JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, filed by the Bijlee Karmachari Sangh (hereinafter referred to as the Sangh), a registered union, registered as such with the Registrar of Trade Unions, Madhya Pradesh, and by one Ramchandra Joshi, a Trade Union worker, seeking a writ of Mandamus from this court against respondent No. 1, the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) to abolish the discrimination between the regular employees and the Nominal Muster Roll employees (for short, the N. M. R. Employees) or daily wage employees at present in vogue and to classify all its employees strictly in accordance with the Standard Standing Orders. ( 2. ) A welfare State, claiming to be wedded with the principle of social justice, has to be approached with such a petition, is itself an abundant proof of the reality which exists and the claims that are advanced. The facts as narrated in the petition are as fair from the goal of social justice as shadow is from the substance and illusion is from reality. It is not merely the legalism involved in this petition, but also the very spirit of our Constitution which seeks to achieve justice, social, economical and political to the teeming millions of our country. If the prominently printed words in the preamble of the constitution have to be translated into reality, there can hardly be any opposition to the petition. But, it is a travesty that the respondent-State of Madhya Pradesh has come out with a laconic return-a tacit denial with dexterity of draftsmanship-seeking shelter behind appointment of a Central Wage Board for Electricity undertakings appointed by the Government of India as back as in 1966 and further adding advancing alibi with denial of connivance at the open violation of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh industrial Relations Act as well as the Standard Standing Orders, framed thereunder. It is to be noted that this denial is not based on the applicability of these Orders and the m. P. Industrial Relations Act, but on their construction, which the respondent-State has chosen to construe in a self-serving manner, quite denuded of the goal envisaged by the Constitution. ( 3. ) BE tore proceeding any further it would be in the fitness of things to meet the denial advanced by the respondent-State. ( 3. ) BE tore proceeding any further it would be in the fitness of things to meet the denial advanced by the respondent-State. Section 3 of the M. P. Industrial Relations act, 1960 provides for appointment of a Commissioner of Labour and S. 7 of the Act confers on him with powers of supervision over his subordinates, which include the deputy Commissioner of Labour, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, the Labour officer and the Deputy Labour Officers. Section 30 enumerates the powers and duties of Labour Officers. Can an authority exercising such wide powers under the Act be so oblivious of the working conditions of such a large number of labourers, by whatever nomenclature they be termed, and can respondents 2 and 3 escape their share of liability in the matter by merely raising a plea of construction of the provisions of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act and the Standard Standing Orders, framed thereunder. Can such authorities plead ignorance of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in such matters. These are some of the moot questions, which the respondent-State is called upon to answer. By mere saying that the subject-matter of the petition precisely pertains to respondent No. 1 the Board can the respondent-State absolve itself of its duty enjoined by law and by the Constitution. If the return filed by the respondents 2 and 3 is an indication, the answer to the question posed, appears to be disappointing. ( 4. ) THE petitioners case is that the Board is an instrumentality of the State of madhya Pradesh, which the respondent-State has not chosen to deny either in the return or during the course of arguments. The averments made by the petitioners in paragraph 2 of the petition have not at all been denied by the respondents 2 and 3. It is also not denied by the respondents 2 and 3 that the Board is governed under the provisions of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act and the Standard Standing Orders, framed thereunder. They also do not deny that this Act and the Orders are applicable to the employees of the Board. There is no denial of the fact on the part of respondent-State that the Board is obliged to comply with all the provisions of the Act as well as the orders. They also do not deny that this Act and the Orders are applicable to the employees of the Board. There is no denial of the fact on the part of respondent-State that the Board is obliged to comply with all the provisions of the Act as well as the orders. Their only alibi appears to be the Wage Board appointed by the Government of india. ( 5. ) THE petitioners have come out with a grievance that a large number of employees on muster roll of the Board-about 50,000 of them-are being paid at the rate of Rs. 7/- per day as daily wages and most of such employees have completed six months continuous service and a majority of them have even completed over 7 years continuous service, as is evident by the Annexures B/1 to B/4. The nature of work these employees are performing and the respondents are taking from them is the same as is being taken from other regular employees. To bring out a contrast in the matter of payments, the petitioners aver that for the same job a regular employee gets about Rs. 800/- per month, while an employee on the muster roll is paid only Rs. 7/- per day as daily wages. ( 6. ) THESE facts are not controverted by the respondents 2 and 3. So far as the board is concerned, it has admitted that the Board is governed under the M. P. Industrial relations Act and the M. P. Standing Orders of 1961. It is also admitted by the Board that the Board is an instrumentality of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Board while admitting that the Standard Standing Orders are applicable to the Board, qualifies the admission by saying that in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of S. 79 of the electricity Supply Act, 1948, respondent No. I Board by a Notification No. S/ii/3706 dated 19-10-1963 has made the provisions of the Standard Standing Orders applicable to its employees falling under Items 4 and 5 in clause (2) under Regulation 1, under the heading "special provisions applicable to works Establishment" in the M. P. Electricity board (General) Service Regulations, 1952. The employees falling under the said items (iv) and (v) are: " (1) Trade establishments which include chargeman at Power Houses, headman Mistry, Operation Artisans skilled and semi-skilled trademan, lineman (Senior Junior and Assistants) Electricians, Wireman, Assistant wireman, Petrolman Engineer, Drivers and oilman, (ii) Casual Labour (i. e. labour employed on Nominal Muster Roll ). " The respondent-Board contends that classification of the employees under the standard Standing Orders, categorising employees under six categories, is not exhaustive. The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that there can be no seventh category other than the categories classified under the Standard Standing Orders. The term employee is defined under S. 2 (13) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, which reads as under : "2 (13)- employee means any person employed in any industry to do any skilled, unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and includes- (a)- a person employed by a contractor to do any work for him in the execution of a contract with an employer within the meaning of sub-clause (e)of Clause 14; and (b)- an apprentice other than an apprentice under sub-clause (v); but does not include any person- (i) who is subject to Army Act 1950 (XLVI of 1950), or the Air Force Act, 1950 (XLV of 1950), or the Navy Discipline Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the Police Service or as an officer or other employee of a prison: or (Hi) who is employed mainly in a managerial capacity; or (iv) who being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding one thousand and six hundred (v) who is a craftsman or an apprentice working under a scheme approved by the State Government on the condition that such craftsman or apprentice shall not be deemed to be an employee under this Act; explanation- An employee who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched from employment or whose employment has been otherwise terminated shall in respect of matters relating to such dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination, be deemed to be an employee for the purposes of this Act. " The Standard Standing Orders provide for classification of the employees in six categories, viz. , (1) permanent, (2) permanent seasonal, (3) probationer, (4) Badli, (5)apprentices, and (6) temporary. " The Standard Standing Orders provide for classification of the employees in six categories, viz. , (1) permanent, (2) permanent seasonal, (3) probationer, (4) Badli, (5)apprentices, and (6) temporary. A temporary employee has been defined as an employee, who has been employed for work, which is essentially of a temporary character or who is temporarily employed as additional employee in connection with the temporary increase in the work of a permanent nature. The definition further provides that in case such an employee is required to work continuously for more than six months, he shall be deemed to be a permanent, employee within the meaning of sub-clause (1) of clause 2 of the Standard Standing Orders, which defines the term permanent employee. ( 7. ) THE respondent Board while admitting the classification, qualifies its statement by saying that in the scheme of the Standard Standing Orders the classification of employees pertains to those employees only who are appointed against sanctioned post. It does not apply to such employees whose employment is not against sanctioned post, but employed purely on a temporary basis or whose employment is of a casual nature. Thus, in essence the respondent Boards contention is that the Nominal muster Roll employees are not covered by the Standard Standing Orders and the classification made thereunder. The distinction as sought to be made and suggested by the respondent Board that the definition of temporary employee under clause 6 of the standing Order applies only to those cases where the temporary employees are appointed against sanctioned post and who are required to work continuously for more than six months. This fine distinction, which is drawn by reference to the definition of a permanent employee which is defined as one who has completed six months satisfactory service in a clear vacancy. It is, therefore, argued that it indicates that a permanent employee presupposes existence of a clear vacancy. But on parity of reasoning in case of a temporary employee, the existence of temporary post or vacancy is also postulated. This argument cannot be accepted. The very fact that a large number of employees- running into thousands-who have been working for years, could not have worked unless there could be posts and vacancies both. To qualify a particular post as sanctioned post and to denounce another as unsanctioned is nothing short of a self-serving proposition advanced by respondent No. 1. This argument cannot be accepted. The very fact that a large number of employees- running into thousands-who have been working for years, could not have worked unless there could be posts and vacancies both. To qualify a particular post as sanctioned post and to denounce another as unsanctioned is nothing short of a self-serving proposition advanced by respondent No. 1. There seems to be no legally valid justification for keeping the thousands of employees on Nominal muster Roll by introducing something which is not what is in the definition of temporary employees, as categorised, a temporary employee, as defined in sub-clause (1) of clause 2 of the Standard Standing Orders. ( 8. ) THE petitioners in their petition have detailed the facts as far as they could gather. According to them over 50,000 employees are employed on Nominal Muster roll for years together and yet are being paid at the rate of Rs. 7/- per day as daily wages. Respondent No. 1 in its return submits that the figure of employees as stated by the petitioners is not correct. Controverting an averment does not mean mere denial, particularly when the fact is sought to be controverted by a statutory body as respondent No. 1 Board. If the figure of 50,000 is not correct, then it was expected of the board to give the correct figure, which the Board has chosen to omit When the Board could give the figure of employees on the regular establishment - nearly 57,000 employees belonging to Class III and Class IV cadres, it does not stand to reason as to why the Board could not famish the correct figure of employees working on the Nominal Muster Roll. This approach on the part of the Board can hardly be said to be fair. ( 9. ) IT is contended by the respondents that employees working in the operation and maintenance department employed temporarily on muster rolls are employees of a casual nature, they are known as labourers and are at times absorbed as helpers whenever vacancies occur. So long as they are not absorbed in the regular cadre, they continue as employees on muster roll and are not treated as regular employees, because they do not hold any appointment against sanctioned post. ( 10. So long as they are not absorbed in the regular cadre, they continue as employees on muster roll and are not treated as regular employees, because they do not hold any appointment against sanctioned post. ( 10. ) ADVERTING to the classification of employees as done under the Standard standing Orders, it would be seen that there is no such classification as regular employees or muster roll employees or employees against sanctioned post and employees against unsanctioned post. This classification of regular attached to the term employee is illusory, in view of the classification made by the Standing Orders. The purpose of such categorisation as regular employee or employee against sanctioned post is not merely beyond the purview of the classification but also intends to defeat such classification. Qualifying the term employee with an adjective regular is illusory, inasmuch as the classification made is exhaustive, prefixed with all sorts of adjectives, yet an employee can be brought in any of the six categories classified by the standing Orders. It, therefore, does not stand to reason that merely because an employee is not termed as a regular employee, he cannot be covered under the classification temporary employee. A temporary employee may be for a day or a few days or for few weeks. It is not always and in all circumstances that a temporary employee becomes permanent. It is only on fulfilment of conditions that a temporary, employee, who has worked continuously for more than six months, he shall be deemed to be a permanent employee. This wholesome provision should not be allowed to be defeated by putting a construction on the term employee and superimposing it with regular employee or employee against sanctioned post. The object of this piece of social security measure should be kept in mind and should not be lost sight of while either categorising or defining an employee in a manner which inevitably results in defeating the very purpose and object of the Act. ( 11. ) THE respondent Board admits that as many as 25,000 employees were on nominal Muster Roll as on 31-3-1983 on the construction side. According to the petitioners, this figure is around 50,000 and the respondents also admit that there are muster roll employees in the operation and maintenance department. ( 11. ) THE respondent Board admits that as many as 25,000 employees were on nominal Muster Roll as on 31-3-1983 on the construction side. According to the petitioners, this figure is around 50,000 and the respondents also admit that there are muster roll employees in the operation and maintenance department. While giving the figure of employees on the construction side, the number of such employees on the maintenance and operation side could also have been given. The respondents say that the number varies. Is the very nature of things when the employee is temporary, it is bound to vary. But even conceding the variation if there is a static position with regard to the number of employees, having continuously worked for more than six months, even in face of such variation, there appears to be no justification as to why such employees, who have continuously worked for more than six months on Nominal muster Roll, should not be given the benefit which the law extends to them. ( 12. ) THE petitioners have averred that 25% of the total employees on muster roll are actually employed on the job of clerks. In a silent tone the respondent Board admits that it might be that some employees might be doing the clerical work and still it is contended that they cannot be classified as such nor can they claim entitlement to the wages of clerks. The respondent Board denies that about 25% of the Nominal Muster roll employees are actually on the job of clerks and it is for them to give the percentage or the figure the number of N. M. R. employees, who are doing clerical jobs. As stated earlier, controverting a fact does not merely mean denying a fact, particularly when the denial comes from a statutory body, it is expected that correct position may also be placed before the Court. It is to be noted with regret that the Board has failed to place the correct position in this behalf. The return proceeds to deny that for lack of material particulars with regard to muster roll employees actually working as clerks, drivers, cleaners and carpenters, the respondent Board is not in a position to reply to these facts. It may be a good excuse for not fully replying to the averments made by the petitioners. The return proceeds to deny that for lack of material particulars with regard to muster roll employees actually working as clerks, drivers, cleaners and carpenters, the respondent Board is not in a position to reply to these facts. It may be a good excuse for not fully replying to the averments made by the petitioners. The petitioners have made allegation that a large section of these labour-force is employed as driver, cleaners, carpenters etc. What more particulars does the respondent Board want for replying to all these allegations? Is it expected that the petitioners should have furnished the exact number and is it not for the statutory body maintaining registers of regular and muster roll employees to place the correct figures on record. In matters such as this a too legalistic approach of pleadings is not warranted. . . . . The position which emerges from the return as regards drivers, who have put in two years continuous satisfactory service as a driver, would be appointed on regular establishment and others on W/c establishment again be considered for appointment on regular basis on completion of two years total service. This is what has been agreed upon between the Federation and the Board on 17-2-1983. Shri Kokje, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that this agreement, if held to be defeating the provisions of law, should not be given effect to as there can be no agreement contrary to law or an exemption which object by defeating the law itself. The board also admits the fact that it sometimes happens that an employee in order to secure employment in the Board does not disclose his qualification of having passed certain examinations and he is engaged as a muster roll employee. No regular appointment orders are issued to the muster roll employees nor any application obtained from them. It is the appointing authority whose satisfaction is final in the matter. It is also averred that such appointments are on ad hoc basis. If the nature of work done by an employee, whether permanent or temporary, either on muster roll or in an establishment in a cadre merely because an employee happens to be an muster roll, there appears to be no justification for treating him as such even after the continuous service of more than six months. If the nature of work done by an employee, whether permanent or temporary, either on muster roll or in an establishment in a cadre merely because an employee happens to be an muster roll, there appears to be no justification for treating him as such even after the continuous service of more than six months. Even if such appointments are ad hoc, ad hoc appointments cannot be treated for an indefinite period. The term ad hoc means- for a particular purpose. Such treatment as meted out to the muster roll employees is not merely a violation but also negation of the equality clause in the matter of public employment as enshrined in the Constitution. ( 13. ) IT is contended that a Gradation list of employees on the muster rolls is maintained and the respondent Board does not deny this fact. However, it is added that some divisions of the Board have published such gradation lists. The petitioners have filed Annexures-B/1 to B/4, to show the length of service of employees included in such lists. Annexure-B/2 is the provisional gradation list of N. M. R. employees of the City division East of the Boards office at Indore. The gradation is as on 31-3-1982 and similar such lists are Annexures-B/3 and B/4 on different other divisions of the Board. ( 14. ) SHRI Kokje, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that a curious practice is followed that persons included in the aforesaid Gradation lists, Annexures-B/1 to B/4, are paid the annual increment of 00. 30 paise per day and this gives a false sense of permanency to the employees. However, the Board does not find it to be curious as it is in accordance with the agreement reached between the representatives of the Union and the Board. It is further submitted by Shri Chaphekar, learned counsel for the respondent Board that this increase is in consonance with the recommendation of the Wage Committee. It has been strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the respondent Board that regular employees are those who are appointed on sanctioned posts and persons employed on Nominal Muster Roll in construction work are not regular employees of the Board. The question of employees on the construction work has already been dealt with and there is yet another aspect, which needs consideration. The question of employees on the construction work has already been dealt with and there is yet another aspect, which needs consideration. According to the respondents there are 40 such pole factories, out of which 8 have been leased out to various groups of unemployed Engineers. It is also submitted that individual employees of departmental pole factories were given option whether they were willing to join the unemployed Engineers - the lessees or were interested to remain with the Board. Those, who preferred to continue with the Board are still serving with the respondent Board. It is submitted by Shri G. M. Chaphekar that while transferring the pole factories on lease, interests of workers were safeguarded by providing the following conditions : (a) services of all workman who are working in the said factory on the date immediately before the coming into effect of the lease deed, would be treated by the leases as uninterrupted by the said transfer; (b) the said workman shall be continued on such terms and conditions as are in no way less favourable to them than those applicable to them immediately before the said transfer, and (c) the lessee shall be liable to pay the said workman in the event of retrenchment of any such workman compensation on the basis that the service has been continued and has not been interrupted by the transfer. The lessee shall be responsible for all liabilities with respect to workman in question since the transfer of the management to them, i. e. payment of wages. EPF contribution, retrenchment and all other similar liabilities. " The proforma agreement is filed as Annexure-R/6. It is also submitted in this connection that as a result of rural electrification scheme sponsored by the Government of India, the entire function of supply of electricity is controlled by Co-operative societies and the respondent Board have no control over their employees. It is on this basis that Shri Chaphekar, learned counsel for the respondent Board has contended that so far as these employees are concerned, the Board cannot be held liable in any manner aml. no relief as such can be granted to the petitioners. ( 15. ) SHRI Kokje, learned counsel for the petitioners on the other hand submitted that despite these intermediaries the employees lor all intents and purposes are under the effective control of the Board. no relief as such can be granted to the petitioners. ( 15. ) SHRI Kokje, learned counsel for the petitioners on the other hand submitted that despite these intermediaries the employees lor all intents and purposes are under the effective control of the Board. The eight pole factories are situated at Nohta. Guna, Bhilai, Khargone, Sehore, Rajgarh, Jagdalpur and Burwaha. The answer to the contention raised by the Board is again to be found in the approach and definition of the term employee. It has always been the attempt of an employer to minimise the scope of definition of employee and the workers to expand it as much as possible the struggle goes on and it is for the Court to sunthesise the conflict. The interpretation of the term as defined in the Standing Orders should be infused with a sense of feeling for the soul of the Act itself. Needless to add that a worker oriented statute must receive a construction where, conceptually, the keynote thought must be the worker and the community, as the Constitution has shown concern for them, inter alia, in Articles 38,39 and 43. Social justice is the singular tune of the Constitution of India and this note is nowhere more vibrant than in Industrial Jurisprudence, which by now has acquired fully developed stature. Based on the values of social justice, which are integral to our Constitution, industrial jurisprudence has been built around several legislations enacted by the parliament as well as the State Legislature and the Act we are dealing with is based on social security measure and the definition of employee is not to be lost in the meaning of meanings, although legal erudition as projected by the learned counsel for the respondents has sought to advance the meaning of meanings while reading the meaning of the term employee. It is to be borne in mind that there are no absolutes in law. The term is relative and in relation to the industry, which in the present changing context and concept, calls for a wider interpretation. The M. P. E. Board-respondent 1 is an organised activity is a purposeful pursuit- not any isolated adventure motivelessly undertaken. It is to be borne in mind that there are no absolutes in law. The term is relative and in relation to the industry, which in the present changing context and concept, calls for a wider interpretation. The M. P. E. Board-respondent 1 is an organised activity is a purposeful pursuit- not any isolated adventure motivelessly undertaken. The definition of employee in relation to such an industry or undertaking is not a matter of splitting semantic hairs and the term employee cannot be torn from the context in which it has been employed and used. Any narrow approach to the definition as propounded by the learned counsel for the respondent Board, which does not share the passion of the Constitution for social justice as enshrined in Articles 38,39, 40,41. 42 and 43a, is not acceptable in the present day context. It is not to be forgotten for a while that we are in the field of labour jurisprudence, welfare legislation and statutory construction, which must have due regard to Part IV of the Constitution. ( 16. ) THE definition of the term employee as given in Section 2 (13) of the Act, has already been reproduced in para 6 above. A mere reading of the same would go to show that it is a very wide definition. The factum of employment either in the leased out pole factories or in the Co-operative Societies is not denied. What is sought to be contended is the control and connection with the establishment. The expression in connection with the work of establishment ropes in a wide variety of workmen, who may not be employed in the establishment as such, but may still be engaged only in connection with the work of the establishment. What is necessary is the existence of some nexus between the establishment and the work of the employee and the nexus is apparent. Poles for electrification is an activity of the Board so also the supply of electrical energy, either directly or through the Co-operative Societies, is equally an activity of the Board and there is no gainsaying the fact that no nexus exists between the two the Board on the one hand and the factories and the Co-operative Societies on the other. Poles for electrification is an activity of the Board so also the supply of electrical energy, either directly or through the Co-operative Societies, is equally an activity of the Board and there is no gainsaying the fact that no nexus exists between the two the Board on the one hand and the factories and the Co-operative Societies on the other. A mere reading of the Act would further show that all that the statute requires is that the work should not be irrelevant to the purpose of the establishment. It is sufficient even if the nature of the work is incidental to that purpose. A thing is incidental to another if it merely appertains to something else as primary. No doubt, such work should not be extraneous or contrary to the purpose of the establishment, but it need not be integral to it either. The Supreme court while considering the question of keeping and running a cycle-stand and running a canteen, has held in Royal Talkies, Hyderabad v. E S. I. Corpn. (AIR 1978 S. C. 1478), that they aire incidental or adjuncts to the primary purpose of the theatre. Mere presence of intermediate contractors or Co-operative Societies with whom alone the workers have immediate or direct relationship excontractu" is if no consequence when, on lifting the veil or looking at the conspectus of factors governing-employment, we discern the naked truth, though draped in different perfect paper arrangement, that the real employer is the Board. . . . . . . . . . not the immediate contractor. If the livelihood of the workman substantially depends on labour rendered to produce goods and services for the benefit and satisfaction of an enterprise, the absence of direct relationship, the presence of dubious intermediaries or the make believe trappings of detachment from the Board, cannot snap the real - life bond. The story may vary but the inference defies ingenuity. The liability cannot be shaken off. ( 17. The story may vary but the inference defies ingenuity. The liability cannot be shaken off. ( 17. ) SHRI Chaphekar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Board has invoked S. 31 (2) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, in which the representative of the employees has to give a notice of change for increasing the number of permanent employees or change in the wages which they desire, if no agreement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings and essentially the Tribunal will be the proper forum where such questions can be agitated and examined on the basis of evidence in all its aspects. ( 18. ) SHRI Kokje, for the petitioners, on the other hand submits that classification of employees and payment of wages being governed by the Standard Standing Orders as well as Schedule II, no notice as such under S. 31 (2) is necessary. It is also submitted by him that as the matter is covered by Item No. 9 of Schedule I and not by any of the Items of Schedule II, no action under S. 31 (2) of the Act can be taken. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, there is no remedy under the M. P. Industrial relations Act for redressal of the grievances made in this petition. There is yet another genuine difficulty that the petitioner No. 1. is not a recognised representative Union and it has no right to represent the workmen under S. 25 of the Act. Assuming that such an action is feasible the recognised representative Union may dislodge the petitioner No. 1 from any such action, it is submitted that in the circumstances the remedy is neither efficacious nor feasible, assuming that an alternative remedy under S. 31 (2) is available. When substantial questions relating to fundamental rights are raised, alternative remedy being available by itself is not sufficient as a bar to the maintainability of a petition, such as this. (See Shri Ram Poddar v. I. T. Officer, AIR 1964 S. C. 1095; A. V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj, AIR 1961 S. C. 1506 and Sales Tax Officer v. M\s. Shiv Ratan, AIR 1966 S. C. 142), ( 19. (See Shri Ram Poddar v. I. T. Officer, AIR 1964 S. C. 1095; A. V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj, AIR 1961 S. C. 1506 and Sales Tax Officer v. M\s. Shiv Ratan, AIR 1966 S. C. 142), ( 19. ) SHRI Chaphekar, learned counsel for the respondent Board submitted that the petition involves consideration of some minute details involving thousands of employees, Shri Kokje, on the other hand submits that all that is sought by this petition is a simple direction to the respondent Board for treating the muster roll employees and the work charged employees as permanent and paying them accordingly. Payments can be worked out by the Board itself. According to the learned counsel, the work extracted-and the wages paid are nothing short of a BEGAR prohibited by Article 23 of the constitution of India. Relying on Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India. (AIR 1982 S. C. 1473} and Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan, (AIR 19s3 S. C. 328) it is contended that even consideration of financial burden, should not be allowed to come in the way of, when discharge of legal duties is concerned. Certainly the case of the respondent Board is in no way better or worse than the Famine Relief case (Sanjit Roy) (supra ). If in such cases payments have to be made in accordance with law, there is no reason why the hundred thousands employees of the Board on Nominal Muster Roll or on Work-charge basis should not be paid their dues as permanent employees. ( 20. ) THE submission made by Shri Chaphekar that elaborate investigation is necessary, cannot be accepted, as it is merely a matter of direction, so far as the petitioners are concerned, details can be left to be worked out in accordance with law by the respondent- Board itself. ( 21. ) SHRI Kokje submitted that in answer to the petition the respondent - Board has raised certain technical objections: that the petitioners should have Followed remedies under the M. P. Industrial Relations Act. He submitted that there is no remedy under the M. P. I. R. Act available to the petitioners. ( 21. ) SHRI Kokje submitted that in answer to the petition the respondent - Board has raised certain technical objections: that the petitioners should have Followed remedies under the M. P. Industrial Relations Act. He submitted that there is no remedy under the M. P. I. R. Act available to the petitioners. Firstly, because there is no provision which permits raising of an issue covered by the Standard Standing Orders and Schedule I, before the Labour Court, Section 31 of the Act does not apply because it applies to matters, which are neither covered by the Standard Standing Orders nor specified in Schedule 11 of the Act. Similarly, as the matter is covered by Item 9 of schedule I and not by any of the Items of Schedule II, no action under S. 31 (3) of the act also can be taken. Thus, there is no remedy under the M. P. I. R Act for getting redress sought through this petition. Moreover, the petitioner No. 1, Union not being a recognised representative Union, it has no right to represent the workmen under S. 27 of the Act. ( 22. ) EXISTENCE of an alternative remedy is not really a bar. This can also not affect the Courts discretion and cannot operate as limitation on its powers. The remedy, which is suggested, assuming that it is available, is not convenient, considering the very large number of employees running into thousands involved in the case. The trend of decisions show the grant of a writ when that was the most efficacious way of granting the relief. Assuming for the sake of argument that an alternative remedy exists, yet it does hot appear to be proper to dismiss the petition on this score. Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are no substitute for ordinary remedies. When clear violation of fundamental rights is spelt out by the petitioner itself and in the instant case Articles 14, 16, 23 of the Constitution even violated by the respondent Board, a statutory body and the question involved is a question of forced labour below the minimum living wage, it would be unjust to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. The action on the part of;the respondent Board is clearly violative of the fundamental rights, apart from the directive principles of State policy, as enshrined under Articles 39. The action on the part of;the respondent Board is clearly violative of the fundamental rights, apart from the directive principles of State policy, as enshrined under Articles 39. 42 and 43 of the constitution of India. ( 23. ) BEFORE parting with this petition this Court cannot help observing that the Labour Commissioner of the State of Madhya Pradesh has failed to discharge its duties towards the employees and the silence in the matter even in the return eloquently speaks of his connivance. ( 24. ) THE fact that the matter is pending before the Wage Board can also not be a bar to the relief otherwise available to a petitioner under the law : (See P. K. Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India, AIR 1984 S. C. 541 ). ( 25. ) SHRI Kokje, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to some of the Regulations and Standing Orders issued by the respondent Board. As these regulations, Notifications and Orders run counter to the Constitutional provisions, referred to above, it is to be regretted that they do not merely find place in the compilation of Regulations but are also practiced. When the Constitution aims at securing the workers economic justice, compilation containing such directions deprive them of their minimum justice a paradox which still holds the field even after 35 years of the Constitution. The very object of these circulars is disgusting and the sooner they are done away with the better it is for the respondent- Board as also for its employees. ( 26. ) A series of decisions, culminating in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa, (AIR 1978 S. C. 548), and M/s. Hukumchand Jute Mills Ltd. v. Second Industrial tribunal W. B. ( AIR 1979 SC 876 ) are the highlights of Industrial jurisprudence, based on the value of social justice, which is integral to our Constitution. These decisions as signpost have guided the order passed in this petition. These decisions as signpost have guided the order passed in this petition. Following excerpts from the case of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) may usefully be reproduced hereunder : "law, especially industrial law, which regulates the rights and remedies of the working class, unfamilar with the sophistications of definitions and shower of decisions, unable to secure expert legal opinion, what with poverty pricing them out of the justice marked and denying them the staying power to withstand the multi-decked litigative process, de facto denies social justice if legal drafting is vagarious, definitions indefinite and Court rulings contradictory. It is possible, that the legislative chambers are too preoccupied with other business to listen to Court signals calling for clarification of ambiguous clauses?" "the functional focus of this industrial legislation and the social perspective of Part IV of the Paramount Law drive us to hold that the dual goals of the Act are the contentment of workers and peace in the industry and judicial interpretation should be geared to their fulfilment, not their frustration. A worker- oriented stature must receive a construction where, conceptually, the keynote thought must be the worker and the community, as the Constitution has shown concern for them, inter alia, in arts. 38,39 and 43. " Needless to add that industrial justice has got to be in consonance with Part IV of the constitution. It cannot be an application of some rigid formula. (See workmen, Shift incharge Sub-Station v. Addl Ind Trib. Delhi, AIR 1980 S. C. 511 ). ( 27. ) THE term employee is the theme around which the facts of this petition move. It is not merely a legalistic interpretation of the term, but also a realistic approach, keeping in view the concept and context of social justice, as enshrined in our constitution. The definition is to be approached as expressed by the Supreme Court, while dealing with the definition of employee under the Employees State Insurance act, in Royal Talkies, Hyderabad v. E. S. I. Corpn. , (AIR 1978 SC page 1478), thus : "this reminds us of the well-known dictum of Sir James Fitziames Stephen "that in drafting it is not enough to gain a degree of precision which a person reading in good faith can understand, but it is necessary to attain if possible to a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand. " ( 28. " ( 28. ) FOR the foregoing reasons this petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed with costs. It is declared that employees on the Nominal Muster Roll and the Work-charged employees of the respondent- Board, who had put in the requisite period of continuous service of six months under the Standard Standing Orders, are entitled to be treated as permanent employees and to all the benefits of their service as armament employees without any discrimination and they shall be treated as such by the respondent and. The respondent No. 1 is directed to see that the employees so treated are paid their wages in accordance with law. The respondents are further directed to classify and categorise their employees strictly and in accordance with the Standard standing Orders irrespective of their being employees either in the Cement Pole factories or the Co-operative Societies. Counsels fee Rs. 500/- if certified. Outstanding amount of the security deposit, after verification, be refunded to the petitioners. Petition allowed.