act is an extraordinary piece of legislation nothing is pointed out to substantiate the argument. Power of revision of the orders passed or proceedings taken under the Act are to be found in almost all statutes. Except the bare assertion lather forceful assertion that the Act is an extraordinary piece of legislation nothing is pointed out to substantiate the argument. Power of revision of the orders passed or proceedings taken under the Act are to be found in almost all statutes. The Bombay Land Revenue Code a piece of legislation enacted during the imperialist rule in the country as far back as in the year 1879 also contains such power of revision by the Government under the provisions of Section 211 of the Code. Section 211 of the Code confers power of revision upon the Government and upon certain revenue officers to call for and examine records and proceedings of subordinate officers. While exercising disciplinary jurisdiction in service matters the highest authority in the field is conferred with such powers. Reference may be made to the provisions of Rules 22 and 23 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules wherein similar provision is made. therefore to say that the power of revision contained in Section 34 is extraordinary has no legal or factual basis. Hence the contention that the Section should be construed strictly on this ground cannot be accepted. ( 22 ) WHILE construing the provisions of any Act the underlying purpose and the object sought to be achieved by enacting the particular piece of legislation has got to be kept in mind. The object of the Act is (1) (a): to impose ceiling on the vacant land under urban agglomeration; (b) : acquisition of such land in excess of ceiling limit; (c): regulation of construction of buildings on such land and other matters connected thereto; (2) for the prevention of: (a) concentration of urban lands in the hands of few persons and; (b) prevention of speculation and profiteering therein; (3) For the purposes of equitable distribution of land in urban agglomeration to subserve the common good in furtherance of Art. 39 (b) and (c) of the Directive Principles contained in the Constitution of India. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Basaviah reported in AIR 1976 SC 1415 wherein observations to the aforesaid effect have been made in. para 6 of the judgment. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Basaviah reported in AIR 1976 SC 1415 wherein observations to the aforesaid effect have been made in. para 6 of the judgment. Further in the case of State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson reported in 412 AIR 1983 SC 1303 in para 6 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:" That the dominant object to be achieved seems to be to prevent the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons so as to checkmate speculation and profiteering therein on the one hand and to bring about equitable distribution of land amongst the urban population". While interpreting certain provisions of the Act the Supreme Court in para 23 of the judgment has stated:"it is well settled that the language of a beneficial statute must be construed so as to suppress the mischief and advance its object. " ( 23 ) THUS the Supreme Court has considered the Act to be a piece of beneficial legislation. This is otherwise also clear from the fact that the Act has been enacted with a view to subserve the common good as provided under Art. 39 (b) a nd (c) of the Directive Principles contained in the Constitution. Hence the approach of the Court while interpreting Section 34 of the Act or for that matter any of the provisions of the Act should be to see that the mischief is suppressed and the object sought to be achieved by the Act is advanced. If this approach is adopted while construing the provisions of Section 34 of the Act it would be the bounden duty of the revisional authority to exercise its power whenever it appears to it that on account of some order passed by the lower authority or on account of certain proceedings having been taken under the provisions of the Act some mischief has been played of is being played or that the object which is sought to be achieved by the Act has been frustrated or is being frustrated. There is no reason why to adopt a restricted construction of the provisions of the Act. In fact if that approach is adopted it would amount to doing something against the law declared by the Supreme Court. There is no reason why to adopt a restricted construction of the provisions of the Act. In fact if that approach is adopted it would amount to doing something against the law declared by the Supreme Court. ( 24 ) IT was submitted that only certain orders are subject to revision under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. On the basis of the phrase against which no appeal has been preferred under Section 12 or Section 30 or Section 33 occurring in Section 34 of the Act it was submitted that only the orders which are appeal able and in which appeals have not been preferred can be taken into revision. This construction cannot be adopted for the simple reason that it would unreasonably restrict the powers of the revisional authority. There is nothing to indicate in the wordings of the Section that the powers of the revisional authority be restricted to the orders which are appealable and in which appeals have not been preferred. Moreover such reading would not be in consonance with the spirit and object lying behind the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. Illegality or impropriety when ever founds required to be corrected. This is the underlying object and purpose of this provision. The only meaning which can be given to the aforesaid phrase is that even the appealable orders are subject to revision provided no appeal is filed and pending. Otherwise it may be argued that the order is subject to the appeal and the appeal having not been preferred the order has become final and therefore the revision cannot be entertained. To avoid such arguments or to put it differently to avoid such confusion this phrase has been used. ( 25 ) IT was next contended that the phrase proceeding taken should mean the proceedings taken by the authority under the Act. There is no warrant to introduce the words by the authority. The proceeding may have been initiated by any one. The only 413 thing required to be seen is as to whether the proceeding has been taken under the Act or not. As per the discussion made hereinabove the notice under Section 26 of the Act and the decision taken thereon is proceeding under the Act. Therefore the argument on this score also cannot be accepted. The only 413 thing required to be seen is as to whether the proceeding has been taken under the Act or not. As per the discussion made hereinabove the notice under Section 26 of the Act and the decision taken thereon is proceeding under the Act. Therefore the argument on this score also cannot be accepted. ( 26 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners submitted that the purpose behind the provision of Section 34 of the Act is to satisfy as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such procedure. On this basis it was submitted that in the context of a proceeding under Section 26 of the Act the only thing which the revisional authority will have to look at will be whether the option for purchase of the land has been exercised or not. This is not the way in which the provisions of the Section conferring revisional powers upon an authority can be construed. Be it noted that the revisional powers are not confined to the orders passed or proceedings taken under Section 26 of the Act only. Revisional powers of the Government are all pervading. The Government as a revision authority can take any matter in revision on its own motion and call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding taken under the Act. The Government is required to examine the record with a view to see that mischief if any is suppressed and the object of the Act is advanced. The express limitation on the exercise of this power or the manner of exercise of this power is contained in proviso to the Section according to which the person affected must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any order is passed under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. The scope of the powers of the Government under Section 34 of the Act cannot be determined by looking at the provisions of Section 26 alone. Therefore to say that the purpose of Section 34 of the Act is only to see that whether the option is properly exercised or not is not correct. The scope of the powers of the Government under Section 34 of the Act cannot be determined by looking at the provisions of Section 26 alone. Therefore to say that the purpose of Section 34 of the Act is only to see that whether the option is properly exercised or not is not correct. The purpose of calling for the record and examining the same is to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety which should mean the legality and propriety in the wider sense of the term that is to say legality and propriety having regard to the entire provision of the Act the scheme of the Act and the object sought to be achieved by the Act. With regard to the regularity of the proceedings also all the aforesaid factors have to be kept in mind by the revisional authority. The revisional authority cannot and should not confine itself to the aspects covered by the specific and particular Section of the Act under which the order is purported to have been passed or the proceedings purported to have been taken. In this case it is Section 26. In other cases it may be some other provision of the Act. The scope and width of power under Section 34 of the Act has got to be determined by referring to the entire provisions of the Act the mischief sought to be prevented and the object sought to be achieved by the Act. That is the reason why the legislature has confined power on the revisional authority (i. e. the State Government) to pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit. The phrase as it may think fit would in the context mean as it deems fit having regard to the provisions of the entire Act and not having regard to a particular Section or part of the Section of the Act. ( 27 ) THIS brings us to the question of exercise of power within reasonable time. On the basis of the decision in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha reported in 10 GLR 992 it is submitted that the Government could not have exercised the power under Section 34 of the Act after a period of about 414 two years. On the basis of the decision in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha reported in 10 GLR 992 it is submitted that the Government could not have exercised the power under Section 34 of the Act after a period of about 414 two years. The calculation of time is made on the basis that the intimation (order) Annexure A is dated October 21 1981 and the impugned show cause notice is dated October 10 1963 First of all factually this calculation of time itself is wrong. The Government decided to take up the matter in revision in June 1983 By order dated June 6 1983 the Government informed the petitioners that the permission granted on October 21 1981 was contrary to record and contrary to the provisions of law and hence the Government had decided to take up the matter in revision. It is mentioned therein that the date and time of hearing will be intimated later on. Thus in the first week of June 1983 action under Section 34 of the Act was taken. This should be considered to be the starting date for the purposes of calculation of time. In the instant case as disclosed in the petition the petitioners got their plan sanctioned by the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority in March 1982. They got the permission for the non-agricultural use of the land on April 29 1982 Thus it can safely be inferred that upto April 1982 nothing whatsoever was done on the land. The land was in the same situation and position till May 1982. So viewed from this angle the period of time which is required to be taken into consideration is from May 1982 to June 1983. Assuming for a moment that the principle laid down in the aforesaid Raghav Nathas Case (supra) is applicable then even one year is considered to be a reasonable time within which the revisional powers can be exercised. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the revisional powers are sought to be exercised beyond a reasonable period of time. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the revisional powers are sought to be exercised beyond a reasonable period of time. ( 28 ) THE argument based or the decision of the Supreme Court in Raghav Nathas Case (supra) has been dealt with by me while deciding a similar question which arose in Special Civil Application No. 5580 of 1982 decided on March 26 84 Therein while considering the restrictions on the power of the Government from the point of view of the time element I have referred to the following decisions of the Supreme Court and that of Kerala High Court:1 State of U. P. v. L. jr. Johnson AIR 1983 SC 1303 . 2 S. P. Gupta and Others v. President of India and Others AIR 1982 SC 149 . 3 Swastik Oil Mills v. H. B. Munshi AIR 1968 SC: 843. 4 A. Pillai v. State AIR 1972 Kerala 39 (A decision of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court rendered by Mathew J. as he then was ). After considering the aforesaid decisions and after considering the relevant provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code as well as the provisions of the Act and the provisions of the Limitation Act I have observed as follows:"just in Swastik Mills Case (supra) as the Supreme Court refused to read any period of limitation it is possible to say that having regard to the scheme and the object of the Act no period of limitation can be read in Section 34 of the Act. It may be noted that the Government exercises its power under Section 34. The Government seeks to fulfil its obligation towards society. The State or the Government is not an interested party to take excess land from the individual. The interest of the Government is to see that the objects of the Act namely the prevention of concentration of urban Land in few hands and prevention of speculation and profiteering in the land be achieved so that the land is equitably distributed to all. The Government cannot be absolved from its obligation towards society because some 415 officers of the Government are negligent and/or indolent and do not take action in time. In. such cases the principle underlying Section 10 of the Limitation Act can very well be applied. The Government cannot be absolved from its obligation towards society because some 415 officers of the Government are negligent and/or indolent and do not take action in time. In. such cases the principle underlying Section 10 of the Limitation Act can very well be applied. Section 10 of the Limitation Act grants a total exemption from the bar of limitation in regard to the suits mentioned therein. The reason behind the Section is that an express trust ought not to suffer by the misfeasance or non-feasance of a trustee. Similarly it may be stated that on account of the negligence or complacent behaviour of a Government officer the society should not be made to suffer. The land which otherwise would have vested in the Government as per the provisions of the Act Should not be allowed to be used by an individual on account of technical pleas of limitation. From the aforesaid discussion and having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Swastik Mills Cake (supra) the limitations which can be read on the powers of the Government will be as follows:"1 Is the revising authority trenching upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Act or Rules to other authority If so it would be beyond the powers of the revising authority. 2 Is the revising authority ignoring the limitation meaning thereby inherent constraints in the exercise of these powers No such inherent limitation is pointed out in this case. However time clement be considered from the standpoint of reasonable and/or genuine exercise of power. " ( 29 ) IT may be noted that what is important is the power conferred on an authority should be exercised in a reasonable manner within reasonable time. The time element enters into consideration only from the limited point of view to see as to whether it is a genuine exercise of power. Exercise of power should be reasonable and the reasonableness would in its sweep include the time element also. The time element enters into consideration only from the limited point of view to see as to whether it is a genuine exercise of power. Exercise of power should be reasonable and the reasonableness would in its sweep include the time element also. Incidentally this is the view taken by the Division Bench of this High Court (Coram: P. S. Poti C. J. and S. B. Majmudar J.) in Lerters Patent Appeal No. 378 of 1983 decided on December 21 1983 In the instant case there is nothing on record to show that simply because the power is sought to be exercised after a period of little over one year the exercise of power becomes unreasonable. Hence the argument that there is inordinate delay and therefore the Government should be restrained from exercising the power has got to be rejected. ( 30 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners submitted that the Government is estopped from exercising the powers under Section 34 of the Act. The argument is based on the principle of promissory estopped. This ground can be invoked by a party to whom certain promises are held out by the Government and the party has changed its position to its detriment relying upon the promises held out by the Government. In the instant case there were vague averments in para 16 and 17 of the petition to the effect that relying on the order passed under Section 26 (2) of the Act substantial amount is spent for purchase of the land and for the construction of bungalow thereon by the petitioners There is nothing to show that what particular promise was held out by the Government and on what basis the petitioners were induced to rely upon the same and were further induced to change their position to their detriment. Passing of an order under Section 26 (2) of the Act by the competent authority prescribed under the Act does not amount to holding out promise by the Government. If it were so then it would mean that no illegal or improper order passed by any authority or officer under the Act can ever be taken 416 in revision by the Government. There is no warrant for taking such an absurd and impossible view. If it were so then it would mean that no illegal or improper order passed by any authority or officer under the Act can ever be taken 416 in revision by the Government. There is no warrant for taking such an absurd and impossible view. ( 31 ) HOWEVER if one scrutinises the facts of the case prima facie it appears that there was well-planned design to circumvent the provisions of the Act. To recapitulate the facts it may be recalled that the land in question originally belonged to two persons namely Atmaram Mohanbhai Patel and Shankarbhai Mohanbhai Patel. Atmaram Mohanbhai Patel died on December 20 1965 Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 appear to be the legal heirs of deceased Atmaram Mohanbhai and hence their names entered in the revenue record on April 14 1966 For the purpose of deciding the questions involved in the case the following details would be material: 1 Interest of the petitioners in the land in question on the appointed date i. e. February 17 1976 2 Date of partition which took place between the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 and Shankarlal. 3 Date of partition between petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 inter se. 4 Date of agreement to sell the land by petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 in favour of petitioner No. 5 and similarly the date of agreement to sell the land between petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 and petitioner No. 6. It is stated at the Bar that the partition between petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 inter se was an oral partition. But no specific date thereof is given. The aforesaid materials are relevant and important for the decision of the questions involved in the petition. The details of all the aforesaid facts would be within the special knowledge of the petitioners. Once the relevant material is not produced by a party in possession thereof irrespective of the doctrine of onus of proof the adverse inference can be drawn against the party not producing the same. This is the law laid own by the Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Krishnaji v. Mohd. Haji Latif reported in. AIR 1968 SC 1413 . This is the law laid own by the Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Krishnaji v. Mohd. Haji Latif reported in. AIR 1968 SC 1413 . Apart from the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court when the petitioner has resorted to the extraordinary jurisdiction of this High Court under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution he must have come before the Court with perfect candidness and must have disclosed all the relevant material. The conduct of the petitioner in keeping back the aforesaid material facts and not disclosing the same in the petition leads to the inference that on the appointed date i. e. February 17 1976 the position in the revenue record would be that the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 along with Shankarlal must have held the entire property of S. No. 196/1 of village Memnagar admeasuring 5464 sq. mts. 33 The aforesaid inference is further reinforced by the way in which the petitioners have conducted themselves. On October 21 1981 the order under the provisions of Section 26 (1) of the Act was passed by the competent authority On the very next day i. e. on October 22 1981 the sale document had been executed by the petitioners. The petitioners did not even wait for a day. Why this unseemly haste 2 The petitioners could have produced on record the agreement to sell and could have shown that round about the time when the order under Section 26 (1) of the Act was passed the time-limit to execute the document as stipulated in the agreement to sell was expiring. No such document is produced and no explanation whatsoever is offered. The conduct of the petitioners reinforces the inference that the petitioners were trying to circumvent the provisions of the Act and that is why they rushed to execute the sale 417 document immediately on the next day of the passing of the order by the competent authority. ( 32 ). Yesterday i. e. on April 9 1984 petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 have produced an affidavit in both the petitions. Petitioner No. 5-Kirit Kumar has stated that he has spent about Rs. 5. 45 lakhs in construction of the bungalow and he has produced a certificate issued by one Mr. N. H. Shethwala B. E. Civil Engineer. ( 32 ). Yesterday i. e. on April 9 1984 petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 have produced an affidavit in both the petitions. Petitioner No. 5-Kirit Kumar has stated that he has spent about Rs. 5. 45 lakhs in construction of the bungalow and he has produced a certificate issued by one Mr. N. H. Shethwala B. E. Civil Engineer. Similarly petitioner No. 6-Dahyabhai Motibhai Patel has produced an affidavit and has stated that he has spent Rs. 4/- lakhs in construction of the bungalow on the land purchased by him. He has also produced a certificate dated April 9 1984 issued by Mr. N. H. Shethwala. Both of them have produced photographs purporting to show the construction of the bungalow on the land. ( 33 ) IT must be remembered that the injunction order was served upon the petitioners on June 6 1983 Therefore the material point is as to what was the position on June 6 1983 and not the position of the land as on today i. e. on April 9 1984 In para 7 of the petition it is vaguely stated that the construction of the said bungalow has already been completed. Except this vague assertion there is no other averment in the petition with regard to the position of construction and the amount spent on construction till June 6 1983 An attempt was made by the counsel for the petitioners to show that in the affidavit filed on April 9 1984 the position of the land as on the date of service of injunction (i. e. June 6 1983 is mentioned. This is difficult to be believed in view of the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners. ( 34 ) IN the first para of the affidavit it is mentioned that the purpose of filing the affidavit is to place the position as on April 9 1984 In the second para the amount spent on construction of the bungalow is mentioned. Formerly the lines were type-written which indicated that the amount spent was representing the amount spent till today i. e. till the date of filing of the affidavit. Thereafter these words have been scored off and the phrase till the date of service of injunction has been inserted. On the face of it the insertion of the aforesaid phrase seems to be an after-thought. Thereafter these words have been scored off and the phrase till the date of service of injunction has been inserted. On the face of it the insertion of the aforesaid phrase seems to be an after-thought. The certificate issued by the Civil Engineer put the estimated value of the building as on April 9 1984 The certificate does not mention as to what was the estimated value of the bungalow as on the date of service of the injunction (i. e. June 6 1983 As a matter of fact the certificate does not refer to anything with regard to the date of service of injunction i. e. June 6 1983 It is doubtful whether such cryptic certificate issued by an Engineer can be given much evidentiary value without the author of the certificate being crossexamined. Even if the same is given sufficient weight the certificate does not give the estimated value of the bungalow as on June 6 1983 The petition is silent as to the estimated value of the construction on the land as on June 6 1983 ( 35 ) IF the petitioners really felt aggrieved by the order of injunction dated June 6 1983 they would have moved this Court immediately in the month of June 1983 itself. There is no explanation whatsoever by the petitioners for waiting till November 22 1983 the day on which the petition was filed. In the instant case the show-cause notice is dated October 29 1983 As mentioned there in the date of hearing was November 10 1983 The petitioners have moved this court after the first date of hearing. There is no explanation whatsoever why the petitioners did not move the court earlier. Moreover petitioner No. 5 has not placed any material on record to 418 show from which source did he get Rs. 5 15 0 and similarly petitioner No. 6 has not shown from which source he got Rs. 4/- lakhs. If the amount was lying in the bank they could have produced the bank account to show that the amount was already withdrawn for being spent prior to June 6 1983 If the amount was received by them earlier than this date from any other source that also could have been shown by producing necessary documents. 4/- lakhs. If the amount was lying in the bank they could have produced the bank account to show that the amount was already withdrawn for being spent prior to June 6 1983 If the amount was received by them earlier than this date from any other source that also could have been shown by producing necessary documents. Since the petitioners have not produced these documents and since there is no satisfactory explanation on the record one may reasonably infer that the petitioners might have in all probability spent (if at all spent) the amount in question towards construction during the period commencing from June 6 1983 till November 22 1983 i. e. between the late of service of injunction order and he date of filing of the petition in this court. However since I am not called upon to decide the question about the genuineness or otherwise of the spending of the amount on construction I am not discussing this aspect any further and I am not expressing any final opinion on the point. I am only indicating that in view of the state of record of this petition one can reasonably infer that the petitioners may not have spent substantial amount or any amount on construction prior to June 6 1983 ( 36 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion the following circumstances emerge:1 That the petitioners have suppressed the relevant and important material from the Court. There is no explanation as to why the necessary details have not been given in the petition. 2 The position of construction as on June 6 1983 has not been shown in the petition. 3 That after the service of the in junction order in June 1983 the petitioners have slept over for a period of about five months and this Court has been moved in the month of November 1983 Even when they moved this Court they have not prayed for any interim relief for suspending the operation of the order of injuction. 3 That after the service of the in junction order in June 1983 the petitioners have slept over for a period of about five months and this Court has been moved in the month of November 1983 Even when they moved this Court they have not prayed for any interim relief for suspending the operation of the order of injuction. They have only prayed by way of interim relief stay of further proceedings in pursuance of the show cause notice Annexure C. 4 In the absence of any satisfactory explanation for not producing necessary material on record one may reasonably infer that the petitioners may have spent on construction after the receipt of the infunction order dated June 6 1983the aforesaid circumstances indicate that the petitioners had a well-planned design to circumvent the provisions of law. True suspicions) surmises and conjectures are not permissible substitutes for necessary facts and the basis of inference. As laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Satish Chandra v. Satish Kantha reported in AIR 1923 PC 73 but that by no means requires that every puzzling artifice or contrivanc resorted to by one accused of fraud must necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so many a clever and dexterious knave would escape. Thus the discussion made hereinabove only indicates the circumstances which lead to the reasonable inference of a well-designed scheme to circumvent the provisions of the Act. It may be that on further examination and on production of further details before the appropriate authority the petitioners may be in a position to dispell this doubt and clear themselves. Hence I am not expressing any final opinion on this point. It will be open to the petitioners to clear themselves before the appropriate authority if and when such an eventuality arises. The aforesaid discussion is made only with a view 419 to show that when a well-designed scheme to circumvent the provisions of the Act is prime facie found the petitioners cannot be permitted to invoke the plea of promissory estoppel. In above view of the matter the plea of promissory estoppel raised by the counsel for the petitioners is rejected. The aforesaid discussion is made only with a view 419 to show that when a well-designed scheme to circumvent the provisions of the Act is prime facie found the petitioners cannot be permitted to invoke the plea of promissory estoppel. In above view of the matter the plea of promissory estoppel raised by the counsel for the petitioners is rejected. ( 37 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners submitted that the Government has no power to issue interim injunction orders under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. This question has been concluded in my decision rendered in Special Civil Application No. 5580 of 1982 on March 26 1984 Relying upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Assistant Collector v. National Tobacco Company reported in AIR 1970 SC 140 I have held that when an Act confers a jurisdiction it impliedly also grants power of doing all such acts and employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. Having regard to the scheme of the Act and the object to be achieved and the mischief to be suppressed it is absolutely essential for the discharge of the power conferred upon the authority that power to issue interim orders be implied. If this power is not implied then proper implementation of the Act would become impossible. Therefore the argument that the Government has no power to issue interim orders cannot be upheld. ( 38 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners submitted that the reasons mentioned in the show-cause notice Annexure C dated October 10 1983 are not germane and relevant and therefore the powers under Section 34 of the Act cannot be exercised. The contention is that revisional power under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised in respect of the proceedings under Section 26 of the Act only on the ground as to whether the decision to exercise option to purchase or not to purchase the land is properly exercised or not. It is further argued that there is no such ground in the show cause notice and hence the notice is bad. ( 39 ) THE contention may be examined. In fact the proceedings have been taken up in revision not as per notice dated October 10 1983 The proceedings have been taken in revision sometime in May-June 1983. It is further argued that there is no such ground in the show cause notice and hence the notice is bad. ( 39 ) THE contention may be examined. In fact the proceedings have been taken up in revision not as per notice dated October 10 1983 The proceedings have been taken in revision sometime in May-June 1983. The intimation to this effect has been given to the petitioners by order dated June 6 1983 In the injunction order it is mentioned that the permission granted on October 21 1981 is contrary to records and contrary to the provisions of law and therefore Government had decided to take up the proceedings in revision under Section 34 of the Act. This in fact is the basis for the Government to take up the matter in revision. By notice dated October 10 1983 the revisional authority has merely indicated what according to the authority appears to be illegal improper or contrary to the facts on record and contrary to the provisions of law. The petitioners are called upon to give explanation on the grounds stated in the notice. The petitioners can very well explain each and every ground. These particulars have been given in details so that the petitioners may have sufficient opportunity to put up their case. They are informed well in advance and it is indicated as to what was contrary to facts and what was contrary to the provisions of law in the proceeding under Section 26 of the Act. ( 40 ) MOREOVER the legality and propriety of the reasons are not to be looked at from the stand-point of Section 26 of the Act alone. The scope of Section 34 is very wide and it cannot be restricted to the particular and specific provisions of the Act under which the proceedings taken or order passed is sought to be revised. As stated hereinabove right from the beginning there 420 appears to be a scheme to circumvent the provisions of the Act. Ground No. 2 mentioned in the show cause notice mentions that it was not open to the competent authority to recognise the entry dated August 14 1981 and hold that the persons giving notice under Section 26 of the Act were holding land below the ceiling limit. Ground No. 2 mentioned in the show cause notice mentions that it was not open to the competent authority to recognise the entry dated August 14 1981 and hold that the persons giving notice under Section 26 of the Act were holding land below the ceiling limit. This ground alone is sufficient to take up the matter in suo motu revision and proceed further in accordance with law. . ( 41 ) IN the show cause notice it is stated that the land was agricultural land and the partition effected was in contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act 1947 Counsel for the petitioners contends that if that be so the land would not be covered by the provisions of the Act itself. However counsel for the petitioners hastened to state that according to him at the relevant time the land was not agricultural land. If the notice is read in the proper context this particular ground only indicates one of the illegal and improper ways adopted in the scheme to circumvent the relevant provisions of the Act. ( 42 ) SIMILARLY another ground in which it is stated that Form No. 1 as required under Section 6 is not filled in by the petitioners is perfectly relevant In para 12 of the petition it is stated that petitioner No. 1 had filled in the form. However it is clarified that petitioner No. 3 had filled in the form and not petitioner No. 1. As stated hereinabove if there was no partition on February 2 1976 (i. e. appointed date) and if the land was held jointly by petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 and Shankarlal brother of deceased Atmaram the total holding of the land would be 5464 sq. mt. This would be certainly beyond the ceiling limit which is 1000 sq. mt. as far as Ahmedabad Urban agglomeration area is concerned. Thus Grounds Nos. 3 and 4 both are perfectly relevant and justified. ( 43 ) IN fairness to the counsel for the petitioners it should be clarified that the petitioners have advanced this arg ment about the relevancy of the grounds stated in the notice for the purpose of this petition only. Thus Grounds Nos. 3 and 4 both are perfectly relevant and justified. ( 43 ) IN fairness to the counsel for the petitioners it should be clarified that the petitioners have advanced this arg ment about the relevancy of the grounds stated in the notice for the purpose of this petition only. In case it becomes necessary for the petitioners to go before the revisional authority he states that he reserves his right to take up the same contention before the revisional authority. I do not express any opinion on this point except saying that if it is legally permissible to raise the same contentions before the revisional authority the petitioners may do so and in that eventuality the revisional authority may deal with the same in accordance with law. I must make it clear that the elaborate discussion of the grounds raised by the petitioners is made because each and every ground had been advanced with rather meticulous details. Therefore as far as these petitions are concerned it was imperative for this Court to deal with each and every contention raised by the petitioners. If the same grounds are taken before the revisional authority the revisional authority may deal with the same in accordance with law. ( 44 ) NO other contention is raised. ( 45 ) IN the result both the petitions fail and are rejected. Rule discharged with cost. Interim relief stands vacated. Rule discharged. .