Judgment ASHWNI KUMAR SINHA, J. 1. There three second appeals involve common question of law and hence have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Whether suits challenging the donation of land (Bhoodan) and consequently asking for declaration of title and recovery of possession are governed by section 17(4) of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), i.e., by, special law of Limitation or by general law of limitation is the solitary significant question of law that arises for our consideration. 3. A few facts with regard to each of the appeals need to be sited. (A) S.A. No. 27 of 1974. This appeal is by the plaintiff against the judgment of affirmance. Plaintiffs-appellant filed the suit (T.S. No. 185, of 1960) for declaration of title and confirmation of possession in respect of 67 decimals of land in plot Nos. 241 and 243 of village Marhaura P.S. Dumraon, in the district of Shahabad fully described in Schedule 'Kha' of the plaint), omitting other details. In-short the plaintiff's case was that the disputed plots fell to the shale of the plaintiff in a partition in his family between the plaintiff’s father and his sons and grand-sons on 28.4.1956 and, according to the plaintiff he came in cultivating possession of the land. The cause of action, according to the plaintiff, was a notice from the Land Revenue Deputy Collector to show cause as to why he shall not be ejected from the disputed land. The plaintiff' case was that he (the plaintiff) filed objection on having received notice (Ext. 6) to show cause but the Land Revenue Deputy Collector expressed his inability, which necessitated the tiling of the suit. The plaintiff’s further case was that he has no knowledge about the confirmation of the gift in favour of the Bhoodan committee or any donation of the land. The plaintiff made members of the Bhoodan Yagna Committee and members and the Chairman of the Bhoodan Committee were the principal defendants in the suit. The suit was contested by the Bhoodan Yagna Committee the State of Bihar as well as the settles from the Bhoodsn Yagna Committee. The settlees adopted the written statement filed by He Bhoodan Yagna Committee, the main contesting defendant. The suit was contested by the Bhoodan Yagna Committee the State of Bihar as well as the settles from the Bhoodsn Yagna Committee. The settlees adopted the written statement filed by He Bhoodan Yagna Committee, the main contesting defendant. The case let up by the plaintiff was denied by the Bhoodan Yagna Committee and other defendants and the main defence was that in the month of September. 1958, Acharya Vinoba Bhave came to the village Dumraon to take the gifts or land from the different persons and Smt. Vidyavati Devi donated the disputed and in favour or Acharya Binoba Bhave and, on 25.9.1952, executed a Danpatra (Ext. A) which after general promulgation, was confirmed by the D.C.L.R. in case No.111/ 57, 58, under section 11 of the Act, without any objection on 8-7-1957. The lands were settled with Raghupat Rai on 10.2.1956 who was granted Praman Patra and his name was mutated before the Anchal Adhikari after the objection stale here general notice on 13.9.1959. as no objection was raised. It is pertinent to that defendants 4 to 9 are heirs and legal representative of the aforesaid Raghupat Rai (the settlee). Further defence was that the settlee came in possession of the disputed lands but the plaintiff dispossessed him, which necessitated the filing of a petition by the settlee to the L. R. D. C. for taking action under section 22 of the Act. The same was registered, dates were fixed but, in the meantime, the plaintiff filed the present suit. Further defence was that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the proceeding taken under the Act, and also of the donation made to Acharya Vinoba Bhave. The State or Bihar also filed a separate written statement supporting the case of Bhoodan Yagna committee though it stated that it was not a necessary party. The trial court framed a number of issue and held that the plaintiff had subsisting title yet non-suited the plaintiff holding that the suit was barred by limitation under the provisions of section 17(4) of the Act, It further held that the plaintiff had attempted to make out a case that he had no knowledge of the proceedings under Bhoodan Yagna Act, or the mutation order only to save and protect his suit from limitation, although be had full knowledge. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree or the trial court and the only point argued by the plaintiff before the court of appeal below was that the trial court had gone wrong in applying the provisions of section 17(4) of the Act. As already just stated above other findings given by the trial court were in favour of plaintiff yet the defendant did not file any cross-objection. The court of appeal below held that the provisions or section 17(4) or the Act, were fully applicable in the instant case and the suit having been filed beyond about three years of the order confirming Danpatra (Danpatra having been confirmed on 8.7.57) the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. It further negatived the plaintiff’s case that processes in the proceedings under Bhoodan Yagna Act, were suppressed in other words it affirmed the finding of the trial court to the effect that the plaintiff had full knowledge of the proceedings under the Bhoodan Yagna Act, end the mutation order. (B) S. A. No. 320 of 1977. This appeal is by the defendants against the judgment of reversal In this case also the plaintiffs brought a suit (T.S. No. 86 of 1967) for declaration that the proceeding relating reconfirmation of Danpatra be declared void and consequently also prayed for declaration of their title and confirmation of possession alternatively for recovery of possession. In short the plaintiffs, case was the donation made by Kunjo Chaudhary to Bhoodan Yagan Committee and confirmation of Dhanpatra was void and in fact neither Kunjo Choudhary nor Bhoodan Yagana Committee even acquired any right, title or interest over the suit property and that the proceeding relating to the confirmation of Danpatra in respect of the suit property was illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiff there was no promulgation or general notice as prescribed in the Act, and hence the order of the Revenue authorities in the proceeding relating to Confirmation of Danpatra was not binding on them. Bhoodan Yagana Committee contested the suit. omitting other defences, the main defence was that the plaintiffs never filed any objection before the Revenue authorities and the Danpatra having been confirmed on 30-8-1957. the suit filed in 1967 was hopelessly barred limitation as it were the provision of section 17(4) of the Act, which applied in the instant case. Bhoodan Yagana Committee contested the suit. omitting other defences, the main defence was that the plaintiffs never filed any objection before the Revenue authorities and the Danpatra having been confirmed on 30-8-1957. the suit filed in 1967 was hopelessly barred limitation as it were the provision of section 17(4) of the Act, which applied in the instant case. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the suit was barred under the provisions of section 17(4) of the Act. Other findings of the trial court do not need to be stated in view of the solitary point of limitation being involved for our consideration in the instant appeal. The plaintiff’s preferred appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court. The court of appeal below showed the plaintiffs, appeal and held that the suit was not time barred and that the provisions of section 17(4) of the Act, were not applicable to the facts of the present case as according to the court of appeal below, the suit was only for a declaration that the order for confirmation or Danpatra was without jurisdiction and not binding on the plaintiffs and consequently for a declaration of title and recovery of possession. The court of appeal below held that, in the instant case, the period of limitation was 12 year and the suit having been filed well within time was not time barred. Thus, this second appeal by the defendant against a judgment or reversal. (C) S.A. No. 225 of 1978. This second appeal is by defendant-first party against the judgment of affirmance. In this case also the plaintiff's case was that the donation of the lands in question by plaintiff's father (defendant second party), the confirmation of proceeding of the Danpatra were all void and not binding upon the plaintiff as the declaration form was filled up surreptitiously and without and notice or knowledge to any members or the plaintiff's family. The plaintiff's further case was that the processes in the proceeding for confirmation of Danpatra were fraudulently suppressed end hence were not binding upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff further averred that the settlees acquired no title. The plaintiff, on the aforesaid averment, brought a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession over the lands in suit. The plaintiff further averred that the settlees acquired no title. The plaintiff, on the aforesaid averment, brought a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession over the lands in suit. The defendants, according to the plaintiff, threatened to interfere in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff, which necessitated the filing of the suit for the aforesaid reliefs. The defendants 1 and 2 jointly and defendant no. 4 (Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Committee) separately filed the written statement and contested the suit. The defence was common. Again omitting other defence the main defence was that the suit was barred by limitation. both under general and special law of Limitation. According to the defence after the donation of the lands in question by the father of the plaintiffs the lands were distributed to different persons on different dates in the years 1964-65 and the Danpatra was confirmed on 18.5.1967 in Case No.1 of 1966-67 after due service of notice under the Act, upon the donees and also after public notice to the Gram Panchayat. The trial court held that the suit was neither barred by the special law of Limitation nor by the general law of Limitation. The trial court further held that the Danpatra constituted a gift of ancestral immovable properly in favour or a stranger. i,e., Bhoodan Yagna. The gift was invalid in the eyes of Hindu Law. With these findings the trial court decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court the defendants-first party preferred the appeal in the court of appeal below. The court of appeal below dismissed the appeal and held that the suit was neither barred by general law of limitation nor under the provision of section 17 (4) of the Act. order findings of the court of appeal below need not be referred to in view of the solitary point of limitation being involved in these appeals. Thus, this second appeal by the defendants first party. 4. Admittedly, in all the aforesaid three suits (out of which the present appeals arises), the plaintiff's of each suit filed the suit after six months from the order confirming the Danpatras in question. There is no dispute with regard to this fact. 5. The learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant (In S.A. 87/74) and plaintiff (s) (in S.A. no. 4. Admittedly, in all the aforesaid three suits (out of which the present appeals arises), the plaintiff's of each suit filed the suit after six months from the order confirming the Danpatras in question. There is no dispute with regard to this fact. 5. The learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant (In S.A. 87/74) and plaintiff (s) (in S.A. no. 329/77 and S.A. 225/78) has argued that since the plaintiff (s) had basically prayed for declaration of title and confirmation of possession section 17(4) or the Act, was not applicable whereas, the learned counsel for the defendant (respondents in S. A. 17/74 and appellants in the other two appeals), has submitted that the suits, admittedly, having not been brought within six months of the confirmation of the Danpatra in question (by the revenue authority) under section 17(4) or the Act, the same were not saved under the general law of Limitation. 6. The purpose of the rule of limitation is to induce the claimants to be prompt in claiming relief. Law comes to assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleep. In order to avoid the difficulty and error that necessarily result from lapse of time, the presumption of the coincidence of fact and right is rightly of the coincidence of fact and right is rightly accepted as final after a certain number of years, whoever wishes to dispute this presumption must do so within that period otherwise his rights, if any, will be forfeited as a penalty for his neglect, will be forfeited as a penalty for his neglect. The law of limitation is an artificial mode to terminate the justiciable disputes and has to be construed strictly and unless the remedy has been expressly barred, it cannot be applied by implication. The law of limitation, like all others, ought to receive such a constructions the language in its plain meaning imports. Equitable considerations are out of place in construing the provisions of law of limitation and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is only safe guide. 7. It is pertinent to quote section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. 1963. “29 (2). Equitable considerations are out of place in construing the provisions of law of limitation and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is only safe guide. 7. It is pertinent to quote section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. 1963. “29 (2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period where the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, provisions contained in sections 4 to 14 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such are not expressly excluded by such special or local law” 8. It is well settled that the expression “expressly excluded" means an exclusion by expressed word's i.e. by express reference to the section and not exclusion as a result of a logical process of reason. It is also well settled that if a special or a local law is a complete code in the matter of limitation or if the phraseology of the section, enumerated in section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, makes those sections inapplicable to proceeding under a special or local law, the application of those sections to proceedings under the special or local law must be deemed to have been expressly excluded. These are the well settled propositions of law. 9. In the background of the well settled proposition of law, as just referred to above, it has to be seen whether the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954 (Bihar Act, 22 of 1954) (as amended from time to time) is a complete and self- contained code including the matter of limitation and whether it expressly excluded the application of the provisions of Limitation Act. if the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act. 1954 expressly excludes the applicability of the Limitation Act, then the provision of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, shall have effect notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in law of Limitation for the time being inforce. 10. Before pertinent sections or the Bihar Bhoodan Yatna Act. if the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act. 1954 expressly excludes the applicability of the Limitation Act, then the provision of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, shall have effect notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in law of Limitation for the time being inforce. 10. Before pertinent sections or the Bihar Bhoodan Yatna Act. 1954, are referred to in order to answer the cardinal point involved in the instant appeals, it is pertinent to see as to what is the object of the Act. Acharya Vinoba Bhave initiated a movement for voluntary donation of lands by persons who were in possession of large areas with the object to distribute the same among the landless persons. The Bhoodan Yagna was a humanitarian movement and the State Government decided that such gifts of land should be facilitated and there should be proper machinary for the management and distribution of the lands. With a view to achieving that object the Bill, after undergoing procedural wrangles, was made into an Act, known as Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954 (Bihar Act, 22 of 1954). At this stage it is pertinent to look to the relevant sections of the Act, in order to decide the cardinal point involved in these appeals; and, in this connection, the relevant section are sections 10, 11, 13, 17 and 23. Section 10 provides that any person being the owner of any land could donate such land to the Boodan Yagna committee or to Acharya Binoba Bhave by a declaration in writing in that behalf (such a declaration was termed as Boodan Yagna Danpatra), it expressly provided the class of land which could not be donated, as under the proviso to section 10 of the Act. Under section 11 the Danpatra has to be published in the prescribed manner and the Revenue Officer is to invite written objection within a period of 30 days from the date of publication. Under section 11 the Danpatra has to be published in the prescribed manner and the Revenue Officer is to invite written objection within a period of 30 days from the date of publication. If no written objection was filed within the period mentioned under sub-section (1) of section 11, a summary inquiry has to be made by the Revenue officer in the prescribed manner as to the right, title and interest of the donor in such a land and his competency to make the gift, if any written objection was filed within the period, the Revenue Officer has to register such an objection fix and date of hearing of which a public notice has to be given in the prescribed manner and a copy of such a notice has to be served on the donor and the objector by registered post with acknowledgment due and on the date fixed the Revenue Officer has to hear the donor and the objector. After holding such a summary inquiry, the Revenue Officer is authorized to supersede the Danpatra either in whole or in part on the grounds mentioned in sub clause (4) of section 11; if the Danpatra was not superseded in whole or in part the Revenue Officer has to confirmation whole and if superseded in part to confirm it in respect of that part which was not superseded. Under clause (6) of section 11, it is absolutely clear that the donation of the land in respect of which the Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra was superseded shall be cancelled and the right title and interest on any person in such land before the date of the Danpatra was not to be effected in any manner. Under section 13 the right title and interest of the donor in any land donated to Achrya. Vinoba Bhave or to the Bhoodan Yagna Committee, on confirmation of the Danpatra in respect of the land, stood transferred to and vested in the committee for the purpose of Bhoodan Yagna with effect from the date of donation and such land which had vested in the committee was not liable to attachment or sale in execution of any decree or order passed by the civil court against the Bhoodan Yagna Committee. Section 17 (1) provides filing of an appeal against the order passed under different section (as mentioned) is sections 17 (1) (a) (b) and subject to the result of the appeal, the order of the Revenue Officer was final under clause (2) of section 17. Section 17 (4) is an important clause which provides the institution of a suit in a civil court and it is most pertinent to quote it as this is the main clause i.e. clause (4) of section 17, which is to be considered in deciding the point involved in these appeals. "Section 17 (4)-Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), any party any party aggrieved the order or any other person interested in land may; within six months, from the date of such order, institute a suit in civil court having Jurisdiction for setting aside the order" Thereafter comes the relevant section 23 of the Act, to be noticed and for the purpose of deciding the point in issue. This section, too, is very pertinent and needs to be quoted. Section 23- The provisions of this Act, shall have the effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law for the time being inforce". 11. A mere glance of the aforesaid relevant sections of the Act, shows that the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, is a complete and self contained Act, and section 23, as quoted above, makes the provisions of the Act, applicable, notwithstanding to the contrary in any law for the time being inforce. 12. From section 17 (4) (as already quoted above) it would appear that not only a patty aggrieved by the order can institute a suit in the civil court having jurisdiction for setting aside the order but any other person also (who was not a party to the proceeding-under the Act) interested in the land may also file a suit in the civil court having jurisdiction for setting aside the order, The only rider put under the statute is that such a suit must be filed within six months from the date of such - order. Then section 23 make it still more clear when it says that the provisions of Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the country in any law for the time being inforce. Then section 23 make it still more clear when it says that the provisions of Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the country in any law for the time being inforce. Thus, the Act, being a self-contained Act, the plaintiff (s) in the present suit cannot be allowed to urge that section 17 (4) did not apply in their cases. A perusal of section 11, as referred to above, would show that the Revenue Officer could supercede the Danpatra in whole or in part on the ground that the donor was incompetent to make the girt or the donor was defective or that the donor was not a person entitled to donate the land under the provisions of section 20. In other Words, it clearly shows that the Revenue Officer was competent to investigate to the title of the donor and in all the present suits (out of which the present appeals have arisen) the order was passed under section 11 of the Act. The respective plaintiff (s), thus, whether party to the proceeding or not, was/were entitled to get the Danpatra superseded or cancelled on the ground of his their subsisting - title but no plaintiff (s) of any suit did so. In all the cases the Revenue Officer, after balding enquiry confirmed the respective donations under section 11 of the Act. The effect or the order passed under section 11 of the Act, was that the respective lands under respective Danpatra vested in the Bhoodan Yagna committee under section 13 of the Act. Hence if the plaintiff (s) of any the of the suit preferred any appeal under section 13 of the Act, the order palled by the Revenue Officer became final so far as the respective donation were concerned, A glance or the relevant sections, as referred to above, makes it abundantly clear that the legislator has vested power in clear and unambiguous terms in Revenue Officer to protect the possession of the land donated after confirmation of the Danpatras under section 11 of the Act, and section 23 gives a overriding effect to the provisions of the Act, laying that notwithstanding to the contrary in any law for the time being inforce, the provisions of the Act, shall have effect. The object or the Bhoodan Act, is to protest the title and possession of the lands donated in connection with Bhoodan Yagna so that the movement initiated by Acharya Vinoba Bhabe is not frustrated by some unscrupulous device. With that object powers have been vested in the Revenue Officers to protect the right, title and interest over such lands. The Act, came into force in the year 1954; it will be presumed that the legislature was conscious of the Limitation Act, at the time when it enacted the Bhoodan Yagna Act, as such the legislature in section 23 of the Act, when laid that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law for the time being inforce, the provisions of that Act, shall have effect, the provisions of the Act, had the overriding effect over any other Act. As a necessary corollary, after confirmation of the respective Danpatras in the respective suits, in view of section 13 of the Act, the right title and interest on the respective lands donated stood transferred to and vested in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee with effect from the date of donation. 13. In all the three suits (out of which these three appeal have arisen) the order passed in the proceedings under the Act, was referred to, which had cast a cloud over the plaintiffs title. In this background the relief of declaration of title and confirmation or possession or alternatively for recovery of possession could not be granted unless the order passed by -be Revenue officer in the proceedings under the Act, was set aside. Thus all the suits, were in fact for setting aside the order of the Revenue Officer passed in relationª to the proceeding under the Act, and not only for declaration of the and confirmation of possession or alternatively for recovery of possession. Thus, the order of the Revenue Officer for one reason on the other, even if was illegal and not in accordance with law it was for the persons, like plaintiff (s), interested in the lands In question to institute the suit within six months from the date of the order for setting aside that order. as provided under section 17 (4) of the Act. 14. as provided under section 17 (4) of the Act. 14. Thus, on a careful consideration of the facts pleaded by the plaintiff(s) in each of the suits (out of which these three appeals have arisen), I hold that, howsoever dexterously drafted the plaint may be, each of the suits was initially for setting aside the order of the Revenue officer confirming Danpatras and the relief sought for declaration of title confirmation or recovery of possession of the lands in suit was only ancillary which could not be granted to the plaintiff(s) without setting aside the order or confirmation of the Danpatras passed by the Revenue officer. In that view of the matter, the question of applicability of the general law of limitation did not arise and the plaintiff (s) could not take shelter under the general law of limitation. As on the facts pleaded and as referred to above, I have held that the suits were basically for setting aside the order of confirmation of Danpatras and not only for the declaration of title and recovery of possession (which were only ancillary relief as I have held above) it was, the provision of section 17 (4) of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, which applied in all the three suits and as the suits were admittedly filed beyond sox months from the date of the order of the confirmation of Danpatras, I hold section 17 (4) of the Act, and were barred by limitation. 15. It is true that if the suits were merely suits for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and alternatively for recovery of possession, the general law of limitation was applicable and that plaintiffs (s) could take shelter under that; but, I have already held above that the suits were not merely the suit for declaration of title and confirmation or possession but those relief’s were only ancillary and, in fact, the suits were for setting aside the order of confirmation or Danpatras. The plaintiffs, in fact, in the suits, challenged the donation of land by the donar and also the order of confirmation of the Danpatras. It is only in the background of that Challenge that the plaintiff(s) had sought for declaration of title and confirmation of possession. 16. The plaintiffs, in fact, in the suits, challenged the donation of land by the donar and also the order of confirmation of the Danpatras. It is only in the background of that Challenge that the plaintiff(s) had sought for declaration of title and confirmation of possession. 16. I hold that such suits, in which the donation of land by the donor and the order confirming department under the Act, are challenged, governed by section 17 (4) of the Act, i.e. by special law of limitation and not by the general law of limitation and such a suit must be brought within six months from the date of the order confirming the Danpatras. I further hold that the Act, being a self contained Act, section 23 of the Act, expressly excludes the applicability of the Limitation Act, in suits challenging the Order passed by the Revenue officer confirming the Danpatras under the Act. I further hold that in order to Challenge the order of confirmation of the Danpatras under the Act, one need not be party aggrieved alone, but any person who is interested in land (like the present plaintiff) could institute the suit. 17. In the result : (i) S.A. No. 27 of 1914 is dismissed. (ii) S.A. No. 320 of 1971 it allowed and the Judgment and decree of the Court of appeal below are set aside and that of the trial court restored. (iii) S.A. No. 225 of 1978 is allowed and the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff respondent is held to be barred under the provisions of section 17 (4) of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act. 1954. However, there will be no order as to costs in any of the appeals. (The lines in this Judgment have been underlined by me for emphasis). S.A. 27/1974 dismissed S.A. 320/77 & 2251 78 allowed.