JUDGMENT Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J. 1. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, Shri Bhagwandas Haralalka a trustee of Adarsh Hindi High School Trust has, inter alia, asked for setting aside the decision of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter referred to as the Board), contained in the Memorandum No. 5755/G dated 14.8.1984 rejecting the claim of the Adarsh Hindi High School Trust for the Special Constitution for the Managing Committee of Adarsh Hindi High School and Adarsh Hindi Girls' High School situated at No.4 Rammoy Road, Calcutta-700025. The petitioners have also asked for a direction upon the respondents to grant a special Constitution for the Managing Committee of the said two schools. The facts which are appearing from the petition and the affidavit-in-reply are briefly stated as hereafter. 2. One Ramrikdas Haralalka, a philanthropist Hindi speaking person along with other Hindi speaking inhabitants in South Calcutta established a school named Ramrikdas Haralalka School. The necessary land and building had been donated by Ramrikdas Haralalka for the purpose of establishing the said school. All the members of the Managing Committee of the said school were Hindi speaking people. The said two schools had two sections-one Bengali medium section and the other a Hindi speaking section. The said School was recognized by the Calcutta University in or about the year 1940. 3. In or about the year 1939, the Calcutta University directed that the Hindi section should be seperated and run as an independent school. At that point of time there was no Hindi medium school in South Calcutta. According to the said regulation of the University, the Hindi medium section was separated and it the recognition as a different independent school in the name of Anglo-India High School. The said Anglo-India High School was established by the people belonging to the Hindi speaking community. All the members of the Managing Committee were Hindi speaking. Almost all the teachers were Hindi speaking and the students were also Hindi speaking. 4. Subsequently in 1947, after independence, the name of the school was changed from Anglo-India High School to Adarsh Hindi High School. 5. All the members of the Managing Committee were Hindi speaking. Almost all the teachers were Hindi speaking and the students were also Hindi speaking. 4. Subsequently in 1947, after independence, the name of the school was changed from Anglo-India High School to Adarsh Hindi High School. 5. In or about 1951, the founders, donors, and the guardians of the students, all belonging to the Hindi speaking people in Calcutta, held general meeting and resolved to form a trust in which the properties and assets of the school would vest and which would control the affairs of the school and develop the school further. 6. By a Registered Deed dated 6.4.1951, a trust was formed. All the Trustees were and still belong to the Hindi speaking community in Calcutta. The said trust, in fact, raised donations from the Hindi speaking public and the guardians of the students reading in the school, created a fund, purchased a three-storeyed building and land (about 1 Bigha, 3 Khattahs, 4 Chittacks, 21 squire fit) at premises No.4 Rammoy Road, at Bhowanipore, at a consideration of Rs. 1,45,000/- on 15.6.1953. The said trust constructed school building on the said land and the school was being run in the said building. 7. The case of the writ petitioner is that the said Adarsh Hindi High School was set up by Hindi speaking people of Calcutta for the benefit of Hindi speaking community. The object of the said trust is to impart education in Hindi and in all the schools of the said trust, the medium of instruction is Hindi and further all trustees of the said Trust are Hindi speaking people. All the present seven Trustees are Hindi speaking. 8. It is claimed that the Hindi speaking people constitute a linguistic minority in the State of West Bengal and are accordingly entitled to protection under Article 30 of the Constitution and as such the said Trust has the right to establish and administer educational institutions based on Hindi language and the Trust is entitled to the benefit of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. 9. 9. It is also claimed that 12 (twelve) branches of the Adarsh Hindi High School were founded by the Trust for the benefit of linguistic minority, and as such the Board has granted and approved special Constitution in respect of the 3 (three) schools being Arya Vidya Mandir, National High School and National High School for Girls. It is also claimed that the board has also granted the special Constitution to other two branches, namely Adarsh Hindi High School, Tollygunge Branch, and Adarsh Hindi High School, Kidderpore Branch. In respect of the two schools, that is to say, Adarsh Hindi High School for Boys' and Girls' situated at No.4 Rammoy Road, the Board approved the special Constitution on 29.12.1977, 19.4.1978 and 13.11.1978. It is alleged that the Board granted special Constitution to the said two Adarsh Hindi High School for Boys' and Girls' after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances as they stood in respect of the aforesaid two schools. 10. In F.M.A.T. No. 866 of 1984 an order was passed by the Division Bench, and pursuant to the said order the petitioner made an application before the Board praying for special Constitution showing there in how the Managing Committee would be constituted. 11. By an Order No. 5755/G dated 14.8.1984 the Board rejected the prayer for special Constitution in respect of the said two schools. The Board, inter alia, passed the following order:- "On careful consideration of the entire situation as stated above and the representations submitted by the secretary of the trust along with enclosures thereto received by the Board on 13.8.1984. By an Order No. 5755/G dated 14.8.1984 the Board rejected the prayer for special Constitution in respect of the said two schools. The Board, inter alia, passed the following order:- "On careful consideration of the entire situation as stated above and the representations submitted by the secretary of the trust along with enclosures thereto received by the Board on 13.8.1984. I, president, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education, am satisfied that the Trust failed to establish that the said two schools were founded by it or it had any substantial contribution towards development of the 2 schools and in exercise of the emergency power vested in it under section 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963, as amended from time to time, reject the claim of the Adarsh Hindi High School Trust for the special constitution for the Managing Committee of Adarsh Hindi High School and Adarsh Hindi Girls' High School, both at 4, Rammoy Road, Calcutta-25, and direct that the Managing Committee for both the said Schools be separately reconstituted in accordance with the Rules for Management of Non-Government Recognized Institutions (Aided and Un-aided), 1969, as amended, within the period fixed by the Hon'ble Court." 12. This order has been challenged in this proceeding. 13. At the hearing it is contended that the said schools were established by the Hindi speaking community and as such the said schools are entitled to the protection of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. It is also submitted that the schools should be deemed to have been established when it was started as an independent school and was recognized by the Calcutta University as a Hindi Medium School. It is further contended that there can be no manner of doubt that the school was established by a person or group of persons belonging to the Hindi community in Calcutta which is indisputably a minority in West Bengal. The donations were given by the Hindi speaking community. It is also contended that the school was established at a point of time when there was no Hindi Medium School in the Bhowanipore area. It is submitted that apart from the fact of establishing by the linguistic minority, the following features are also present in the instant case. 14. The donations were given by the Hindi speaking community. It is also contended that the school was established at a point of time when there was no Hindi Medium School in the Bhowanipore area. It is submitted that apart from the fact of establishing by the linguistic minority, the following features are also present in the instant case. 14. Firstly, all teachers are Hindi speaking, secondly, the medium of instruction is Hindi, thirdly, the students come from families who are Hindi speaking, fourthly, the Trustees are all Hindi speaking people and lastly, the members of the Managing Committee nominated by the Trust, were Hindi speaking people. 15. It is contended that all the ingredients of a linguistic minority school are satisfied in this particular case. It is also contended that apart from the fact that the school was the choice of the linguistic minority, it is a school established for the promotion of language and culture of a particular linguistic minority, namely Hindi speaking community in West Bengal, and accordingly the said linguistic minority has a fundamental right under the Constitution to administer the school in the manner it likes. 16. No affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the State of West Bengal in the present proceeding an affidavit-in-opposition has been filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7 being the West Bengal Board of Secondary education and the president and secretary of the said Board respectively. 17. It has been alleged by the Board in their affidavit that there is nothing to indicate that Hindi speaking people of Calcutta had anything to do with the establishment of the said school. 18. This objection however, has no merits. The facts and circumstances as mentioned hereinabove would clearly demonstrate that the school was established by person or persons belonging to the linguistic minority. It has not been disputed that the school was originally established by Ramrikdas Haralalka, father of the petitioner, who admittedly was a Hindi speaking person. 19. It is now well-settled that the educational institution may be established by a single philanthropic person belonging to the minority community or a group of persons belonging to the minority community, or the community at large. In State of Kerala vs. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, AIR 1970 SC 2079 , Supreme Court observed thus:- "Article 30 (1) has been construed before by this Court. In State of Kerala vs. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, AIR 1970 SC 2079 , Supreme Court observed thus:- "Article 30 (1) has been construed before by this Court. Without referring to those cases, it is sufficient to say that the clause contemplates two rights which are separated in point of time. The first right is the initial right to establish institutions of the minority's choice. Establishment here means the bringing into being of an institution and it must be by a minority community. It matters not if a single pilanthropic individual with his own means founds the institution or the community at large contributes the funds. The position in law is the same and the intention in either cases must be to found as institution for the benefit of a minority community by a member of that community. It is equally irrelevant that in addition to the minority community others from other minority communities or even from the majority community can take advantage of these institutions. Such other communities bring in income and they do not have to be turned away to enjoy the protection." 20. Whether the school was initially established by a group of people belonging to the linguistic minority is not of much relevance in view of the subsequent events which would show that the school is for the linguistic minority. It has not been disputed that the school is a Hindi medium school and is for the promotion of language and culture of the particular linguistic minority, that is the Hindi speaking community. 21. It is also contended by the Board in the affidavit-in-opposition that the object of the Trust is to impart education. Therefore, it cannot get the protection of Article 30. The school may be of the choice of the minority. The minority community has the choice to establish institution to impart education. It is not necessary that to avail of the protection of Article 30 of the Constitution, it should be for protection of the particular language. An educational institution established by a linguistic minority irrespective of its purpose is entitled to the protection under Article 30 of the Constitution of India. 22. The preamble to the Constitution of India declared that there would be liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, and equality of status and opportunity. An educational institution established by a linguistic minority irrespective of its purpose is entitled to the protection under Article 30 of the Constitution of India. 22. The preamble to the Constitution of India declared that there would be liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, and equality of status and opportunity. India being a multilingual State with diverse culture, traditions, customs and usages, the protection was necessary to allow any misapprehension or fear of the linguistic minority in the matter of preservation of its language and culture. By the incorporation of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution, cultural and educational rights of the minorities religious and linguistic, have been guaranteed. Article 29 is general in terms and it protects the rights of cultural minorities. The said general rights include the right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its choice. Article 30 guarantees a particular right of the minorities based on the religion or language to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The right concerned by Article 30 a right independent of Article 29 and the right concerned by Article 30 extends to all kinds of educational institutions including secular educational institutions if the same are established and being administered by a minority-religious or linguistic. Such educational institutions need not be for the preservation of its language, script or culture. 23. It will be useful to refer at this stage to the judgment of the Supreme Court In Re: Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1957 SC 956, where the Supreme Court held thus:- "There is no reason why the benefit of Article 30(1) should be limited only to educational institution established after the commencement of the Constitution. The language employed in Article 30(1) is wide enough to cover both the Pre-Constitution and Post-Constitution institutions. It must not be overlooked that Article 30(1) gives the minorities 2 rights, namely (a) to establish and (b) to administer educational institutions of their choice. The real import of Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) seems to us to be that they clearly contemplate a minority institution with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted to it. It must not be overlooked that Article 30(1) gives the minorities 2 rights, namely (a) to establish and (b) to administer educational institutions of their choice. The real import of Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) seems to us to be that they clearly contemplate a minority institution with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted to it. By admitting a non-member into it the minority institution does not shed its character and cease to be a minority institution in which the object of conservation of the distinct language, script and culture of a minority may be better served by propagating the same amongst non-members of the particular minority community." 24. The first point to note is that the Article 30(1) gives certain rights not only to religious minorities but also to linguistic minorities. In the next place, the right conferred on such minorities is to establish educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities is to establish educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion as hold establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their language only. What the article says and means is that the religious and the linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught in such educational institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for higher university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such intellectual attainments as will make them fit for entering the public services, educati0nal institutions of their choice will necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education also. In other words, the article leaves to their choice to establish such educational institutions as will serve both purposes, namely, the purpose of conserving their religion, language or culture and also the purpose of giving a thorough good general education to their children. The next thing to note is that the article, in terms, gives all minorities, whether based on religion or language, two rights, namely the right to establish and the right to administer educational institutions of their choice. The key to the understanding of the true meaning and implication of the article under consideration are the words of their choice. The next thing to note is that the article, in terms, gives all minorities, whether based on religion or language, two rights, namely the right to establish and the right to administer educational institutions of their choice. The key to the understanding of the true meaning and implication of the article under consideration are the words of their choice. It is said that the dominant word is choice and the content of that article is as wide as the choice of the particular minority community may make it. The ambit of the rights conferred by Article 30(1) has, therefore, to be determined on a consideration of the matter from the points of view of the educational institutions themselves. The educational institutions established or administered by the minorities or to be so established or administered by them in exercise of the rights conferred by that Article may be classified into three categories, namely (1) those which do not seek either aid or recognition from the State, (2) those which want aid, and (3) those which want only recognition but not aid. 25. In the case of Rev. Father W. Proost and other vs. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1969 SC 465 , the Supreme Court considered the scope of protection under Articles 29 and 30(1) of the Constitution. There the Supreme Court held as follows:- "In our opinion the width of Article 30(1) cannot be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Article 29(1) is based. The latter article is a general protection which is given to minorities to conserve their language, script or culture. The former is a special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. This choice is not limited to institution seeking to conserve language, script or culture and the choice is not taken away if the minority community having established an educational institution of its choice also admits members of other communities. That is a circumstance. irrelevant for the application of Article 30(1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied. The two articles create two separate rights, although it is possible that they may meet in a given case. In our judgment the language of Article 30(1) is wide and must receive full meaning. We are dealing with protection of minorities and attempts to whittle down protection cannot be allowed. The two articles create two separate rights, although it is possible that they may meet in a given case. In our judgment the language of Article 30(1) is wide and must receive full meaning. We are dealing with protection of minorities and attempts to whittle down protection cannot be allowed. We need enlarge the protection but we may not reduce a protection naturally flowing from the words. Here the protection clearly flows from the words and there is nothing on the basis of which aid can be sought from Article 29(1)." 26. In the case of The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and another vs. State of Gujarat and another, AIR 1974 SC 1989. Supreme Court observed thus:- "The real reason embodied in Article 30(1) of the Constitution is the conscience of the nation that the minorities, religious as well as linguistic, are not prohibited from establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice for the/purpose of giving their children the best general education to make them complete men and women of the country. The minorities are given this protection under Article 30 in order to preserve and strengthen the integrity and unity of the country. The sphere of general secular education is intended to develop the commonness of boys and girls of our country. This is in the true spirit of liberty, equality and praternity through the medium of education. If religious or linguistic minorities are not given protection under Article 30 to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, they will feel isolated and separate. General secular education will open doors or perception and act as the natural light of mind for our country men to live in the whole." 27. The Supreme Court also observed:- "Inspite of the consistent and categorical decisions which have held in valid certain provisions of the University Acts of some of the States as interfering with the fundamental rights of management of minority institutions inherent in the right to establish educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1), the State of Gujarat has incorporate similar analogous provisions to those that have been declared invalid by this Court. No doubt education is a State Subject, but in the exercise of that right any transgression of the fundamental right guaranteed to the minorities will have its impact beyond the borders of that State and the minorities in the rest of the country will feel apprehensive of their right being invaded in a similar manner by other states. A kind of instability in the body politic will be created by action of a State which will be construed as a deliberate attempt to transgress the rights of the minorities where similar earlier attempts were successfully challenged and the offending provisions held invalid." 28. In the case of S.P. Mittal vs. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1 , the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "In order to claim the benefit of Article 30(1) the community must show – (a) That it is a religious or linguistic minority. (b) That the institution was established by it. Without satisfying these two conditions it cannot claim the guaranteed rights to administer it. On an analysis of the two articles, Article 29 and Article 30 and the three cases referred to above it is evident that the impugned Act does not seek to curtail the right of any section of citizens to conserve its own language script or culture conferred by Article 29. The benefit of Article 30(1) can be claimed by the community only on proving that it is a religious or linguistic minority and that the institution was established by it. In the view that we have taken that Auroville or the society is not a religious denomination, Articles 29 and 30 would not be attracted and, therefore, the impugned Act cannot be held to be violative of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution." 29. From, the decisions referred to above, it is clear that to claim the benefit of Article 30(1), only two ingredients are to be satisfied. The institution has been established by a person or group of persons and that the person or group of persons establishing the institution must belong to the religious or linguistic minority. Once it is proved as a matter of fact that the person belonging to religious or linguistic minority bas established the educational institution, the minority has a fundamental right to administer the said educational institution according to their own choice. Once it is proved as a matter of fact that the person belonging to religious or linguistic minority bas established the educational institution, the minority has a fundamental right to administer the said educational institution according to their own choice. It cannot be disputed that in this case the School was established by persons belonging to linguistic minority and the said institution is also run by linguistic minority. 30. The best for determination whether the funders belonged to the minority community has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra). There the Supreme Court held that the question of minority must be determined by reference to the entire population of the particular State. In D.A.V. College vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 1937, the Supreme Court held that the religious or linguistic minorities are to be determined only in relation to the particular legislation which is sought to be impugned, namely that it is the State Legislature, these minorities have to be determined in relation to the population of the State. A linguistic minority for the purpose of Article 30(1) is one which must atleast have a separate spoken language. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that in West Bengal, Hindi speaking people constitute a linguistic minority. 31. It is also contended that at no point of time the School claimed protection of Articles 29 and 30 and the Managing Committee was formed under the special Constitution granted by the Board. This contention has no substance. The fundamental right is not lost and there cannot be estoppel against the Constitutional rights. If the linguistic minority has the right to administer its educational institution they have the freedom of choice and such freedom of choice could be altered according to the exigencies of the circumstances. It is immaterial whether the minority community get a special Constitution approved by the Board for the School. If it is a linguistic minority school, it is entitled to the benefit of protection under Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. Thus, because the special Constitution was approved, the fundamental right of the linguistic minority under the Articles 29 and 30 cannot be lost. In Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra) the Supreme Court observed that there could be no lost of fundamental rights merely on the ground of non-exercise of it. There cannot be any estoppel against the Constitution. Thus, because the special Constitution was approved, the fundamental right of the linguistic minority under the Articles 29 and 30 cannot be lost. In Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra) the Supreme Court observed that there could be no lost of fundamental rights merely on the ground of non-exercise of it. There cannot be any estoppel against the Constitution. 32. An objection has also been raised by the Board that the State Government has not declared that the School was established by the minority community for the benefit of the minority community. This objection has no substance. The fundamental right of the minority community does not depend upon the declaration to be made by the State that the School was established by a person or persons belonging to the minority community, religious or linguistic. On the facts as brought on record, I am unable to hold that the School was not established by a person or persons belonging to the linguistic minority. Thus the school is entitled to the protection of Article 30 irrespective of the fact whether the State Government has made any declaration to that effect or not. A right under Articles 29 and 30 cannot depend on the declaration to be made by the State Government. 33. It is true that the rights to administer the linguistic minority school by the minority group is not an absolute right. The Supreme Court in Re: Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra) has held as follows:- "We are thus faced with a problem of considerable complexity apparently difficult of solution. There is, on the one hand the minority rights under Article 30(1) to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice and the duty of the Government to promote education, there is, on the other side the obligation of the State under Article 45 to endeavour to introduce free and compulsory education. We have to reconcile between these two conflicting interests and to give effect to both if that is possible and bring about a synthesis between the two. The directive principles cannot ignore of override the fundamental rights but must, as we have said, sub-serve the fundamental rights, we have already observed Article 30(1) gives two rights to the minorities, (1) to establish and (2) to administer, educational institutions of their choice. The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The directive principles cannot ignore of override the fundamental rights but must, as we have said, sub-serve the fundamental rights, we have already observed Article 30(1) gives two rights to the minorities, (1) to establish and (2) to administer, educational institutions of their choice. The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or reconginition for an educational institution run by them in unheal the surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe the institutions to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided. Learned Attorney General concedes that reasonable regulations may certainly be imposed by the State as a condition for aid or even for recognition." 34. But the Government cannot in the guise of regulation to ensure the excellence of the institution interfere with the internal administration of the school and such conditions for aid or recognition cannot be violative of the guarantee contained in Articles 13, 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India. State cannot be allowed to compel the minority educational institutions to surrender their fundamental right of management by threatening to stop giving aids or grants or recognition. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the extent of the right of the religious and linguistic minorities to administer their educational institutions. In The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and another vs. State of Gujarat and another (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the right to administer consists of four principal matters:- 1. The right to choose its Managing or Governing Body. 2. The right to choose its teachers. 3. The right to admit students of their choice subject to reasonable regulations about academic qualification. 4. The right to use its property and assets for the benefit of its own institution. 35. The right to choose its Managing or Governing Body. 2. The right to choose its teachers. 3. The right to admit students of their choice subject to reasonable regulations about academic qualification. 4. The right to use its property and assets for the benefit of its own institution. 35. In that case, the Supreme Court also considered one of the provisions contained in the impugned Act therein which laid Gown that every college shall be under the management of a Governing Body which shall include amongst its members a representative of the University nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, and representatives of teachers, non-teaching staff and students of the college. These provisions were challenged on the grounds that these amount to invasion of the fundamental rights of the administration. The contention was that the Governing Body of the college is part of its administration and, therefore, that administration should not be touched. There, the Supreme Court, dealing with the said contention, held thus:- "The right to administer is the right to conduct and manage the affairs of the institution. This right is exercised through a body of persons in whom the founders of the institution have faith an confidence and who have full autonomy in that sphere. The right to administer is subject to permissible regulatory measures. Permissible regulatory measures are those which do not restrict the right of administration but facilities it and ensure better and more effective exercise of the right for the benefit of the institution and through the instrumentality of the management of the educational institutions and without displacing the management. If the administration has to be improved it should be done through the agency or instrumentality of the existing management and not by displacing it. Restrictions on the right of administration imposed in the interest of the general public alone and not in the interests of and for the benefit of minority educational institutions concerned will affect the autonomy in administration." In the said judgment, the Supreme Court has also held that:- "Autonomy in administration means right to administer effectively and to manage and conduct the affairs of the institutions. The distinction is between a restriction on the right of administration and a regulation prescribing the manner of administration. The right of administration is day to day administration. The choice in the personal of management is a part of the administration. The distinction is between a restriction on the right of administration and a regulation prescribing the manner of administration. The right of administration is day to day administration. The choice in the personal of management is a part of the administration. The university will always have a right to see that there is no mal-administration. The university will take steps to cure the same. There may be control and check on administration in order to find out whether the minority institutions are engaged in activities which are not conductive to the interest of the minority or to the requirements of the teachers and the students." 36. The Supreme Court also considered in the case of State of Kerala vs. Very Rev. Mother Provincial, AIR 1970 SC 2079 , the question of the rights relating to the administration of the minority institutions and observed as follows:- "Administration means management of the affairs of the institution. This management must be free of control so that the founders of their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit, and in accordance with their ideas of the how interests of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best serve. No part of this management can be taken away and vested in another body without an encreachment upon the guaranteed right." 37. In that case, the Supreme Court also held that the body in charge of the administration or management of the school must be answerable to the founders in the matter of administration. The Supreme Court also held that it is the Governing Body which will have the right to take a disciplinary action against the staff and provisions which enable political parties to come into the picture of the administration of minority institutions which might not like the interference would be offending the fundamental rights guaranteed to the minorities. From the decisions referred to above, it is clear that the right to choose the Managing Committee or the Governing Body is an essential right of administration guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution any interference with the said right is violative of Article 30. 38. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also contended that the order passed on 14.8.1984 is a nullity by reason of the fact that the Board did not give any hearing to the trustees. 38. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has also contended that the order passed on 14.8.1984 is a nullity by reason of the fact that the Board did not give any hearing to the trustees. The right of hearing is fundamental to just decision. It is accordingly contended that the right having been denied, the order cannot be sustained, in support of this contention, reliance has been placed on several decisions of the Supreme Court. 39. In the case of S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan and others, AIR 1981 SC 136 , the Supreme Court held that the requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of the proposed action. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has been furnished the information on which action is based if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purposes. The person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. 40. In the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 , the Supreme Court held that even where an industrial undertaking is taken over without investigation, a hearing at pre-decisional stage has to be given. It has been reiterated by the Supreme Court that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise. 41. It is apparent from the impugned order that the order was passed without affording reasonable opportunities to the Trustees. It may be that the Board proceeded at hot, haste, in view of the order passed by the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court, it is recorded in the said order as follows:- "As it appears that the Supreme Court was pleased to direct that the election be held by 30.9.1984, and the Division Bench directed the Board to dispose of the representation for the special Constitution for both the Schools within 7 days, the matter should no doubt be taken up as an emergency. In the emergent circumstances as stated above. In the emergent circumstances as stated above. I, President was Bengal Board of Secondary Education, in exercise of the emergency power under Section 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963, as amended, considered the matter of the sanction of the Special Constitution for both the Schools." "The Board sent a notice fixing 2.7.1981 as the date for inspection by its own officers in the matter of the special Constitution for the schools but it was stalled by the Trust so as to prevent the Board from taking any action in accordance with law." "On careful consideration of the entire situation as stated above and the representation submitted by the Secretary of the Trust along with the enclosures thereto received by the Board of 13.8.1984. I, President, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education, am satisfied that the Trust failed to establish that the said two schools were founded by it or it had any substantial contribution towards development of the Schools." 42. It is thus manifest that in this case, the Board did not give reasonable opportunity of being heard to the Trust, nor did the Board consider all the relevant factors in deciding whether the Special Constitution should be granted to the Schools or not. On this ground also, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 43. That apart, since the schools are run by linguistic minority, that can run their schools without any interference from the Board. The Board cannot dictate how the Managing Committee of the schools should be constituted, and in any event, arbitrary and unreasonable refusal to grant special Constitution to a minority institution would be unconstitutional. 44. The Supreme Court in the case of Managing Board of the Mills Tamil Mission vs. State of Bihar and others, 1984 (4) SCC 500 , held that refusal to give aid or affiliation by the statutory authorities without just and sufficient grounds amounts to violation of Article 30. If the Government withholds giving aid or a University refuses to grant affiliation, the direct consequence would be to destroy the very existence of the institution itself. It is for this purpose Article 30 was inserted in the Constitution. If the Government withholds giving aid or a University refuses to grant affiliation, the direct consequence would be to destroy the very existence of the institution itself. It is for this purpose Article 30 was inserted in the Constitution. The Supreme Court also held in the case of All Saints High School vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1980 (2) SCC 478 , that if the provisions of any Act or Rules interferes with the right of the minority to administer the affairs of their minority-educational institutions such provisions would offend Article 30(1). 45. The impugned Order dated 14.8.1984, suffers from other infirmities. It appears from the said impugned order dated 14.8.1984 that the President passed the said order relying upon the alleged complaints made by the teachers and the guardians in the year 1979-80 without even specifying the date of the alleged complaints. The President did not apply his mind, and passed an order mechanically. It was recorded in the said order that the Board wanted to inspect the schools by its own officers in the year 1980-81 on the basis of certain alleged complaints but the said inspection was not at all made by the Board. There was, therefore, no material before the Board to hold that the alleged complaints, if any, made by the teachers and the guardians in respect of the special Constitution had any substance or not. The manner in which the order was passed on 14.8.1984 without taking into account relevant considerations would clearly manifest how the emergency power was exercised in a most mechanically and arbitrary manner. It appears as if the President was determined to reject the claim of the school for the special Constitution. As a matter of fact, the allegations which had been made against the school had not been disclosed nor the Trustees were given any opportunity to make any representation against such complaints. 46. There is another aspect of the matter. It appears as if the President was determined to reject the claim of the school for the special Constitution. As a matter of fact, the allegations which had been made against the school had not been disclosed nor the Trustees were given any opportunity to make any representation against such complaints. 46. There is another aspect of the matter. In C.C. No. 7407 (W) of 1981 (Bhagwandas Haralalka & other), B.C. Roy, J. in his judgment and order dated 8.7.1981, held as follows:- "I also fail to understand how the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education who after considering all the aspects of the matter, the trust deed and everything, issued a letter approving special Constitution of the Managing Committee of this very school and directed the authorities to reconstitute the Managing Committee as per special Constitution granted by its letter dated 29.12.1977 and also by another letter dated 13.11.1978 in regard to the boys and girls school that impelled then to make an enquiry because on the ground that some teachers have made allegation. It fails to the understanding of the Court what a teacher has got to do whether and in what manner a school is entitled to get special Constitution or not. Whether a school is entitled to get special Constitution of its Managing Committee, it is in accordance with the rules framed under the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963. No teacher nor any guardian has any say in the matter. Therefore, to this Court the letter that has been issued by the Board is wholly without substance and it appears, has been made purposefully to infructify or nullify the direction made by this Court in clear terms on 2.6.1981." 47. Thus, even if there are complaints made by the teachers and the guardians against the special Constitution such complaints cannot be taken into consideration at all by the Board. The teachers or the guardians have no locus standi to object to the grant of special Constitution. The purpose behind such objection is that if the special Constitution is granted or the schools are treated to be minority institutions, in that event the disciplinary power will vest with the Managing Committee and the Board cannot interfere in such a case. The teachers or the guardians have no locus standi to object to the grant of special Constitution. The purpose behind such objection is that if the special Constitution is granted or the schools are treated to be minority institutions, in that event the disciplinary power will vest with the Managing Committee and the Board cannot interfere in such a case. Therefore, assuming that a teacher may have in a given case genuine grievance against the management, but that cannot be a ground for rejecting the special Constitution when such schools belong to the linguistic minority. It has to be mentioned that although no appeal was preferred against the said judgment and order dated 8.7.1981 of B.C. Ray, J. the President of the Board in passing the impugned order, completely ignored the said judgment, the said judgment is binding upon the Board. The Board cannot as rightly observed by B.C. Ray, J. changes their mind in the matter of granting special Constitution. Once the special Constitution is granted to a school, the Special Constitution cannot be valid unless it can be shown that the schools do not belong to the linguistic minority. 48. As indicated earlier, the President in passing the said order proceeded in hot haste by invoking the emergency power. The President can exercise the power under section 26(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963, if there is an emergency. The President in exercising his emergency power cannot act contrary to any decision of the Board and he has to submit report to the Board after the action is taken. The President must also state the reasons in his report as to why he has exercised the powers of the Board under section 28(2) of the said Act. From the impugned order it does not appear that the condition prescribed for exercise of power under section 28(2) of the Act has been satisfied, nor there are materials to show that the conditions subsequent have been fulfilled The President by rejecting the application for special Constitution has acted contrary to the previous decision of the Board dated 29.12.1977 and 13.11.1978 where the Board granted special Constitution in respect of the said schools. 49. The aforesaid facts and circumstances amply demonstrate that the impugned order is not sustainable either in law or on facts and it deserves to be set aside and quashed. 50. 49. The aforesaid facts and circumstances amply demonstrate that the impugned order is not sustainable either in law or on facts and it deserves to be set aside and quashed. 50. Before I part with this case, I would like to dispose of a few side contentions raised by the added respondent who is stated to be the founder Head Master of the school. The main contention raised is that the institution seeks to serve the language and script of the minority community. It is being done by the State through the Cinema houses running Hindi films, major part of the T.V. programmes being in Hindi, and even a small child of this area is acquainted with Hindi. Thus the purpose of the Constitutional protection is fulfilled by the State itself for which no Trust is necessary. This contention has no substance at all. The State is bound to protect the fundamental rights granted to the minority community. Hindi is the lingua franca of India and therefore the State has the obligation to promote Hindi in non-Hindi speaking area but that does not mean that no other institution should be established for the purpose of development of Hindi in non-Hindi speaking areas. If that be so, the Articles 29 and 30 would have no meaning at all and would be completely otiose. It is the Trustees who manage the Trust. The Trustee are all Hindi speaking and the facts and circumstances of these two Schools have been indicated earlier which would amply demonstrate that this contention is absolutely without any basis. 51. The other contention raised is that the school is not entitled to get any special Constitution inasmuch as they have accepted the election conducted by the Administrator in terms of the order of B.C. Ray, J. in C.O. No. 8407 (W) of 1981. Simply because the administrator was appointed for conducting the election cannot take away He right of the person who are entitled to protection of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. If there is any allegation against the Trust, any beneficiary may institute appropriate proceedings in the competent court but that is not a ground for interfering with the internal administration of a school run by a linguistic minority. 52. It is also very unfortunate that an allegation has been made against late Sri S.K. Roy Chowdhury who was appointed Chairman by the Division Bench. 52. It is also very unfortunate that an allegation has been made against late Sri S.K. Roy Chowdhury who was appointed Chairman by the Division Bench. There is no iota of evidence and the allegation has been made only to cause certain prejudice in the mind of the Court. It is also surprising that the person stated to be the Head Master is disputing that the school is not entitled to the special Constitution or the school is not entitled to protection under Article 30 of the Constitution. His conduct amply demonstrates that he is set up by interested persons to enable the Board to interfere with the internal administration which they otherwise are not entitled to do. 53. For the aforesaid reasons, the application succeeds. The Rule is made absolute. Let appropriate write be issued. 54. As I have held that the schools are run by a linguistic minority the Trust will be entitled to run the school on the basis of their own constitution so long as the special Constitution is not granted to them by the Board. 55. There will be no order as to costs excepting that the added respondent shall pay the costs in view of the baseless allegations made against the late Sri S.M. Roy Chowdhury. Such cost is assessed at to G.M.S. 56. In view of the above all actions taken pursuant to the order passed by the President of the Board on 14.8.1984 shall not be given effect to. 57. Chairman of the special Committee is directed to hand over the charge to the Trust forthwith. Let a plain copy of this judgment countersigned by an officer of this court be handed over to the learned advocate for the petitioner upon the undertaking to apply for a certified copy and upon the undertakings to put in required folios and stamps.