Judgment Krishna Ballabh Sinha, J. These three applications under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India for writ in the nature of habeas corpus have been heard together. As common questions of law & facts are involved & common argument was advanced in all the petitions, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The Government of Bihar on being satisfied that with a view to prevent the petitioners from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State passed the detention orders on 15.12.1985 as contained in Annexure 1 of each of the petitions in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National Security Act, (No 65 of 1980) (hereinafter called as ‘the Act’). A brief narration of the facts giving rise to these petitions is necessary in order to appreciate the points raised by the parties. 3. The petitioners were arrested by the police in the night between the 29th & the 30th November. 1984 at Jogbani check post near Nepal Border in the State of Bihar. The police registered Jogbani P.S. Case No.110 of 1984 under sections 121A, 123, 124A, 505 & 120B of the Indian penal code, read with section 5(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, against them. They are produced before a judicial magistrate, Araria, District Purnia (Bihar) & the were remanded to jail custody in connection with the said case. While they were in jail, the order of detention was served on them on 17.12.1984 & the ground of detention on 20.12.1984. After receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board, the State Government confirmed the detention order on 24.1.1985. 4. Mr. Basudeo Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners assailed the detention order & first contended that the ground of detention were served on the detenue on the 5th of January,1985 & so they were deprived of their right of filing representation. 5. 4. Mr. Basudeo Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners assailed the detention order & first contended that the ground of detention were served on the detenue on the 5th of January,1985 & so they were deprived of their right of filing representation. 5. Section 8 of the Act, provides that when a person is detained in pursuance of an order passed under this Act, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later then five days & in exceptional circumstances & for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made & shall afford him the earlier opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. At the time of argument, Mr. S. Hoda, the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State produced the record maintained by the State Government in connection with each of the detenues, from which it transpired that the ground of detention were served on the petitioners on the 21st of December, 1984, within five days of the date of detention. After looking to the records, the learned counsel for the petitioners did not press this point. 6. Then it was argued that the detention order was bad as on the same grounds petitioners were being prosecuted & the matter was pending before a Court & hence it was not proper to pursue two parallel proceeding against the detenues. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the case of Biran Chand Vrs. State of U.P. in which it was held that the detaining authority could not take recourse to two parallel and simultaneous proceedings nor could take recourse to a ground which was the subject matter of a criminal trial. This argument does not merit any consideration. The law is settled on this point & the case relied upon by the petitioner was over-ruled by a subsequent decision of a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in H. Saha Vrs. the State of West Bengal. After surveying a number of earlier decisions and consideration of different aspect of this issue, it has been held that the power of preventive detention is quite different from penal provision. the State of West Bengal. After surveying a number of earlier decisions and consideration of different aspect of this issue, it has been held that the power of preventive detention is quite different from penal provision. Such an order is essentially a preventive measure by way of precaution to curb the future behaviour of the detenue based on his past conducts, which may consist of a single or series of acts. It is not a parallel proceeding. It has also been observed that the pendency of the prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. The order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution & in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. Under the preventive detention, the detenue is not punished for having done something, rather the detention order is passed under the Act, to prevent him from acting in a particular manner. Same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Hemlata Vrs. State of Maharashtra, in which it has been held that a prosecution or the absence of it is not an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. The same view has been affirmed in the case of Alijan Mian Vrs. The District Magistrate, Dhandad. An argument was advanced in that case that the two incidents on the basis of which the proceedings for preventive detention had been started were already the subject matter of criminal proceedings and in the circumstances the proceedings for preventive detention were not warranted. This argument was not accepted and it has been held that the preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are started to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The pendency of a criminal proceeding is no bar to an order of preventive detention, nor the order of preventive detention creates a bar against the prosecution. 7. The validity of the detention order was also challenged on the plea that the grounds were served to the petitioners in English, language, with which they were not conversant and hence it was no communication in the eye of law as contemplated under section 8 of the Act. The petitioners sought to draw support from the case of Hari Kishan Vrs. State of Maharashtra. The petitioners sought to draw support from the case of Hari Kishan Vrs. State of Maharashtra. The ground of detention on the appellant before the Supreme Court was served on 10.4.1961. The substance of the ground was that since after his release from the previous detention, he had been instigating persons to defy and disobey reasonable directions and lawful orders issued by the detaining authority from time to time. By use of highly provocative words, expressions and slogans in the meeting and procession, he had instigated persons on several occasions to indulge in acts of violence and create disturbance in the city and thereby he had been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in that city. Thereafter followed the particulars of his activities, running into five closely typed pages and contained in many paragraphs. The appellant wrote a letter to the District Magistrate on 19.4.1961 that the order and grounds of detention being in English, he was unable to understand them and, therefore, asked for a Hindi version of the same. To that letter, the District Magistrate replied on 21.3.1961 that the order of detention and the grounds of detention communicated to the appellant were given in English, which was the official language in that district. The District Magistrate further said in his letter that it was not possible to supply any translation of the same. In that letter it was also stated that the order and grounds of detention, served on the appellant, were fully explained to him by the Police Officer in presence of the Dy. Superintendent of Police. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that he was not conversant with the English language and the oral translation by the Police Officer, said to have been made to the deteuue, was not sufficient compliance with the requirements of Article 22 of the Constitution. 8. In that case, the grounds were several and were based on numerous speeches, said to have been delivered by the appellant on different occasions and different dates. The oral translation or explanation given by the Police Officer; therefore, was not considered to be sufficient for communicating the grounds. It has been held that the communication, in this context, most mean bringing home to the detenue knowledge of the facts and circumstances, on which the order of detention is based. The oral translation or explanation given by the Police Officer; therefore, was not considered to be sufficient for communicating the grounds. It has been held that the communication, in this context, most mean bringing home to the detenue knowledge of the facts and circumstances, on which the order of detention is based. It has also been observed that to a person who is not so conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitutional provision, the detenue must be given the grounds in a language which he can understand and in a script which he can read. 9. Counter-affidavits have been filed in reply to the petitions by the Deputy Secretary in Home (Spl.) Department, Patna. From the said affidavits, it appears that the order of detention and the grounds thereof were served on the petitioners on 21.12.1984 in English as well as in Hindi. It is also mentioned in the said affidavits that the petitioners, in token of having received the orders and grounds have put their signatures in English. As mentioned above, the record maintained by the Department was made available in the Court at the time of hearing from which it transpired that the petitioners had also made endorsement of receipt of the said documents in English. They had asked for a copy of the grounds in Gurumnkhi language on 2.2.1985, much after the period prescribed under section 8 of the Act, It was submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that the demand for copy of the grounds in Gurimukhi language was an after thought, obviously, with a view to create evidence for showing non-compliance of section 8 of the Act. It was further submitted that the petitioners did not make any complaint regarding use of language in communication of the orders and grounds when they were served on them. 10. True it is that in order to enable the detenue to make representation, it is necessary that he must have knowledge of the ground on which the authorities concerned are satisfied about the necessity of making the detention order. The ground must be intelligible to the detenue to meet the allegations made in the grounds. But the case of Hari Kishan (Supra) cannot be of any avail to the petitioners as the facts of that case are distinguishable. The ground must be intelligible to the detenue to meet the allegations made in the grounds. But the case of Hari Kishan (Supra) cannot be of any avail to the petitioners as the facts of that case are distinguishable. The High Court) in the said case, found that the detenue had studied up to the 7th Hindi Standard, which was equivalant to the 3rd English Standard. The High Court had negatived the contention raised on behalf of the datenue not on the ground that he did not know enough English rather it was held that the English continued to be the official language in the State of Maharashtra and so the service of the order in English language upon the detenue was sufficient compliance with the requirement of Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. The High Court also came to the conclusion that the failure of the District Magistrate to supply the grounds in Hindi did not have the effect of preventing him from making his representation to the authority. The District Magistrate had mentioned in his letter that the grounds were explained to the appellants in Hindi by the Police Officer. I would like to refer to the case of Jaganath Das Vrs. State of West Bengal. The grievance of the detenue in that case was that there was no valid communication of the grounds of detention. He claimed to be an illiterate man and had affixed his thumb impression on the detention order at the time when it was served upon him. The assertion of the petitioner in that case was factually found to be incorrect as the petition sent by him from jail contained his signature which was attested by the jail authority. It was held by the Supreme Court that it could not be said that the order was defective, for want of proper Communication. The petitioners in these three applications did not raise any objection at the time when they received the grounds of detention. They had written in English to have received the documents and also put their signature in English at the time of service of the order of detention and also when the grounds were communicated to them which is fully borne out by the records of the cases maintained by the State Government. They had written in English to have received the documents and also put their signature in English at the time of service of the order of detention and also when the grounds were communicated to them which is fully borne out by the records of the cases maintained by the State Government. Under such circumstances, the detaining authority could not have anticipated that they were not conversant with the English language. They, themselves, after keeping silent for a pretty long time, made demand for copy of detention in Gurumukhi language. It was also argued by the learned State Counsel that no such complaint with regard to the use of language was made by the petitioners before the Advisory Board. This fact is also stated by the Deputy Secretary in the counter-affidavits. In view of the fact that the petitioners had made endorsement and put their signatures in English at the time of service of the order of detention and the grounds there of and did not ask for a copy of the said document in Gurumukhi language for a long period, it is not possible to accept the contention that the order is bad being violative of section 8 of the Act. 11. Mr. Prasad next contended that the grounds supplied to the petitioners were absolutely vague and the detaining authority passed it without applying its mind. It was not clear from the order (Annexure 1) as to security of which State was in danger by the alleged prejudicial activity of the petitioner. So, it is relevant to look to the grounds served on the petitioners, which are thus: GROUND From the report of the D.S.P., C.I.D. received through the I.G., CID, it transpires that the Government of Punjab had issued an order of detention, on 28th May, 1984 under the National Security Act, in respect of Shri Simaranjit Singh Mann, who was an officer of the Indian Police Service in Punjab Cadre, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of the Country and the Security of the State, but he was evading arrest. His full details, along with his photo had been circulated to all check posts with the instruction that he should not be allowed to go out of the Country. His full details, along with his photo had been circulated to all check posts with the instruction that he should not be allowed to go out of the Country. On the 29th November, 1984 at 23.30 hrs, a patrolling party under the charge of Shri Ramdeo Tiwary, Inspector of Police, Forbesganj, while at Jogbani (Purnia) check-post, saw a jeep bearing No. WMF-5737 coming in high speed from south to north. Sensing something suspicious, the Police Party signaled the jeep to stop, five sikhs were seated in the jeep. On being questioned they did not disclose their names and addresses. But the officers of the Special Branch and CID at the Check-post identified one of them as Sardar Samaranjit Singh Mann. The Special Branch Officer brought the records relating to Shri Mann and his identity was confirmed by his photo. On being searched his Passport No. P- 553712 and some other papers were recovered from his pocket Thereafter, Shri Mann accepted his identity. The other four persons, who were seated in the jeep and, had been brought to the check-post, disclosed their names and addresses as below :- 1. Shri Kanikar Singh Son of Shri Kartar Singh, 10/A, Balliganj, Circular Road, Calcutta ……19. 2. Shri Jagpal Singh son of Shri Arjan Singh, 156/10, Calcutta…………..35 3. Shri Charan Singh, son of Shri Karnail Singh, 29fB, Chhatawala Gali, Calcutta ……12 4. Shri Raghubir Singh son of Sardar Mohan Singh, Circular Road, Calcutta …….19 On search of the persons of aforesaid five persons, seditious documents affecting the security of the State were recovered. Three suit-cases and one Airbag were found in the above intercepted jeep and they were seized. Shri Kanikar Singh offered a bribe of Rs.25,000/- to the Police Officers present there and requested them to allow them (accused persons) to cross Over to Nepal. When refused, Shri Kanikar Singh took out some more bundle of notes from his suitcase-and offered them to the officers. The total amount of Rs.62722/- available with them was seized. In this connection, Jogbani P.S. Case No. 0110/84, dated 30th November, 1984, u/s 121A/124A/123/153A/505/120B I.P.C. and Section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, was instituted on the basis of the first information report submitted by the Inspector of Police, Forbesganj, against these persons, and these five persons were arrested. 2. The total amount of Rs.62722/- available with them was seized. In this connection, Jogbani P.S. Case No. 0110/84, dated 30th November, 1984, u/s 121A/124A/123/153A/505/120B I.P.C. and Section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, was instituted on the basis of the first information report submitted by the Inspector of Police, Forbesganj, against these persons, and these five persons were arrested. 2. The documents and papers recovered from them were found to be incriminating and seditious for their convenience they had distributed these documents among themselves. These facts establish their common intention and purpose. A brief description of the incriminating and seditious endocuments and papers, recovered from them is given below :- (i) In the letter of Shri Simaranjit Singh Mann dated 18th June, 1984 addressed to the President of India, anti-national feelings have been excited by utterances like the Indian army murdered Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawala the respected leader of the Sikh Nation, Killed innocent Sikhs, looted Toshakhana. It has also been said that the Indian Govt. is a Hindu Government which has adopted the policy of annihilating the Sikhs and other minorities in India, and Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India by such actions, has outdone even Mohd. Ghazni. It has also been said in the letter that the Government of India considers the Sikhs as even greater enemy than Pakistan and China. It has been said in the letter that in the army action in Punjab, 20.000 Sikhs were killed and over 50,000 are missing. It has also been said that if even India has to fight a war, the Sikhs will not support the Government of India and the Sikh Jawans of the Army will also not put up the type of defence with the same zeal and fervour. In the letter, a call has been given to the Sikhs to observe the 6th of every month as "Martyrdom day" and march to the residence of the Prime Minister and after their heads so that she may quench their thirst for sikh blood. Similarly, the Sikhs living in the States have been called upon to present themselves at the Rajbhawans so that the Governors of States can chop off their heads and send them to the Prime Minister. Sikhs living abroad have been instructed to follow a similar programme before the Indian Embassy. Similarly, the Sikhs living in the States have been called upon to present themselves at the Rajbhawans so that the Governors of States can chop off their heads and send them to the Prime Minister. Sikhs living abroad have been instructed to follow a similar programme before the Indian Embassy. (ii) The pamphlet titled "Sikh and foreign Affairs" speaks of the Sikhs as a separate nation and deals with the independent foreign policy of the Sikhs according to which the Sikhs have to establish independent and cordial relations with Israil, China and Pakistan. It has been mentioned therein that the Sikh nation should independently seek the associate membership of the UNO and raise their problems through the UNO. In this pamphlet, demands have been made to accord Amritsar City the Vatican City in which the Amritsar Administration will make legislation regarding administrative economic and commercial activities of its population, and public order. According to this, Amritsar will be fully independent and will enjoy tae status of an independent sovereign state in international affairs. (iii) The manuscript titled “History of Amritsar” deals with the founding of the Amritsar City and giving a year wise account of the happenings there Since its inception mentions about the entry of Indian army in the Golden Temple in 1984, alleged murder of Sant Bhin darwala and other Sikh leaders and killing of Sikhs in the name of fake-encounters. The army action in the Golden Temple of Amritsar in June, 1964 has been termed as an attack on the Golden Temple by Government forces and the Sikh extremists, who were opening fire on the Indian army from behind the Golden Temple premises, have been described as patriotic national forces and have been extolled. Quoting Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawala it has been said that should the army enter the Golden Temple, it will mean dismemberment of India and Punjab will secede in this a call has been given to the Sikh community to rise in revolt. 3. It is manifest from the facts given above that Shri Kanikar Singh along with his other aforesaid associates, is engaged in antinational activities. They were in close collaboration arranging the escape of Shri Mann, who had been prohibited from leaving the country, and were trying to take out incriminating and seditious materials outside India for anti-national activities abroad. 4. 3. It is manifest from the facts given above that Shri Kanikar Singh along with his other aforesaid associates, is engaged in antinational activities. They were in close collaboration arranging the escape of Shri Mann, who had been prohibited from leaving the country, and were trying to take out incriminating and seditious materials outside India for anti-national activities abroad. 4. The State Government is satisfied on the basis of facts above that if Shri Kanikar Singh Son of Sri Kartar Singh is not detained under the National Security Act, he will indulge in activities which may have prejudicial effect on the security of the State since Shri Kanikar Singh is on remand by Judicial Court in Jogbani P.S. Case No. 0110/84 dated 30th November, 1984 and there is likelihood of his being' released on bail the grounds of detention are being served on him inside jai1." 12. The order was passed by the Government of Bihar and the grounds as well as the order, both, were issued under the signature of the Additional Secretary to the said Government. So the facts mentioned above unmistakably lead to the conclusion that the order speaks about the security of the State of Bihar and there is no ambiguity. 13. It was also contended that the grounds were irrelevant and had nothing to do with the security of the State. The petitioners were only fellow passengers with Simaranjit Singh Mann on the jeep which was intercepted by the Police. Merely helping a person to escape from this country for going to Nepal cannot be treated as a ground affecting the security of the State. Similarly passive possession of some documents without execution and any effective action taken in pursuance of the same by the detenues would not justify their detention under the Act. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the case of Nathmal Vs. State of Rajasthan In that case, some essential articles were recovered from the shop of the detenues and it was found that they had not displayed the price list and stocks at their business premises. It was not alleged in the order under challenge that the petitioners had refused to sell any of the articles to any of the customers. The detenue had taken the stand that their shop was closed, which was not specifically denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the other side. It was not alleged in the order under challenge that the petitioners had refused to sell any of the articles to any of the customers. The detenue had taken the stand that their shop was closed, which was not specifically denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the other side. On the fact of that case, it was held that mere recovery of certain articles from the premises of the petitioner without there being any allegation or violation of any law, would not be sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the petitioner had acted in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supply of essential commodity. 14. The facts of that case are apparently distinguishable. A bare perusal of the grounds served on the detenue would show that the petitioners were noticed moving in a jeep in the dead of the night. When the jeep did not stop even after the signal given by the Police party, it was intercepted and passports and other papers were recovered. One of the petitioners occupying the jeep, namely, Shrt Kanikar Singh, offered huge amount of bribe to facilitate the escape of one of their companions from this country. The documents recovered from them revealed that members of Sikh community living in this State as well as in other parts of the Country were instigated to establish an independent State. A call had been given to the members of that community to raise their heads against the State Government and the Prime Minister. It is therefore not possible to accept that the petitioners were only co-passengers. 15. Mr. Prasad strenuously argued that in a democratic country like India where freedom of speech was guaranteed by the Constitution, there was nothing wrong when an agitation was started against the Government and the petitioners were found with the documents conveying the ideology behind that movement. He tried to draw support from the case of Kedar Nath Singh Vrs. State of Bihar and others, in which the main point for consideration was whether the provision of section 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code were unconstitutional being violative of fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and the answer was in negative. State of Bihar and others, in which the main point for consideration was whether the provision of section 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code were unconstitutional being violative of fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and the answer was in negative. In Course of argument, emphasis was laid on the following observations of the Supreme Court : "As already pointed out, the explanations appended to the main body of the section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however, strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression." It was submitted that in view of the said finding the materials contained in the documents recovered from the petitioners did not constitute any offence as it was permissible to criticise the action of the Government even in strongest terms. 16. I would like to mention at the out set that the question of applicability of sections 124A and 505 of the Penal Code does not fall for consideration in these petitions. It is not at all relevant to find out whether the petitioner committed the offences mentioned above. However, the ratio of that case does not give unfettered right of expression to the citizens as would appear from the same passage of the judgment relied by the petitioner as extracted here below: "It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. The provisions of the sections read al a whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public place by resort to violence. It is only when the words, written or spoken; etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. It is only when the words, written or spoken; etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion, strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order," So, this case, in my view, is not helpful to the petitioners, rather it goes a long way to justify the impugned order. It is the right of every citizen to have his own political philosophy. Even arousing consciousness and dissatisfaction against a party Government cannot be considered to be a ground affecting the security of the State. But this right is subject to the condition that the dissatisfaction should not be spread so as to result in violence. On the plea of propagation of a political philosophy, there should be no incitement to use violence. 17. Now, coming to the facts of the instant applications, it is to be found that the petitioners were not only innocent fellow passengers of the jeep, unaware of the purpose for which they were moving in it. One of their companions wanted to flee away from this country to avoid execution of a detention order. When the steps taken by the petitioners was foiled by the Police; persuasive attempts were made to win over the Police by offering huge money. The recovered documents clearly disclosed the purpose for which it was written. As the documents were also carried in the vehicle in which the petitioners were traveling, it can legitimately be inferred that the said documents had come in circulation. What is written in the documents, in my view, cannot be said to be unconnected with the security of the State. Although they were purported to have been created in another State, but at the time of detection, it was found with the petitioners, who were trying to cross the country border through 'a check post situated in this State. The gravamen of the accusation against the petitioners was that they were found helping one of their companions, who was evading execution of a detention order and was on a campaign which aimed at setting up an independent State out of this country. The gravamen of the accusation against the petitioners was that they were found helping one of their companions, who was evading execution of a detention order and was on a campaign which aimed at setting up an independent State out of this country. Further in order to achieve that end a call was given to a sizable population of this State and the country to take open recourse to violence and the documents in circulation indicated the method to accomplish it. So it is clear beyond all doubts that there is ‘live and proximate link' between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention i.e. to prevent the petitioners from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, It is well settled that the truth or adequacy of the materials forming the foundation of satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be a subject matter of consideration by this Court. The scope of the enquiry in case of this nature is very limited and the grounds are assumed by the Court to be true. 18. It was contended next that the grounds of detention were nothing more than mere reproduction of the first information report of the case in which the petitioners were made accused. The detaining authority after putting the contents of the said first information report in the grounds of detention concluded with a statement that the State Government was satisfied that in case the petitioners were not taken in custody under the Act, they would indulge in activities, which might prejudicially affect the security of the State and there was likelihood of their being released on bail. According to submission of Mr. Prasad the only ground for detention was likelihood of release of the petitioners on bail which apparently indicated non-application of mind by the detaining authority. It was urged that the satisfaction was not founded on legal materials and the order was passed only to keep the petitioners in jail custody. 19. In support, reliance was heavily placed on the case of Vijay Narain Singh Vrs. State of Bihar and others and reference was made specially to the following observations :- "It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and, therefore, it should be strictly construed. 19. In support, reliance was heavily placed on the case of Vijay Narain Singh Vrs. State of Bihar and others and reference was made specially to the following observations :- "It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and, therefore, it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available in such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very lame charge which is to be tried by the criminal court." It was submitted that the impugned order was passed only with a view to prevent the petitioners from coming out of jail as they were likely to be released on bail. The detention orders were passed without proper scrutiny and the detaining authority had used the power conferred by the Act, to clip the wings of the petitioners In other words, it was submitted that the order was malafide as two parallel proceedings were initiated against the petitioners, one under the National Security Act, and the other under the Ordinary Criminal Procedure. 20. It may be noticed that it has also been observed in the same judgment that it is not correct to say that merely because there was an acquittal of a detenue, the detaining authority cannot take the Act, complained of leading to the trial into consideration for passing the detention order. It is well settled that there is no rule which prevents the detaining authority from taking into consideration the materials which may be subject matter of adjudication by a trial court for prosecution of the detenue. It is well settled that there is no rule which prevents the detaining authority from taking into consideration the materials which may be subject matter of adjudication by a trial court for prosecution of the detenue. If the grounds forming the basis of satisfaction of the detaining authority are found to be mala fide, the position will be completely different and the detention order must be struck down. So far as this case is concerned, it has already been held that the detention order does not suffer from infirmity of vagueness and the grounds are germane No. material was brought to the notice the Court suggesting that the detaining authority was actuated by any malice for unnecessarily keeping the petitioners under detention and the impugned orders were passed in a mechanical way. 21. It is also not possible to accept the contention that the only ground of detention of the petitioner was likelihood of their being released on bail. It is apparent that after enumerating the activities of the petitioners on which the satisfaction for detention was founded the detaining authority came to the conclusion that the detention of the petitioners under the Act, was necessary, as they were likely to indulge in activities, prejudicially affecting security of the State. Fur other it is mentioned in the ground of detention that they were likely to be released on bail and hence the grounds were to be served on them in jail itself. The ground of detention cannot be truncated, as argued on behalf of the petitioners, so as to put the first part separately and consider the concluding portion independently from the other because for the purpose of passing an order under the Preventive Detention Act, the past conduct and antecedent furnish materials about the future course of probable conduct of the detenue. 22. It was also canvassed on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned order were passed while they were in jail and under that circumstance, there was no occasion for the detaining authority to infer reasonably that the petitioners Act, in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. 23. This question has been debated quite frequently whether a detention order can be made against a person, who is already in custody. On this point there is several authoritative decision of the Supreme Court. 23. This question has been debated quite frequently whether a detention order can be made against a person, who is already in custody. On this point there is several authoritative decision of the Supreme Court. Apparently the order of detention of a person, who is in jail custody on the ground that is necessary to do so with a view to prevent him from acting in any prejudicial manner, appears to be paradoxical. However, this does not mean that in no circumstance detention order can be passed against a person, who is in jail custody. In a suitable case where a person is undergoing imprisonment for a very short time & is likely to be released on bail, the detaining authority may consider the antecedent, history & other circumstances. If the authority is bonafidely satisfied that after release on bail, the petitioner is likely to Act, in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State such an order may be made prior to the release of the person. So, it will largely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The impugned orders of detention, in my view, cannot be held to be illegal, because it was passed by the detaining authority while the detenues were in jail custody. 24. In the case of H. Saha (Supra), it has been clearly held that the power of preventive detention is precautionary power exercisable in reasonable anticipation, which mayor may not relate to an offence. An order of detention may be made before or during prosecution and the pendency of a prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. In the case of Alijan Mwn (Supra), one of the derenues were in jail custody and as such there was absolutely no apprehension of breach of public order at their instance. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court. It has been observed that the detaining authority was alive to the fact that the petitioners were in jail custody on the date of passing of the detention order. The position would have been entirely different if the petitioners were in jail and had to remain in jail for a pretty long time. In such situation, there could be no apprehension of breach of 'public order' from the petitioners. The position would have been entirely different if the petitioners were in jail and had to remain in jail for a pretty long time. In such situation, there could be no apprehension of breach of 'public order' from the petitioners. But the detaining authority was satisfied that if the petitioners were enlarged on bail, of which there was every likelihood, it was necessary to prevent them from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public Order. 25. So, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned above, is aptly applicable to the facts of these cases. The detaining authority was aware of the fact that the petitioners were in jail custody and were likely to be released on bail. But the detaining authority was satisfied that the petitioners, if released on bail, would indulge in activities prejudicial to the security of the State and so their detention was considered necessary. This argument, therefore also fails. In the result, I find no merit in these writ applications and they are, accordingly dismissed. Applications dismissed.