A. K. SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application by defendants under Section 17 (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), for extension of time for making the deposit and for payment of arrears by suitable installments. ( 2 ) ON or about November 7, 1984 the plaintiff instituted this suit, inter alia, praying for recovery of vacant and peaceful possession of the flat being Flat No. 8d Camac Court, 25 Camac Street, Calcutta as well as for arrears of rent and mesne profit. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant failed and neglected to pay rent to the plaintiff since December 1982 and is a defaulter within the meaning of the said Act and by reason thereof the plaintiff has become entitled to take vacant and peaceful possession or to re-enter into the said flat. It is also alleged that the defendant has wrongfully and illegally sub-let and or transferred and/or parted with the possession of the said flat to one Private Limited Company without any consent of the plaintiff. It is also the case of the plaintiff that he is in need of the said flat as the same is reasonably required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation. ( 3 ) THIS application has been made by the defendant on March 21, 1985. Admittedly the defendant paid rent upto November, 1982. Accordingly, he is liable to pay or deposit rent or a sum equivalent to the rent as the case may be from December, 1982 till the application was made in March, 1985. It is also alleged by the defendant that he tendered rent for the months of January, February, March, April, May and June, 1984 to the plaintiff by an account payee cheque forwarded under prepaid registered cover of a letter dated June 19, 1984. The plaintiff, it is alleged, however refused to accept the said letter as also the cheque forwarded under cover of the said letter. It is also alleged that prior to that the defendant, on several occasions, duly tendered rent before the landlord under postal money orders but on each of the said occasions the rent was allegedly refused by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) IT appears that there is another suit pending in this Court instituted by the defendant being Suit No. 418 of 1983. ( 4 ) IT appears that there is another suit pending in this Court instituted by the defendant being Suit No. 418 of 1983. The said suit relates to the dissolution of a partnership where the defendant, a Chartered Account, was a partner along with two others Sushit Roy and Sourendra Nath Chakraborty. In the said suit, various orders were passed from time to time and the said flat, It was also directed that the defendant (plaintiff in that suit) would continue to pay the rent. The defendant no. 1 (Sushit Roy) was directed to keep deposit with his Advocate on record a sum of Rs. 1,750/- per month from May, 1984. An application was made on 27th June, 1984 in the said suit by the defendant for obtaining leave to occupy and use the said flat and also for other reliefs. The said application is still pending. ( 5 ) IT further appears that another suit was instituted by the plaintiff in or about March, 1983 against the defendant, being Suit No. 211 of 1983 praying, inter alia, for perpetual injunction and a money decree for Rs. 1,00,000/- and other consequential reliefs. An application was also made in the said suit for an injunction restrainaing the defendant from assigning and/or parting with the possession of the said flat to Mesrs. G. P. Electronics Private Limited of which the defendant is the Director or to any other person. The said application was disposed of by D. K. Sen, J, on January 21, 1984 directing the maintenance of status quo in respect of the flat-in-dispute as on March 31, 1983. It is alleged that the said flat is lying vacant and is not occupied by anyone. It is alleged by the defendant that in view of the stoppage of his business and/or profession and consequent stoppage of earning from all corners, the rent which was due and payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for the period between December, 1982 and March 1985 has been utilized by the defendant for maintaining his family. He, therefore, ask for easy instalments to pay the arrears. ( 6 ) IT is contended by Mrs. Deb Burman, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, that this application is barred by limitation in view of the provisions contained in Section 17 (2b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. He, therefore, ask for easy instalments to pay the arrears. ( 6 ) IT is contended by Mrs. Deb Burman, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, that this application is barred by limitation in view of the provisions contained in Section 17 (2b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. It is also contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time unless the application is made within the time prescribed under the said Act and in any event, there is no prayer for condonation of any delay in making this application. ( 7 ) TO appreciate this contention of Mrs. Deb Burman that the application is barred by limitation, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the said Act : "s. 17 (2a): Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (3), on the application of the tenant, the Court may, by order, (a)extend the time specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) for the deposit or payment of any amount refer red to therein; (b) having regard to the circumstances of the tenant as also of the landlord and the total sum inclusive of interest required to be deposited or paid under sub-section (1) on account of default in the payment of rent, permit the tenant to deposit or pay such sum in such instalments and by such dates as the Court may fix; provided that where payment is permitted by instalments, such sum shall include all amounts calculated at the rate of rent for the period including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which the order under this sub-section is to be made with interest on any such amount calculated at the rat specified in sub-section (1) from the date when such amount was payable up to the ate of such order. S. 17 (2b): No application for extension of time for the deposit or payment of any amount under clause (a) of section (2a) shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified therefore in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), and no application for permission to pay in instalment under clause (b) of sub-section (2a) shall be entertained unless it is made before the expiry of the time specified in sub-section (1) for the deposit or payment of the amount due on account of default in the payment of rent. " ( 8 ) FROM the aforesaid provisions it would appear that unless the application for extension of time for the deposit or payment by instalments is made within the time prescribed under Section 17 (1) of the said Act, the Court cannot entertain such an application. Section 17 (1), inter alia, provides that the deposit has to be made in Court or to the landlord within one month from the service of the writ of summons on the defendant. In this case, the writ of summons of served on the defendant on February 20, 1985 and the present application has been made by the defendant on March 21, 1985. It is, therefore, contended that this application has not been made within one month from the date of service of the writ of summons and, therefore, it is barred by limitation. ( 9 ) MR. Barin Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the defendant, has submitted that 'month' has not defined in the said Act and the dictionary meaning of 'month' has to be adopted. It is his submission that the writ of summons was served on February 20, 1985 and the day on which the writ of summons was served has to be excluded as the Limitation Act applies. Therefore, one month from the date of service of the writ of summons will expire on the corresponding day of the next calendar month. He has also referred to the Oxford Dictionary for the meaning assigned to the word 'month'. ( 10 ) I have given anxious consideration to the contentions urged on the question of limitation. The word 'month' in its ordinary acceptance means a calendar month. Under the General Clauses Act, 1897, 'month' shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. ( 10 ) I have given anxious consideration to the contentions urged on the question of limitation. The word 'month' in its ordinary acceptance means a calendar month. Under the General Clauses Act, 1897, 'month' shall mean a month reckoned according to the British Calendar unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition), 'month' means a space of time extending from any date to the corresponding day of the next calendar month (called a calendar month ). If this ordinary meaning of the word 'month' is accepted, then the writ of summons having been served on February 20, 1985, one month will expire on the corresponding day of the next month, i. e. , on March 20, 1985. Thus even calculating on this basis, the application would be late by one day as it was made on March 21, 1985. The question, therefore, is whether, as contended by Mr. Ghosh, the applicant is entitled to get the exclusion of the day when the writ of summons was served on the applicant. ( 11 ) SECTION 39 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, provides that subject to the provisions of the said Act relating to limitation, all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to suits, appeals and proceedings under the said Act. The Limitation Act of 1908 has since repealed by the Act of 1963. Repeal of the Act of 1908 followed by enactment makes the provisions of the Act of 1963 applicable to all the proceedings under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Since the Limitation Act applies, the provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act can be invoked in the determination of the period of limitation prescribed under the Premises Tenancy Act. ( 12 ) UNDER Section 12 of the Limitation Act in computing the period of limitation for any suit or appeal or application, the day from which such period to be reckoned shall be excluded. Accordingly, in computing the period of one month, 20th February, the day on which the writ of summons was served has to be excluded. If that date is excluded, the period of one month would be counted from 21st February and one month from that date would ordinarily mean the calendar month and would expire on 21st March, 1985. Accordingly, in computing the period of one month, 20th February, the day on which the writ of summons was served has to be excluded. If that date is excluded, the period of one month would be counted from 21st February and one month from that date would ordinarily mean the calendar month and would expire on 21st March, 1985. The period of one month begins on 21st and must terminate with the corresponding day of the next calendar month i. e. , 21st. In my judgment, the word 'month' should be understood in its ordinary dictionary meaning and therefore, having regard to the fact that the day on which the writ of summons was served is to be excluded under the Limitation Act, this application made on 21st March, 1985 is within time and not late by one day as contended. ( 13 ) MRS. Dev Burman has relied on a passager from Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 37, Article 143 at page 83 which is as follows: "article 143. Calendar month running from arbitrary date. When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end of calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month, the period expires at the end of the latter month. If a period of one calendar month includes the last day of February there must be twenty-nine or twenty-eight days, according as the year is or is not a leap year. " ( 14 ) IT is contended that even if 20th February is excluded from the computation of the month, the month will expire on 20th March and not 21st March 1985. I am, however, unable to accept this contention having regard to the dictionary meaning of the month. That apart, even in Halsbury the examples which have been given would show that the period of month which begins on a particular day will terminate on the corresponding day of the next month. Those examples are as follows: a period of a month which begins on the 28th or any later day in January must in the ordinary year terminate on 28th February. Such a period can never extend into a third month. Those examples are as follows: a period of a month which begins on the 28th or any later day in January must in the ordinary year terminate on 28th February. Such a period can never extend into a third month. A sentence of imprisonment for one calendar month pronounced on 31st October ends on 30th November. A bill of exchange dated 29th January and payable in one calendar month is, apart from day of grace, payable on 28th February, or, if it is leap year, payable on 28th February. When a calendar month's notice of action is required and is given on 28th April, action may be commenced on 29th May. (See pages 83 and 84 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 37.) ( 15 ) IT, therefore, follows that the month is a space of time extending from any day to the corresponding day of the next calendar month but where there is no corresponding day, it will then terminate on the last day e. g. if the month starts from 31st October it is terminated on 30th of November has only 30 days. ( 16 ) EVEN assuming that this application is barred by limitation because of delay of one day; question is whether this court has any jurisdiction to extend the time. It has been held in the case of Sm. Annapurna Mukherjee vs. Satish Chandra Sikdar, 1978 (1) CLJ 620 that if an application is made under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court has the power to extend time for making the deposit under section 17 (1) of the said Act provided that the cause shown in acceptable to the court. If the time specified under section 17 (1) for making deposit can be extended, the time to make application under section 17 (2a) can similarly be extended. ( 17 ) THE defendant in this case has proceeded on the footing that the application has been made within time in view of the interpretation of the word 'month'. Thus there was no question of making any application for condonation of delay. Even if it is held that there is a delay of one day, it will be an idle formality if the defendant is given leave to make application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of one day. Thus there was no question of making any application for condonation of delay. Even if it is held that there is a delay of one day, it will be an idle formality if the defendant is given leave to make application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of one day. ( 18 ) IN the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the view that even if it is assumed that there is delay of one day, thee has been sufficient explanation that such delay is due to the mistaken interpretation of the word 'month'. This is essentially a question of law. When the question whether there has been delay or not depends on the interpretation of the relevant provision and not on any determination on facts, the court can for the ends of justice even without requiring an application for condonation of delay allow the application unless it appears to the court that the interpretation which is canvassed to justify that the application has been made within the prescribed period of limitation is ill-founded and untenable. ( 19 ) THE next question which requires to be decided is whether in this case the defendant is entitled to any instalment or not. ( 20 ) IT is the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff that the Court should take into account the circumstances of the landlord and the total sum inclusive of interest required to be deposited. It is contended that the plaintiff is an old man and he has no other means of livelihood and is solely dependent on the income of the said flat. Mrs. Dev Burman, the Learned Counsel for the plaintiff has drawn my attention to an affidavit filed by one Sushit Roy, the defendant No. 1 in Suit No. 41b of 1983. The said suit, as indicated earlier, was instituted by the defendant in this suit against the said Sushit Roy and one Sourendra Nath Chakraborty for dissolution of the partnership firm. In paragraph 9 of the said affidavit affirmed on 10th September, 1983 the said Sushit Roy has alleged that the defendant is a close associate of Shambhu Prosad Mukherjee of Sachaita Investment and he was a constituted attorney of the Sachaita Investment and collected large amount of money from various depositors for and on behalf of Sachaita Investment. In paragraph 9 of the said affidavit affirmed on 10th September, 1983 the said Sushit Roy has alleged that the defendant is a close associate of Shambhu Prosad Mukherjee of Sachaita Investment and he was a constituted attorney of the Sachaita Investment and collected large amount of money from various depositors for and on behalf of Sachaita Investment. She submits that the defendant has sufficient funds to pay the entire arrears at a time and no instalment should be granted. ( 21 ) MR. Ghosh, the Learned Advocate for the defendant has denied the allegations made in the said affidavit of Sushit Roy and has submitted that the defendant has virtually no income. He cannot continue with his profession as a Chartered Accountant as the flat in dispute is in the possession of the Receiver appointed by this Court nor he can continue with his Electronic Business as he has no access to the flat in dispute which is the registered office of the Private Ltd. Company (G. P. Electronics Pvt. Ltd. ). He has also submitted that the defendant tendered the rent by cheque and postal money orders which had been refused by the plaintiff and the said amounts had been spent by this time by the defendant for maintaining his family. It is, therefore, submitted that the defendant should be allowed to pay the arrears by reasonable monthly instalments. ( 22 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and materials on record, time to make the deposit under Section 17 (1) is extended for the current month till 15th July, 1985. Subsequent deposits shall be made on or before 15th of each succeeding month. ( 23 ) THE defendant has become liable to deposit a sum of Rs. 54,250/- for the months from December, 1982 till June, 1985. After considering the circumstances of the landlord as well as of the tenant and the total sum inclusive of interest required to be deposited, I permit the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the said sum of Rs. 54,250/ -. The first of such instalments shall be paid on or before 15th July, 1985 and thereafter within 15th of each succeeding month along with the monthly deposit for the current month. 54,250/ -. The first of such instalments shall be paid on or before 15th July, 1985 and thereafter within 15th of each succeeding month along with the monthly deposit for the current month. The aforesaid payments shall be made by the defendant by Demand Draft or Pay Order drawn in the name of the plaintiff which will be forwarded to the Advocate on record of the plaintiff on or before 15th of each month. ( 24 ) COSTS of this application shall be costs in the suit. All parties shall act on a signed copy of the operative part of this judgment. Application allowed. .